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I n t r o d u c t i o n .
A few generations ago it have seemed incon­
ceivable to write a grammar, and particularly a syn­
tax, without making extensive use of the terms Subject 
(= S) and Predicate (= P). They were considered, as 
a matter of fact, as the main constituent parts of 
a linguistic construct. According to H. Paul (Pringiuienfe 
p. 138) all syntactic relationships - with the except­
ion of the coordinative nexus (e.g. father and mother) - 
go back to the S - P relationship. These terms were 
thus considered as being of fundamental importance.
Any doubts concerning their legitimacy or even their 
mere usefulness betray therefore a crisis of grammatic­
al thought, a new departure in grammatical thinking. They 
affect the whole system of grammar and not merely part 
of it.
We are witnessing in our generation such a crisis of 
methodological thought. Doubts as to the usefulness 
and legitimac&y of the terms S and P have been form­
ulated by both linguists and philosophers as we 
♦going try show in $ detailed? wayt in- Chap. 1 6f Part 13.-*-)
Ao far as grammar is concerned it is not very difficult
1) Pp. H S  ff.
to discover the reason which led to such a criticism
og the traditional grammatical system. Ever vSince it
was discovered that linguistic forms could not he x
accounted for hy logical categories the whole schol-
k<*& fc>«.cn
astic “basis of grammar wmt discredited. A develop­
ment set in which can he described as the emancipat­
ion of grammar from logic. In the eyes of certain 
reformers this emen|tcipation could not he complete 
so long as one did not succeed in cresting a grammat­
ical system from which the terms S and P had been 
eliminated. It was therefore only natural that attempt 
to;that end should he made.^)
Such a development in|bhe science of linguistics 
was reinforced hy the modern development of logic 
where the situation was once described to us hy an 
expert as one in which the logician "has lost interest 
in the S - P question. Indeed it appears that tradit- 
ional or Aristotelian logic is housed in a very modest 
backroom in the building of modern symbolic logic.
It seems thus that the moment has come to answer
1) Such attempts have been made by Th. Kalepky (cf.
p. / 3 4 ), C. Svedelius (cf. pp. /4V*. gn&, in a
way, by A. Lombard (cf.. pp. 4(>0 *
' An
2) PBoi in S. Langerfs Introduction to Symbolic Logjic.
* London, 1937, pp. 157/60
J. Ries’s cell and investigate in a systematic way,
what is the usefulness of the terns S and P - if any -
for the grammarian.1  ^ The present essay is an attentat
&to answer just this question. - The peculiar fundam­
ental importance of these terms, with which stands
or falls a whole conception of grammatical analysis,
-method of
requires a peculiar^ approach pf tyfraxffl. It ought to 
he clear from the beginning that the legitimacy of 
S and p can only he discussed within the framework of 
a study oifi the relationship between 1 thought1 or
O \
rather: ’cognition* ' and ’language*, and this in turn 
involves a theory on the delimitation of the science 
of linguistics from the sciences of the mind: epistemo- 
logical logic and psychology. The problem of S and P 
is only part of that wider context and .should not be 
separated from it.
It seems to us therefore that the first question
Oft
we have to answer is not "What te S and P?" as the 
philosopher -would, but rather "Can we build up an 
autonomous linguistic science not subservient to the 
sciences of the mind?" Is the linguist ffot perhaps 
ill advised to operate with a terminology such as
X) Cf. p. /'#.
2) We shall explain on pp./flS' tf.why prefer the terra 
’cognition* to ’thought*.
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1 concepts’, ’judgments’, ’representations’ or ’S and P ’ 
which are all borrowed from the sciences of the mind 
and which imply the acceptance of logical and psycholog­
ical theories the linguist has no means control^'n^ ? 
Indeed it seems that we have in ’sign’ and ’meaning’ 
terms of a purely linguistic import which can be de­
fined in a purely linguistic theory. It is clear that 
«So / a r  Q*S
in the1 mo a sure* we succeed in detaching linguistics 
from logic and psycholoi^gy or separate language from 
cognition the main issue is already prejudged. Better 
still: the very nature of the S - P problem in the 
linguistic field can only be shown that way; 0nly if 
v/e discover the precise point where linguistic theory 
is connected with the theory of cognition and. explain 
why they have to be linked,shall we know that the 
S - P question is not one which can be eliminated 
from linguistic sitejarjp. as has been claimed. ^
These are the reasons why we shall devote the 
first part of this essay to a^discussion of the relation­
ship between logic and psychology on the one hand and 
linguistics on the other hand. In this part the reader 
will find little which refers directly to S and P, but 
in the end he will probably isiee^  that what must seem 
at first a round-about way was really a short-cut. For 
when v/e come to our positive account of representation 
and thought and. their relationship to language, we
See above p. 2, note (l).
any P ^ fik  eA
shall he glad not to have to burden the discussion^with
critical considerations of a general nature;any mo nr?
all that critical spade-work will have already been done
in the first part.
Cnee we have formed, an idea about the relationship
between linguistics and the sciences of the mind1) and
have arrived at a sharp contrasting of cognitional and v
•A
linguistic symbolism we shall approach in the second
part the S - P problem proper. After a critical account
of the position in the domain of 'thought’ and insthat
of ’language’ we proceed to a positive account of the
these terms
theory of S and P; will appear as constituent parts
of the cognitional act and are therefore terms which 
belong in the first place to cognition and not to 
language. Since we are’ convinced that advanced linguist­
ic symbolism cannot be understood without reference to 
cognitional symbolism, the question arises how far 
S and P are reflected in language. We shall devote the
third part of our essay to the investigation of that
'tirf i»e
problem. - We believe te have good reasons to distinguish 
in the sphere of cognition between ’representation’ and 
^thought’. The discussion of our topic will therefore 
take the form of showing how representational grammar
1) Part I, Chau. £.
2) Part I, Chap. 6.
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is integrated into the grammar of thought and both into 
that of formulation.
Throughout the treatment of our subject it should be 
clear that we argue always as linguistics for linguists.
That is to say the logical and psychological points of 
view are only considered <>n so far as they have had in­
fluence on grammar. Anybody knowing the infinite complexity 
of the sciences of the mind will probably agree that it 
was the wiser course to take not to enter here into dis­
cussions which do not concern the linguist. On the other 
hand, since S and P belong in the first instance to the
realm of thought, not to that of language, it was inevit- 
Hat (je
able rteytrespass into the philosopher’s territory, partic­
ularly in Part II.-We have done so with all the trepid­
ation and all the courage required by the circumstances. 
Without any ambition to teach the masters of philosophy 
anything about a subject which is theirs, w .j had to aim 
at a clarification of views for ourselves and. in this way 
at the same time for the linguist. How far we have succeed­
ed in this only the competent critic can tell.
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T h e  g e n e r a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  
t r a d i t i o n a l  l o g i c . -  The type of logic 
which has had the most tangible influence upon grammat­
ical theory is the logic created by Aristotle, made 
widely known to the Occident by Boethius1 translations, 
whence it penetrated into the schoolbooks. ^) In spite 
of the fact that it underwent certain alterations accord­
ing to the various theoretical needs and interests in 
different ages, it remained fundamentally unchanged, 
so much so that no less a philosopher than Kant could 
claim in the preface of the second edition of his Crit­
ique of the Pure Reason that since Aristotle logic has 
neither been able to go one step backwards nor one step 
forwards.2) T)-day most logicians would probably be re­
luctant to make Kant's statement their own. But whoever 
wants to give an idea of the influence of logic upon 
grammar needs hardly be concerned with learned contro­
versies among contemporary logicians. For him it will 
be sufficient to indifate the general nature of tradit-
1) Cf. H. Steinthal, Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft 
bei den Griechen und Rdrnern, lrst ed. 1862/63, 2nd 
ed. 1890/91.
L. Kramp, Das Verhaltnis von Urteil und Satz. Bonn, 
1915.
2) I. Kant. Kritik der reienen Vemunft. Vorrede zur
ional logic and to give a birds-eye view of its object, 
and even that only in so fur as is needed to understand 
the logical point of view in grammar.
Logic in the traditional sense may perhaps he de­
scribed as a science dealing v/ith the forms of thought 
considered in its adequacy to its ideal function, v/hich 
is the finding of truth. Such a science obviously pre­
supposes that adequate or true knowledge is possible; 
that is to say that traditional logic has a natural 
basis which is the theory of knowledge. The temptation 
has always been great to draw logic proper into the 
orbit of epistemology; hence We get different types 
of logic, v/ith a purely epistemological (Kant), a more 
metaphysical (Hegel) or a more psychological (Wundt) 
bias. Aristotelian logic too cannot deny its epistemo- 
logical origin. It lays stress on the structure of 
t h o u g h t  instead of analysing the structure of
i)
f a c t s  as modern symbolic logic does. For 
epistemologocal logic the judgment is of paramount im­
portance. Hence the fact that the terms S and P are in­
separably connected with this type of logic and held to 
be logical terms, although one could equally well, consider
them as cognitional terms since they are cnt
from
parts .-iq# the cognitional act.
But traditional logic is not purely concerned with 
thought. One of its most charaxteristic features is 
that it pretends at the same time to offer ana analysis
- 9 -
of the structure of facts, for the judgment was held
to reflect the structure of reality;^^She fusion of
cognitional notions with those of factual logic determ-
2 )ine the general character of traditional logic. *
1) See p.
2) The great progress achieved "by symbolic logic con­
sists precisely in this that the cognitional act has 
been eliminated from the logical field. Consequently 
it was no longer necessary to reduce the complex var­
iety of facts to the frjomula A is B which appears 
only as one possible relationship among an infinite 
number of others. In the definition of the propos­
ition there is no longer room for the familiar 
notions S and P. According to S. Langer (An Intro­
duction into Symbolic Logic, pp. 50/51) it runs
like this; “Any symbolic structure, such as a sentence 
expresses a proposition, if some symbol in it is 
understood to represent a relation, end the whole 
construct is understood to assert that the elements 
(denoted by the other symbols) are thus related.“
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T h e e l e m e n t s  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  
l o g i c .  - Traditional logic distinguishes (a) 
concepts, being unifying principles or comprehensions 
of compatible objective properties, (b) propositions 
or syntheses of two concepts, one of which is used in 
affirming or denying something about a thing represent­
ed by the other concept, and (c) syllogisms or "forms 
of reasoning in which from two given or assumed pro­
positions called the premises and having a common or 
middle term a third is deduced, called the conclusion, 
from which the middle term is absent."1) We may neglect 
the syllogism altogether, since it has'no bearing on 
our question.
What we call here the logical point of view in
grammar is the assumption that a w o r d  i s  t h e
s y m b o l  o f  a c o n c e p t  a n d  t h e
s e n t e n c e  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  a 
r
p o p o s i t i o n .
k
C o n c e p t s  a n d  w o r d s . -  Let us first 
examine the claim that &o a word in language there 
corresponds a concept in thought. - If we ask a philo­
sopher what is the nroorium of the concept as against 
representation, idea or sensation, it is not ijaways 
easy to get a clear-cut answer. One widely accepted 
opinion, however, holds that sensations and represent­
ations are found in animals and infants, whereas 
concej)ts or conceptual thought is supposed to be the
1 ) Concise Oxford Dictionary s.v. syl] „m
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privilege of the adult homo sapiens: in other words, 
that sensations and representations are on a lower p' 
psychological level than concepts. This conception is 
probably the result of the Kantian 18th century psycho­
logy 9 according to which we have different Vermogen: the 
senses supplying us with sensations, the material of 
representations, the intellect furnishing the concepts; 
and since man, that animal rationale, alone possessed 
an intellect, the conclusion is obvious.^) Whatever we 
may think to-day about that psychology, it is regrettable 
that both philosophers and grammarians alike did not 
distinguish clearly between concepts and representations 
and used these terms promiscue. We shall see later on 
how useful and important this distinction is.2) For the 
time being it will be sufficient to describe concepts 
in the sense of traditional logic as classifying intellect-; 
ual symbols and instruments of t h o u g h t ,  as diS’fine* iiI
from representation. Classes gEHErsiiE naturally 
generate subclasses, and these again further sub-classes, 
and so forth. The more sub-classes fall under a concept
1) This conception goes back to Antiquity. Cf. W. Jeru­
salem, Die Urtheilsfunction. Eine psvchologische und 
erkenntniskritische Untersuchung. Wien, Leipzig 1895, 
p. 38.
2} Cf. Part III, Chap. 4 pp, Z / I •
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the wider its extension; thus the concept of being is 
that of the widest extension under which fall all the 
other concepts. But the wider the class, the poorer its 
meaning. A concept which means something very general 
means nothing in particular. So that there is a sort of 
compensating rule according to which to a relatively 
wide extension corresponds a relatively scanty content.
Different philosophical systems reserved the name 
of ’categories1 for those classes which are the most 
general ones after that of being and underlie all oper­
ations of thought.1  ^ There are wide differences as to 
how to conceive the theory of categories. As far as 
grammar is concerned it is mainly the parts of speech 
which are supposed to reglect logical categories. But 
this is a point where we see clearly how unsatisfactory 
it is to account for linguistic phenomena in terms of 
epistemological logic: All concepts are qualitatively
of the same kind, i.e. they all can be definged in terms 
of extension and intension (content). Consequently a 
language conformable to logic ought to have only one 
class of words, and it has been correctly observed by 
'the philosopher Cook-Wilson that only the noun is an
1) G. Hagemann and A. Dyroff, Logik und Noetik. Frei­
burg i. Br. 1924, pp. 81 ff., 137 ff.
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adequa te expression of concepts.1) As Bergson remarks, 
our concepts are of a spatial nature in their stability 
and their mutual limitations,^) and nouns are precisely 
space-words which can be symbolized by circles binding 
together a certain number of semantic elements. We can | 
point at nouns,either directly or metaphorically, in the 
same way as we can point at objects in space, which ex­
plains why in many languages the noun is accompanied or 
grammatically characterized by articles which have been 
originally demonstrative pronouns. But languages have 
many other kinds of words besides nouns, such as ad­
jectives, prepositions, verbs etc. The existence of
these so-called fparts oi speech* has always been re-
3 ) •cognized by grammarians since Dionysius Thrax, '  but so j 
strong was — and is — the predominance of logic in grammar,1
I
1) Gook-Wilson, Statement and Inference I, j
pp. 170/71.
2) H. Bergson, L ’Evolution creatrice, 43rd. ed., AlcPn,
Paris, pp. 166 ff.
3) Dionysios Thrax, Techne II, IX; ed. Uhlig, 1884.
Cf. also L. Lange, System des Apollonios Dyskolos,
Gbttingen 1852, p. 8.
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that up to modem times they too have been accounted 
for in terms of concepts. At least as far as nouns, 
adjectives and verbs are concerned, these were de­
fined as reflecting the ‘categories* thing, quality 
and action. This does not do much harm, as long as one 
remains conscious of the fact that terms such as 
thing-words, action-words, quality-words are only 
rough semantical approximations or logical make-shifts, 
which do not account for formal differences of these 
word-classes. Without such a safeguard one fails to 
understand why goQd and goodness, the desire and to 
desire coexist in language, in other words why there 
are different parts of speech, if the noun is quite 
sufficient to denote any sort of ’category*.
The influence of logic has had the most disadvant­
ageous effect on the theory of particles and pronouns. 
As to the former, the very term && ‘particle’ seems
r^».m
to indicate that ono wa-g? at a loss how to classify ±Jih 
them, and since the latter were obviously not coneept- 
words in the sense of substantives or adjectives, 
there was hardly any other possiblity left but to 
name them concept-substitute-words or pro-nouns. The 
nature of these words has been discussed in a long 
series of treatises and we know now much better
1) Cf. K. Btihler, Surachtheorie. Jena 1934, pp. 
115 ff.-
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tkiir
/deictic or orientational nature, although school-books 
are slow to adopt views contrary to the type of 
grammar dominated by logic.
J u d g m e n t s  a n d  s e n t e n c e s . -  More 
interesting for our particular subject than the suppos­
ed parallelism between concept and word is that between 
the logical proposition (judgment) and the sentence.
A parallelism of this kind was found first of all in 
sentences of the type la terre est ronde (Port-Royal) 
and Socrates is mortal, sentences which serve as 
' illustrations of simple propositions in the handbooks 
of logic. Here one finds a word corresponding to the 
logical S (la terre. Socrates). one corresponding to 
the attribute (ronde, mortal) and finally the copula 
(est. is). whose function it is to link up the attrib­
ute with the S and to express at the same time the 
positive quality (=Affirmation^ of the judgment.
Copula and attribute together form the P of the pro­
position. This has been taught with slight variations 
by Aristotle, Port-Royal and Christian Wollj£ Although 
the ’copula* was known already to Byzantine grammarians 
and to Ab^elard, it seems to have been Wolf^who gave 
to the term ’copula*, called by Port-Royal la liaison 
entre les deux termes. wide popularity; but already
- 1 6 -
Aristotle himself, who operates in the main with a two­
fold division of the proposition into S (v TTO^tLyUt. 0^ ^) 
and P ^  ^ , 4 ^ 0 \r) > had,declared that
L
represents the^/uw. in its purest form and had analysed
iVj^O/ToX ft cT* c as /T0^ 'l&iftJfiQ IT ^
We see that in traditional logic the cognitional 
S -.P relation is identified with the factual substance - 
property relation, and the logical form og the judgment 
is accordingly expressed by the formula A is B. We shall 
see in due course that this identification is not justi­
fiable;^) but we should like to reserve this criticism 
for later on. Here we may be content with poiAting out 
a general consequence of this view.
If language is essentially the expression of logical 
thought, it follows that those linguistic forms not con­
forming to the logical ideal must either be easily re­
ducible to the desired scheme or else be faulty. If
l) H. Steinthal, Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei 
den Griechen und Rdmern2 I, p. 241.
. L. Kramp, Das Verh&ltnis von Urteil und Satz. p. 15.
I have not seen E. 0. Sisson, The Copula in Aristotle 
and afterwards. The Philos. Rev4^XLYIII (1939), pp. 
57/64.
2) In Part II, Chap. 1; pp- >1* ff ’•
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we find for instance in French the sentence Paul court, 
where two words correspond to three logical units, it 
must be reduced to Paul est c our ant. Such an interpret­
ation leads to the opinion that "le verbe est toujours
le verbe dtre" (G-rammaire des Grammaires2 ,^ p. 440), Bueh 
T h . i t
opinion is harmless as long as it remains quite clear 
that the assertion Paul cort = Paul est courant affirms 
nothing hut logical equivalency. But it leads to a grave 
error should we assume that the more logical expression 
has any claim to greater linguistic originality and that 
the other form must he explained hy deriving i£ from the 
type ’Substance - Copula - Attribute*, that is if we 
establish a genetic relation between both. The comparison 
between the two types is useless for the explanation of 
formal discrepancies.
As the concept comprehends compatible objective pro­
perties, so mu&%, in the sentence-proposition, all elements 
utbe compatible with each other. Differences between this 
logical ideal and linguistic resLity must seem like an 
insult to the schoolbook logician. In forms such as Engl- 
ish she is -pretty ugly or French il se trouvait perdu 
he will see contradicxtions in terms and mark off such 
expressions as solecisms. - There is, however, a limited 
number of illogical usages which even the logician has 
to respect to a certain extent if he wants tt* understand 
linguistic usage at all. But he will admit them only 
under certain circumstances and under a legal pretext,
- 1 8 -
as rhetorical devices. These are the famous tropoi: 
Synechdoche, Metonymy and Metaphor.
G e n e r a l  g r a m m a r  a n d  L a t i n .  - 
This theory, which claims that differences "between logical | 
and linguistic structures can easily "be reduced to harmony, 
or else are either "blunders or rhetorical devices treats 
linguistic phenomena as quantite negligeable, of which 
short is made if they do not fit into the logical
scheme. Therefore it must appear to the logician of the 
old school that the differences "between languages are 
trifling, and since at "bottom linguistic thought and 
logical thought tf&re one everywhere, it ought o|t "be 
possible to create a sort of general grammar and a gen­
eral language common to all human beings and founded on j 
logical principles. It is well known that some of the 
finest minds of the 17th and 18th centuries have worked 
in that direction. We need not/be^ concerned here with 
these attempts to create a general language and an idel!^ I 
grammar. But it may perhaps not be without interest to 
add here a remark on the influence of Latin.
It is more than probable that certain basic features 
of Aristotle’s logic -have "heenr suggested to him by 
grammatical distinctions, and it is doubtful whether 
the ’substance- accidence’ relation would have been 
given the place of hojjjnour in logical theory by a philosd-
- 1 9 -
pher speaking a language for which the contrast "bet­
ween the noujn and the verb was ■
less significant than in Greek.-1-) So profound an ex­
pert as Steinthal has pointed out repeatedly that 
the logical and linguistic points of view are constant­
ly mixed up in Aristotle’s thought.s) If this could 
happen to such an ingenious logician we need not wonder 
if philologists asserted that a certain language reflects 
better than others the pure structure of thought and is 
therefore of a greater universal and pedagogic value.
This language was Latin?)Latin had been for many centuries 
the vehicle for scientific thought, and the temptation 
must have been great to believe that certain grammatic­
al categories of Latin corresponded to natural needs 
of thought and that Latin grammar was the nearest 
approach to the idell^ . general grammar. And as the logical 
point of view predominated for a long.time over the 
linguistic point of view, so Latin grammar imposed its
1) Of'O/Ui and j d e f i n e d  already for Plato the parts 
of the judgment. Of. W. Jerusalem, Die Urtheilsfunc­
tion. p. 40.
2) H. Steinthal, Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei 
den Griechen und R0mern^, p. 187.
3) Cf. 0. Jesperson, Philosophy of Grammar. London 1935, 
pp. 47, 176 f.
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categories upon tha-fr of other languages. In consequence 
Spanish school-grammars teach an ablative in Spanish 
(e.g. uara el hombre) following herein probably Sanchez 
&e la Brozas (Sanctius), who taught in his Minerva 
(1587) that the ablative in Latin required a preposition 
and explained therefore all pure ablatives as elliptic. 
Jespersen has pointed out how little the notion of the 
Latin Future Tense is suited to English,1) and we have 
witnessed not many years ago a long discussion over the 
Passive Voice in French, so different from Latin, 
although this fundamental difference has not always been 
recognized by schoolbooks.
C o n c l u s i o n s .  - For over a hundred years 
linguists, psychologists and philosophers have been at 
work to break this double tyranny of trad/tional logic 
and Latin grammar and to work out a more realistic view 
of the- relationship between thought and language. It 
is only natural that linguistic science during the past 
two or three generations has been unkind towards trad­
itional logic. The more the field of linguistic study 
was widened by the acquaintance with a great variety 
of languages, the more it was deependd by comparative
1) 0. Jespersen, loco citato.
2) The discussion was conducted between K. Vossler and 
W. Meyer-Lttbke. Cf. Th. Engwesr, Vom Passiv und sei- 
nem Gebrauch i. heut. Franz.. Jena, Leipzig 1931,p.1.
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analysis, the more logical schemes must seem barren, poor 
and unsuited to an understanding of linguistic struct­
ures. This, I think, is a position which cannot he re­
versed in any way.
If v/e try now to formulate what we have to learn 
from this for the preliminary discussion of the S - P 
problem, it is this: (1) Traditional logic is unsuited 
to explain language. (2) There is no simple parallelism 
between concept and word, judgment and sentence.-This 
do£s n o t  prove, however, that language has nothing 
to do with logic. We have seen that traditional logic 
is of a hybrid character, because it pretends to be a 
logic of thought and a logic of facts at the same time. 
It may be possible to reform this logic by purging it 
of its metaphysical implications. If that is done it 
may be found that the characterization of that mental 
symbolism we call ’thought’,as find it in traditional 
logic, may still be acceptable, i.e. concepts and judg­
ments still be considered as the main forms of 
thought, provided the judgment is not conceived as a 
factual relationship of the t ^  A is 3. In this way the
«. cC t'o
dAohotomi-c* structure of thought and with it the reality 
of S and P could be re-affirmed. Furthermore, the re­
jection of a parallelism between a purely mental sym­
bolism and linguistic symbolization does not prove the<r 
independence from each other. There remains the possib­
ility of both being entangled, that at least a certain
- 2 2 -
type of linguistic symbolization KxaxRHHsgaaeaiisixjrayxx 
refers in some way - a non-parallel way - to that 
mental symbolism. If that were true, it would be possible- 
after a period of stressing the d i f f e r e n^ c e s 
between grammar and logic - to re-establish contact 
with them and see how far certain ideal laws of thought 
or cognition make themselves felt in linguistic sense- 
combinations after all. We may perhaps st^te here al­
ready that we believe that such a potion is tenable 
and that it is the one we shall occupy in this essay.
P a r t i  
Chapter (2)'
T h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  p o i n t s  o f  
v i e w .
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T h e  g e n e r a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  
p s y c h o l o g y ,  - I n  its striving for emancipation 
linguistic science could not avoid getting under the 
sway of psychology. As a matter of fact the great hattle
t/L*. a£>u.ft of ^oyt’c tK
against^ Iogio-isiHi hegan in the name of psychology. We 
need not he concerned here with a definition of this 
’science of the soul*. As time passes on and new schools 
develop, which all claim to he ’psychological*, the 
question what ought to he considered as the main psycho­
logical fact, becomes more difficult to answer. But it 
is perhaps possible to give a general idea of the 
particular brand of psychology which has exercised such 
a great influence upon grammar.
We shall best begin our account by showing the main 
difference between the logician’s outlook and that 
of the psychologist. There is first of all a.difference 
of quantity: whereas the logician’s interest centres 
upon thought, the psychologist studies all phenomena 
related to thought, feelings and volitions. There is 
secondly a difference of approach. Logic is a science 
of ideal forms or norms, it studies the formal laws, 
which thought has to respect, if truth is to be obtained 
by reasoning. Psychology,however, is concerned with real 
thought as a concrete event in man’s mind, whether 
correct or not, and with real feelings and affections.
- 2 4 -
We understand therefore that psychology was opposed to 
logic in the name of greater realism. There is finally 
another most remarkable difference: Logic is essentially 
analytic and static,, it takes and analyses concepts 
and judgments as given facts, whereas psychology is 
analytic and genetic, considering thoughts and affect­
ions in fieri, not in esse. This is necessarily so, 
since the ’soul’ is essentially activity. Psychological 
analysis is a reduction of relatively comp licated phen­
omena to relatively simpler ones, which are more primitive 
in the double sense of the term: they are more ±elementar3| 
and precede the higher and less elementary phenomena in 
time. !
Here are three excellent reasons why psychology !
seemed to be so admirably fitted to explain language: 
First, it is not dogmatic. Scientific grammar prides j
ii
itself upon abandoning the schoolmasterly and academic j
view of ’correct speech’. It does not say ho\v we ought
to speak, but simply states how we do speak: cockney
is as good as, and probably more interesting than,.
to
standard English. With this indifference linguistic
t o
form is coupled indifference the correctness of its 
content, since psychology does not trouble about truth 
or logical correctness. In the words of Steinthal it is 
a erkennende. not a beurteilende science.^-) Secondly,
1) H. Steinthal, Grmmatik, Logik und Psychologie, ihre 
Prinzipien und ihr Yerhaltnis zuej^ np-nrjp.n. rteru^r^lSI3D. j
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since language is apparently never, not even in scientif­
ic prose, a mere denotation of ifeaxgii abstract ideas, 
tout l^ aso, and perhaps mainly, an expression of feelings 
and tendencies of will,^ psychology which makes a 
special study of these things, seems to be in an ad­
mirable position to supply the needs of the linguist.
And finally, ever since W. v. Humboldt*s famous dictum 
that language is not an ergon, but energeia,2) it was 
considered as an axiom of scientific linguistics that 
language is in constant development and the only adequate 
method of dealing with it is a genetic method; and since 
all changes must necessarily take place in the soul of j
the individual, psychology was again called in to furn­
ish the necessary explanations.
T h e  ’p s y c h o - p h y s i c a . l  e v e n t *
|
t h e o r y  a n d  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  j
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l . -  What now are the main !
implications of the psychological point of view? The 
most important one is £>robably the conception of language
i
1) The contention that language is ’the expression of 
thought and feelings* will be criticized in the next 
chapter where we shall try and establish the (relative) 
independence of linguistics from logic and psychology.
2) Die snrachwissenschaftlichen Werke WilhelAvon Hum­
boldt. Ed. H. Steinthal, Berlin 1883, p. 262.
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as an expressive movement, which in turn is a psycho­
physical event* According to Wundt expressive movements 
are only the physical side of an affectional process 
(Affektverlauf)*^) According to its three components, he 
distinguishes expressions of intensity, of quality and 
of representations, the latter forming gxx± an integral 
part of any-affectional process. Between instinctive, 
reflexive and voluntary movements there is no difference 
in principle, the two latter evolving out of instinctive 
movements "by either mechanization (regressive development 
leading to reflexive movements) or "by complication (pro­
gressive development leading to voluntary movements). 
Therefore no distinction can he drawn between animal 
’language* and human language, except that between a 
relatively lower and a relatively higher form of organiz­
ation.
How if language is essentially an expressive movement 
it is real only as an event or a sequence of events 
actually taking place in the soul of the individual. This 
consequence seems hardly avoidable and has been widely 
accepted by grammarians. It has found its most outspoken 
expression in H. Paul’s formulation: flAlle psychischen 
Prozesse vollziehen sich in den BxuxKissnis Einzelgeiste?m 
und nirgend sonst.” And: "Vielmehr ist es eine Tatsache
l)W. Wundt, Volkernsychologie. 1st vol. Die Snrache. 1st 
Part, 4th ed., Stuttgart 1921, p. 45 ff.
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von fundamentale^r Bedeutung, die wir niemals aus dem
Auge verlieren dtlrfen, dass alle rein psychische Wechsel-
wirkung sich nur innerharb der Einzelseele vollzieht.
Aller Verkehr der Seelen untereinander ist nur ein in-
direkter auf psychischem Wege vermittelter."^) It is
true that Paul derives his psychology not from Wundt,
hut in the last instance from Herhart, and that Wundt 
in
has^defended precisely  a sort of collective soul. Be 
this as it may, even Wundt would probably not have 
denied that linguistic changes can only be studied in 
the individual, although they are the expression of 
general forces and tendencies, which may manifest them­
selves in a number of individuals independently of each 
other. This can be clearly deduced from the examples 
Wundt gives in support of his thesis. He quotes as 
non-individualistic changes the transition of Latin 
octo to Italian otto and of German brumben to brummen.
But these very examples reveal that at bottom there 
is no escape from vfcfee* individualism in the sense stated
1) H. Paul, Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte. 5th ed.
Halle a.S. 192o, pp. 11/12.
2) W. Wundt, Ydlkerpsychologie 1,1 (1921), p. 22.
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by Paul, because if changes such as the assimilation 
of consonants occur in a number of individuals inde­
pendently, it is clear that they operate only in the 
,souls of these isolated individuals and not in any 
collective soul). Of course that does not mean that a 
linguistic change is a sort of individual invention 
which spreads to other individuals by way of imitation; 
at least this cannot be considered as the rule. But if 
these forces responsible for linguistic changes operate 
in the individual, this does not preclude us from 
affirming that they are of a superindividual character, 
and it is this ithat Wundt contends most emphatically.
But * super individual* is by no means synonymous with 
’collective*. The superindividual forces Wundt has in 
mind are not the activities of a collective soul, but 
general tendencies inherent in hu&an nature and the organ­
ization of the human body in general; in other words 
they are not to be derived from the special fact of 
human society but from the general fact of man as a 
species.1) We see from these remarks that psychology 
was at bottom a natural science and ’reality* the reality 
of ’nature*. This was the praxis of Wundt and the theory 
of Paul. Hence the claim that only the individual Cs
Cf. p. U  *
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concrete and that art, religion etc. - and in this etc. 
is hidden language itself - are mere abstractions.^*)
It did not strike Paul’s and Wundt*s generation that 
their ’concrete individual* was nothing but an abstract 
meeting-place of general tendencies, and not the living 
person with individual character, Srtsr pecular spir­
itual and moral * structure*, as some say to-day, whose 
rights were goi-ft-gi1 to be proclaimed by Karl Vossler. 
Psychological individualism led naturally to a reduct­
ion of linguistic phenomena to psycho-physical events 
and thus to a sort ofjfatomism.
This one must understand in order to appreciate a 
certain scientific attitude typical of many works of 
linguistic research in the past two generations and 
which is sometimes qualified as ’positivistic*. It is 
clear that the positivist - let us adopt this name for
i
the sake of brevity - views with scepticism the idea of | 
Volksgeist which animated the Romantics including 
Steinthal. Notions such as ’French*, *Englsili(s’, ^Spanish’, 
’German* were considered as abstractions. Accordingly 
dialects were nearer to reality, the speech of still 
smaller groups, such as families, still nearer, but 
only in the individuals could one really grasp the 
reality of language.^) It would be in keeping with this
1) H. Paul, Prinzipien, p. 11.
2) I quote two works which are typical for this tendency:
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atomistic view to contend that we should write two 
different syntaxes, that of the speaker and that of the 
listener, since the "building up of a sentence in the 
mind of him who speaks is an event psychologically 
different from the process taking p Lace in the mind of 
the person listening to the sentence.1)
T h e  s u b j e c t i v i s m  o f  p h y s i o ­
l o g i c a l  p s y c h o l o g y . -  A consequence 
of psychological individualism is the subjectivistic 
attitude of psychology. According to Marty the meaning
P.-J. Rousselot, Modifications phonetiques du langage 
etudiees dans le -patois d*une famille de Cellefrouin 
(Charente). Paris 1892, and L. Gauchat, 1/unite pho- 
netique dans le patois d fune commune, in: Aus romani- 
schen Sbrachen und Literaturen. Festgabe ftir Heinrich 
Morf, Halle a.S. 19o5, pp. 174 ff. ^
1) H. Gomperz points out that the processes in the 
speaker and in the listener have to be investigated 
separately. (Zur Ps.vchologie der logischen Grund- 
tatsachen. Leipzig, Wien 1897, p. 24) and Elise 
Richter fulfills this programme;at least in part,in 
her book Wie wir snrechen. Aus Natur und Geisteswelt j
I
No. 354, Leipzig, Berlin 1925, Chaps. 3,4#
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o f a  linguistic sign is the psychical phenomenon or the 
psychical experience which the linguistic sign is apt 
to ^ vo^e the listener.-**) The phenomena (experiences) 
can he classified into representations, judgments and 
phenomena of interest (love, hate).**) Here we find a 
theory which is almost the opposite of the logical point
I
of view. Whereas the meaning of a logical concept can 
he stated in terms of the o b j e c t  comprehended hy 
the concept, the meaning of representation is thought 
to he a psychical experience and is therefore stated in 
s u b j e c t i v e  terms. This is probably the reason 
why, in psychologietic grammar, the term ’representation1 
occupies the place corresponding to that of concept' in 
logistic grammar. As a matter of fact, compared with 
logical concepts representations are more subjective, they 
vary from one to another, they often contain visu5^ and 
acoustical elements or elements of other sensitive data, 
which are not considered in concepts; they often have 
not the rigidity of things, but are fluid, melt into 
each other; they are significant without being necessari-i 
ly either true or false; they can be highly unintellectual
1) Cf. H. Derape, Was ist Snrache? Eine sorachphiloso- 
•phishhe ^ntersuchung im Anschluss an die Sorachtheorie 
Karl Bflhlers. Weimar 1930, p. 75.
2) Marty follows\herefe» Brentano.
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untampered with by critical reflection. They are as it 
were the raw materials of logical concepts, which carry 
with them merely subjective data which critical re­
flection has to eliminate, if it wants to arrive at 
complete objectivity and conceptual distinctness. Paul 
states expressly that he implies in the notion of re­
presentation the accompanying feelings and tendencies. 
Steinthal defined the proposition as an analysis of 
a complex representation;*^) a similar view is expressed 
in Wundt’s famous definition of the sentence as an 
analysis of a complex representation into parts.5 ) So 
that we may say that the parallelism of ’concept* - 
'word*, * judgment ’ - ’sentence’, which dominated logical 
grammar, is replaced in psychological grammar by that 
between *rtp r e s e n t a t i o n ’ - ’w o r d *  , 
’c o m p l e x ^  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ’ - 
*s e n t e n c e ’.
1) Frinzioien. p. 26, note.
2) Gramas tig. Logik: und Psychologje. p. 326.
3) VQl&erpsYchologie 1.2. Leipzig 1900, pp. 234 ff.
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T h e  c o n f u s i o n  o f  r e p r e s e n t ­
a t i o n  a n d  t h o u g h t . -  We should expect 
that such a theory would lead directly to the discovery, 
in the linguistic field,of a purely representational 
grammar different from the judgment-concept grammar.
Such was however not the .case. What we do find is that 
'representations1 and 'concepts' become synonymous ex­
pressions. Hence the puzzling fact, that the result of
the analysis of a total representation into parts is thecf
ACLiUte 6e
judgment and part-representations are^concepts. This has 
been the contention of both Steinthat- and Wundt, although 
they differ in the way they account for the breaking up 
of a total representation into parts. For Steinthal
I
'judging* is still an autonomous act responsible for the 
analysis of the total representation, as can be seen 
from the following quotation, which also shows, in­
cidentally, the synonymity of 'concept* and 'represent­
ation* : 11 Die S&tze und Urtheile sind nicht aus zwei 
V o r s t e l l u n g e n  o d e r *  B e g r i f f e n 1) 
zusammengesetzt, sondem die Ansehauung, d.h. die Ein- 
heit, ist das Erste, und das Urtheil ist die Aufldsung 
dieser Einheit. Von den vielen Momenten, den Merkmalen 
einer A n s e h a u u n g  O d e r  e i n e s  B e - 
g r i f f e s *) wird eines hervorgehoben, nur dieses, 
als Pr&dikat, wird gedacht, und nur als dieses wird in
1) pressed by me.
dem Augenblick des Urtheils der Begriff des Subjekts 
gedacht, nur in ihm liegt der Wert des Subjekts.
This is how Wundt accounts for thes same phenom­
enon: "Voran steht eine Assoziation von direkten 
Empf indungs- und von Erinneffangselementen: das ur- 
sprtingliche V o r s t e l l u n g s s u b s t r a t  
d e s  G e d a n k e n s .  Aus ihm entsteht auf 
zweiter Stufe durch einen Apperzeptionsakt, der ge- 
wisse Wahmehmungsmotive vor anderen bevorzugt und 
das Ganze gegen andere Bewustseinsinhalte abschliesst, 
die Bildung der G e  s a m t v o r  s t e  l l u n g .  
Darauf folgt in dritter Linie eine Reihe s e k u n - 
d i r e r  A s s o z i a t i o n e n  G b e r e i n -  
s t i m m e n d e r  B e s t a n d t e i l e  ver- 
schiedeher Gesamtvorstellungen, infolge deren sich sol 
che ftbereinstinimende Teile deutlicher von anderen ab- 
heben, mit denen sie wechselnder verbunden sind. Hier- 
zu komnt endlich als letzter Apperzeptionsakt die 
willktlrliche Isolierung dieser durch Gleichheitsasso- 
ziationen gehobennn Elemente zu selbst&ndigen Einzel- 
vorstellungen.)
1) H. Steinthal, Grammatik. Logik Und Psychologic. p.
326.
2) W. Wundt, Vdlkerps.ychologie 1,1 (1921), pp. 614/15-
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So far there are no logical implications. These 
appear however clearly when he contends that ”jedes 
Urtheil ein Aussagesatz ist, ebenso aher jeder eigent- 
liche Aussagesatz logisch als ein Urtheil hetrachtet 
werden kann'^ and such implications are quite outspoken 
in Wundt’s famous definition of the sentence as ”der 
sprachliche Ausdruck ftir die willkiirliche Gliederung einer 
Gesamtvorstellung in ihre i n  l o g i s c h e  B e - 
z i e h u n g e n  zu einander gesetzten Bestandtheile”^  
which permits the identification of part-representations 
and concepts. - If we read in Jerusalem’s hook on the 
judgment (Die Urtheilsfunktion)-p. 29j,fDas Urtheil ist 
ehen eine Synthese aus Yorstellungselementen und Arti- 
kulationsempfindungen, wozu noch Geftlhls-und Willensele- 
mente koramen” and on p. 33 ; uDas Wort ist somit psycho- 
logisch nicht Vorstellung sondern Urtheilselement.” 
we shall prohahly agree that here again psychological 
and logical categories are not clearly separated, since 
obviously ”Urtheilselement” x® or concept is ”Vorstellungs- 
element”.
We see thus that the same psychological method which 
in a sense
could^be described as a revolt against school-logic, 
could not liberate itself from that same logic and ended 
up in a sort of reformulation of the main logical elements/
1) Vblkerpsychologie 1,2 (1900),p. 258.(2) Ibid. p. 240.
’judgments* and * concepts’fwich appear now as ’total 
(complex^) representations’ and *part-representations’. 
This explains the pra^doxical fact that the same 
grammatical science which is so much at pains to 
stress the a-logical character of language in the name 
of a realistic psychological method, could not liberate 
itself from the ihssxy tyranny of logical categories.
P s y c h o l o g y  a n d  g r a m m a r . -  Since 
we were able to recognize in ’total representations* 
and ’part-representations’ the old logical categifeies 
’judgment’ and ’concept’ it is not difficult to see 
that in ’psychological’ grammar we find often nothing 
but a translation of the old scholastic terminology 
into the new psychological idiom. So v/hen K. Morgenroth 
calls the nominal sentence (Wundt’s attributive Satz-_ _  r— . -j . — . .
form)^) an”Ordnung einer Gesamtvorstellung mittels des !
nur die Vorstellungsassoziationen bemerkenden intuiti- 
ven Denkens” (e.g. Russ, koschka nrygg na lafku ’cat 
jump on bench’).2) In the same way J. Haas uses in 
his works on French syntax the expression ’’Korrelat 
einer Gegenstandsvorstellung” instead of ’substantive’ 
or "Korrelat einer Merkmalsvorstellung” instead of
’adjective’. There is little harm done; we have just
1) W. Wundt, VSlkerpsychologie 1.2. (1900) pp. 329/41
2) German. Roman. Mpnatsschrift IV, p. 10.
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to translate psychological terminology hack into or­
dinary grammatical language to know where we are.-*-)
On the other hand in some extreme cases the danger 
has not always "been avoided of drawing linguistics too 
deeply into psychology. As a matter of fact, if language 
is to he considered as nothing hut the outward mani­
festation of psychical events, the temptation is great 
to regard an analysis of the psychical factors of 
which language is supposed to he the manifestation as 
the main task of the linguist. In doing so the linguist 
will not only find well established facts he can use 
for the explanation of linguistic phenomena, hut he 
will find psychological theories, hypotheses and pro­
blems he must criticise or solve for himself before 
he can use them for his purpose; that is he must become 
a psychologist himself, he must perform this very 
dangerous act which the Greeks called IdXieLfrdrfiS" f*\T
The result of this is not so much grammar, hut 
a psychology which chooses language as a starting point; 
what ought to he used as a help to explain linguistic 
forms becomes the central problem. This seems to he 
the case in the late Professor Ettraayer’s ^Analytische
1) J. Haas, ffranzhsische Syntax. Halle a.S. 1916.
Kurzgefasste neufranzbsische Syntax. Halle a. S.
1924.
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S.vntax der franzbsischen Sprache where we find many 
pages of purely psychological discussion without a 
single French quotation (vol. II, pp. 728/32; 687/91 
etc.). An extraordinary and difficult hook. It may he 
called a very profound treatise on linguistic psycho­
logy rather than a grammar; at least its purely grammat­
ical parts are rather an illustration of psychological 
facts.
This sidestepping into an alien field would have 
heen avoided if it had heen clear that the investigat- 
ion of the ^ physiological conditions of speech does not 
define the c e n t r a l  task of the linguist inspite 
of its importance as an auxiliary science. As we shall 
explain morejlfully in the following chapter it is the 
functional point of view which is prevalent in the 
linguist’s work. By occupying the functional point of 
view the linguist will also he ahle to overcome the 
suhjectivistic atomism of the psycho-physical method.
In this way we s^ill also understand why the linguist 
does n o t  write two different grammars, that of the 
speaker and that of the listener, hut only one which is 
respected hy hoth partners in an act of communication. 
For the linguist there is precisely that normative 
element in language which a purely psycho-physiological 
method tries to eliminate. But all this we shall have 
to explain more fully in the next chapter.
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P s y c h o l o g y  a n d  i d e a l  c o g n i t -  
i o n a l  f o r m s . -  In the same way as it is 
difficult to see how a psychological method which 
focusses its attention on the individual speaker or 
listener can account for a sh e social norm respected 
by "both, it is difficult to imagine how that same 
psychology^ which is naturalistic and materialistic in 
its tendency,can give a satisfactory account of ideal 
objects and ideal-ohjective relationships, for these 
cannot be accounted for in terms of events taking place 
in the mind of the individual! In the face of this 
difficulty three different attitudes are thinkable:
(a) Either one declares that cognitional acts, objective 
and conceptual relations have a psychological side or 
are even psychological facts; this leads to an absorpt­
ion of epistemology and logic into psychology, (b) Or 
one declares them to be scholastic abstractions without 
reality and believes consequently that thought can be 
accounted for without troubling about things such as 
concepts and propositions, (c) Or finally one stresses 
the autenticity of epistemological and logical data 
and their irreducibility to psychological categories 
and thus takes up an anti-psychologistie attitude. -
All these three different attitudes have been taken 
up. It is clear that in practice there is an almost 
infinite variety of blending and dosage possible in the 
three sciences (psychology, epistemology and logic),
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but it cannot be our task to go into these details. 
Moreover the anti-psychologistic attitude cannot "be a 
subject of this paragraph. We may just remark that it 
has "been taken up hy the phenomenologists whose in­
fluence on a certain group of contemporary linguists 
is very marked.1)
But we feel that we have to make it clear what our 
attitude is with regard to this question. And there 
we should like to point out that it is most important 
to see that h o t h  t h o u g h t  a n d  r e p r e ­
s e n t a t i o n  c a n  h e  r e g a r d e d  a s  
i d e l\^ f o r m s ,  and that, if one does regard 
them as such it becomes immediately clear that r e ­
p r e s e n t i n g  a n d  j u d g i n g  h a v e  
t w o  e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  i d e a l  
s t r u c t u r e s .  Physiological psychology, 
and Wundt in particular, was so much concerned with 
the genesis <fef representations and thought that fchsystf 
had no eye for ideal structures and their differences. 
Representation and thought appeared as more or less 
the same thing. The separation of the two realms seems 
to us a task of the greatest methodological importance. 
In the same way as we shall stress, in the pages to 
follow, the normative and social aspect of language, 
so we shall take into full account the ideal forms
1) One may quote in this connection Amrnann, Porzig, 
Weissgerber, Dempe.
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of representing and judging, considering each according 
to its specific nature and'XK. both in their collaboration 
and integration.
C o n c l u s i o n s .  - Physiological psychology, 
which at first sight seemed so apt to explain language,
reveals itself now as unsuited to account for the normat- 
ive character of language and de-tract a linguistics from 
the central task of functional analysis of signs. In the 
; domain of thought it fails to do justice to ideal forms.
Both shoroomings are due to the naturalistic and subject-
ivistic attitude of physiological psychology.
! nut criticism is perhaps inclined to underline too
i
! heavily the shortcomings of a method, and so it must nave 
appeared in our criticism of the psychological point of 
view that we are blind to the great achievements of the 
j psychological method in grammar. It is therefore import­
ant to point out that we do believe that the definition 
: of language as a. psycho-physical event contains an un- •
I deniable element of truth. For language can undoubtedly be
considered in the context of natural science. We have 
j mentioned that this after all is a ’realistic’ attitude,1?" 
i the persuit of this line of study was quite rightly felt
| as an act of liberation from scholasticism and has brought 
: much progress in linguistic science. Entirely new horizons
i
i
have opened up. We can now study the influence of emot­
ions, of subjective tastes upon language .and the express­
ive ’language’ of emotion itself. The study of so-called 
’primitive’ peoples and of children can now be approached 
1) On p. 24.1 ,
and limxed sip with. tine study of coiGrajmicsiioii I n miias! 
societies. A t  tine ©sue tine w e  ere e n r i c h e d  toy p h y s i o l -  
logicsl (of clinical) p s y c h o l o g y , which. explains pjfte&o- 
eeiiiS:- soe! &s spins: sis, sts^ e^Fiiiig smd ©llaeF etomoisa&li ties, 
thus re veiling the lew© o t  norw&l. limgiuiisiic functioning 
toy etmiyimg it© defects.
Jltlo^g! the definition o f i£Bgtig.ge &s s psyeii©- 
physics! event doe© comteim am element of truth, it is 
ceFtsimly mot the whole tniitii. Ixmgiuxge cam well h e  
epjpFoeeloied froo s. different, point o f view, end we ft r e  
convinced thet -me lingpist is not only entitled tout ©Is© 
•i!Made_- otjl obligetioB. to fix h i s point .of view o u  f s i d 
m s  t i r a 1 s c i e n c e  end. fheFefore omt&ide pmysi 
logics! psychology. 1M.& does mot Mieam Hat me earn dis- 
FegsFd msttuiFsl science, onto it does m e m  t t m t the c e n t r e  
of mis imteFest is elsewhere. — A n d  t h e  e & m e iM®g hold© 
good aiffltmtis mmfamdls for the science of tBiiomgmt. It 
seems i^oFtmt to Fecogmis© the idee! foFsaus of jtadsxmxax 
t to. o t gli i ©ml F e p F e s e m t s  t i o n j  si- 
t&eiHgm isere too is s. gmyslologi©© 1 ©Me to if which. 
snoHcR ©ey mo y££iiS to© oveFlooxeo..*'
It see* to ubs thet only toy eltotooFsfiaiig am mtomom)^ 
obbs limgiialstic point of view a d  toy tie Feeognitiom of 
t h e Ides! matomF© of tlorngtot ©ml f©©f@ semis tiom shall 
we to© stole to ©ststolisto s. fjfara tosels f©F s. sstisfsetoFV 
ttoeoty ©f S sml F m d  of tdeiF ii^oFMmce foe gFnm;iis f~ 
iesl analysis.
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and limced up with the study of communication in animal 
societies. At the same time we are enriched by physioi- 
logical (or clinical) psychology, which explains pheno­
mena such as aphasia, stammering and other abnormalities, 
thus revealing the lav/s of normal linguistic functioning 
toy studying its defects.
Although the definition of language as a psycho­
physical event does contain an element of truth, it is
certainly not the whole truth. Language can well be
» approached from a different point of view, and vn are 
convinced that the linguist is not only entitled out also
under an obligation to fix his point .of view o u t s i de
n a t u r a l  s c i e n c e  and therefore outside physio 
-logical -psychology. This does not mean that he can dis­
regard natural science, but it does mean that the centre 
of his interest is elsewhere. - And the same thing holds 
good mutatis mutandis for the science of thought. It 
seems important to recognize the idea! forms of xxhxsxnx 
t h o u g h t  and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ;  al­
though here too is a physiological side to it which 
should bey no'means be overlooked.
It seems to us that only by elaborating an autonom­
ous linguistic point of view and by the recognition of 
the idea! nature of thought and representation shall 
we be able to establish a firm basis for a satisfactory 
theory of S and P and of their importance for grammat­
ical analysis.
P a r t i  
Chapter (3)
T h e  l i n g u i s t i c  p o i n t  o f  v i e w
- 43-
T h e 1 i ti g uni s t i c  p o i n t  o f  v i e  w.- 
In stating the linguist*s point of view we cannot simp­
ly rely on theoretical pronouncements of leading lingu­
ists; ‘because it has happened time and again that the 
I
linguist who.reflected ©n the methodological implic-
ations of his work, that is when he^converted himself
r
into a philosopher, has t^ ied to state his case in the 
light of some philosophical system which did not quite 
do justice to his work.1) This has raised a certain 
amount of scepticism among the workers in the field 
against the introduction of ’philosophical speculations* 
into linguistics. Some scholars^even tried to take up 
a consciously anti-philosophical attitude, "because they 
realized that the linguist was at his "best when he was 
guided "by nothing hut his expert common sense. But such 
an attitude can surely not he maintained the moment one 
tries to see an individual fact or an individual observ­
ation in a wider perspective, the moment one is no 
longer satisfied with a mere connaisseurship and tries 
to rise to the level of coordinated knowledge. An anti- 
philosophical attitude leads to a sort of wild, uncon-
1) Such influential systems have heen those of Kant, 
Wundt, Croce, Meinong, Husserl, Behaviourism and 
others.
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trolled philosophy instead of one whichAby reflection 
! upon its principles(is disciplined% i t  leads further-
j more to a sort of voluntary renunciation of enquiry
j
j into problems which remain in existence in spite of
|
| the positivistic ostrich policy, and their neglect
; must ihev-g sooner or later/va had effect upon the special-
! ist’s work for the sake of whose protection this anti-
i
| philosophical attitude had been taken up. There is
j no escape from the truth clearly stated by Hermann
j Paul that the plainest linguistic fact^ cannot be state
; ikt
ed without implicating philosophy. But of course,, only
A
, 0 ort-C.
c philosophical attitude is /ueeftri? which leaves things
fCnfuCjfiis
! in their proper place, which, instead of drawing^im-
patiently and arrogantly into its orbit,
from outside as it were, has enough patiencexto step
| inside linguistics and to learn as much as poss-
!
| ible from the expert before the construction of philo-
j it li K6
[ sophical theories, and the. more thouroughly does Hbt»,
|I
j the better.
T h e  l i n g u i s t i c  f a c t . -  Both the 
technical procedure and the limitations of a scientific
1) It is true that Paul says (Prinzipien. p. 5) ’hist­
orical1 facts; but there is no doubt that for him 
linguistic facts a r e  historical facts. Cf. also 
Schuchardt’s word quoted as motto of this essay.
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method are determined by the properties of the object 
the particular science undertakes to study. In this 
essay, which deals with methodological questions it is 
therefore of paramount importance to find a correct 
answer to the question: With what sort of facts has 
the linguist^to deal? Or: What constitutes the linguistic, 
fact?
In a broad sense we may say that we consider as 
language anything which functions as an i n s t r u ­
m e n t  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n .  What do we 
understand by this? - Communication is a purposeful act 
by which something is conveyed by an individual to a 
social partner who partakes in this act by his willing­
ness and his ability to understand what it is the other 
wishe^ to convey to him. Whatever else may be conveyed
XX p 'j !
by that purposeful act 7of communication ' we are sure
that it is a purposeful act only in so far as by it
2.) \
is conveyed some m e a n i n g .  This however is not 1
done directly, but with the help of an instrument, the \
l i n g u i s t c  s i g n ,  which passes as it were 
from one partner to the other. It is a go-between which 
fulfills this function of conveying meaning by repres­
enting it. This it can only do if it has the same re-
1) We are thinking of impressions such as sympathy, 
intelligence etc.
2) *To have meaning* is the minimum criterion of the i
linguistic sign.
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presentative value for "both partners in an act of j
communication. Prom this can be seen that it is the_ j
meaningful sign which can be produced ( * signalled1) o£
j
and understood by various members of a community which |
I
is the object of linguistic science. \
It is worth insisting on the fact that language is j
an eminently s o c i a l  phenomenon. This point cannot 
be stressed too much. Linguistic theory has for too 
long given too much consideration to what happens in j
the speaker instead of observing what happens between j
speaker and listener. And even to-day B. Croce’s philo­
sophy with its identification of language with any form 1
i
of expression, whether used for communication or not, 
has many followers.-*-) It is the merit of the so-called 
’French School* (Saussure, Meillet)^) to have given 
prominence to the sociological conception of language. 
Indeed, the functioning of language cannot be understood 
without taking into account the interpreter who litter- 
ally collaborates with the speaker in an act of communic­
ation. As far as our theory is concerned we shall find 
that ultimately the distinction of ’language* and 
’thought* is one betv/een a socjaLly accepted and so­
cially fashioned symbolism and an ideal symbolism.
1) In the so-called ’Idealistic School*. Cf. I. Iordan 
and J. Orr, An Introduction to Bomance Linguistics. 
London 1937, Chap. 2.
2) I. Iordan and J. Orr, loc. cit. , Chap. 4.
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This distinction is one of the cornerstones of the argu­
ment presented in this investigation^For this reason 
it is so important to insist on the sociological con­
ception of language.
T h e  i d e n t i t y  o f  t h e  l i n g u i s t ­
i c s  s i g n . -  Language, then, is a socially con­
ditioned symbolism. Whatever empirical differences the 
production of signs may cause in their physical structure, 
they must he recognizable as identical by both partners 
of an act of communication whenever they are used. They 
must have the relative stability of a social institution. 
This is an interesting and important point. We see 
quite clearly that linguistic signs are treated as re­
latively stable entities; in identifying them one abstracts 
empirical variations resulting from individual usage.
A sign is recognized !as the same* whenever it fulfills 
the same function for different members of a linguistic 
community and not because of its empirical identity. 
Empirically there are not two identical signs; the 'same1 
sound for instance, even if repeated by the same person, 
is empirically differnet^ each time it is uttered. But 
these empirically differences are overlooked as long as 
the sign fulfills the same function. In this the linguist
------ —  Socjai u-sope
follows\faithfullj^. Whenever he considers language as
l) Cr. Part I, Chap. 6.
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a social institution he neglects empirical differences 
and concentrates on functional equivalency. Since the 
values of signs are socially accepted they oppose a 
certain resistance to individual attempts to change
OL
these values. Linguistic signs have therefore^normative j
value$ as far as the individual is concerned. One could j
say that the normative character of linguistic signs j
is the same thing as their social character considered j
from a different angle. Since the identity of the social 
function of a sign is so allimportant for its identific­
ation it is clear that the f u n c t i o n a l  p o i n t  
o f  v i e w  is the one which interests the linguist 
most.
T h e  i d e n t i t y  o f  m e a n i n g . -  Now 
signs are only vehicles for meanings, and in the same 
way as signs must he the ’same* for "both partners of 
speech, meanings must also he the ’same* for them. That 
is to say, signs must refer to things-meant which are 
identical for all who understand the signs correctly, 
i.e. following a socially accepted norm. Pending a 
more detailed elucidation of ’meaning1 in a later chapt­
er1) we may point out here already that meaning has to he 
i assessed in terms other thain those of subjectivistic 
psychology, because the psychological processes in hoth 
speaker and hearer are different and in principle non-
| 1) Part I, Chap. 5.
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identical, whereas it is a condition for the proper 
functioning of a sign that its meaning should be identic­
al for both partners of an act of communication. The 
identity of meaning can ofcly be derived from the ident­
ity of the goal in any process of sign-interpretation, 
whatever its physiological nature may be, and that 
goal must be conceived as lying somewhere o u t s i d e  
both speaker and listener, or sender and receiver: The 
identity of meaning is to be based on the identity of 
the thing-meant.
L a n g u a g e  a n d  s p e e c h .  - Vi/e have 
now arrived at a conception of signs and meanings as 
something speaker and listener have in common, in spite 
of recognizing the reality of individual differences* It 
is this conception which enables the linguist to detach 
’language* to a high degree from speaker and listener 
and consider it as a metaxy both have in common. By so 
doing the linguist^ cuts\also ’language* off to a certain 
extent from the actual act of ’speech?. It is only by 
taking this into account that we understand, how the 
linguist arrives at the dicovery of objects called ’the 
English (French, Spanish, German etc.) language* as a 
potential possession of linguistic groups.
The isolation of language in the functional sense 
from concrete individual acts of ’speech* is possible 
only to a certain degree, admittedly a high degree, but
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no t completely. Linguistic form and particularly its 
changes in acts of speech cannot be explained without
vC
recurring to the physiological and psychological con­
ditions underlying them. Therefore phonematics, for 
instance, a purely functional branch of linguistics, 
needs as an auxiliary science phonetics conceived as a 
natural science. And functional semantics nedtts as an 
auxiliary science psychology to explain such things 
as analogy, contamination etc. But it rauBt be clear, 
that the main interest of the linguist does not lie ^
there, that such natural sciences are for linguistics 
auxiliary sciences.
’S i g n 1 a n d  l e a n i n g 1 v e r s u s  
’l a n g u a g e *  a n d  ’t h o u g h t ’. - W e  are now 
able to see in a general way, what this normative and
t'S
sociological conception of language fceefce like which we 
forecast in our criticism of the psychological point of 
view.'*') The interesting feature of this conception is 
that it seems to be quite complete without the introduct­
ion of ’thought*. -As a ^matter of'fact the classical 
opposition between ’language’ and ’thought* seems to be 
replaced in a purely linguistic context by that between 
’sign’ and ’meaning’: linguistics presents itself as 
an autonomous science, not dependent on the sciences 
of the mind. Should it be possible to exclude ’thought’ 
entirely from linguistic theory, then indeed the question
I 1) See above, p. 38.
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of S and P will be prejudged already. For they are logic­
al terms, and if we exclude ’thought* from linguistics, 
the ideal laws of thought and its ideal forms *do7 no 
longer interest the linguist. The answer to this can 
only be given at a later stage of our discussion, after 
a further elucidation of the terms *sign’ and ’meaning’ 
in the next chapters. We leave therefore this question 
open for the time being and first complete our account 
of the linguistic point of view as different from that 
of the sciences of the mind.
T h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  l a n g u a g e .  - It 
will be clear by now that linguistics is in the first 
place a functional science. But the one function of the 
sign we have mentioned so far was that of conveying mean-
g
ing. We have th^efore considered only the so-called i n ­
f o r m a t i v e  function of language. But linguistic 
theory has always recognized a plurality of linguistic 
functions. Beside an informative function language is 
often held to have an e m o t i v e  function. •*■) Nothing 
else is meant by the statement that language is the ex­
pression of thought(corresponding to ’informative’ funct­
ion) and feelings (corresponding to ’emotive’ function). - 
WhaofcxsEEBiBXEBxtaiHxxhHjeEXSxx For reasons just stated, we 
should like to avoid this formulation, just because it 
introduces the awkward term ’thought’ which prejudges
1) See above, p. 25.
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a dependence of language on cognition, a. point we should 
like to reserve for a later discussion. What seems cert­
ain, however, is that the purely informative fu_nction 
of language is not the only one; besides an intellectual 
side language offerjs also another aspect which has 
been called ’emotive* (or ’emotional*). But as we had 
a methodological interest in excluding ’thought* from 
linguistic theory because it implies Quite unnecessarily 
too much epistemology and logic, so we should like to 
avoid the term ’emotion* or ’feelings’ for the reason 
that they imply too much physiological psychology. This 
is not merely a question of words. Behind them lie con­
ceptions of things which are faulty and inadequate.
These conceptions are partly the result, partly the 
sponsors of a linguistic theory which ultimately dissolv­
es itself preoicely  into epistemological logic and 
physiological psychology. They must be corrected and 
overcome in a properly designed linguistic theory. Yet, 
as so often, even in this unsatisfactory formulation is 
hidden an element of truth which we shall try to elucid­
ate.
Let us begin with an analysis of the reality which lies 
behind the so-called informative function of language.
By this, I think, we have to understand the fact, that 
linguistic symbolism tells us something about an ob-
jective world, that it refers in an act of speech to
a certain thing-meant which thus defined the meaning
of the sign.1) But language does this in a peculiar way:
in i ts tn t tV e fy
the thing-meant^is never represented/£k by the linguist­
ic sign, -jn-ito entire ^ /with all the objective factors^ 
^which may be discovered in it.j
It is with language as with the visual arts. A pict­
ure of a landscape(for instance/gives prominence to 
certain features and neglects others; it dan stress 
the outline of things and neglect atmosphere or vice 
versa. • it brings o&t certain colours and mitigates 
others, it gives mainly a foreground interpretation or 
shows greater interest in the depth of perspective.
In short, it gives an extract from reality, not reality 
in its entirety. This^only one example of the principle 
termed by K. BOhler Prinzin der abstraktiven Relevanz. 
which applies to any sort of s y m b o l i s m . As in the
1) We have to anticipate here something which will be 
stated more fully in Chap. 5.
2) As a non-psychologist I was surprised to find that 
such a principle was formulated only so recently. I 
cannot see in it anything but an instance of the 
general truth that all symbolism is selective, includ­
ing that of our senses, since ear, eye, nose etc. act 
always as filt%s of sensuous material. This knowledge 
must be as old as psychology itself.-Cf. K. Btihler,
Sprachthenri.p, p. X.
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domain of art it operates also in that of cognition, as 
we shall see, and it applies.also to language. Language 
too refers only to a selection of objective features 
constituting the thing-meant, and this is easily ex­
plained. Not only is our mind incapable of getting in- 
terested in too many features at once, it also refuses 
quite voluntarily to consider those features which are 
of no importance for the purpose at hand. In this sense 
s y m b o l i z a t i o n  i s  a l r e a d y  t h e  
f i r s t  s t e p  i n  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
We understand therefore that prominence is given to 
those objective features we are interested in when we 
speak, while others are merely inplied. So we may dis­
tinguish between e x p o s e d  and i m p l i e d  
objective features in the linguistic representation of 
the thing-meant.
Exposed + implied objective features constitute the 
a c c e p t e d  thing-meant. But we must add that the 
r e a l  thing-meant may have furthermore certain feat­
ures ^hgich are neither exposed nor implied, of which 
we have no knowledge at all, but which nevertheless are 
there as p o t e n t i a l  features which may enrich 
the accepted thing-meant at a more advanced stage of 
knowledge.
It is due to the fact that linguistic representation 
exposes only an extract of the total meaning that we not
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only know what is meant, "but can learn implicitily some­
thing about the speaker*s point of view, his personal 
interest, the attitude he is taking up with regard to 
the thing-men(g,t and also, perhaps, with regard to the 
listener. For any selection of representative features 
is determined by the points of view of^who selects them. 
Sy paying attention to the personal and individual 
point of view from which representative features have 
been selected, we not only understand what is mer%t by 
the rpeaker but we understand the speaker himself. As 
a matter of fact, the better we are able to identify 
ourselves with the speaker’s point of view, the better 
can we interpret the meaning of his utterance, or of
_ _ ht a-tion travels all the time in two opposite directions:
s^ 0lB he uses«/( So we m&y say that our interpret-
Away from the speaker towards the thing-meant, and back 
towards the speaker, to grasp and occupy his point of 
view. The first may therefore be called o b j e c t i v  
or c e n t r i f u g a l  interpretation, the second 
s u b j e c t i v e  or c e n t r i p e t a l  inter­
pretation. It is clear that both go hand in hand, that 
they are two complementary sides of the one process of 
understanding. We will never be able to understand the 
word patient unless we can identify ourselves with the 
point of view of the doctor, the meaning of boss remains 
a dead letter to us, as long as we cannot appreciate 
the ppint of vj^ w of an employee. We must be at home in
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certain spheres determined by certain human actions and 
reactions, certain aspirations, evaluations and feelings 
in order to understand such terras; and if we do, these 
terms seem to carry with them a certain personal atrnoe 
sphere.
All words are somehow individually coloured. There 
are words that smfill of the farmyard, others reflect 
the paleness of thought. The least colourfull ones are 
those of the most general use such as go, be, left, way. 
under etc. etc. But this very indifference determines 
a subjective value.-What applies to words holds also
t* ttrc/j
good for sentences, with the difference that there the 
material meaning is at least as important and revealing 
as the formal meaning, whereas in sentences it is the 
formal structure which ’gives the speaker away* . Between
bay i
a Ciceronian period and a short ejaculation we^a whole 
scale of subjective values.
Whenever our interpretation goes in the direction 
of the thing-qieant and is centrifugal twe get to under­
stand ’what is meant* by a particular expression* This 
is therefore the foundation of ’meaning*. What we under­
stand when^ f our interpretation follows the opposite, 
centripetal, direction is not ’meaning’ in the technical 
sense but ’physiognomic significance*. We may therefore 
also speak of an objective interpretation of signs
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whose aim is elucidation of their meaning and a subject­
ive interpretation which aims at the understanding of 
the physiognomic significance. This appears to us the 
reality behind the distinction between infifcmative and 
emotive language. Looking in the centrifugal direction 
signs seem to d e n o t e  things-meant, looking injjthe 
centripetal direction they seem to e x p r e s s  a 
world of attitudes and feelings. It should be noted, howe 
ever, that even the expressive values of linguistic 
signs are of a s o c i o l o g i c a l  nature and 
should not be confused with the expressiveness of 
n a t u r a l  symptoms such as blushing, stammering, 
involuntary mimic reactions which are of a physiological 
character. To confuse both would amount to confusing 
linguistic signs and symptoms; we shall have to guard 
ourselves against this.1) Because even these expressive 
values of linguistic utterances have a well-known 
currency in a given social group, the outsider or foreign­
er who would know all the objective meanings of the
still ^
expressions of a given language is^apt to slip in
the correct handling of expressive linguistic values;
his grammar may be correct, but his style is faulty.
1) See next chapter
- 58-
The question arises whether we are justified in face 
of this distinction between leaning* and ’physiognomic 
significance’ to. talk of two functions of language as 
has "been done. To tl\is we should like to answer in the 
following way: It seems essential from a functional point 
of view that signs should have a meaning, ’Sign* and 
’meaning* are complementary terms, one cannot he thought 
of without the other. It is quite different with physio­
gnomic significance. This is nothing specifically lingu­
istic hut applies to all human activities. The way we 
sleep, we eat, we sit down, has a physiognomic signific­
ance, and I may infer from the way a girl walks in the 
street that she is a Girl-Guide! I should like to infer 
from this that the expressiveness of signs is a f a c t - ;  
u a 1 characterization, whereas their meaningfulness 
characterizes the f u n c t i o n a l  side of language. 
And so with the other activities: the expressiveness ;
j
of walking is a f a c t ,  whereas the f u n c t i o n  i 
of, walking is to cover a certain distance hy the !
appropriate movements of our legs, etc. etc. This |
does not preclude, of course, the enormous importance 
of the expressiveness of signs for the understanding j
ii
of linguistic behaviour and even for the understanding ! 
of the ’deeper significance’ of Abjective meaning 
itself as we have seen. But we do think.it misleading 
to call the fact that linguistic signs have a physio­
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gnomic significance a second function of language and label 
it as emotive function.
To characterize an instrument - and language is an 
instrument of communication - "by o n e  function only 
has a great advantage, for it allows us to recognize it in 
any empirical disguise^ Whenever we see this function 
fullfilled without having to trouble about possible other 
functions. It is easy to identify a chair as a ’table* once 
it fullfills the functions of a table. In the same way 
we can discover i, language wherl>ewe find meaningful signs, 
whereas we should be at a loss to find a criterion of
om
language in signs of physiogn^c significance; linguistic 
symbols would not be distinguishable from natural symptoms.
Having said this it is almost superfluous to enter into 
polemics regarding a third, £ a fourth etc. function of 
language. As is well known Btihler thinks that besides an 
informative and an expressive ’function*, there is thirdly 
a ’function* which he calls Appell. ^  To my mind this re­
fers to nothing but the social conditions in which signs 
work. Very indispensable conditions indeed, but hardly a 
’function*; this ’Anpell-function * is already implied in 
the definition of language as an instrument of communic­
ation. In order to function linguistic utterances must be 
received by a listener. But this in itself is as little a 
function of signs as for instance their audibility in 
spoken language.
!) Sprachtheorie. pp. 28 ff. Sv n 'A . >vt't/ocdtiVe''
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iixixx Btihler sees in pet-words and in verbal abuse 
a display of the so-called expressive and the Anne11 
*functions*• But if a student could move a market-woman 
to tears hy insulting her with the names of Greek letters 
(Sie Aloha, Sie Beta!etc.), he could succeed in this be- 
cause the good woman supplied gratuitously the most awful 
meanings to the strange terms she herd. It is precisely 
"because these words had for her an informative function 
that the effect of tears was produced. - ■*■)
The distinction "between objective meaning and physio­
gnomic significance is an important one and is not invalid­
ated by the fact that is is by no means always easy to 
determine what is me^t and what is only expressed or 
revealed. A shout Helo! has the objective meaning *1 want 
help!*, whereas its physiognomic significance may be 
circumscribed by saying *1 am in great distress*, but this 
seems problematical. It may quite well be that whoever 
shouts Help! wants also to imply * I am in distress* and 
in that case *1 am in distress’ fors% part of the objective 
meaning of the expression. Another doubt may perhaps con­
cern the modality of verbs. In the Spanish sentence Le dare 
la Have cuando venga. the subjunctive of venga seems to 
reveal uncertainty on the part of the speaker, who hesit­
ates to present the action as definite or real. But I 
think rather that the subjunctive does not ’reveal* that 
uncertainty, but ’denotes* it, and that fro# the point of
1) Sprachtheorie, p. 52.
- 6 1 -
view of the linguist "both the action and the doubts con­
cerning its definiteness or reality form one objective 
whole.1) We sometimes observe how certain features in the 
empirical make-up of a sign have to begin with only 
physiognomic significance but no functional meaning, but 
that they become meaningful in the functional sense later on. 
That certain speech-melody meaning now Question* has 
probably once been a significant symptom of getting stuck 
before the intended sentence was finished.^) And there 
may have been a time when it was difficult to decide whether 
that speech-melody was merely significant or already mean- 
ingfull But the admission of border-line cases should not
c
lead to a mjbhodological confusion or to an attempt at in­
validating an important methodological distinction.
The importance of centripetal interpretation for spoken 
language is paramount since the most diverse points of view 
may be revealed through a linguistic medium, which makes 
language so apt as a medium for art. It is less great in 
technical languages such as that of the mathematical scienc­
es or symbolic logic. But even those7 far from being a
1) Of. E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen II, p. 78: 
MAusdrticke kbnnen ebensowohl wie auf andere GegenstSnde,
auch auf die gegenwSrtigen psychischen Erlebnisse des sich 
Xussemden Beziehung haben. ” Cf also here p. 18$.
2) cf. pp.
completely objective symbolism reveal a subjective point 
of view, only it is fixed once and for all in contrast to 
’living* speech.
G r a m m a r  a n d  s t y l i s t c s . -  On the 
distinction between centrifugal and centripetal interpret­
ation is built that between 's e m a n t<’c s (including 
g r  a m m  a r) and s t y l i s t i c s .  It follows from 
this that both4| thes#^ linguistic disciplines are complement­
ary to each other and treat the same material from different 
angles.
Stylistics studies, as we said, the physiognomjrE of 
linguistic expressions, that is the mental and moral make­
up of the users of creators of the linguistic instrument,
Km civic
it searches for man behind language. Buffon’s famous *woi7dr 
le style est 1 *homme mdme is quoted so often, because it 
expresses the essence and nature of style in such a very 
concise and brillant way. Only it must be clear that ’man* 
here, is taken in his most personal aspect as different from 
the generic aspect; homme in Buffon’s sentence is equival­
ent with *personality*. It must also be clear that ’per­
sonality* is not only to be found in the isolated individual, 
but also in social groups. Whoever denies the reality of 
’the* Englishman, ’the* Frenchman, ’the* German etc. is 
like the man who could not see the wood because of the 
trees. In the sense of linguistic physiognomy the conception 
of a VSlkgrpsychologie is completely legitimate.
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It may perhaps be useful to show in just one concrete
example how centrifugal or grammatical and centripetal
or stylistic interpretation work together. '^he grammar-
e
ian will say that m  a genial way French .ie ferai.
English £ shall do and German ich werde tun denote(all 
the same *thing-meant1, namely future, first person, in­
dicative. As far as they do the form of one language can 
be translated into the corresponding form of any of the 
other two languages. But the three expressions differ
tL**
in^prominence they chose to give to certain aspects of 
the thing-meant: the French future tense reflects a per­
fective, the German a durative verbal aspect, and the 
corresponding English tense is modal. At this point 
stylistic interpretation comes in and finds that the stati 
ic, ts. definite | view of the French form is typical of a j 
certain logical mentality, aiming at precise distinctions i 
and definitions, that the German form$ reflects the in­
definite Germanic dynamism, whidc is to its Latin neigh-
z
bours such a disquieting trait in the T^tonic character, 
and finally^the English future tense with its alterations 
^ shall. you will etc. reflects all the politeness and 
diplomacy based on marality so characteristic of the 
English. - We see from this example of the collaboration i
i
between grammar and stylistics, how the latter gives 
sometimes the raison d*etre of the forms analysed by
r
the grammatical method and is therefore an indispensable
completion of purely semantic analysis. But it should not 
he forgotten .that grammar and n o t  stylistics defines 
the central interest of the linguist. For linguistics is 
a functional science and grammatical interpretation is 
identical with functional interpretation}, whereas stylist- 
ical interpretation is not.
L i n g u i s t i c s  a n d  t h e  s c i e n c e s  
o f  t h e  m i n d . -  Looking backwards to our previous 
discussion it is not difficult to discover h&iwKfiK semant­
ic or centrifugal analysis a linguisitc analogon to epist- 
emological logic and in stylistic or centripetal ananlysis 
the linguistic counterpart to psychology. In fact, centri­
fugal analysis tends towards the thing-meant and is there­
fore objective analysis, whereas centripetal analysis 
aims at subjective qualities. Likewise, epistemological 
logic is the science of the,objective forms of cognition, 
whereas psychology looks at the subjective side of psycho­
physical events. This may explain, in part at least, the 
methodological shortcomings of the past. Logistic grammar 
had well grasped the fasi truth that linguistic meaning is 
objective meaning. But it fell short when it identified 
socially accepted symbolism with ideal symbolism. It is 
a mistake easily to be explained, for both symbolisms stand 
for the same objective values.
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Once the individuality of socially accepted 3syHfiBw3:±iraa 
systems of signs was discovered in Humboldt !s 1 inner form1, 
linguistic physiognomy came to the fore under the garb 
of Steinthals V61ker7:»sycholop;ie. This,however, should have 
remained more of an art than a science. It needs all the 
tact and all the courage of highly synthetic, that is non- 
atomistic work. But there is of course no reason to deny 
to this art the name psychology’. It was however an 
almost unavoidable tribute to the spirit of a 1 scientific* 
age, that that psychological art should take a more and 
. more analytical, atomistic and ’scientific* turn. In con­
sequence of this the linguist’s attention was somehow dis­
tracted from its proper centre towards the empirical, 
physiological side of language. Since somehow everything 
is connected with everything else, this side-stepping
M O r it .  i r k *  £ t J J  J
into a natural science *was not without* yieldftfg- useful
i
knowledge to the linguist. The^haziness of the very term 
k
’psychology* w£ch was found lying somewhere between physio­
logy and physiognomy was a stimulus to sharpen more and 
more the love for analytical details and this led auto­
matically to a sharper formulation of linguistic individ­
uality and to stylistics and back to the very centre of 
linguistics on a much more advanced level.
To-day it is again relatively easy to see that our 
centripetal significance reveals attitudes to be assessed 
in terms of practical needs, aesthetic feelings, moral re­
actions, temperament characteristic*often not so much of 
the ijsolated individual, & * o f  groups, he it regional,
professional or national gnoupe*. In order to understand 
them, we need more urgently a study of historical con­
ditions, of traditions and milieus thaik rfehafc of nerve- 
fibe^rs and centres in the "brain. The linguistic, subject 
is not only the individual speaker, although it is he too - 
"but rather all those who stand behind him and have helped 
to shape the symbols he is using, that is, great lingu­
istic groups.
I should like to point out in a clear way the differen­
ce between logic and psychology on the one hand and lingu­
istics and the other moral sconces on the other hand by
i
saying that the former consider ’man as a c r e a t e  
i o n ,  the latter as c r e a t o r .  The former are in­
terested in the s p e c i e s  ’m a n ’, the latter in 
m a n  a s  a p e r s o n a l i t y .  Hence the fact that 
the ideal laws of logic and th.e empirical laws of psycho­
logy claim universal value, whereas norms of grammar or 
stylistic values belong to certain historical epochs, to 
certain group-personalities and often to limited space.
By establishing these differences we find also the 
connection between them two points of view: we belong to j
a species and have personality. The latter would not be j
s
there without the former, and the linguist who jwouldi \
/ j
knGw nothing about the generic aspect of man would be !
i
ill-prepared for his job. And this we may say with re­
gard to the methodological shortcomings of the past. If 
the partial confusion of grammar with logic and that of 
stylistics with psychology was a mistake, at least ift I
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it was an intelligent one, because the problem of the 
polarity object - subject is the same here as there.
/
C o n c l u s i o n s . -  We have tried to establish 
the outline of a linguistic theory from which the terms 
’thought* and ’feelings* were excluded and which does 
not,therefore, borrow anything from the sciences of the 
mind. It appears therefore that a purely grammatical 
mwthod will be able to dispense with an S - P analysis, 
all the more since there is evidently no parallelism 
between the socially accepted symbolism of language and 
the ideal symbolism of epistemological logic. We have 
insisted on the fact, which we shall etrtUr elaborate in 
due course, that the meaning of linguistic signs is ultim­
ately to be defined in terms of’thing-meant* and not in 
terms of ’concepts* and ’judgments’. But since both the 
linguistic symbolism and the ideal symbolism of thought 
may refer to the same thing-meant we may still find that 
both become somehow entangled, particularly should it 
become clear that we cannot speak without thinking at the 
same time, a point we shall have to discuss. Although 
there is no a -priori reason to expect that thought-symbol­
ism should be reflected in linguistic formulations, it is 
in practice still possible that they may not be indepen­
dent unde,r all circumstances.
But what is that ideal epistemological symbolism we 
are ifl&Sgg about ? We have polnted.out that thg
- 6 8 -
*psycho-physical event* theory confused the realms of 
thought and representation, This is another question we 
have to clear up. But that is still a distant task. Our 
immediate concern has to be whether or not we can dis­
cover a point where ’thought* has to be drawn into iiua 
linguistic methodology, and for that reason we shall have 
to continue the discussion of ’sign* and ’meaning* which, 
in their social setting, constitute the linguistic fact*
§
P a r t  I 
Chapter (4-)
T h e  l i n g u i s t i c  s i g n .
■)69-
g e n e r a l  p r o b l e m s .  - I n  a generally 
accepted sense we may call ’sign’ anything acessicle to 
our senses which ’stands for*, ’represents* or ’has* a 
certain meaning. As it stands this definition is of little 
use to the linguist. On the one hand it is too wide; it 
comprehends ^hviuusly much more than is compatible with 
the sociological conception of the sign as an instrument 
of communication. The linguist is not so much interested 
in the sign in general as in the socially accepted or con­
ventional sign, although he has to know something about 
the sign in the wider sense in order to understand well 
the positive characteristics of the linguistic sign; for 
that reason it is also important to know, fchat the lingu­
istic sign is not. That is why we shall do well to approach 
the problem of the conventional sign by way of contrast­
ing it with other possible conceptions of the sign.
t
But if the general definition is in a sense too wide 
for our purpose, it is on the other hand also too narrow. 
For besides an|. o u t e r  form which is accessible to our 
senses the linguist knows also an i n n e r ,  purely 
mental symbolic form. But again, the problem of inner 
form cannot be detached from that of outer form, so that 
indeed an outline of a complete theory of the linguistic 
sign becomes necessary.
S y m p  t o m s , .  - So we must review the different
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phenomena, which, have been or could be called ’signs’ and 
investigate their properties. - There we find first of all 
one class of signs, which are not linguistic signs at all, 
although the term ’language* has been extended to them.
It is true, this term is used here only in a metaphorical 
sense. Still, it is easy to forget this and then the danger 
arises of confusing the second-hand, derived^notion with 
the real thing.
oP
When the appearance with* swallows in Korth-European 
countries is taken as a sign of spring, when the rings
visible on a vertical section of a tree trunk ’tell* us
the number of years of the tree’s life, we may well be 
tempted to speak of a ’language of things’. Do we not have 
here signs which have a hidden significance or meaning?
This is certainly so, there is also the interpreter, able 
to understand that meaning, but there is no demonstrator 
or sender, the sign is not ’addressed’ to anybody, and 
therefore this class of sign is not linguistic. Signs in 
this sense are s y m p t o m s  . how we can easily imagine 
that a pious man such as Columbus, when he concluded from
the presence of floating logs that land is was near, may j
have imagined that God had placed those logs in the way 1
I
of his ships in order to give him a ’sign’.' In this j
case the logs are for Columbus not merely symptoms but j 
real linguistic signs. It is by such a metaphysical \
substitution of a devine demonstrator that one comes to \i
r
speak of a ’language of things*. It ought to be clear,
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however, that such a metaphysical expression has no place 
in scientific discourse.1)
A symptom may "be described as a n a t u r a l  (auto­
matic, blind) phenomenon related by laws of nature to • 
another natural phenomenon, which defines for an interpret­
er the meaning of the symptom. A certain greenness of grass 
may be regarded as a symptom of the fertility of the 
ground. The outline of a human figure at the far end of 
the street may be interpreted as fmy friend X.* and thus 
also be called a symptom. There is no doubt that all auto­
matic and reflexive mojvements of animals and men alike 
must be assessed as symptoms. Of special interest are 
here those phenomena which have some physiognomic signif­
icance such as blushing, turning pale, stammering and so 
on; they are symptoms of intensity of certain affections.
S y m p t o m s  a n d  l i n g u i s t i c ’ s i g n s .  
- If we now wish to characterize the linguistic sign in 
opx-^ osition to the symptom v/e become aware of the fast j
•that a tremendous problem is implied in the term ’lingu- j
istic sign*, which we have not considered so far. It is j 
the problem of freedom. Indeed, if we consider any sign j
l) Professor Campbell reminds me that Berkley’s interpret-I
ation of the ’causal order of things’ as a ’divine langu- *
j
age of signs’ provides an exact parallel to the belief f
l;
imputed by us to Columbus. )(
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as an automatic reflex to a stimulus, then it would only 
be a symptom, it would be part of an inescapable, causo.£ 
lation-ft-l nexus; it is only when we grant to the sender 
a minimum of freed/?<3 communicate ois not to communicate, 
that is, a minimum of freedom to break that causal nexus, 
that we can speak of a linguistic sign. In this sense we 
might say the symptom is an involuntary, the linguistic 
sign a v6luntary, sign. Indeed the problem of freedom is 
already hidden in that property of the linguistic sign 
of being ’addressed* to a partner. If it were not voluntary 
it would hardly have this specific direction towards a 
present partner, it would simply be there; whether it 
would be picked up by an interpreter or not, would be a 
mere coincidence. The famous question whether animals 
possess ’language* or not will be answered negatively if 
we consider animals with Descartes as mere automata. The 
condition for a positive answer lies precisely in the 
granting to animals a minimum of- freedom. If we assess 
all the ’signalling* and all the ’interpretation’ of anim­
als as xh automatic responses to certain stimuli, then 
their apparent linguistic behaviour is undistinguishable 
from other natural events: the bee’s transmitting a 
message to her fellow-bees concerning the presence of 
pollen in a certain place, the male chamois1 warning the 
herd of an approaching enemy, the old stork teaching his 
youngsters how to flyjwould belong to the same class of*
events as the rushing of water down the slopes or the 
tree’s bursting into blossoms in spring.
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But, and this is perhaps egen more important, freedom 
of will may also be denied to human beings. A linguistic 
theory on a thoroughly (fatalistio/basis has been elaborat­
ed by behaviourists. For the behaviourist school a sign is 
a natural phenomenon or thing acting as a stimulus on the 
’interpreter1, where it provokes automatically a certain 
response manifesting itself in a corresponding behaviouB.
To understand the sign is therefore identical with an 
automatic^ adaptation to the fact that a given situation 
has been altered by a phenomenon called ’sign’;
The great inconvenience of such a theory is that it 
operates with a ’sign’ which is simply there, is simply 
happening. Without being willfully addressed to an inter­
preter it is no social sign. This can be seen from an ex-
l* iwT**'! oictC
ample which trne-aner to give an account of how signs are un- ,
0*1 OcVanOfcf
derstood: If I have experienced during? a number of -kime-s
that, when I strike a match against its box, a flame appears 
I shall expect a flame whenever I hear the scratch of a 
match against its matchbox; the scratch has become a ’sign’ 
of the flame. It acts now as a stimulus, which evokes auto­
matically the expectation of a flame. We see here clearly 
that the sd-called ’sign* is not wilfully addressed to. an 
interpreter and has therefore not the function of communic­
ating anything to anybody; it may be called a symptom, but 
it is surely not a linguistic phenomenon at all. - Even 
ih the other famous behaviourist example of the dog, who 
runs into the din&ng room in expectation of food on hearing
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the gong announcing lunch, no linguistic sign is involved 
as far as the dog is concerned. What for human beings is 
a signal, is for the dog only a factor of a natural con­
texts such as for instance the smell of food.
The problem of language can be discussed on the level 
of symptoms only if one is the victim of a metaphor as we 
have pointed out before.
C r i t e r i a  o f .  t h e  l i n g u i s t i c
s i g n .  - These critical s b l  reflections seem to suggest
that we cannot escape from admitting this problematical
factor of freedom in the theory of the linguistic sign.
But I think we can avoid the danger of being drawn into a
2)metaphysical discussion about the essence of freedom, '
1) The behaviourist examples quoted by us have been taken 
out of* The Meaning of Meaning by C.K. Ogden and I.A. 
Richards, London 1944, pp. 52/57. The most prominent 
linguist d>f the Behaviourist School is L. Bloomfield 
(the author of Language. London 1925). For a historical 
account of the question cf. M. Schlauch, Early Behaviour­
ists and Contemporary Linguistics, in Word II, 1947,
pp. 25 ff.
2) Cf. on this question A C. A. Campbell, In Defence of 
Free Will. Glasgow 1938.
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if we make use of a certain methodological modesty and 
limit tob the-discussion to the question, of how this factor 
of freedom reveals itself in the linguists object, that is, 
if we replace the question of the moral and metaphysical 
conditions of language by the question of how far do they 
betray themselves in linguistic form, by what characters 
are they to be recongize^in the linguistic sign. And 
there we shall be able to say at once, that the linguistic 
sign distinguishes itself from the natural sign or symp­
tom by its character of artificiality. Language is an 
a r t i f i c i a l  instrument of communication. Man 
reveals his relative independence from nature, that is his 
freedom, in his being homo faber. An instrument is made 
precisely for being used at will. In directing our attent­
ion to those features pf the linguist’s object in which 
freedom reveals itself, instead of to the problem of freed­
om itself, we have the great methodological advantage 
of being justified in confessing our ignorance, wherever 
this criterion of the artificiality of the linguistic 
instrument fails to assist us. This applies to animal 
communication and to certain features of human communicat­
ion likewise. Whether a certain groan is a mere reflex 
or a linguistic sign, I connot tell. But I do know that 
the mere structure of signposts, artificial models of de­
monstration and above all articulate sounds betray already 
their instrumental character and that they are therefore 
linguistic signs.
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As far as our sound languages are concerned this is 
clearly revealed "by the tremendous diversity of speech
(Babel); if languaga were not artificial but natural, then 
J*
it should be the same for the species man, instead of being 
almost indifferent to the factor of ’race’. So we may well 
say that symptoms are natural signs, and that it is char­
acteristic of the linguistic sign to be artificially shared. 
Hence we may say that the linguistic sign fulfills its re­
presentational function very differently from the symptom. 
The natural sign belongs to the same natural context as 
the thing represented by it: Columbus1 logs belong natur­
ally, and therefore necessarily, to 'land1, the first 
swallow is a natural 253c phenomenon of’spring*. The linguist­
ic sign on the other hahd is not connected with the thing- 
meant by the same inescaple causal nexusj it is arbitrary 
and conventional. Experience and observation of natural 
phenomena can teach us to expect fire where we find smoke, 
butthe same method fails completely if we wish to know the 
meaning of our linguistic signs: the presence and reality 
of a linguistic sign <iees in no way guarantee* the presence 
and reality of the thing-meant. T h e  s y m p t o m  m a y  
b e  m i s i n t e r p r e t e d ,  b u t  i t  c a n n o t  
l i e ,  w h e r e a s  t h e  l i n g u i s t i c  s i g n ,  
apart from being liable of misinterpretation, c a n  a l s o  
b e  i n t e m t i o n a l l y  m i s l e a d i n g .  The
absence of a causal nexus between the linguistic sign and 
its thing-meant is thus the blessing and the Curse d>f
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language. The blessing, because it marks the liberation 
of a sign from given physical contexts: we can represent 
the thing-meant, whether it is physically present or not. 
This makes it possible to talk of future things or imagined 
things. The curse, because it is the basis of cheating 
and lying.
Artificiality is thus one criterion of the linguistic 
sign. Now, fax as far as human language is concerned, we 
can add to this a second criterion. It is this; 2 t h e 
t e c h n i c a l  p r i n c i p l e  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  w h i c h  o n e  l i n g u i s t i c  s i g n  i s  
b u i l t  u p  i s  u n i v e r s a l l y  a p p l i c ­
a b l e .  If, for example, the sign of a meaning A is 
formed by making use of certain phoneraatic differences of 
articulate sound, the signs of B, D, D, etc. can be built 
up according tothe same principle, by a variation of phone* 
raatic differences. Such a universal principle is at the 
basis of writing, morse, signalling by flags etc,, which 
are all derived in the last instance from the principle 
constituting our sound languages. This seems to indicate 
that man has conceived 1 communication1 as a special pro­
blem, as a factor various actions such as calling for food, 
warning, instructing etc. had in common, a problem suscept­
ible of a universal solution, and it seems likewise that 
\
this problem was never grasped by animals.
So we may sum up by saying that language is easiest 
identified where we find an artificial instruments of
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communication consisting of signs constructed according 
to a universally applicable principle. Our previous 
assumption that language is an i n s t r u m e n t  of 
commuhication has thus been fully warranted and a clear 
line has been drawn between symptoms as objects of natur­
al science and linguistic signs as objects of the science 
of language.
D i a c r i t i c o n  aja^s y m b o 1 . - Inside 
this category of the linguistic sign, we have now to 
distinguish two main categories which we shall different­
iate as d i a c r i t i c o n  and s yiab o 1 . 1)/
The diacriticon is a d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  
Sign. Its main function is to serve as a distinguishing 
mark. A cross chalked at a particular door in order to 
single it out, to prevent it from being confused with 
other doors, or reminders such as a knot in the handker­
chief or a ring worn on a finger different from the usual 
one, are examples of diacritics. In our languages almost 
all phonematic labels or outer word-forms may be con­
sidered as diacritics of certain meanings. Sound-labels 
such as Jtrif] , £buk~] etc. etc., can be regarded as dia- 
critica of the meanings ’tree1, ’book’ etc. in the seme
vs
way as phonological differences bel^een Tp and Tpt&nJ
1) I think that these are better terms than ih name
(=diacriticon) and sign (= symbol) which I have used
in On Linguistic Explanation*Mod. Lang. Kev. XXXVI (1941) 
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or Dw- and are distinguishing marks of sound-
lahels.
The main characteristic of the diacriticon is its 
a r b i t r a r i n e s s ,  that is, its form could be 
changed at will without necessarily imparing its function: 
Whether X mark a door by a cross or a splash of paint 
or a nail does not really matter; one form of distinguish­
ing mark is almost as good as any other. From this foll­
ows directly the great m o b i l i t y  or transferabil­
ity of the diacriticon. A knot in the handkerchief may 
remind me of one thing to-day and of an entirely differ­
ent thing to-morrow. In the same way it does not really 
matter whether J stall an ’eye*£a.cj or or
or whether I change the label *1 in the course of
time toCS^s] or whether I use the sound-label [cuArt *0
in one context for a large packing-case or in another con-j
]
text for the nose of the elephant. I
i
Semantically speaking we m^y say that the diacriticon j
i
singles out a thing or meaning without betraying by its I 
form which thing or meaning it does single out. In short, ! 
it has a negative meaning, that is, a meaning without 
positive characteristics.^) |
i
-------------------------------------------------------------------- Ii
1) A friend tells me the story of a colleague who, j
j
looking up in an encyclopaedia the word abacadabra found \
\
it defined as ’word without meaning’; looking up under j
word he was informed that it is ’the smallest unit of
’meaning*. It would have been clearer to say that 
abacadabra was a mere diacriticon.
- 8 0 -
In contrast to the diacriticon, which is a sign of 
gtrbitrary reference, the . s y m b o l  is characterized 
by its a n a l o g i c a l  r e f e r e n c e .  If we 
use a cross as a symbol of the Christian Religion, the 
analogy between this sign and the cross on which Christ 
suffered bodily death is very obvious. If ’white1 is the 
colour of innocence, it is because we feel an analogy 
between this colour and purity, etc. It is through those 
features of the sign which are analogous to something in 
the thing-meant that it becomes a symbol . It is clear, 
therefore, that we must class as symbols all imitative
signs.
How far now are linguistic signs symbolic in that 
sense? There is one type of language which seems to con­
sist of nothing but symbols; it is the language of natural 
signs. They are of two sorts: Deictic and imitative gest­
ures. ^ ^ithese only the latter seem to fulfill the con­
ditions of symbols, but it is clear that deictic gestures 
also are nothing but a special class of imitative signs, 
jtk since they all picture the arm in the action of seizing 
something, although they do not picture the thing-mem^nt. 
We know also that our script-language has begun by being 
pictographic and thus symbolic. To stx a certain extent 
the same thing can be said of our sound-languages. It
*
1) Of. B. Bourdon, L&expression des emotions et des
tendances dans le langage, Paris (Alcan) 1892,p. 30.
Also Wundt, V51kerpsvcholOff:ie (1900), pp. 606/07.
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is probable that here too at the beginning^so-called 
* sound-gestures’, that is gestures made with our speech- 
organs, although it is uncertain to what extent they were 
merely a by-product of expressions in which other parts 
of the body played a prominent part and how far they were 
originally singled out for communication purposes. - As 
things are to-day we may call symbolic all onomatopoeic 
signs, although they very often do not picture the thing- 
meant in its totality, but only an aspect of it: cuckoo 
does not picture the bird, but only its cry, tic-tac imit­
ates the noise of the swinging pendulum but not the clock, 
etc. etc.
Obviously the range of meanings represented by signs 
operating according to a pictorial principle would be 
relatively small, because the nature of the sign material 
imposes strict limitations. The things we can imitate 
with the help of sensual material such as sounds, gestures, 
drawings etc. are relatively not very numerous. But as a 
matter of fact, man has extended considerably the realm 
of meanings to be covered by symbols, by using them 
m e t a p h o r i c a l l y .  The gesture imitating a roof 
may be used to mean ’protection’, the sound-group pst! 
imitating a whispering hh±jss voice is used in German as 
an exhortation to talk in a low voice and in Spanish as 
a discreet way of calling a person. Metaphor is an indirect 
way of symbolizing, in which we use the meaning A of a 
sign in its turn as a symbol of a second mending B.
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In the case of the roof-gesture or the pstl-sound the 
pictorial features of the sign were accessible to our 
senses. But this is generally not the casein linguistic 
metaphors. If I speak of an ’iron’ age, all that is 
accessible to my senses is the sound-label feu'x and
yet we may call an ’iron’ age a ’graphic1 expression, be­
cause here again we have a kind of picture, only the 
material with which we paint is not of a physical nature, 
it is a purely mental picture. It is only in our minds 
that we find the analogous, symbolic features. So in our 
case the linguistic sign is a characteristic complication 
of an outer diacriticon or sound-label and an inner, 
purely mental, symbbl; it is a complication of an o u t - 
e r (diacritical) and an i n n e r  (symbolic) form.
What now if I speak of an iron rail? Is it that in 
this case we have only an arbitrary label or diacriticon 
affixed to a certain thing-meant, or is it that here too 
we find an inner symbolic form? There should be no doubt 
that the latter alternative is the correct one. The only 
difference between eh the use of the v/ord iron in iron 
age and in iron rail is that the inner (or mental) sym­
bol in the first example is a somewhat imperfect analogon 
to the ultimate meaning, which has to be adjusted by the 
interpreter in order to be correctly understood, whereas 
in iron rail the mental symbol is already ideally ad­
equate to its meaning and needs no further adjustment.
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j The higher pictorial value of the metaphor results fromi
) the fact that a more abstract meaning is illustrated by 
certain concrete features which the interpreter has ’to . 
put into brackets’, because they do not fit the intended 
abstract meaning, and it is precisely the incongruity of 
these ill-fitting concrete features which throws them into 
relief and makes the whole expression picturesque.
From this >we shall xh have to learn a rather import­
ant lesson: Most linguistic signs are a complication 
of diacritical + symbolic features; in our soundlanguages 
they are normally distributed in outer (diacritical) and 
inner (symbolic) form, except in onomatopoeic signs, where 
both features appear in the outer form. If we consider 
the complication of symbolic + diacritical features as 
a unity, it is quite legitimate to follow ordinary usage 
and call all words ’symbols’, provided we really think 
of the complication; but if we abstract from that com­
bination outer form only, we should not refer to it as 
’symbol* but as ’diacriticon*. For instance if we consider 
freeze as a diacriticon we shall say that the hsim word1 
freeze has two meanings: that of a mural decoration and 
that of intense cold, if we look at it from the point of 
view of the symbol we shall say there are ’two different* 
words freeze in English; one meaning a mural decoration, 
the other intense cold. A w©rd such as abacadabra only 
exists as diacriticon.-1-)
!I
| 1) See our note on p. 79.
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S t a g e s  o f  s i g n  - d e v e l o p m e n t . - 
Symptom or natural sigp., symbol or analogous sign and 
diacriticon or arbitrary sign are first of all analytical 
concepts, distinguishing different classes of signs 
which we find hie et nunc before us. Now the temptation is 
almost irresistible to give to these analytical temms 
a genetic sense. At once an important perspective opens 
before us. We would see language emerge from imitations 
of symptoms, particularly expressive symptoms, which still 
would be almost indistinguishable from the real thing; 
they would be inarticulate and cover a small range of 
elementary meanings. Once the principle of metaphorical 
extension had been grasped, we see it conquering the 
material world and soon extending its area to abstract 
meanings by the way of inner symbolism. We would then 
have created the condition for the arbitrary sign, be­
cause we have only to suppose on the one hand that the 
direct (original) meaning of the sign is forgotten and 
on the other hand that the production of the outer sign 
becomes mechanized and aj^reviated. N oy/ the creation of 
signs is really free, severed from all fetters imposed by 
material conditions; language &aoomeo closely to the ideal 
of scientific notation. This picture acquires an even 
deeper significance if v/e suppose that this linguistic 
development gives us the measure of the development of 
human intelligence. The elaboration of the abstract sign 
would indicate the conquest of abstract thought.
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Linguists have yielded to this temptation to put at 
the beginning of language imitation of natural signs and 
to see in the arbitrary, artificial sign the crowning of 
a long process of development. The famous bow-wow theory 
(Max Mtlller) or Steinthalfs three levels of inner form 
corresponding to our distinctions of outer symbol (e.g. 
onomatopoeic signs), inner (menial) symbols and dia- 
critica are famous examples of such a theory.
For my part I should think that it is in principle 
correct. It would be wrong, however to overv/ork this genetic 
view, claiming that all arbitrary signs go back in the last
ressort to imitations of natural signs. Historical reality 
is infinitely more complicated. Grammont has shown in his
matopoeic words have often their origin in arbitrary 
words and vice versa. As long as language is being used 
for artistic expression v/e shall find that the more 
’’primitive” onomatopoeic signs are used, because they are 
so much more imaginative, they seem to bring us ever so 
much closer to reality than the abstract arbitrary sign. 
Artistically E. A. Poe's Raven expresses himself much 
better in the original where he says Never morel than in 
Mallarme’s famous translation where he utters Jamais -plus?
1) Grammatik. Logik u. Psvchologie; pP.97-101.
2) Revue des langues romanes, XLIY (1901), pp. 97/158,.
o)
famous article Qnomatopees et mots exoressifs ' that ono-
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But that on the whole linguistic progress goes from 
the imitation of natural signs (i.e. motivated signs) 
in the direction of arbitrary signs is not only suggested 
by the evolution of conventional gestures which follows 
this pattern, b.ut also by the development of our script 
with its three characteristic stages, called pictographic, 
ideographic and phonetic.-All this has a direct bearing 
on our question of S and P. for the simple reason that 
it will be all the more difficult to look for an S - P 
structure in signs which are to a large extent sensorial 
pictures. But it may be different in the domain of arbitr­
ary signs being associated with purely mental pictures.
«P a r t  I 
Chapter (5)
;M e a n i n g .
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T h e  p r o b l e m  o f  m e a n i n g .  -
^ A theory of the linguistic sign such as we have out­
lined in the preceding pages should "be supplemented hy a 
theory of m e a n i n g ,  because a sign only exists 
only in so far as it is a meaningful sign. The very notion 
of ’sign1 implies that of ’meaning’• One can never be jQzBnig 
thought of without the other. It is therefore all the more 
deplorable that the very term ’meaning* seems to be 
elusive and opinions disagree widely as to how the quest­
ion ’What is linguistic meaning?* should be answered.
Is ’meaning* a thing of our mind or is^ it identical 
with the thing-meant? Surely one can say *to get hold of 
the meaning of an expression is to get hold of the thing 
meant by it*; and consequently the thing-meant and mean­
ing are taken to be identical. On the other hand there 
are powerful arguments against it. To quite Professor 
Gardiner*s words * the thing meant by the word cake is 
eat&ble, whjle the meaning of the word is not.* And the 
same thing can be affirmed mutatis mutandis with re­
gard to abstracts: *....it is not the meaning of the word 
religion which stirs such emotions, which can create '
saints and inquisitors; only the thing meant by religion 
can do t h a t . I f  we look however in Professor Gardiner’s 
book for an answer to the question, what linguistic 
meaning is, apafct from its being different from the 
thing-meant, we are disappointed. We learn that word-
1) Alan H. Gardiner, The Theory of Speech and Language 
Oxford 1932, pp. 29/30.
1
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meaning for instance can "be looked upon subjectively, and 
we find its grammatical meaning; or objectively and we 
discover the area of meaning comprising all the things- 
meant a word might refer to,(p. 36). We hear that word- 
meanings are 1 adjectival’ in relation to the thing-meant 
(p. 39); ’meanings* belong to the psychical side of words 
(p.69), ’when we allude to the ’meaning* of a word what 
is signified is the multitude of ways in which a speaker 
may, if he will, legitimately employ it* (p. 1 0 0); in the 
term ’meaning* is involved the notion of human purpose (p. 
103). All these remarks are most Valuable characterisations 
of the phenomenon in question, revealing a very thjourough 
and competent linguistic experience, and yet I feel that 
they still leave a gap, which must be filled up before we 
can answer our question. If we look for help to other 
scholars we.find that according to L.R. Palmer ’meanings’ 
are the mental contents of sound-patterns?^ Does that in­
dicate that meanings are ideas, or concepts? We have only 
to ask this question and we remember what Stuart Mill
Q \
taught in his polemic against Hobbes ' ’When I say 11 the sun 
is the cause of day** I do not mean that my idea of the sun 
causes or excites ih in me the idea of day; or in other 
wol*ds, that thinking of the sun makes me think of day. I 
mean, that a certain physical fact, which is called the
1) L.R. Palmer, An Introduction to Modem Linguistics, p. 7 7.
2) J. Stuart Mill, Logic I,, p. 21.
A A
i ymm af
sun’s presence ... causes another physical fact, which 
1)is called day. * ' This seems to indicate that meanings can­
not he assessed in mental terms, and we are thus hack - 
at least apparently - to the point we started from. For 
Marty - Brentano meanings are definitely of a psycholog-
o \
ica.1 character. ' Here looms the danger we spoke ahout 
in .our chapter on the Psychological Point of View, that 
the linguist might he drawn into an alien field.3)
The most puzzling thing ahout this question of the 
linguistic meaning is prohahly, that the closer we analyse 
the|language situation, the less we discover anything that 
could he called ’meaning*. There are the speaker and the 
listener and the thing-meant; there are the relation be­
tween thought and thing-meant, that between sign (Bally*s 
signifiant) and thing-meant (Bally’s signifie) called by 
Ogden and Kichards r e f e r e n c e hut no ’meanings.*, unless
QfttrrAttvegy
we want to confine this term to either the reference or
/ \
to the thing-meant, as has been done. Should we therefore 
consider -the term ’meaning* devoid of any sense? This is
1) J. Stuart Mill, System of Logic X, London 1856, p.24.
2) Cf. p. 31, note 1.
3) See above pp. 37 f.
S) The Meaning of Meaning p. ,Ll.
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4) Ch. Bally, Linguistique generale et linguistique 
francaise, Paris 1932, -passim.
6) According to Gomperz - Dittrich ’meaning* is a relation 
■between "Aussage" and "Sachverhalt*1., This merely says 
that sentences are meaningful if they refer to facts; 
meaning is thus identical with reference to facts. 
Nothing is said, however, ahout the nature of this 
reference, nor is it clear how we have to conceive the 
meaning of isolated words, which do not refer to facts. 
Cf. 0. Dittrich, Die Prohleme der Sprachosvchologie 
und ihre gegenwSrtigen Lbsungsmoglichkeiten. Leipzig 
1913, p. 33.
hardly possible in view of the fact that linguists have 
used the term to very good effect.
And I think an answer to our question can he found. 
Signs operate according to the quid pro quo principle, 
that is to say, we accept them in communication instead 
of the things-raeant which they represent. The whole situ­
ation reminds us of commercial life, where we accept a 
cheque or a banknote instead of hard cash, and we do so, 
because both are equivalent. Sign-representation is also 
an expression of a sort of equivalency, and ’meaning1 is 
nothing but t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  
v a l u e  o f  s i g n s ,  where the term ’representation­
al* should not be taken in a psychological sense as re­
ferring to representation in the mind, but is merely the 
equivalent of the German stellvertretend: r e p r e s ­
e n t a t i o n a l  v a l u e  is the q u i d  -pro 
q u o  v a l u e .  In order to forstall possible confusions 
between epistemologic&l and linguistic terminology we 
shall call the quid pro q u o  values of signs s e m  a n t - 
i c values and avoid the ambiguous word ’representational* 
in this connection. Thus we shall say that me a n i n g 
i s  t h e  s e m a n t i c  v a l u e  o f  a s i g n .
Values are something immaterial, and that is why we 
cannot eat the meaning of the word cake, nor can we, for 
that matter, walk on the meaning of Columbus’s logs. On 
the other hand, values are nothing, if they cannot be 
properly assessed, and, in the last ressort, the semantic
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value of signs has to "be assessed in terms of 11 h i n g s- 
m e a n t ' .  Without the possibility of experiencing the 
thing-meant speaker and listener would be deprived of 
that neutral platform on which both must meet if the 
aim of communication, namely understanding, shall be 
reached.1  ^ Comparison with a commercial situation may 
again be helpful. If I say 'This half-crown means an 
ounce of tobacco to me', we use a material object as evalu­
ator, and in the same way we use the thing-meant as evaluu 
a tor of signs. When I say my lamp_ means that well-known 
particular object just in front of me, this object i s 
not the meaning of my lamp, but it d e f i n e s  it. 
Therefore we must get hold of the thing-meant in order to 
understand a meaning, but that does not prove that thing- 
meant and meaning are identical, although we can under­
stand that a confusion of both is not necessarily harm­
ful, provided the context suggests that the thing-meant 
is not quoted in relation to other things but as evaluator
of the sign.
M a t e r i a l  m e a n i n g  a n d  f o r m a l  
m e a n i n g .  - Our statement that meaning is the thing- 
meant value of a sign,must be qualified and elaborated 
if misunderstandings are to be ruled out. Looxing at
1 ) Cf. p. 49.
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isolated nouns such as cake, logs and lamp etc* we might 
he’ tempted to think that, "broadly speaking, each sign xe 
really denotes a thing in the outside world. Nothing 
could be farther from the, truth. We have only to look at 
all those signs, which the grammarian calls fformal signs* 
such as articles, auxiliary verbs, pronouns, prefixes, 
endings, word-order, accent etc. etc. in order to see at 
once that this is often not the case. But our statement 
is true in this sense, that a linguistic sign always re­
fers to a world thought of as lying * opposite* both 
speaker and listener - iven# should this world only exist 
in imagination - and subjected to their attention, and it 
is precisely the rd^le of the sign to direct the listener’ 
attention towards that goal. A linguistic sign is a direct 
ing as well as a directed sign, and -the ultimate goal of 
that direction is the ’thing-meant*.'
Uncomposed or holophrastic signs seem to fulfill their 
function in the most direct way, by simply telling us 
what is meant or to which thing-meant they direct the 
listener’s attention, without, however, indicating how 
this ultimate meaning is to be built up. The composed 
sign, however, functions in a different way. If we com­
pare it to an optical instrument we may say that certain 
parts of it have the function of singling out the broad 
objective sphere which appears somehow blurred until we 
adjust the focus with the help of additional, auxiliary 
signs. If I pronounce the word hunt for instance, I
evoke for any English speaking person a certain objective
j sphere of a relatively imprecise character, I give a
!
| first orientation. Bjc saying either the hunt or to hunt
j  I single out certain much more precise features in that
! general sphere. The question ’What is the thing-
or: meant value of to or the ^ even an isolated hunt? *.is a 
| very puzzling one, because on the one hand we feel that 
| these signs refer somehow to ’something objective*, on 
I the other hand we are unable to single out any precise 
j objective feature in a possible thing-meant for which 
I they stand. But once we have come to know the thing-meant
j
| value of the c o m b i n a t i o n  to hunt or of the
i
I c o m b i n a t i o n  the hunt, we are able to character- 
I ize the r6le played by these part-signs in building up the
i
i thing-meant value of the combination. Therefore, insteadI o
j
i of asking the material question ’What is the thing-meant 
j value of to or the or hunt?’ it is much more reasonable 
j to ask ’What contribution do these signs make in the build- 
| ing up of the ultimate thing-meant value?*, and this is 
i  a functional or a formal question. In other words, all 
! questions concerning the ’meaning’ of part-signs or signsj
■ destined to work in combination with other signs really 
I aim in the first place at the operative or functional
i
| value of signs and are therefore formal questions.
I
Strictly speaking it would be preferable to avoid 
any question of the form ’What is the meaning of the £ 
definite article or an ending -er etc.?* and replace it
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by a more accurate formulation such as ’What is the funct­
ion of the article etc. in a given meaningful reference?’, 
j But the term ’meaning’has Been so currently adopted in this
i
! context that it would "be pedantic to replace it "by the 
| more accurate but much more clumsy ’function in meaning- 
| ful reference*. We shall therefore simply say that t h e  
i t h i n g - m e a n t  d e f i n e s  t h e  u l t i r a -  
j a t e m e a n i n g  o f  t h e  t o t a l  s i g n  
I m a t e r i a l i t e r . whereas t h e  m e a n i n g s  
o f  p a r t - s i g n s  i n  c o m p o s i t i o n  
| d e f i n e t h e  u l t i m a t e  m e a n i n g  f o r m  ■ 
j a 1 ite r . Likewise ’semantic values* may be either 
j material values or formal values.
We may well characterize the ultimate thing-meant 
; value as e x t r i n s i c  meaning, because the thing- 
I meant value is always transcending grammatical form,"1') 
the thing-meant lies outside the linguistic sign, from 
which it can be dissociated. To the extrinsic meaning we 
may oppose the i n t r i n s i c  or functional (grammat- 
I ical) meaning of part-signs in composition. So Y/e would 
say that the extrinsic meaning of the hunter is definde 
by a certain thing-meant, namely a man exercising the 
■ functions of hunting. Whereas the meanings of the, hunt-, 
-er are intrinsic or grammatical meanings indissolubly 
associated with the part-signs the, hunt-. -er. and to
1) We have called attention to the fact that certain feat­
ures of the thing-meant remain outside linguistic symboliZ'
ation. Cf. p. 54.
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be defined in terras of function in meaningful reference.
At this juncture we come up against a terminological 
difficulty, because the terra ’material meaning* is not
i
| confined in grammatical parlance to extrinsic meaning 
| only, but covers also the meaning of elements such as
I ^
| hunt- in our exaraple# This^perhaps not very satisfactory 
I from the theoretical point of view, but as so often in 
I the case of traditional terminology which has proved
! useful in practice there can be found some reason, why
I
| the term ’material meaning* should be used in that way.
In our case the reason is that both whew! and hdnt- con­
tain a s p e c i f i c  reference to the objective 
world, whereas elements such as the, -er and the like
j are more g e n e r a l  signs. This traditional termin-
!
I ology has an obvious disadvantage: it obscures the fact 
| that the oertinent question which can be asked with re-
j i
! gard to whew! is: ’What is meant by whew!?’ whereas in the 
| case of we can only ask ’Which function does it
| fulfill in meaningful reference?’. In other words, trad- 
! itional terminology obscures the fact that even root- 
meanings as that of hunt- are grammatical meanings, 
whereas whew! is outside grammar. However, I think it is 
wiser to avoid terminological novelty as far as possible
in order to avoid confusion, so that we shall adopt the
I shall
following compromise: We^retain the traditional term of
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!
|
|?material meaning* in the sense of specific reference to 
the objective world together with our distinction between 
extrinsic and intrinsic (grammatical) meanings
i
! ( whew! Extrinsic meaning
Material meaning J
L hunt- ^
j t Intrinsic (grammatical) meaning.
Eormal meaning the, -er \
j
Inside the grammatical field we would call hunt- a
ii
i s e m a n t e m e  , the and -er m o r p h e m e .  In any
ii
composition of part-signs semantemes are the most import­
ant ones just because they (they? refer to the objective
t
wor^ d in a specific way. They are therefore able to suggest 
in any meaningful reference the bulfi of the information, 
jcompared to them morphemes play only an auxiliary r^le,
'they are auxiliary signs (outils grammaticaux) in the 
largest sense.
^n a statement such as the hunt-er kill-s the deer weI — ~ ~r~—^  . .j i _ - - —
ihave three semantemes, the rest are morphemes. The semant- 
|ernes as the most important parts in a linguistic communic-
;ation are the natural halting-points for the interpreter^
I
attention. This can be clearly seen if we compare He fell.
iDead! with He fell dead. In the first instance fell re-i ——- — — ------- —  —— ——•
|ceives the full weight of attention, whereas in the second
|
I example our attention races ahead to the relatively most
|
|important word dead, thus degrading fell to a mere auxiliary. 
The meaning of semantemes is the one which allows us 
to establish word-families, it is the meaningful element
common to the desire, to desire and desirous. It also 
allows us to distinguish morphological varieties of the 
same meaning: good, “better, “best: to go. went, gone etc.
On the distinction “between semantemes and morphemes is 
thus “based the entire grammatical organization of langu­
ages.
’Meaning* as an action implies doubtless an element of 
will, and the goal of our wilful effort in speaking is 
the thing-meant defining extrinsic meaning. It is therefore 
(the extrinsic meaning we are aiming at, which stands out 
clearest in our consciousness, whereas the intrinsic 
meaning,■which is purely instrumental in achieving that 
aim is often not noticed at all. While we speak ar listen 
we seem to live entirely in the world of things-meant, 
and it requires the methodical effort of the trained 
linguist to learn anything about the mechanism of intrins­
ic meaning. Our description of meaning as a wilful act 
corresponds exactly to our characterization of the s±gn 
k linguistic sign as a voluntary sign. In the sphere
of meaning as in that of the sign the same problem of 
freedom is implicated.However, not in all cases does 
the meaning of a socially accepted sign conform to the 
intention of whoever uses that sign. Language has a 
peculiar life of its pwn; as sodn as a linguistic formulat­
ion has come into existence its meanings is that corre­
sponding to the norms of social convention, and nobody
1) See above p. 74a.
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has the right to claim he meant ’white* when he said black. 
But this does of course not obliterate the fundamentally 
i n t e n t i o n a l  character of meaning as something 
we aim at when speaking.1’)
Prom our foregoing remarks on extrinsic and intrinsic 
meaning it can be gathered already that both are interde­
pendent. Without a knowledge of the thing-meant value of 
to hunt or the hunter it Yfould be impossible to analyse 
the formal meaning of the linguistic elements involved, 
and it is almost a commonplace to repeat that knowledge of 
the thing-meant is one of the most valuable assets in the 
interpretation of signs. This gives to the linguistic norms 
which regulate understanding,a certain elasticity. As long 
as we know what is meant by an expression, this expression 
need not conform very closely to conventional form. It is 
here that lie the germs of linguistic change.
l) It is the merit of phenomenologists (Husserl, Dempe) to 
have insisted on this fact. If it id' overlooked one 
might be tempted to define ’meaning* as an associative 
link between sign and sense and thus fall back into 
associational psychology which has been overcome by 
phenomenology. (H. Dempe, Was 1st Sprache?. p. 50: 
"Intentionalitat ist das Wesen des Psychischen11. ) The 
conception of ’meaning* as an associative link is still
v/fheld tetgf by S. de Ullmann, Language and Meaning, in 
Word II, 1946, p. 118.
P a r t i  
Chapter (6)
L a n g u a g e  a n d  c o g n i  t i o n .
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T h i n g - m e a n t  a n d  c o g n i t i o n .  - 
We have pointed out on p. 91 that the thing-meant has 
a great social importance: it provides that neutral 
platform on whiizh hoth speaker and listener can meet . 
The possibility of adequately experiencing the thing- 
meant is therefore one of the most important conditions 
of linguistic understanding. It is only in the thing- 
meant that we find a truly 'neutral* platform, that is 
something that (does* nei the r| be longs to the speaker no t 
to the listener; the same could hardly be said of sub­
jective psychological events. According to Dittrich1  ^
Gomperz has tried to define the neutral platform where 
speaker and listener meet in terms of "generell-typi- 
schen Totalimpressionen’1. By this he understands those 
representational features of the objective substratum 
common to all members of a linguistic community: f,die 
alien gemeinsamen Vorstellungselemente einer Aussage- 
grundlage11. Against this we should like to point out 
that any listener can know that certain representational 
features in the speaker correspond to certain others in 
his own mind only if and when experience shows that the 
goal of attention, i.e. the t h i n g - m e a n t ,  
is identical for both in a given act of communication.
1) Die Probelme der S-prachpsychologie. p. 44.
-)ioo-
But our insistence on the role of the thing-meant 
as evaluator of signs does not mean that we underestim­
ate the factor ‘cognition1 in the process of understand­
ing, We have to recognize that, notwithstanding its 
existence outside the subject, the thing-meant is 
‘given to us* only in c o g n i t i o n ;  it exists 
for us only in so far as we have come to know it. We
i
can refer to the objective world in a meaningful way
only with the help of those mental processes which
we call cognition.
This looks as if we are after all giving prominence
i*«Vf M
to a subjectivistic psychology, which we totreve? all the 
time to relegate to the rank of an auxiliary science.
But in reality we do nothing of the kind. All we do is 
to affirm the truth formulated by Schopenhauer that 
there is no object without a subject. In the very term 
object, cognition is already implied as a potentiality 
We^seen already that the very term ‘objectivity* is the 
necessary correlatum of the subjective fact we call 
* directing our attention^ It is true we introduce the
Ovtr
cognizant ego top-p-o-slte which the objective world is
found and the subjective action of experiencing it. But
in a theory of cognition we consider individualistic
psychological processes only in so as they are
y€ *fo txper fence of
precisely o b j e c t  -S — cxpcrioncc? We do not
consider them in their psychological reality but only
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in their i d e a l  f u n c t i o n  of reflecting 
objects. The very terms ‘reflection of objects* oto 
‘objective experience* imply that objective features 
have for our mind the value of cognitional features in 
uotentia and that cognitional features have the value 
of a c t u a l  objective features; in other words, 
c o g n i t i o n a l  f e a t u r e s  a r e  c o n ­
g r u e n t  t o  o b j e c t i v e  f e a t u r e s .
And it is this ideal parallelism between objective and 
cognitional features whcjjh dispenses us from analysing 
cognition of the ‘same* thing-meant in listener and sijeak- 
er separately, because by granting the identity of the 
one, the identity of the other is already implicitly I
accepted. Cognition as a psychological process differs 
from one individual to another in intensity, clarity and 
sentimental colour, but f u n c t i o n a l l y  it 
is the same in so far. as certain objects are recognized.
The ideal equivalency between cognitional and ob­
jective features should not be taken for more than it 
really^is, namely an expression of equivalency accepted 
by the cognizant ego. that is to say that the question 
of truth or equivalence between cognitional and r e a l  
(as opposed to imaginary) objective features is not pre­
judged by our statement. If I say the chimaera exists.
I know of course that there is nothing in the real 
world corresponding to chimaera. and yet, there is an 
‘accepted* object or a thing-meant by chimaera which can
- 1 0 2 -
be recognized independently by speaker and listener, 
and there are in their minds cognitional features 
ideally conformed to this accepted object. This goes 
to show that the question of ‘reality* and ‘truth* 
can be eliminated from a theory of meaning by quali­
fying the term ‘object* or ‘objective world* by the 
attribute ‘accepted*, by insisting that ‘objective* 
is merely anything we can direct our attention to 
and ‘objectivity* is nothing but the necessary correla- 
tum to that subjective fact. And we can direct our «- 
attention not only to real things but also to imaginary 
ones. In fact cognitional experience embraces much 
more than the real world. We have not only access to 
the spoon we eat our soup with or to the tree in our 
streets there is the tremendous world of fiction, and 
the meaning of fairy can be tested in the same way 
as that of table, cat or house. and some people know 
Menhistonheles better than the typewriter on their 
desk.
In the same sense^statement^ such as My house is 
built of water is still meaningful although it is 
manifestly untrue. Husserl would have said that a state­
ment ceases to meaningful only when it is unsinnig. 
not when it is widersinnig.In our terminology we
1) E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen II. p. 312.
should say that in our statement v/e have a compatibility 
of f o r m a l  meanings of the signs involved, but 
incompatibility of m a t e r i a l  (=extrinsic) 
meanings, but since the linguist deals only with 
accepted objects he has no means of testing this mat­
erial incompatibility. Therefore he accepts statements
1)such as This round triangle is industrious, 'provided 
the formal meaning is in order. And this is also what 
Steinthal v/as trying to point out in his famous parable 
in which the logician protests against the statement 
diese runde Tafel ist viereckig. whereas the grammarian 
accepts it; his turn of criticizing comes when he hears 
dieser Tafel sind rund to which the logician has nothing*j
the logician to point out the contradiction in terms 
of a statement, whereas the linguist is only concerned 
with formal correctness measured by the norms of langu­
age.
All this confirms that for the linguist the thing- 
meant is the thing-meant accepted in cognition, and it 
is possible to accept things-raeant even if they are 
constituted in such a way that they would not exist in 
reality.
According to Steinthal it is the job of
1) Cf. E. Otto, Die Wortarten. Germ. Roman. Monatsschr. 
16 (1929), p. 420.
2) Grammatik, Logik u. Psychologie. p. 220.
We were very careful (in Chap. 3) to build up a 
theory of ‘sign* and ‘meaning* without introducing 
the terms ‘thought* or ‘cognition*. Our aim in this 
was to develop the consequences of a pure linguistic 
point of view, giving it as much autonomy as possible. 
This we have dftne because we believe that, if the S - 
P analysis has any foundation in fact at all it can be 
applied only in the realm of thought, a proposition 
which we shall endeavour to make acceptable later.
Now if this point should! be granted, it is clear that 
the fairest way of conducting an enquiry as to the 
legitimacy of an S - P analysis in the realm of langu­
age would be not to introduce cognition or thought 
into linguistic theory unless it becomes absolutely 
unavoidable. We believe that we have now reached a 
juncture where this is indeed the case. If meaning is 
in any sense the thing-meant value of signs, and if 
thing-meant values can only be adequately assessed in 
cognition, then t h e  f u n c t i o n o f  l a n g u  
a g e  i s  n o t  c o n c e i v a b l e  w i t h ­
o u t  a c o g n i t i o n a l  b a s i s .  This 
does not say anything about the way the relationship 
between cognition and language has to be conceived, but 
it does prove what we might call the factual entangle­
ment between cognition and language. The acceptance of 
this fact is a decisive step in the direction of the
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solution of our problem. We have found the plane on 
which to look for S and P: cognition, and we know also 
that cognition and language hang somehow together.
R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  a n d  t h o u g h t .  - 
It seems to be the practice of treateses on the philo­
sophy of language to talk of 1thjpught* where we use 
the term ’cognition1; the relationship between 
X ‘thought* and ‘language* has been the high theme 
of these treateses.-^-) Unfortunately, however, we 
found that in the term ‘thought*,as currently applied, 
two quite different things are confused, namely 
a higher type of cognition,or ‘thought* proper,and
o \
a lower type of cognition, namely ‘representation*, ' 
which furnishes to ‘thought* its material content.
The difference between thought and representation 
becomes immediately obvious if we consider them as 
i - d e a l  s t r u c t u r e s  rather than psycho- 
physical events, ' and we have explained how important 
it is to consider cognition from an ideal functional 
point of view if one wishes to understand the r6le
1) Cf. the titles of works by Brandenstein, Brunot, 
Delacroix, Deutschbein, Jespersen, Jordan, Kramp,
Morgenroth,,Matthes, Sechehaye, Steinthal, Stenzel,
Sweet, Vossler,given in our bibliography.
2) See above pp. 39 ff.
3-) See above p. 40.
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of the thing-meant as evaluator of signs. *0
If we do thatjwe realize at onee that in represent­
ation the objective world is given u s  in two e x ­
t e n s i v e  forms: s p a c e  and t i m e ,  and in
one i n t e n s i v e  form: q u a l i t y .
In thought this representational material is broken 
up into entities of a certain fixed objective range 
(analysis, yielding c one e p t s) and re-united into 
units of a higher order (synthesis, yielding j u d g ­
m e n t  s).
Representation is essentially an a u t o m a t i c  
process, that is to say, given our sensorial apparatus 
and those parts of the brain responsible for their con­
trol, we cannot help representing under certain condit­
ions. - Thought, on the other hand, is essentially 
c r e a t i v e  and c o n s t r u c t i v e ;  it con­
sists o f p u r p  o s e  f u l  acts in contrast to a 
mere train of associations. This purposefulness of 
thought reveals itself already in its analytical phase, 
in the creation of concepts. No concept without con­
ception, that is, without a position taken up by the 
thinker, adapted to his purpose: From all the represent­
ational features lying before him, those are picked out 
and given prominence which best serve the ends of his 
thought. It is precisely the purposefulness of the con­
cept which is at the basis of its higher intellectual
' 1) See above pp. 100/01.
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value as compared with representations; purpose is the 
truly ‘understandable* factor in concepts, a factor 
which allows us to get a grip on the representational 
material, which gives also to concepts the stability 
and rigidity so necessary for a successful operation 
of thought. According to different purposes we may 
consider the same individual from different points of 
view, and the same man may appear as ‘foreman* as 
‘colleague*, as ‘husband*, as ‘daddy* etc. All these 
reflect different conceptions of the same thing-represent 
ed, they are notae picked out from a variety of possib­
ilities as the material of the corresponding concepts.
In this analytical ste^is given _already)an appreciable 
degree of prominences to certain representational feat­
ures above the rest, and this, as is well known, may 
be carried a step further to complete independence by 
a b s t r a c t i o n ,  which is nothing but carrying 
the analytical process to its extreme. This goes to 
show that conceptual symbolism is only another instance 
of the fact that all symbolism is selective.-0
This analytical selection of notae has the advantage 
of shelving, as it were, those representational features 
which are relatively unimportant for us at a given 
moment, and this makes it easier to dominate the whole 
complex.They are comparable to strongholds of high 
strategical value in the representational material. But
1) See above p. 53, note 2.
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such a stronghold is permanent, or at least, enduring, 
value only if it can he properly linked up with pos­
itions already fortified. We must even say that these 
strongholds are already selected with this view in mind, 
and that it is carried into effect hy the synthetic 
phase of thought. Indeed, hy one concept we only seize 
a thing-represented, it is only hy means of the synthesis 
that we mentally act upon it.
This superficial and metaphorical account of the re­
lationship between representation and thought may suff­
ice at this stage of our discussion to give us a first 
idea of how this relationship may he conceived; it does 
not pretend to give more than that, it does not pretend, 
ahove all, to give an epistemological or psychological 
account of mental processes.
We add one word on terminology. Both representation 
and thought have their specific forms. How, while there 
is the adjective representational to qualify forms, there 
is no adjective derived from thought. We shall therefore 
make the term cognitional do the work of such an adject­
ive w h e r e v e r  i ^ i s  c l e a r  t h a t  w e  
u s e  i t  i n  o p p o s t i o n  t o  r e p r e s - 
e n t a  t i o n a l  .(In other contexts it will still 
comprehend hoth representation and thought.)We shall 
say for instance that space time and quality are re­
presentational forms, S and P are cognitional forms, 
we shall also call the judgment a cognitional act.
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C o - g n i t i o n  a n d  l a n g u a g e .  - We 
have^arrived at the following situation: on the one hand 
we find language, i.e. a certain order of diacritical 
and symbolic signs and their socially accepted semantic 
values, their formal and material meanings. On the other 
hand we have the thing-meant, definig^the ultimate 
meaning, and the idel|a cognitional forms ( representations 
integrated into thought) through which they are experienc­
ed. The question of the relationship between ’language1
c
and ’thought* is therefore for us a problem of the re­
lationship between two hinds of symbolism: a s o c i ­
a l l y  conditioned one, viz. ’langauge’ and an 
i d e a l  cognitional symbolism, viz. ’thought’.
This sharp opposition between cognitional and lingu­
istic symbolisation is the basis on which our in­
vestigation of the S - P problem has to be built up.
Being now able to contrast in a clear way linguistic and 
cognitional symbolism we gather the first fruit of our 
introductory discussion which was mainly aimed at this 
point. Prom here the way leads on in a clearly marked 
direction: after the distinction of the two kinds of 
symbolism, cognitional and linguistic, we are now faced 
with the task of shov/ing how they are related to each 
otBr.
In this respect we shall have to say first of all 
that in intelligent speaking and understanding cognition
is necessarily involved, "because the accepted thing-meant
the
cannot play its role of defining meaning of linguistic 
signs, unless it is got hold of in cognition. It is 
therefore to "be expected a priori that at least in 
a d v a n c e d  linguistic symbolization signs will 
refer somehow to the ultimate thing-meant only by a
TOVCt*,
round-about^, i.e. referring directly to cognition and 
only indirectly, through cognitional forms, to the 
thing-meant. Because, if they do, they can obviausly 
help understanding, which is the correct assessment of 
the thing-meant in the mind of the interpreter. And 
experience shows that this is without doubt the case. 
Indeed, our first knowledge ,of cognitional categories 
has been gained by abstracting them from grammatical 
categories, and this would have been impossible if 
language could teach us nothing about them. But in view 
of the fact that for so many centuries cognitional and 
grammatical categories have been thought of as identical, 
it is most important to assert that this reflection of 
cognitional categories in language i s  b y  n o  
m e a n s  a n e c e s s i t y  and can therefore not 
be expected to be found in all linguistic manifestations 
at any time, that its raison d’etre is n o t  a 
n a t u r a l  n e c e s s i t y ,  but dme to the 
p e d a g o g i c a l  t e n d e n c y  in the speaker 
to facilitate understanding, a tendency which is a 
mark of advanced speech and therefore a h i s t o r -
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i c a 1 phenomenon. If that is so we shall have to 
expect also that the manifestations of this tendency 
are not all equally clear and pronounced even where 
they are encountered, and it will he precisely pur 
task to show specifically how cognitional categories 
are integrated into grammatical categories.
In view of the fact that very eminent philosophers
i)
such as B. Croce and W.M. Urban have proclaimed a sort 
of cogito ergo loquor theory, it may perhaps he useful 
to dwell a little•longer on the d i f f e r e n c e  
between language and cognition, as we see it.
There is first of all a f u n c t i o n a l  differ­
ence. Functionally cognition is not a social phenomen­
on, whereas language is. The thinker faces the ob­
jective world alone, the speaker, however, faces 
also the listener. To this we may add a p r a c t i c -  
a 1 difference: linguistic symbolism is necessarily 
bound to physical signs and is therefore influenced 
directly by physical factors, thought-symbolism may be 
conceived as purely mental, physical factors can come 
to bear on it only indirectly^through an influence 
of language on thought. For the linguist the relat­
ive independence of language from cognition is recogn-
I
ized in the great m o b i l i t y  of the linguistic I|
sign as it manifests itself in synonymity and j
horaonymity. It would be wrong to infer from the
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absence of an adequate linguistic sign the ignorance 
of the corresponding thing-meant (German has no word 
-^or bully. English no word for Schadenfreude); it 
would be equally wrong to conljcude that an English 
speaking person could not see that dew, rain, ice. 
water, mist etc. are only different states of the 
same thing, only because there is no word for that 
thing in the English language. Generally we know many 
more things than we can name or describe adequately, 
we may also know a number of words which remain mere 
diacritica for unknown meanings. Even the fact that 
language and thought influence each other is a proof 
fif their difference. Physiological inhibitions (a&phasia) 
are likewise most easily understood with the help of 
our hypothesis.
' On the other hand we believe also that the difference 
between language and cognition, to be recognized in 
principle, does n o t  warrant the belief in an all- 
pervading factual independence of both. We do not be-
Ov—
lievettherefore,that it is feasible end* justifiable 
to expel cognitional terminology from the field of 
grammar of advanced linguistic constructions as certain 
modern reformers would like to do. We think cfche-refore* 
also that the terms S and P are going to continue to 
play a legitimate rdle in grammatical analysis. But J
the sense of these terms has to be restated in sjtch r
q way that the metaphysical implications of the tradit­
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ional theory are avoided.
To prove all that1we shall have to fulfill the follow­
ing programme: (1) We shall have to outline a theory 
of S and P in the domain of thought wich is purely 
formal. (2) We shall have to investigate how far S and 
P afce reflected in language.
P a r t  II 
Chapter (l)
T h e  m e a n i n g  o f  S u b j e c t  a n d
P r e d i c a t e  i n  t h e  s c i e n c e  o f
t h o u g h t .
E x p o s i t i o n .  - Through the discussions of
KJQ.
the First Part we "believe ter have fulfilled the two 
points of our programme as outlined in the Introduction; 
(l) we possess a qualified opinion on the relationship 
"between linguistics and the sciences of the mind, logic 
and psychology. We have seen that the functional and 
sociological conception of language allow* us to "build 
up an autonomous theory of sign and meaning, relatively 
independent from physiological psychology and also from 
epistemological logic. (2) On the other hand we found
A,
in spite of this that language is factually entangled
with cognition. - Instead of confusing representation
and thought as the followers of "both Wundt and Paul
have done (Part I Chap. 2) we propose to separate them
as sharply as possible. This we can do if we treat them
not in, their physiological and psychological aspects,
hut as ideal floras. We habe pointed out in Part I Chap.l
that the inadequacy of traditional logic for the analysis
and explanation of linguistics, i.e. social symbolism
cannot be taken as an argument against certain basic
assumptions of traditional logic, and indeed we believe
that ’concepts* and ’judgment* - and hence S and P -
define accurately forms of thought as different from
*
representational forms. But this is h h  s o  far nothing 
but an assumption for which we still have to give furth­
er justification.
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This we propose to do in the course of this Second 
Part of our essay where we attack the problem of S and 
P proper. We cannot, however, offer a fair statement of 
our c--se without discussing the view of others on the 
subject; this will most certainly not only enrich but 
also complicate matters. It will be useful therefore to 
outline a -plan de campagne according to which we shall 
proceed in this Second Part of our investigation.
To begin with it will probably be indispensable to 
quote a few authorities, both linguists and philosophers, 
expressing scepticism with regard to the usefulness of 
the distinction of S and P. For it is in these opinions 
that the modern methodological crisis is best reflected. 
Secondly, v/e shall endeavour to show what might be and 
has been understood by the terras of S and P. As far as 
possible we have divided up the whole complex into two 
realms, that of thought and that of language. As intro­
duction to the problems of the former we are going to
1
choose a very brief expose of Aristotle’s classical theory,!i
because it seems to met that all the main aspects of the j
question are already involved in it. The questions we 
have to deal with there are the following: Is the S - P 
relation to be found i in the relation between things 
or that between concepts or in a complex thing-concept 
relation? - In the realm of language we shall discuss 1
those questions which are somehow different from those 
already considered under the heading of ’thought*, as I
for instance that the P of a sentence is the finite 
verb, or the stressed term, that the S precedes the 
P in speech etc. These two sections will he critical 
and negative. We reserve the exposition of our positive 
point of view for the following chapter, which brings
U IT»us ±h the theory of S and P proper. This, I trust, 
will provide us with a basis sound enough to discuss j
the limits of grammatical method operating with an !
analysis into S and P in the Third Part of this essay.
S o m e ,  c r i t i c a l  r e m a r k s  o n  t h e  
S - P  r e l a t i o n . -  According to the old logistic 
grammar a sentence was "the expression of a judgment”
(La proposition est 1 fenonciation d*un jugement says 
M. Chapsal1)); as such it is supposed to consist of 
two main parts called S and f?; the latter may in turn 
be analysed into copula and attribute. - This conception 
is dangerous, because it might lead to the opinion that
iI
we think first according to the rules of formal logic 1
and then express this thought in such a way that to |
i
each logical element there would correspond a linguistic j
one. Ifc is also faulty, because it leaves out the one- 
word sentence altogether; furthermore it does not say,
}
how requests and commands are to be classified, and, j
t i
lastly, it does not envisage the possiblity that a !
1) In: Ch.-P. Girault-Duvivier, Grammaire des grammaire s 
I, Paris 1879, p. 44Q, note.
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sentence may comprehend not one "but various judgments.
In spile of ttijses shortcomings this old formula has the
considerable advantage of expressing the fact that sent'
ences - if they are analysable at all - have to be anal­
ysed according to a dichotomic principle, and it is this,
which secured the formula*s success in syntactical treat­
ises. But when grammar began to emancipate itself from 
logic, the old formula fell into discredit,and in extreme 
cases reformers wanted to do away completely with the terras 
S and P, which were considered to be remainders of an 
antiquated scholastic point of view, which could no longer 
be adopted in modern scientific grammar.^
Hugo Schuchardt affirms that one would be justufmed 
in eliminating the terms S and P altogether from grammar.
If he goes on using them, it is only for reasons of con-
* ±><prt*tc4
venience. ' A similar scepticism is uttered? by Stout, who 
writes; '*the subject-predicate relation is Altogether dis-
i
tinct in kind from those relations, with which it is 
commonly identified by 'grammarians. It is a psychological 
category, characteristic of the nature of discourse as a 
mental process.1,3 ^ Noreen is very cautious dn the use of*
1)This attitude is reflected nowadays eve# in popular works. 
Cf. P. Bodaer, The Loom of Language. London 194-3,pp. 130/53
2) Hugo Schuchardt Brevier, ed. L. Spitzer, Halle a.S.
1922, p. 225.
3) In Mind. XVI, 1891, p. 192.
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in the use of the terms S and P; he speaks of the ”soge- 
nannte Subjekt'1 and the "sogenannte Prbdikat", and pre­
fers to call the two terms of a “pradikativer Konnexion'* 
a ’’prinzipale Gloss*1 and an "akzessorische Glosse*' in 
order to arrive at a purely grammatical terminology as 
distinct from the logical or psychological one.^) - 
Svedelius is very categorical on this point: Tl0n ne peut 
tenir compte de celle-ci (i.e. **de la nature pratique du 
langage’*) qu*en ahandonnant toutes ces denominations de 
proposition (= jugemfint logique), sujet, predicat, em- 
pruntees a la logique.**2) More recently Professor Hjelms- 
lev affirms: *fEt la phrase ne semble pas etre.une notion 
SEL*ordre iagxspas linguistique. *' Consequently he arrives at 
the conclusion: **Hous doutons .... qu*il soit possible, 
par des procedes purement grammaticaux, d* aboutir a de- 
gager des tern^ tels qu*un sujet et un predicat.*’ ' - The 
late Professor Kalepky says in an article on the impersonal 
construction: ”Als Ergebnis dieser Erbrterungen sei nun- 
mehr festgestellt, dass die beiden Termini Subjekt und 
PrSdikat die dominierende Rolle, die sie seit zirka zwei 
Jahrtausenden - unter Einbeziehung der aristotelischen
1) A. Noree^ H.W. Poliak, EinfQhrung in die wissenschaft- 
liche Betrachtung der Sprache. Halle a.S. 1923, p. 230.
2) L*analyse du langage appliciuee a la langue franpaise. 
Uppsala 1898, p.6.
3) Principes de grammaire generale. Copenhagen 1928,p. 35.
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Ausdrticke - in den Grammatiken okkupiert hatten, ausge- 
spielt haben und - wenigstens in w i s s e n s c h a f t -  
l i c h e n  Satzdarstellungen - nur noch g e n e t i - 
s c h e Bedeutung beanspruchen dttrfen, nSmlJch so, dass 
gesagt wird: *Jeder Satz± ist das Pr&dikat zu einem sein 
Subjekt bildenden Bewusstseinsinhalt. nt‘^  - J. Ries 
in his hook on the sentence writes: "Subjekt und PrSdikat
!
setzen den Satz voraus, lassen sich erst aus der Form und 
den Gliederbeziehungen des Satzes herleiten und verste- 1 
hen." But he cautiously adds in a note: "Falls sie tlber- 
haupt aufrecht zu erhalten sind, was noch genauerer Prtt- 
fung hedarf."^) t ^
U be *.y\xoKntt.v-
A similar hostility against the terms S and
GlUPUillTl >*
among .philosophers, and occasionally we that they
think these terms good enough for the grammarian in the 
same way as a grammarian might leave them with the philo­
sopher hut eliminate them from the field of linguistics. 
Heinrich Maier writes: "Es ware viellelcht, da das Suksixx
1) Th. Kalepky, Sind die "Verba Inroersonalia" ein gramma-
«
tisches Problem? In: Die neueren Sprachen. XXXV,p. 166. 
Cf. also Keuaufhau der Grammatik. Leipzig, Berlin 
1928, pp. 19 ff.
2) J. Ries, Was ist ein Satz? Beitrage zur Grundlecrung 
der Syntax III, Prag 1921, p. 7.
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Subs traturteil keinen ursprbnglichen, selbst&ndigen 
Urteilstypus darstellt, zweckmassiger, die T e r m i ni 
S u b j e c t  u n d  P r ' a d i k a t  a u s  d e r  
l o g i s c h e n  U r t e i l s l e h r e  a u s z u -  
s c h l i e s s e n  und sie ganz der Grammatik zuzu-
l) YtiVlAxK'
weisen." - H. Gomperz mentions a word? by Sayce who !i
has said: "Die Theilung des Satzes in zwei Theile, in j
Subjekt und Pradikat ist ein reiner Zufall.", and he I
I
utters himself a similar conviction: Ich kann deninach der
Subjekt- und Pr&dikatvorstellungen keine bevorzugte I
Stellung einrSumen. Ic.i glaube vielmehr, dass sich das •
Gesetz der Dualitat einschr&nken l&sst auf die ebenso
sel'Everstandlich wie inhaltsleere Behauptungj aus der
Zerlegung einer Gesamtvorstellung nriissen m i n d e s t-
2)e n s zwei Einzelvorstellungen hervorgehen.1
Ch. Serrus wants to exclude the notion S from logic: 
"le sujet n fest pas un element du jugement et, comme 
categorie grammaticale, il est un accident du lan-
l) Psvchologie des emotionalen Denkens. p. 163.
This would have been accepted by the grammarian H. Sweet.
fi
Cf. Words. Logic and Grammar. Coll. Papers of H. Sweet. 
Arr. by H.C. Oxford 1913, pp. 20/21.
2) Zur Psvchologie der logischen Grundtatsachen. Leipzig, 
Wien, 1897, pp. 52/53. 'j
I!
I
I
j
j gage.”1) The P does not belong to either grammar or logic
i
I "Si la predication est l^nonciation de ce que je pense,
f
i elle n'appartient ni a la grammaire, ni a la loglque,
o\
rnais a la semeologie." Tt is thus a semantic category,
! This distinction between semantic and grammatical categor-
| ies can only be understood if one knows that for Seffrus(
| "la grammaire est indiffergnte au sens."
j
] These few quotations may suffice to show that both
I
j among linguists and among philosophers the terms S and P
i
j are treated with a godd deal of scepticism. This will
v
become completfy understandable, once we shall a^ve seen
1) Ch. Serrus, Le parallelismslogico-grammatical. Paris 
(Alcan), 1935, p. 167. - Cf. also:"II faut exclure le 
sujet de la logique", ibid. p. 170.
2) Ibid. .-p. 180.
3) Ibid., p. 134; cf. also p. 83. - I find it difficult 
to reconcile with these statements w^ht follows: "Sujet 
et predicat sont des termes grammaticaux dont il faut 
reporter l*origine aux conditions psychologiques de la 
connaissance. Le predicat est l ’objet de 1 1enonciation, 
la chose dite; le sujet, c'est ce dont on parle... II 
apparalt alors que la phrase....pose le theme general
de la pensee, c*est-a-dire son sujet, puis, dans le pre­
dicat, le jugement reel." (pp. 296/97.) Here we find
!
that P, contrary to his earlier affirmation, is a
grammatical term after all. Furthermore, if we accept 
the grammatical nature of both S and P we should expect
what different senses have been attached to our terns 
and what a highly complicated state of affairs has been 
reached, v/hich almost deserves the the name of confusion. 
And yet, I think, this scepticism can be overcome in the 
end. But before we expose our positive point of view, 
we have still to do a certain amount of critical spade­
work.
T h e  p r o b l e m . -  The oldest meaning of S and
P, that attached by Aristotle to his terns VTforfttd/*tror 
f
and tfocrvj ^ o^ovyii *</ofr was that the S was the basis on 
which the predicative relation was founded. In a propos- I 
ition it was a concept A, about which something was i
affirmed or denied through a concept B; it v/as
• To this concept A there corresponded a S&Rgx 
thing in which v/as found (£/* ) whatever was
represented by B. The thing represented by A was necessari
, > . f \ t
ly a substance ( o x n all possible y u/u
that is concepts pf -qualities that can be affirmed of
to fwUitl'tS /
the substance^ to be found in it; they are </* */
these terms to be defined within the framework of grammar, i
|
Instead, we find that S is the substratum and ^  the con- j 
tent of a judgment or, as Serrus says, the 'real* judg­
ment. On the identity of P and judgment cf. also p. 220. !
If either a semiological or a grammatical P reflects 
the real judgment, what is the form of such a judgment?
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We may add, perhaps, that linguistically the S - subst­
ance was symbolized by an oVoyU/ whereas the P or pro­
perty affirmed or denied of the S was represented by 
ajSjyU*.
1 7 TCi ^  idlL Zl UoLTdL T tiroS'’ I1* K<*ZoL L Jv 
<fy,j /MoLLp'00<?oC Z OVZ O £< t t fTL ' / '  V'j o So/JoC ^  Zo 
OtP’bOt"'0/M o P ’’‘'oLP'*U £ 1/* oCT Of D i 61 />t
KoLtcLyoCa' C f  oucft o£Ti oy>otd . ( & .  'x’s r lA U jl*  . /9  & ) '  ^
This seems a rather crude and superficial statement 
of the great Stagyrite’s theory concerning S and P. It 
does not show, how all this is connected with his 
epistemology and metaphysics and it presents it as a 
ready-made article, not taking into account the develop­
ment of Aristotle’s thought. It is furthermore a short­
cut, pushing aside all difficulties arising from the 
comparison of different writings which tradition has 
handed to us under Aristotle’s name and which would 
prove that it is not easy to form an accurate idea on 
the relationship between Logic and Grammar as conceived 
by the great Greek philosopher. But all this - important 
and interesting in itself - has been deliberately
l) F.A. Trendelenburg, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre . 
Berlin 1846, p. 18. Cf. also H. Steinthal, Geschichte 
der Sorachwissenschaft bei den Griechen u. Romernl. 
pp. 138/39.
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discarded, because it would deflect us too much, from 
our immediate purpose and lead us away into questions 
which only a specialised philologist-philosopher could 
handle competently. As it is, we rather take the risk 
of leaving matters unduly simplified, provided we get 
a good introduction into the question about the nature 
of S and P and th&s, I think, we obtain in the most ex­
cellent way.
Taking thus the above given Aristotelian statement 
H o i ' n t
as a starting-off ground;, we may now investigate the 
relation between the various elements such as ’substance1, 
S; ’property*, P; concepts A and B etc. as they can be 
derived from Aristotle’s scheme. But in order not to 
make matters too complicated, we shall leave out the 
question of language, that is to say all questions con- 
cerning and , at least for the time being.
^e are thus left in the realm of objective reality 
with substances and all those properties which can be 
affirmed (or denied) of them, and the realm of knowledge, 
or 9 with tv/o concepts A and B bound together in
judgments (= acts of affirming and denying) as S and P. 
These two reilrns are now related to each other in such 
a way that substances are the potential material of a 
concept A, functioning as S, and the property of substanc- 
ces are the potential material of a concept B, function­
ing as P.
_ l2 4 ~
T h e r e l a t i o n  " b e t w e e n  t h e
c o n c e p t s  A a n d  B • - It is most important to
hold on to these distinctions and this formulation,
"because if we do not, we lay already the foundation of
a dangerous confusion. Should we for instance simply
say’S*instead of ’concept A functioning as S* and,
respectively *P’ instead of ’concept B functioning as
P*, we would "be easily led to "believe that we know
everything about the S - P connection, if we know the
relationship "between the concepts A and B. This would
"be, however, a mistake: The relationship "between A and B
is entirely ideal and ca^ to a large extent^ perfectly 
ttns toitrto* ipJjgC*L6 £2 ”  Art>vn 
well "be rpercoived— o-ir t s-l. d e* the function as S and
P. By affirming this we do not want to deny that in 
the S'- P relationship there i s involved also a 
conceptual relationship, and we shall have to come "back 
to this in due course. But certain aspects of the con­
ceptual relationship fall endeed outside the judgment.
If I say !A falls into the extension of B 1o r ‘the spheres 
of A and B have no contact’or 'B falls partly under A' 
and so forth, I speak about possible relations between 
concepts, but then S and P are vft-r*-cisely/ not involved.
If it is true that in judgenp.ts the extension of B, 
functioning as P, is always wider thaA that of A, funct­
ioning as S, I obtain certainly useful information.
This knowledge may help, for instance, in cases of
• )  Osv» |V • I ^  •
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doubt to find out,which of two concepts involved in a 
judgment is really functioning as S and which as P; 
hut this would he only a criterion of things the exist­
ence of which is already presupposed. I can use further­
more this knowledge as a starting-point for further 
investigation, asking why it should he that in a judg­
ment the concept functioning as P should he wider than ik 
the concept functioning as S. But all this would not 
say anything ahout the S - P connection itself. All 
this goes to show that the pronrium of the S - P 
relationship c a n n o t  h e  d i s c o v e r e d  
i n  t h o s e  p u r e l y  c o n c e p t u a l  r e ­
l a t i o n s h i p s  w e  h a v e  j u s t  m e n t ­
i o n e d .
o
T h e  s u h s t a n c e - p  r^p e r t y R e ­
l a t i o n s h i p .  - Not only has this not always
heen properly observed, so that A became synonymous with
H  140.4 ex^ vicftrf
S and B wynonyrnous with P, hut/one-wont evon/ further 4
hy declaring that the S - P relationship is identical
with that holding between a substance and its accidents
(in the widest sense). In this way onfr-addocfe to the con-
tA.trc ctdcfeol
fusion between concepts and cognitional functions^that 
of both with an objective or® material relationship; 
for the relation of, say, a substance and its propert­
ies is a transcendent objective relation founded in the
nature of things, v/hich, as the ide&l relation
_ l2 6 -
between A and B, can be conceived independently from that 
between S and P. It is an expression of such a confusion 
when Bally - following a long scholastic tradition - 
declares that S is always the lieu of P: if wc have the 
proposition la terre est ronde we see that ’roundness1 
is found ’in the globe’.1) As a matter of fact the ob­
jective relationship between substance and quality cannot
ntof on€y
beppnly adequately represented^by a judgment of the 
form Socrates is wise but also by its reversion Wisdom 
is in Socrates. Here the objective relationship remains 
unchanged although the cognitional relation has been re­
versed.
The well-known contention to be found in contemporary
grammars that the S of a statement denotes a thing or
a person (standing for ’substances* or concreta) and
that the P denotes a quality or state (= accident) is
therefore wrong.2) According to this contention only
Socrates is wise is a statement as it should be and
3)Socrates remains therefore the ’real’ S even in 
Wisdom is in Socrates. lOnei could no t| admit7/that Socrates
1) Ch. Bally, Linguistioue ggx generale et linguistiaue
f rang ai.ee, p. 43. ohu<.,
2) Aristotle would also admit ’abstract substances*A such 
as wisdom: but this is only a dtfvice to overcome the 
difficulty under discussion and to save the o^o/^x - 
substance parallelism.
3) P.H. Finck operates with the terms re ales SnbjftVt.
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in this second statement is no S at all, neither ’real* 
nor ’logical1, nor, for that matter, ’grammatical*.
And yet this is the truth. In Wisdom is in Socrates. 
Socrates is as little S as Africa in The camel lives in 
Africa. In the one case we affirm that the place where 
the camel is found is Africa and in the other that the 
place where wisdom is found is Socrates. Both state­
ments are strictly parallel. We have to admit that 
abstract things or qualities can he made the bases of 
judgments in the same way as concrete things can. This 
seems so obvious, so easily confirmed by our experience 
of judging, that one may well ask oneself, why it was 
not generally accepted as a matter of course from the 
very beginning, and why even now it seems &o tempting 
to define the S as the substance about which something 
is predicated.
and re ales Qb.iekt. Cf. his essay on Der angeblich passi- 
vische Character des transit'iven Verbs. In Zeitschr. f. 
vergl. Snrachforsch. XLI (1907), p. 213 and -passim.
Already in the Categoriae we find the expostion of the 
famous theory that the primary substance )
is the concrete individual and that this can never be 
■predicated of it: ^  ^ koc c /Tpotoj'
■** i ^  . » f r  /
igZLir) .1 tiid--' 3 v - J »)■ 7' aX~° f-'"-"' v ■
-1 2 8 -
The answeer to this seems to me to lie in the following 
Our experience generally seems to go in an inductive 
direction, starting from the concrete, the individual, 
that is,the things directly accessible to our senses, 
and to rise only gradually to more abstract levels. Or
perhaps we should say that we^become
that only trained reflection gives us access to those
individual, from which we have to ’abstract* them. In 
experience thus the concrete individual seems to come 
first and the abstract $gen#ral thing second. So far
t
so good. But now one commits a quite impermissible con­
fusion: One thinks^what is supposed to be true of the 
progress of experience in general must also be true 
in the case of the individual experience constructed in 
the cognitional act. But one forgets that at the time 
this act takes place, innumerable abstract things have 
already been conquered and are stored up as abstract 
concepts in our minds and that they can be made the 
basis of judgments in the same way as concrete notions 
can. This confusion was helped by the psychological ten-
gain from the relatively concrete;
a
hende the impression that this is fther more ’natural’
of the reality o|r intuitive data in our experience and
general’things'1 which appear as being contained * in the
tkc*
new experiences, and especially in sx
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U
way fchini sr( arting^from the abstract; but instead of 
explaining this tendency psychologically, one is apt 
to look for a reason for it in the ’nature of things1, 
which error helped to make the definition of the S 
as thing or person we think about $o tempting and made 
the introduction ofl the *r@l’ S and the ’real1 P al­
most unavoidable, although it is time that that de­
finition and this notion should disappear from our 
manuals.
In any case we could only say that even in such 
instances as Socrates is wise, la terre est ronde. the j 
thing conceived as A, functioning as S, is the lieu 
of the property conceived as B, functioning as P, and 
n o t  that S is the lieu of P. Quite »©» the contrary.
If we conceive concepts with the help of spatial sym­
bols ascribing to them ‘extension*, then we shall find 
theat the concept corresponding to S falls within the 
extension of the predicated concept: A is found in the 
sphere of B; B i s  t h e  l o g i c a l  l i e u  
o f A# This is a general rule established already 
by BoSthius and taken up in modern times by Professor 
Jespersen.*^) The difference betv/een the two scholars 
is only that the former admitted one exception (P 
indicates the proprium of S) which the latter does not 
take into account. So we may well say: In the realm
l) Philosophy of Grammar, p. 153.
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of things a substance is the lieu of* a property, in
the realm of thought the concept representing the j
property (= B) is the logical lieu of the corresponding j
concept A pepresenting the substance.
These things are of course not only compatible
with each other, but it is difficult to see how they
could be otherwise. I can therefore not see, how a
logical system placing more emphasis on the substance-
property relation could be op|)osed to another system 
*
underlining the conceptual relation between A and B, as 
it is done by M V. Brjfaidal, who c&lls a logical system 
of the first kind logiaue comprehensive and characterize 
es it as analytic, deductive, with a panlogistic tenden­
cy, whereas a system of the latter kind is described 
as logjque extensive, revealing an antimetaphysical
Y~ a*\CC
attitude; the difference o£ this system the logjque
comprehensive is formulated in the following words:
”rien n ’est fonde (in the ’logique extensive*) sur la 
nature des choses; toute verite est purement empirique’*
(sic).1)
That the substance - not the concept A - is the 
lieu of its property is true first of all with regard 
to positive statements. A negative statement (e.g. j
1) In:Pensee. Langage, Ire et 2e partie de 1 ’Encyclo­
pedic franpaiee. Tome I. 1 ’outillage mental,
Paris 1957, p. 48 - 4.
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Kar vasselages -par sens nen est folie. Chans, de Rol. 
1724) really affirrae that the spheres of A and B are 
separated from each other, in other v/ords that the 
attempt to find vasselages in the sphere (s logical 
lieu)of folie has come to naught, which means at the 
same time that in the realm of things folie is not 
found where vasselages is found.
T h e  s u b j e c t  - o b j e c t  r e l a t ­
i o n s h i p .  - A  theory which considers the 
substance as S and its property as P of a judgment 
must not only be embarassed by statements such as 
wisdom is in Socrates, where the •real* substance is 
foudjj. in the P, but also by such statements where 
more than one substance is involved. It seems that 
statements such as Jack calls Jill can only be account­
ed for in the framework of the substance - property 
theory by interpreting it as the fusion of two 
judgments, each exhibiting only one substance:
Jack calls
la. called. Jill
Jack calls Jtll.
Such an analysis will appear artificial and super­
fluous once S and P will have been defined in formal 
terms instead of material terms such as substance and 
property; we shall come back to this question once 
the fStomal definition of S and p will have been found}) 
l) See p./7 0.
j
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Here we shall "be content with pointing out that the 
analysis dif statements of the type Jack calls Jill 
has had considerable influence on the manner the S 
of propositions has been conceived. And with this 
we enter still deeper into the maouis of the confused 
application of our terms.
The characteristic feature of this sort of statement 
involving two substances is the presence of what we 
are accustomed to call in grammar an object. Although 
t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  S - O b j e c t  i s  
c o m p l e t e l y  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h a t  
o f  S - P it has had a certain influence on the theo­
ry of this latter relationship. Already the term S 
in this connection is suspect and offers an opportunity 
for confusing S as opposed to ’object1 with the S as 
opposed to P. Indeed, in a proposition such as the man 
fells the tree. the. word man can be taken as a symbol 
for either, and as their terminological determination 
is identical, they can easily be thought of as being 
essentially identical. j
If we ask v/hich objective relation is involved
i
in the opposition S - object we shall be well advised i
to avoid this ambiguous terminology and replace it ij
"by a more appropriate one. The best I can think of j
is that of ego and non-ego, which, I believe, goes 
back in the last instance to J.G-. Fichte. These terms
1
are so fitting "because they "bring out clearly three 
important facts about this relationship: (1) The fact 
that the two factors are correlated in such a way 
that the one, the non-ego. can only "be conceived in 
contrast to the other, the ego, as the negation of its 
essential properties; (2) the fact that the one is active 
the other passive; this is really only a specification 
of (l); (3) the fact that one can perceive the ego 
only uer analogiam with one*s own ego.
Ego and non-ego are relative terms. The ego is con­
ceived as a centre of energies and feelings, it is 
thus essentially afctive and re-active. It requires for 
its full realization something upon which it can 
exercise its activity and to which it can react: the 
non-ego. This in turn is conceived as essentially 
un-personal, something in-active, the material on 
which the ego sets to work. But the non-ego appears 
as such not necessarily, if considered in isolation,
I
"but only from the point of view of the ego. In a state- i
ment such as Jack calls ^ill we do not doubt that 
Jill is as much a person as Jack, but relatively, viewed 
from the point of view of the acting Jack, she is the 
object of that action. Jack in turn can only be con­
ceived as acting through a sort of selfidentification 
of whosoever conceives the proposition in question with 
Jack, through lending to Jack an ego. If this self-
identification does not take place we could not speak
of an action at all, "but only of a (neuter) event
involving two objects (substances)•
This relation "between ego and non-ego has "been
called by Kalepky ,,pragmatischM, and he pretends that
it is this at bottom that such statements express and
that what haa been arbitrarily called S is nothing but
a sort of ego. f,der Trager der HandlungM and the so-
called P the action or state ("Verlauf"). ^  That this
pragmatic conception pervades grammar, is reflected in
the ‘persons! of the verb, in the distinction of an
active, passive and medium voice. If behind the grammat<
ical terminology of S and P were really nothing but
this, then indeed grammar would be better off without
ocj i'-h  tA* caxe
such ill-fitting terms. For An the came way as* the
substance- accident relationship (la terre est ronde).
the ego - non-ego relationship is an objective one,
holding between things and can therefore be conceived 
>1
quite independently of the terms of any judgment. But 
is there really nothing else behind S and P as used 
in grammar? - This is precisely the (Question we shall 
try to answer in the course of our investigation.
We have seen that Kalepky was right in so far as 
he recognized that the ego - non-ego relation kxe is
l) Th. Kalepky, heuaufbau der Grammatik. Leipzig, 
Berlin 1928, pp. 25/26.
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essentielly different from the S - P relation. But 
another, very eminent, linguist, Ch. Bally, has made 
this very relation the "basis of his theory of the logic­
al judgment."^ For him the S of the judgment is the 
person who judges, that is, asserts which degree of a 
actual validity a representation has for him in de­
termined circumstances.2) The representation is the Hia# 
object of the judgment. This is to begin with a simple 
vue d'esprit and therefore virtuel; by the act of 
assertion it becomes actuel. The assertion is a logic­
al copula, linking the object of a judgment to the 
judging S* Copala and object form together the P of 
the judgment. Example: In the statement Galilee affirme 
quefcla terre tourne we have the rexjresentation la 
terre tourne, object of a judgment formulated by 
Galilee who appears thus as a S. The copula affirme 
shows for whom la terre tourne is the object of an 
assertion, it lodges as it were the object into the 
mind of S and expresses at the same time the assert­
ion itself. Affirme cue la terre tourne is the P of 
the judgment. If we have the statement la terre
1) Ch. Bally, Linguistique generale et linguistique 
franyaise. pp. 31/38.
2) ’'Assertion” has been replaced in the 2nd edition 
by ’’reaction towards a. given representation”.
2nd ed. j5 27.
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)
| eunitoer
I tourne, no logical S is expressed, although the ^ssert- 
tU
| whether the representation la terre tourne. the
| object of the judgment, is conceived or asserted as 
| being correct, false or possible, that is the modality 
of the judgment, is i m p l i e d  in the verb tourne.
| Can we say now that la terre tourne represents a judg- 
| ment without an S2 and without copula? By no means;
i for there cannot be an object of a judgment without a
|
j S. Though S and a copula such as .ie pense or on sait
I
! etc. may now be only implied, they do not cease there-
| fore to be very real.
1
! As we can see, Ballyfs S is nothing but the ego as
I
j opposed to the nonego. Only both terms are taken in a
j limited sense: they are the cognizant ego and the object
| of cognition. But of course, if it is true that the ego -
j non-ego relation in the widest sense cannot be made the
i
! basis of a theory of S and P, the same must hold good 
j with regard to any restricted application of the terms,
i
j and we have reason to suspect that something is wrong
I in Bally*s theory. And I think it is this: For anybody
t
| who thinks, affirms or utters the statement Galilee
j
i affirme que la terre tourne. Galilee is an object of
II
| representation and he himself the S. It is an inescap- 
! able consequence of Bally's theory to say that here
j
i  too S and copula are implied; the full expression would 
: be .ie sais cue Galilee affirme que la terre tourne or 
| something similar. But in that case the judging S
would have become in turn an object of representation, 
and we would get into an infinite regress. On the other 
hand, in the statement la terre tourne the thinker is 
only implied as the psychological condition of the whole 
judgment and can therefore not be opposed as a correlat­
ive part of any P of a judgment. In other words, there 
is no difference in the exposition of logical terms 
in both Galilee affirme que la terre tourne and la 
terre tourne. So our contention that the term S in the 
S - object relation has a tofelly different meaning from 
the same term S in the S - P relation has been confirmed.
In conclusion we have to repeat: In the same way 
as the S - P relation could not be discovered in certain 
idel[a relations between two concepts, it cannot be dis­
covered either in any o b j e c t i v e  relationship, 
be it that of substance - property, be it that of ego - 
non-ego. actor - actio or any similar relationship.
T h e  f a c t - j u d g m e n t  r e l a t i o n . - 
It remains to see, whether S and P cannot be discovered 
in the relation between the objective fact on the one 
hand and the judgment b in which it is apprehended on 
the other hand. The popular belief that S is the thing 
or fact, we are talking about and P what we ^ hve to 
say about it can be traced back to Aristotle himself, 
whose tena of 'bto Korean easily create that im­
-138-
pression. Did not BoSthius say 11 subjectura est de quo 
dicitur id quod praedicatur. Praedicatum est quod de eo 
dicitur quod subjectum est” - Since we are at pres­
ent not concerned with language hut with thought, we 
may perhaps change that popular formula by saying that 
P is what we * think* (instead of *say* or *talk*) about 
the fact apprehended by the judgment.
And indeed it is the fact - judgment relationship 
or the parallel thing - concept relationship which 
according to Kalepky is the^nly one for which the S - P 
terminology can legitimately be applied.2) And if H.
g \ avH o np
Paul 1 ( others) operates with a situa^tional S 
to which a monotomic holophrase may function as P (e.g. 
E x c e l l e n t may be considered as P of the objective 
fact to i^hich it refers), he seems to admit that Kalepky 
is srright. Now Kalepky*s contention - and that of Paul 
in so far as he agrees with Kalepky - is at bottom, 
nothing else but the expression of the conviction that 
any symbolic representation is P with regard to the 
thing or fact represented. If we draw the last conse­
quences from such hypothesis we are driven to the con­
clusion that the interperefiation of a noise heard by 
our ear as a combination of sounds is also P with re­
gard to the noise itself, since it is a symbolic re­
presentation of that noise; and the same would hold
1 ) Boethius, ed. Migne, Patrologiae, 64, p. 1130.
2) Th. Kalepky, Neuaufbau, p. 25.
3) H. Paul, Prinzinien5. p. 129.
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good of the optical interpretation of visual forms:
a picture of a landscape for instance would "be p with
regard to the landscape itself. As a matter of fact
all sense-interpretation would he P in relation to the
sensed object. In other words, any form would he P
with regard to its material,and the S - P relation
would he identical with the form - material relation.
It is when we are driven to this last consequence that
we hegin to feel uneasy and douht whether this is true.
j o
But it is perhaps not jquifre easy to j«o+***•»■ +v% ^tear
particularly so if we confine ourselves to the examin- 
ation of the sitiftiational S with relation to which an 
explanation such as Excellent! functions as P. This 
seems indeed quite legitimate, and we are ourselves
think therefore that we may accept Paul’s example as 
a legitimate borderline case for the true S - P relat­
ion hut reject the rest. And here are our reasons to 
justify such an attitude: In the following chapter v/e 
shall e^lain that the typical feature of P as distinct 
from S is a factor not considered so far, namely 
modality. Without this specific factor there can he 
no P and consequently no S. Now in Excellent! there 
is indeed to he found a positive modality, hut it
theoretical reasons (this instinctive douh
going to operate with this distinction later on.'*') I
1 ) Cf. p.
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is this precisely whkfo is lacking in mere symbolic re­
presentations outside the judgment. Therefore the 
acceptance of an example of this sort does not imply 
the acceptance of the identity of the S - P relation 
with the material - form relation. Indeed the latter 
in its general form, must be rejected precisely be­
cause it leaves the question of md±l modality untouched.
C o n c l u s i o n . -  S?we may sum up the negat-i 
ive results obtained by our critical survey so far by 
saying:
T h e  S - p  c o n n e c t i o n  c a n n o t  b e  
d i s c o v e r e d  i n  c e r t a i n  i d e a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b e t w e e n  c o n c e p t s ,  
n o r i n t h a t  b e t w e e n  o b j e c t i v e  
f a c t o r s ,  n o r  i n  t h a t  b e t w e e n  
c o n c e p t s  a m d  t h i n g s  o r  j u d g ­
m e n t s  a n d  o b j e c t i v e  f a c t s .
1) See above p. 124.
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D y n a m i s m  a n d  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  
j u d g m e n t ,  - We a(hve given above individual 
reasons, which compelled us to arrive at this conclusion. 
Hoy/ we shall he ahle to ask: Is there a general reason, 
valid for all the relations so far examined? Have these 
relationships anything in common Y/hich prevents them 
from heing identified as S and P? I think that such a 
general reason can he discovered in the fact that all 
these relations are of a static character. *To judge* 
or *to propose* are apparently acts taking place in 
time and therefore of a d y n a m i c  character. We 
therefore need a genetic definition of S and P. We 
have explained b e f o r e , w h y  the psychologists have a 
better eye for thought as a process than the logicians, 
who are probably too much under the influence of mathem­
atics, where relations are reversible and sequence in 
time does not matter; mathematically it is the same, 
whther I say 2 + 2 = 4  or 4 = 2 +  2. The psychologist 
will be able to see, however, that the mental picture 
of S is necessarily complete b e f o r e  the S - P | 
picture. Stout compares the movement of thought with 
a y/alking movement: “sentences are in the process of 
thinking what steps are in the process of Y/alking.
The foot on which the weight of the body rests corre­
sponds to the subject. The foot which moves forev/ard
On pp. 25/26.
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in order to occupy new ground corresponds to the pre- 
l) isdicate.” ' This^indeed a most important contribution 
towards a solution of our problem and one of the very 
greatest importance for grammar. For if we believe 
that language reflects thought in its movement, then 
- but of course only then - we shall make word-ord^r 
the only grammatical criterion for the discovery of
p \
S and P as xh has been done by von der Gabelentz. '
But the judgment is not merely an event taking 
place in the mind, it is a p u r p o s e f u l  act.
If we take these two things: dynamism and purpose 
together, we shall not be content with saying, the 
S is the relatively old, the P the relatively new 
part of a proposition, but we shall somehow express 
the purpose which prompts the act. Now if we look at 
thought we shall talk of the S as determinandum and 
the P as determinans or call S the identificandum 
and P the identificsns (Rozwardowski);®) ’determination 
or ’identification* expressing the immediate theoretic­
al p u r p o s e  underlying the judgment; we de-
1) G.-F. Stout, Thought and language in Mind XVI,
1891, pp. 181 ff.
2) In: Zeitschr. f. Tdlkerpsvchol. u. Snrachwissensch. 
Vi and VIII and in Die Snrachwissenschaft. Leipzig 
1884, pp..348 ff.
3)J. v. Rozwardowski, Wortbildung u. Wortbedeutung. 
Heidelberg, 1904, p. 65.
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termine a concept A "by a second concept B in order 
to get rid of a want, namely the indetermination of 
A. If we look rather at propositions from the lingu­
istic point of view we shall talk with Wegener of 
the 'exposition* (S) of a statement^ For Elise 
Richter S, in a sequence of sentences, is the term 
which takes up something previously mentioned 
(’'AnknUpfung*1), while P is tfder Gegenstand der Aus- 
sage11
If we now reconsider our "basic example of a judg­
ment involving two concepts A and B, it is clear that 
those scholars seem to do "better justice to the dynam- ! 
ic view who, like Paul, define the proposition as a 
synthetic of concepts (Representations), "because
vO
it is only then, that get a sequence of (l) A
|
+ (2) B = AB. If, on the other hand, one takes the view 
that the judgment is the analysis of a complex re­
presentation, then A and B seem to come to mental 
existence at the moment the analytical act is proceed- ; 
ing: much in the same way as two half circles are 
made "by one act of drawing a dividing line through j 
the centre of a v/hole circle. Be this as it may; we 
learn that those v/ho take the dynamic view of the
1) Ph. Wegener, Untersuchungen uber die Grundfragen 
des Snrachlehens , Halle, a.S. 1885, pp. 20/30.
2) Zeitschr. f. Roman. Philologie XL, p. 20.
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proposition must not only place S and P i n  t h e  
r i g h t  t e m p o r a l  o r d e r ,  "but also the 
complex AB. We shall have to come hack to this quest­
ion in due course.
A t t r i b u t i o n  a n d  p r e d i c a t i o n  
- We saw that the gene&ie or dynamic view brings us 
a considerable step foreward, but one flaw is to be 
found in everything we have mentioned so far in this 
connection. All these observations are useful once we 
know w h e r e  t h e  j u d g m e n t  b e g i n s  
a n d  w h e r e  i t  e n d s .  If not, everything 
we mentioned could equally well hold good of two con­
secutive judgments or even groups of judgments. But 
not only may larger units than the individual judg­
ment be divided into determinandum and determinans 
and the like, but also smaller -units: the two parts, 
and in exactly the same relationship, seem to be found 
in Whitehouse, the white house and the house is v/hite: 
but only the latter is regarded as a proposition. In 
other words, the judgment as such must be given al­
ready, before we can find out anything about its parts.
We have mentioned already that the view which 
regards Jack calls Jill as a fusion of two judgments
1) Cf. p p .  169 ft-
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(Jack calls + is called Jill) is only a consequence 
of the substance - accident hypothesis; it will lose 
all value once this hypothesis rwitii hay^ been discard- 
ded, and we need not trouble about it now.-1-) Ihe pro­
blem of the fusion of various judgments into higher 
units presents itself, however, also in another form. 
Magnifique. ce tablfeu!. for instance or I found the 
cage emnt.v are explained as fusions of Magnifiquei 
Ce tableau! and of I found the cage. It was emu tv. 
respectively. The solution of the problem such forms 
imply hees£e requires as a preliminary a discussion 
on coordination versus subordintation which we propose
to give in a later chapter to which we may peffta]?s^ re-
2)fer here, in order to avoid repetitions.'Remains the 
question of the nroprium of the typw the house / is 
white as opposed to the white house or Whitehouse.
This question has often been under discussion.
Two sorts of solutions have been given to it: those 
of a more psychological and those of a predominantly 
episteraological character. We may cite under the form­
er heading Herling who writes: MIm Satze erscheint 
die 3eziehung als geschehend, im Worte schon als ge- 
schehen. In der Vogel fliegt geschieht die Beziehung 
wirklich, in der fliegende Vogel ist die Beziehung
1) See above p. 131.
2) Cf. Part III, Chaps. 7 and 8 .
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des Fliegens auf den Vogel schon als geschehen be-
l) ofatcMfMff’
zeichnet.11 ' And Hies comments^this of Herling's
"by saying: "Was Herlings Aufstellung besagt, ist dies: 
Der Satz ist die sprachliche Auswirkung eines psychi- 
schen Akts in seinera gegenw&rtigen Vollzug, die (enge) 
Wortgruppe der Ausdruck des Ergebnisses eines solchen 
frtiher vollzogenen Aktes."2) Ries himself stresses the 
fact that in groups of the type the white house thiref 
“die Attributvorstellung dem Kernglied der Wortgrup­
pe e i n g e g l i e d e r t  (ist)'1, whereas in the 
S - P synthesis the second part of the judgment is 
"z u g e o r d n e t" to the first, preserving a relat­
ive autonomy and not forming a fixed unit. - Accord­
ing to K. Ettmayer the P is characterized "by the fact 
that only part of a complex representation is the ob­
ject of our attention. It is at the same time that 
part which is clearly distinguished inside that sphere 
which is called the S of the linguistic expression.3)
1) Die Syntax der deutschen Sorache. 1830, p. 18.
2) Was ist ein Satz? p. 69.
3) K. v. Ettmayer, Zur Theorie der analvtischen Syntax 
des PranzSsischen. Akademie d. Wissenschaften in 
Wien, Philos.-histfer. Klasse, Sitzungsberichte,209, 
Bd., 3. Abhandlung, Wien, Leipzig 1929, p. 15.
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Therefore is white in the house is v/hite is much more 
distincly and consciously perceived than white in either 
the white house or Whitehouse.
Such distinctions and characterizations deserve the 
name of psychological, because they are all based on 
observations of the judgment as a psychical event. But 
we may call epistemological a theory, which considers 
above all the relation between the objective content 
of a judgment and the cognizant ego.
Traditional logic has recognized that a judgment is 
more than a synthesis of two concepts A and B. By that 
only a mental picture of an objective fact is created.
But a judgment also expresses whether this mental pict­
ure is believed to be conformed to reality or not; this 
is known as the m o d u s  of the judgment. The modus 
thus expresses the objective value the cognizant ego 
discovers in the A-B synthesis, whereas A-B apart from 
"the modus is the m s m a t e r i a l  of the judgment.
Now it is important to note that the act of objective 
evalution (or of judging, assent, belief) has as its 
object n o t  t h e  w h o l e  m a t e r i a l  of 
a proposition. It does not decide, whether A-B is correct 
or not, but it answers the question: 'Granted A, can I 
correctly connect with it B in the way I did?' This 
shows that the positive or negative belief, the modus 
of a judgment, h a s  a j c l o s e r  c o n n e c t ­
i o n  w i t h  B a n d  i t s  r e l a t i o n s h i p
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w i t h A than with A itself. It is this circumstance 
which c o n s t i t u t e s  t h e  p r o p r i u m  
o f  P, and the fact of u n q u e s t i o n e d  
a c c e p t a n c e  by the cognizant ego o f A 
c h a r a c t e r i z e s  A a s  S .  This accounts 
for the fact that in a proposition of the form the 
house (= S) is white (= P) the copula is thought as 
belonging to P, since it is the expression of both the 
modus and the relationship of v/hite to the house. It 
is therefore the expression of modality which allows 
us to identify a judgment and v/hich distinguishes the 
S - P relation from any other.
Needless to say that the psychological theories 
and the epistemological thesis are well compatible with 
each other. But it seems to us that the former are 
rather concerned with side-issues, whereas the episterao- 
logical account deals withfthe central question. The 
difference between "Zugliederung" and "Eingliederung" 
(Ries) or the fact that P receives a greater attention 
than S (v. Ettmayer) receive their e x p l a n a t i o n  
only through the epistemological account v/hich gives 
the real key to the question of the proprium of the 
judgment.
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R e m a i n i n g  q u e s t i o n s . -  Should 
this he granted in principle, many questions remain 
still open. The first one would he whether fudging1 
is a separate act from the representational synthesis, 
as Goedeckeraeyer seems to suggest,'1') or whether 
'representing* and * judging* are only two sides of 
the same cognitional act. - The second question re­
gards the nature of medality. In ideal thought it can 
he only positive or negative, because between ideal 
truth and falsehood no transitions are possible. But, 
and this interests above all the linguist, in verbal 
modality we find expressed all sorts of shades of doubt, 
of non-theoretical interests and of volitions.-WEXjasEush 
hfiXKXsxpBXBJt A third question, intimately connected 
with this one, is the relationship of questions and 
commands to judgments. - And there is finally the 
famous question of the elementary judgment such as it 
is raining, where we do not seem to relate two terms 
but have only one. The answer to these questions must 
however be deferred until we have given our positive 
account of S and P.
l) A. Goedeckemeyer, Das Wesen des UrteilSt in:
ftir svstematische Philosoohie IX (1903), pp. 179/94.
P a r t  II 
Chapter (2 )
T h e  m e a n i n g  o f  S u b j e c t  a n d  
p r e d i c a t e  i n  t h e  s c i e n c e  o f  
l a n g u a g e  .
i
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T h e  g r a m m a t i c a l  c o n c e p t i o n  
o f  S a n d  P. - Hitherto we have studied the possible 
sense of the S - P combination in the domain of ’thought*. 
It is now time to draw into the picture ’language1.
To a large extent the same things we have remarked 
there also hold good here: We have only to replace 
’thought1 by ’speech* or ’language*, ’concept’ or * re­
presentation* by ’word’, ’proposition’ or ’judgment’ by 
’sentence* or ’statement’, and we will find^all the |
things /agaMa we have been speaking about, only clad in !
a new garb. This reformulation can easily be done by 
(the reader, so that we may be excused from making state- j 
ments which are at bottom nothing but repetitions. Two j 
things remain however still to be done: We must mention 
those opinions which had no proper place in the previous 
exposition, and we must show, to what a chaotic situat­
ion the adoption of various points of view at once led.<£f
in the field of grammar. !
t
It is perhaps worth while pointing out, that the 
immediate interest of the grammarian,whose task it is 
to ar^ Lyse sentences, consists in possessing a clear 
criterion for the distinction of S and P, which allows 
him to proceed with his analysis,and that he is not 
immediately concerned with more far-reaching questions 
about the intimate nature of these phenomena. We must 
therefore hot be surprised to find in grammarbooks 
statements concerning S and P, whcjih testify to this
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methodological modesty. The justification for the 
adoption of this or that criterion does not lie in 
any philosophical theory of S and P, hut rather in its 
methodological usefulness.
Such a formal criterion we find in the remark ijiade 
hy Messrs. Le Bidois in their syntax^1) where they 
affirm that S is 11 tout simplement le mot qui, selon la 
naive mais tres juste expression du vieux grammarien, 
rdonne la loi au verhe’ (Vaugelas), le mot qui regit 
1*accord (ee personne et en nombre)...’* The S here is 
identical with the *personf of a finite verb. Prom 
this it would follow that the finite verb itself should 
he called P. Everybody knows that this is often done in
Uy
practice. It has heen proclaimed^Sweet and mentioned 
hy Professor ^espersen: "Sweet (HEG- p. 48) says that 
in a snlgtence like fI came home yesterday morning1 the 
word came hy itself is the grammatical predicate, hut 
came-home- yesterday-morning the logical predicate.
In another case (HL) he says that in fGold is a metal1, 
the strictly grammatical predicate is is., hut the log­
ical predicate is metal. We see that the points of//esi 
Messrs. Le Bidois and of Sweet complete each other:
S is the noun or noun-equivalent with which the finite
1) G. Le Bidois et R. Le Bidois, Svntaxe du francais
moderne. ses fondements historiques et Dsychologjques
Paris, 1935, p.382.
2) Philosophy of Grammar- London 1924, p. 1 4 9.
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verb is in grammatical accord, and P this finite verb.
It is obvious that such a narrow morphological criter­
ion is only applicable to a certain type of sentences. 
Everywhere where there is no finite verb as in infinit­
ive constructions or sentences Lat. Paulus fortis or 
Russ, on soldatom. furthermore in short exclamations 
such as Rice da.v! let alone such languages, as do not 
use finite verbs, is a strictly grammatical analysis 
into S and P does not seem possible although the possib­
ility of logical analysis does not seem to be ruled 
out.
' It is not difficult to see that noun or noun-equiv­
alent, being the ’grammatical* S, and the finite verb, 
being the ’grammatical* P, are nothing but Aristotle's
9/ i
o \ro /a-ol and j ^ f*- <L. The very name of noun (nomen) is
nothing but a translation of the corresponding Greek
term; as to the verb it always expresses relation
through time (cf. Germ. Zeitwort) and it is this element
♦ 1,1 vof time which distinguishes Aristot3sTs from his
And it serves also as the expression of P in 
propositions.
At this point it becomes apparent, by the way, how 
much Aristotle’s logic was -unconsciously dominated by 
grammar. The syntax of Greek - as that of all Indo- 
European lange^ges - knows thejdistinction between 
nominal and verbal constructionswhjich are oftenw
logically equivalent. Hence the possibility of reduc-
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ing one to the other: Zt O TT o f t . JtJnof
/)oC<f^ Ju t l(f*L . In Both the noun is 8, and the verb 
the characteristic element of P. The reason why 
Aristotelian logic was and is so popular among gramm­
arians is precisely "because it fits so well the main 
features of our grammars. But we must not forget that 
it does so only B e c a u s e  i t  h a s  o n c e
B e e n  a B s t r a c t e d  f r o m  t h e m .  All
to
we do in fact is feat we explain grammar By grammar 
in disguise,and our aim must Be to get out of this 
vicious circle.
Although the opinion that the noun or noun-equiv­
alent is the linguistic expression of S and the finite 
verB the linguistic expression of P can Be traced 
Back to Aristotlefs logic, there is this that is new 
in Sweet and others, that they are compelled to oper­
ate with two different distinctions of S and P, t h e  
g r a m m a t i c a l  a n d  t h e  l o g i c a l  
S a n d  P . And it is here that we touch at the root 
of the crisis in modern grammar. The practice of dis­
tinguishing two or even more different sorts of S and 
P in the same sentence is quite common. This means 
tjiat in the last resort one Becomes more and more 
conscious of the difference Between thought and langu­
age, language can no longer Be treated as a mere ex­
ponent of thought, and from there it is only a logic­
al steo to ask whether the science of language should i
I
I
J
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not "be considered as autonomous with regard to the 
scejince of thought,
For the time being, however, such a radical separ­
ation of grammar from the sciences of thought has not
O'
become a practic^ possibility, and the old identific­
ation of judgment and sentence can still be felt in the 
very terms of grammtical S and P. I think msy one may 
sum up the present situation by saying: Although it is 
not true that the S and P of the judgment are necessari­
ly symbolized in language exclusively by certain types 
of ?;ords, it i s  true that certain types of words 
have a natural 1vocation* to symbolize S and P. In other 
terms: not eve sy P is symbolized by a finite verb, but 
the finite verb has no other vocation than symbolizing
P either by itself or in conjunction with other words,
i / e r b
which form with the finite sroydr a syntactic group. A 
Subject is n often not expressed in language at all, but 
if it is, it is symbolized by a noun or noun-equival­
ent either by itself or in conjunction with other 
words, forming with the noun a syntactic group and being
| in grammatical agreement with the finite verb. That is wh
I why ±n grammar the noun or nominal group 11 qui donne la
! loi au verbe fini’1 is called grammtical S and the finite ;
; ! 
verb or the corresponding group is called the grammatic- 1
al P. This, of course, holds good first of all o£-all? j
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of our Indo-European languages, but such a restriction 
deerr in no way invalidates these distinctions. We see 
that the grammatical S and P in this sense are not 
only noun and finite verb but comprehend also larger 
groups, which is an advantage, because it eliminates 
the discrepancy between language and thought in Sweet’s 
examples 'ijsame home yesterday morning* and 'Gold is 
& metal'.
These grammatical criteria can be made even more 
far-reaching. For the grammarian does not hesitate to 
identify S and P even where certain types of construct­
ion exhibiting different morphological features can be 
naturally translated into the type characterized above. 
In this way the Latin constructions known as ablativus 
absolutus and accusativus cum infinitivo can be anal­
ysed into S and P as is well known to everybody and, 
generally, so can all so-called ^predicative* construct­
ions. This is not the place to discuss the problem 
which may arise from such a procedure. Supposing that 
we possess here a method of grammatical analysis, which 
allows us to identify S and P in the great bulk of 
linguistic utterances, the fundamental problem of the 
difference between thought and language has not been 
overcome. The fact still remains that l i n g u i s  t - 
i c  f o r m  i s  a s  o f t e n  a s  n o t  m i s ­
l e a d i n g ,  that is, does not fit its content. The
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formal or grammatical S and P, even if taken in the 
liberal and wide sense just indicated, is often differ­
ent from the ’real1 S and P of thought.
G r a m m a  tic a 1 and l o g i c a l  , p s y c h  
l o g i c a l ,  o n t o l o g i c a l  S a n d  P . - 
The commonest and most simple case of such discrepanc­
ies between the formal and the ’real* S and P may be 
represented by a sentence, where a word, which is not 
the formal P is stressed: J i l l  has done it.We have
seen that in a judgment of the type UA is Bn, it is P 
which constitutes the real object of the judgment, and 
psychologists telljus that it is P which is in the focus 
of attention; there can be no doubt that P is the most 
important part of a judgment, and if in its enunciat­
ion any part is stressed, it should be P. And that is 
what we find normally.^ If now in our example the 
grammatical S is stressed, we shall agree, that by 
J i l l  has done itwa we ’really’ wanted to say The 
doer of it has been Jill: and this would be a more 
correct though less usual form of expression. If we 
were allowed to generalize from this one example, we 
could formulate the rule, that morphological criteria 
aliow us to identify the formal or grammatical S and P
1) See hoyer Papt Ii;[> Ghap# 8> p-
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and that the distrihution of stress indicates the S and 
P of thought. ^ And the- validity "of Ihrs-rule ha&-Jheen_
| nocopted hy most wrd-ter-S4 And the validity of this 
j rule has heen accepted hy most writers (Wegener, Paul,
I Gardiner).
! ■ Others such as v. d. Gahelentz have adopted a differ-
| ent criteria for the identification of the 'real1 S 
| and P, namely word-order. -*• / We have hoen pointed oirb,
j that in thought S precedes P in time, or, as v. d. Ga-
!
| helentz would have said, S is the 'initial notion' and
j
| P the goal of communication1. Prom this it fillowtfcjl 
[ that, whatever the grammatical structure of a sentence
i
| may he, each word which is first heard is S in relat-
i1
| ion to any other word expected to follow, van Ginneken
|
| has pointed out that v. d. Gahelentz was not the first 
j  to make this discovery, that the credit for this he-
i
! loners to Henri Weil who outlined in his hook L'ordrej O  — ---
| des mots (Paris 1844, 2nd ed. 1869, 3rd ed. 1879) an 
essentially similar doctrine.2)
Now a word becomes necessary on terminology. There 
is fairly general agreement with regard to what should 
he called the fi^omal or grammatical S and P. But there
l) See ahove p. 142. 
j 2) J. van Ginneken, Principes de' psvcho-
l o g j Q u e . Paris, Leipzig, Amsterdam 1907, p. 495.
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is little unity on the question of how to name the S 
and P of thought. Both the terms ’logical* and ’psycho­
logical* have Been used in this connection, and Both 
terms can he defended. If, as we said before, The doer
of it has been Jill is logically a^correcter* expression 
than Jill has done it. then the term of logical S and 
P will appear justified. - If we stress more the psycho­
logical fact that one part of the stateme^4- ~----  —
more strongly than the other(our attentic L
call that part the psychological P and consequently
more complicated when we learn that some scholars want 
to give a different sense to ’logical* and to ’psycho­
logical * S and P. J. Haas would say that in our example 
the grammatical S and P coincide with the logical S 
and P, but differ from the psychological S and P. In 
The doer of it has been Jill, however, it is the psycho­
logical S and P which coincide with the grammatical, 
whereas the logical S and P would be different. This is 
because Haas calls the substance - property relation 
*logical*S and P, which remains the same in both form­
ulae. ^  I do not think personally that ’logical* S and 
P are good names for this sort of relation, which really 
belongs to the realm of things and is therefore of an
'Tttor*
oppose ii to it a psychological S. - But things become
l) J. Haas, Pranzbsische Syntax. Halle A.S. 1916, Chap. 
VI, pp. 79/85.
o n t o l o g i c a l  character. As a matter of fact, 
Haas’s ’logical*S and P are identical with the ’real’
S and P, mentioned on p. 126. They represent also 
Kajepky’s ’tDr&ger - Zustand" relation, characterized 
hy the philosopher Erdmann as “Inh&renz“.-0 -
If} we rehaptize^for the sake of argument, Haas * s 
’logical* S and P * ontological *, we would come to a 
threefo^ld distinction: (l) Grammatical S and P, (2) 
logical or psychological S and P, (3) ontological S 
anff P. - It is not difficult to imagine a statement 
in which none of these three distincta coincides with 
any of the other two. Let us suppose some students 
discussing the merits of a poem and of a novel written 
hy different authors. To avoid confusion one student 
would say: The p o e m  is written hy Longfellow”. In 
this case the poem is the formal (grammatical) S and 
the logical (psychological) P, whereas the ontological 
S would "be Longfellow. Haas would surely accept this 
sort of analysis with a slightly different terminology. 
Others apparently shrink from the introduction of too 
many points of view into the analysis of sentences.
l) “Die Beziehungen der Merkmale, die in dem Inhalt 
eines Gegenstandes vereinigt sind, zum Gegenstande
selhst hahen ......  das Inharenzverh&ltnis der
Eigenschaften zum Dinge zu ihrem Musterbild.1 
Logik, I, p. 129.
Wundt for instance claims that the grammatical and 
logical S and P always coincide and that in a case such 
as J i l l  has done it the stressed word corresponds 
to a “ dominierende Vorstellung” 1)a  similar method has 
I been adopted by Ch. Bally; for him there is a grammatic-
j al S and P, arbitrarily characterized by certain mor-
! phological features, and a “theme” and “propos”, which
I
| he does not want to call psychological S and P, but
simply A and Z. A nd Z may or may not coincide with 
the grammatical S and P. In our example the stressed 
word Jill would be Z and the rest A.^
T h e  p a r t i a l  o r  t o t a l  e l i m ­
i n a t i o n  o f  S a n d  P f r o m  g r a m m a r .
There has been another, very subtle, attempt to over­
come the difficulty which is created by the non-coin­
cidence of grammatical categories with those of thought.
| It is the grammatical system elaborated by Monsieur
j A. Lombard.^) In it the terms S and P appear rather
I as concessions to traditional terminology,as mere
| names, but are divested of their central importance
for grammatical analysis. It is true that this system
| l) W. Wundt, Volkerpsychologie 1,2 (1900), p 259.
I 2) Linguistique generale et linguistique francaise.
p. 44.
3) A. Lombard, Les membres de la oro-position franyaise.
I Essai d’un classement nouveau. In: Modema Spr£k
XXIII (1929), pp. 202/53.
has "been created in the first instance for the analysis 
of French only, hut there can he little douht that it 
fits'Jprohahly any grammar which is huilt up on the 
fundamental distinction of noun and verh, that is at 
least any Indo-European grammar.
In the centre of Monsieur Lombard’s system we find
the verh and particularly the finite verh, which is
o
called P. Now to this P there c r r e s p o n d s  n o t
K
a S , hut the following parts of speech: substantive, 
article, adjective, pronoun, adverb, infinitive and 
participle. According to ordinary grammatical parl­
ance these are m o r p h o l o g i c a l  distinct­
ions, wherb^the finite verh occupies a special place. 
Besides this morphological we find a s y n t a c t ­
i c a l  distinction: all parts of a sentence grouped 
round the verh are called "adverbal", all those grouped 
round a noun are called lladnominal,t. The latter are 
subdivided into "epithete" , "attribut" , and "apposition". 
These three together with the P and the 11 adverhal” form 
the group of f i v e  g r a m m a t c a l  f u n c t ­
i o n s .  Not taking into account the finite verb or P, 
each function can be represented by a "membre direct1' 
(constructed without preposition), a "membre indirect" 
(constructed with the help of a preposition) or a sub­
ordinate clause; besides, the "adverbal" can also be 
an absolute Construction.
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We obtain thus 15 categories (4 for the "adverbal",
3 for each of the other three). Each of these can 
express an unlimited number of " v a l e u r  s" such 
as "valeur qualificative", "valeur subjective", "va- 
leur objective", "valeur dativale", "valeur possessive", 
"valeur temporelle", etc. etc. Of these the "valeur 
subjective" is of special interest for us. Since it 
represents "celui, ou ce, qui fait, ou qui est quelque 
chose, c’est-a-dire celui a qui, ou ce a quoi, on 
attribue une action, un etat ou une qualite" (e.g.
"i 1 h^site. s o n  hesitation, i 1 est sincere. 
s a s i n c e r i t e can easily recognize in it our 
so-called ’ontological1 S, i.e. the first member of the 
substance - property or "Tr&ger - Zustand" relation 
(Kalepky). And I think it is also not difficult to see 
in Monsieur Lombard’s P or finite verb a modern successor 
to Aristotle’s
One feature of this system will probably strike 
any grammarian who examines it, that is t h e  a b ­
s e n c e  o f  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  a g r a m m ­
a t i c a l  S as opposed to P. But in practice this 
term turns up in the examples analysed by Monsieur 
Lombard. The S of passive constructions for instance is 
called "sujet grammatical", but this seems to be a mere 
verbal concession to traditional usage, since there is
1) Ibid.p. 245.
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the other expression "adverbal au sens objectif" at 
our disposal. It is more difficult to find an appro­
priate expression for the neuter pronoun in cases such 
as il est necessaire de partir. because the 11 adverbal 
subjectif" is de partir: il is called "sujet apparent" 
by the author. But this may be dismissed as a point of 
minor importance, since il. here can be considered as 
a purely morphological element.
On the .other hand the advantages of Monsieur Lom­
bard’s system are apparent: one finds one’s way easily 
through it; it permits us to group together such things 
as il desire, il est desireux. son desir or Cesar 
construit un pont and un pont est construit -par Cesar 
in an easy and clear way, and thus finds points of 
comparison which are somewhat obscured by the usual 
grammatical method, and we know what excellent use 
Monsieur Lombard has made of these possibilities in 
his boohs on nominal constructions in French.-*-)
But this must not prevent us from ventilating some 
criticism. Actually the terms S and P in Monsieur Lom­
bard’s system are mere words. To call the finite verb 
P is obviously a mere concession to tradition and the 
"valeur subjective" is really a "valeur de substance".
So it loohs as if Monsieur Lombard’s system is really, 
what certain linguists have been striving after for a 
long time, namely a g r a m m a t c a l  s y s t e m  
w h e r e  t h e  t e r m s  S a n d  P a r e  p r a  ct- 
i c a l l y  e l i m  ijn. a t ed, and with it the
/) A *  > v i V > v v H _ » 4 >
r=a- —*  - * • —  - : * " - -eJl*., /‘tr-cAA.O-tvv /f SO.
- 1 6 4 -  (u)
deliverance of grammar from logic end psychology seems 
to he achieved. And yet, it seems to me, that th*old 
difficulties are only masked, hut not eliminated. 
Monsieur Lombard defines an "adverbal" by saying:
"Un adverbal est un membre de phrase se rapportant 
a un verbe, a une proposition entiere, a un adjectif, 
a un adverbe ou a un groupe prepositionnel." By choos­
ing the neuter expression "se rapportant a" he says 
nothing about the nature of the thought-relation of 
the adverbal to the corresponding part of the sentence. 
Now we know that in Cesar construit the verb determines 
the noun, whereas in (un pont) est construit par Cesar 
it is the noun which determines the verb. We know 
furthermore that the relationship between Cesar and
and par Cesar. All these differences are hidden betwcera 
the general term "se rapportant a", and its determin­
ation by any of the"valeurs" is of no help in the matter, 
Nevertheless they are very real differences and claim 
our attention, and with that we are precisely back at 
the point we started from.
Lastly we shall do well to mention a system of 
grammatical analysis which r e j e c t s  e x - 
p l i c i t e l y  t h e  t e r m s  S a n d  P ; 
it is that elaborated by C. Svedelius in his very 
sagacious book L fanalyse du langage appliouee a la
that between est construit
vi
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langue francalse. (Uppsala 1898<p). He eliminates the 
term proposition altogether; the object of grammatical 
analysis is the "communication". Of this purely lingu­
istic category the author says: "Cette categorie per- 
mettra de rechercher librement ce que l ’homme communi­
que vraiment a son semblabbe dans chaaue cas parti- 
culier, recherche d ’ou ressortira aussi, nous l ’espe- 
rons, la subdivision de la communication." (p. 6). How 
does he define his term "communication"? We find the 
answer to this on p. 17, where the author declares: 
"(Est communication) toute combinaison linguistique 
par la quelle une personne fait part a une autre, ou 
d ’un procede lie a une certaine substance, ou d ’une 
relation existant entre deux substances." - In other 
words, Svedelius promises us to give an analysis of 
the objective contents of acts of communication: "ce 
que l ’homme communique a son semblable", but he dis­
cards the proposition or judgment for which these ob­
jective contents might be the material as linguistic­
ally irrelevant. He affirms furthermore that all 
communicated contents are of two sorts: (i) "substance 
- procede", (2-) "substance - relation - substance".
The difference between the two is that the "relation 
de procede" (l) "renferme un procede comportant un 
element o c c a s i o n n e l  par rappert au terminus 
a quo (=le locus, lieu de naissance du procede)**-):
1) P. 17.
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(ecoutez!) les oies .iacassent". whereas "la communicaft® 
tion de relation" "compete un element c o n s t a n t  
par rapport a la suhstance subordonnee: les oies 
jacassent = sont des animaux jacassante.'• (p. 41);
"sont" r^gresents the relation, "animaux jacassant" 
the second "suhstance".
In the way of criticism we should like to point
out that Svedelius has <vory weld! seen two important 
vzrybttW
facts\j: (1) That the Aristotelian Suhstance - Accident 
theory does not do justice to the complexity of facts; 
he therefore replaces it hy two fundamental schemes: 
"communication de relation" and "communication de pro­
cede". (2) That his own classifications and therefore 
ths^ of traditional logic which they are meant to re­
place have nothing to do with the jud^ient and its 
S - P structure.
What he did not see, however, was the fact that 
even his two fundamental schemisj’represent too great 
a simplification of the complexity of facts, and, 
ahove all, it seems to us that it is quite illegitimate 
to conclude as he does: Objective relations must he 
considered independently of the S - P relation; ergo 
the judgment does not interest the linguist. To restrict 
the analysis of "communications" to that of objective 
facts seems to us quite legitimate as long as one knows 
that one simply leaves out another, not less important
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aspect: One has still to account for the grouping 
of the three objective factors * substance - relation - 
substance* in two groups: (l) substance, (2) relation- 
substance. And one has also to consider the question 
of m o d a l i t y .  These a r e  questions the 
linguist has to take notice of. Svedelius* reform of 
the traditional method is quite justified as far as 
it goes, but it is i n c o m p l e t e .  Had he seen 
that it would have been difficult for him to avsToid 
the question of S and P.
P a r t  II 
Chapter (3)
T h e  S u b j e c t - P r e d i c a t e  r e l a t i o n .
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P r i u s ( p r i m u m )  l o g i c u m  - p o s - 
t e r i u s ( p o s t r e m u  m) l o g i c u m *  - 
The preceding px chapter was mainly of a preparatory 
character* We have pointed out where, in thexjsjs sphere 
of thought, S and P cannot he looked for, hut we have 
also mentioned those positive characteristics of trad­
itional theory, which must he taken into account in 
any theory of S and P. They are the act-character of 
the judgment, which takes piace in t i m e ,  and the 
theory of m o d a l i t y .  - I n  the sphere of language 
we have convinced ourselves that, however wide v/e 
make the definition of the grammatical S and P, v/e 
never get rid of the fact that linguistic form is as 
often as not misleading, that there is a difference 
between what linguistic form seems to express and what 
it really does express* Hence the introduction of var­
ious sorts of S and P into linguistic analysis and a 
rather disquietingly arbitrary choice of terminology, 
which seems to indicate that grammatical analysis has 
not the firm basis it ought to have*
Now we are going to attempt a p o s i t i v e  
t h e o r y  o f  S a n d  P ,  and again we shall 
try and sep>arate the two spheres of thought and 
1language*. That is, for the time being we are going 
to disregard linguistic morphology altogether and con­
centrate on thought-analysis of statements. As a
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star tingpoint I choose a simple French sentence, where 
the question of distinguishing different sorts of S 
and P does not arise, where thought and language coin­
cide as far as these distinctions are concerned. The 
sentence is Son attitude intransigeante intimidait 
tout le monde . This statement we are going to analyse 
in the traditional way, that is, granting that an 
analysis in S and P is possible. But this, for the time 
beinlj, can only be a hypothesis. We shall however ac­
cept the hypothesis, if we find out in the course of 
our investigation that it is not arbitrary, that these 
terms have a definite sense measured the standard 
of our previous critical remarks, and I hope to con­
vince the reader that this will be the case, so that 
this whole chapter will be a defence of the legitimacy 
of the old terms S and P in the realm of thought.
Taking thus the first step we shall say that Son 
attitude intransigeante is the S, intimidait tout le 
monde the P of the statement. Now both S and P are com­
plex and therefore further reducible. Let us begin with 
the S. We cJould not conceive the meaning of son atti- 
tude intransigeante , without having previously accept­
ed a statement of the form son attitude est intransi­
geante. This in turn is based on the acceptance of 
il a oris une attitude, which in turn presupposes the 
acceptance of il y a une nersonne definie (8 il). Here
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we seem to reach a limit "beyond which we are not able 
to extend our analysis. - Let us turn now to P. It 
can he analysed in a similar way; we obtain again a 
number of statements, each of which is the logical 
basis for the next: (l) il y a ± x h x ± x x x  intimidation. 
(2) l fintimidation est eprouvee par tout le monde.
This analysis reaffirms what is v/idely recognized: 
namely that this sort of sentence can be analysed into 
two main units which are related to each other as S 
and P and that its sub-units can further be analysed 
according to the same principle. But it brings\also 
out something which, as far as I am aware, has not 
befin singled out with al2> desirable distinctness and 
which we shall call l o g i c a l  t i m e .  What
clear.we mean by this term will become immediately
We found that both S and P of our sentence pre­
suppose the acceptence of the validity of certain 
other, more elementary, suppositions, each of which 
appears resumed in the S of the next higher state­
ment. We found furthermore, that the order in which 
the part-statements have to be accepted is not arbitr­
ary but logically conditioned; it obeys a n e c e s s -  
i t y of thought. And, lastly, we found that this 
method of analysis can be pursued until we reach a
sort_of elementarystatement of the form il y a A.
1) Cf. W. Wundt, Logik, 3rd ed., vol.I, Stuttgart 1906 ^
P*
In the light of these findings we are able to say 
that each S is a prius logicum in relation to its P, 
which is thus a posterius logicum with regard to its 
S and that the elementary statement, on which all the 
others are "based, .may "be called primum logicum. This,
I think, gives us at least one outstanding characterist­
ic feature of the S - P relation. And since it reflects 
a necessity of thought it seems reasonably firmly 
established.
how we can go one step farther. If, instead of 
going logically backwards from the whole statement to 
its raosljelementary basis, the primum logicum. we follow 
up the opposite direction, we shall find, that in the 
whole statement itself is involved a logical process, 
which leads necessarily up to a result which may be 
expressed in the following formulation: II y a intimi­
dation de tout le monde. causee par son attitude in- 
transigeante* and since we cannot go any farther in 
this direction, we may well call this statement the 
postremum logicum. Two things about Iz are rather re­
markable: (l) The S of the postremum logicum has the 
same form as that of the primum logicum which will allow 
us to see in il y a the most elementary form of S.1^
l) See Part III, Chap. $, p. 3^7*
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(2) The S of the original statement (son attitude in- 
transigeante), after having heen determined "by intimi- ■ 
dait tout le monde, appears in the postremum logicum 
as the^determining factor of the original P; the orig- 
inal determinandum has hecome, in the postremum logicum.
the determinans. Bally has formulated the principle * " 1 " r™~ r " 1
of what he calls"conditionnement reciproque": "Dans 
toutes les formes d’enonciation, le theme (A) et le 
propos (Z), le determine (t) et le determinant (t*) 
sont dans ion rapport d*interdependence, de coraplemen- 
tarite, de conditionnement reciproque. On ne peut ima- 
giner d*enonce sans qu’on dise a propos de quoi il est 
fait, de m£rae qu'il n T y a pas, en logique, d fassertion 
sans une matiere de j u g e m e n t . A s  can he seen from 
this Quotation Bally simply affirms the fact that S and 
P are r e l a t i v e  terms, one cannot he thought
e
of without implying the other. We, however, affirm here 
more than that. Besides proclaiming the r e l a t i v e
f o r
interdependence of S and P we also contend^the r e - 
v e r s d S - a  o f  f u n c t i o n s  of A and B in 
the postremum logicum as compared to the original 
judgment; Ax4fixS£xxxBx4xx££ A - B becomes II y a 3-A. 
The importance of this will show itself in our account 
of the mechanism of t r a n s p o s i t i o n  and 
of a n a l y t i c a l  and s y n t h^i c forms.2 /
1) Linguistioue gnrierale et linguistique franyaise. o.4-4.
2) Cf. Part III, Chap. 7.
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Having said this, we must add that it is difficult to 
see in this reversal of functions more than a t e n ­
d e n c y ,  for we have accepted ourselves son attitude
intransigeante as the postremum logicum of son attitude
e
est intransigeante, whe^as according to the principle 
of the reversdt&f. of functions we should expect *1fin- 
transigeance de son attmtude as the result of a judg­
ment of the form son attitude est intransigeante. Like­
wise, the postremum logicum of the house is white, 
should he the whiteness of the house rather than the 
white house. These things are difficult to assess, be­
cause it looks as if we have to count with various 
tendencies which influence each other. I should he in­
clined to see in the whiteness of the house the triumph 
of an ideal logical tendency, whereas the hmixK white 
house reflects the force of that psychological tendency 
of which we have spoken ahove (pp. 128/29), according 
to which we prefer the relatively concrete concept 
to function as de te rminandum and the relatively abstract 
as de terminans. The overriding of the idel^ a logical 
tendency is ihExfissxEX easily accepted since the white­
ness of the house and the white house are equivalent 
in th&X sense that they both describe the same substra­
tum.
If we analyse now more closely the two parts of the
-173-
main judgment we shall find that t h e  c o n s t i t ­
u t i o n  o f  B or posterius logicum d o e s  n o t  
d e p e n d  o n  t h e  s a m e  f a c t o r s  a s  
t h a t  o f  A or prius logicum. Which objective 
features of the substratum are comprehended by A de­
pends on how much of it has been taken in by p r e - 
v i o-J.U s experiences; A comprehends the previously 
accepted cognitional features. The choice of the object­
ive features to be incorporated in B is determined by 
the character of the postremum logicum or the cognit­
ional g o a 1 to which the cognitional act leads up.
This cognitional goal is reached and becomes an 
acquired reality only after the cognitional act is spent. 
Hence the possibility of p u s h i n g  t h a t  
g o a l  f a r t h e r  a w a y j w h i l w  t h e  
c o g n i t i o n a l  a c t  i s  s t i l l  i n  
p r o g r e s s .  We can imagine that in our example 
there was a first goal; II y a intimidation causee par 
son attitude intransigenate. to Tpe reached by a judg­
ment exposed by the statement Son attitude intransigeante 
etait intimidante, and that the additional factor tout 
le monde was added as a result of what we just called 
'pushing that goal farther away*. & In other words, 
while the extension of A is relatively s t a b l e ,  
that of B is relatively fl a b i 1 e*. And this becomes 
quite understandable if we look at the constitution of 
the cognitional act in logical time. There we see that
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the ’lability* of B is conditioned By the fact that 
the Present displaces itself on the positive tirae- 
axis marked ’Future*, whereas A is completely part of 
the fast.
And this is also the reason why, in the analysis 
of A we proceeded moving from the right to the left, 
whereas we went in the oiDposite direction in the analys­
is of B.
What conclusions shall we draw from this analysis?
logicum By a number of successive steps? By no means.
The statement just analysed represents o n e  step 
only, leading up to the final result or postremum 
logicum. Even the occasional ’pushing farther away* of 
the cognitional goal can rather Be likened to a hesit­
ation in doing the one step than to a second £or third 
etc.) step. Thjmalysis into part-statements gives ex­
pression only to two facts: (l) That, generally speak­
ing, e a c h  c o n c e p t  we possess h a s  B e e n  
a c q u i r e d  t h r o u g h  a c o g n i t i o n a l  
e x p e r i e n c e , w h i c h ,  w h e n  m a d e ,
Past Present Future
A B
Primun logicum JJLS.-------------------  >j--- »---
prius logicum  ^ posterius logicum
---------------------------------- Q----------------------------------------------
V  'Postremum logicum
> 0 0
Does it mean that Build up the postremum
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h a d i n  i t s  t u r n  t h e  S - P f o r m .
(2) That this is t h e  o n l y  r e a s o n a b l e  
f o r m  o f  c o n n e c t i n g  (in t h o  u g h t^ >
I----------c o g n i t i o n a l  e x p e r i e n c e s ^  and can 
therefore "be reconstituted in any analysis of com­
bination of concepts purposefully leading up to a theo­
retical result; and it is just this which distinguishes 
’thohght1 from a mere stream of impressions or a mere 
chain of associations.
C o n c e p t s  a n d  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n ­
s h i p  i n  t h e  j u d g m e n t . -  If, as we say, 
concepts are the result of cognitional experiences, 
forming part of our mental equipment, that means that 
they are stored up in m e m o r y .  It is here that 
they are t r a n s f o r m e d  in a special way.
In the cognitional act the concepts involved in S and 
P are well distinguished. It is only through a special 
mental effort that they are brought together into a new 
unity. Once this unity has b^en created, it becomes the 
p r e d o m i n a n t  feature of the combination, be­
cause it is just that which our mind strove to achieve. 
The S - P duality will in time be obliterated and 
finally the stage will be reached where they become 
unanalysable in the sense that the old S - P struct­
ure has left no traces. We may symbolize this process
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graphically "by the following notation: A -B > AB >^T 
(= ’term'). Of course, as a rule T is still analysahle 
as to its c o n t e n t s ,  hut this analysis, called 
definition1 is not an analysis reconstituting the form­
er S - P structure. In our example it is the concept 
il or lui, which is unanalysable as to its former
S - P structure, although we were well able to define
''mneTKOTU’ ^
it by saying II = une oersonne definie . In this mem-
simplification of concepts a law of mental economy 
reveals itself: Our memory retains the important part 
of the past cognitional experience, that is the unity 
and extension of the objective content, but it elimin­
ates the traces of the fabric which served to create it. 
This fact enables logical handbooks to symbolize con­
cepts by simple letters of the alphabet and to reduce 
the judgment to the notation A (= S) (= P).
Prom this it follows that concepts, which we have 
previously defined in a preliminary way, as ’unifying
tipCcl or C.07rtpYch-tnfions Cff com p u t t ie  p to p tr t its ,
intellectual- s y m b o l * derive their unifying force 
from the fact that they are terms of a judgment. I 
thing therefore also that the question whether or not 
w o r d s  d e n o t e  c o n c e p t s  can only be 
answered in the affirmative i n  s o  f a r  a s  
w o r d s  r e f l e c t  t e r m s  o f  j u d g ­
m e n t s  (either actually or potentially).
I)  O/w p  . t o  .
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In a judgment two concepts A and B are drought to­
gether into a higher unity hy a purposeful act which 
consists in d e t e r m i n i n g  A t h r o u g h  
B.^* Whatever the ultimate purpose of such an act may
he, itCs immediate and general purpose, as we said de-
2)fore, ' is that of determination. Determination is only 
another word for i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .  We 
may say that in the cognitional act a sudstratum, first 
identified through a concept A, is now deing identified
$ I wu' C&r to t k o j t
as delonging to experiences^represented dy the concept 
B.
But the term ’identification* should de taken in 
a dynamic sense as an X attempt on the part of the 
thinker to make the spheres or extensions of A and B
o v e r  6a p
cover eaeh crbher. It should not de taken as an express­
ion of the result of this attempt, that is to say, it 
should not de thought of as meaning that the concept­
ual spheres of A and B are actually of identical ex­
tension, So while it is not true that all judgments 
have the form A = A, it may de said that t h e y  a l l  
a r e  v a r i a t i o n s  o f  t h e  ’f i r s t  
l a w  o f  t h o u g h t ’ which is expressed in that 
formula. This attempt of identification of A through B 
can de successful, however, only if the extensions of
2) On p. 142.
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the concepts cover each other at least partially;
wherever this is not the case we obtain either no
When is this condition fulfilled? There can he 
only one ansv/er: The attempt to cover the extensions 
of tv/o concepts can he sucessful, if the experiences 
reflected in the concepts are really experiences of 
the same substratum from different points of view, or, 
in other words, if they are founded on properties of 
one and the same substratum. The self-identity of the 
substratum reveals itself thus as the objective con­
dition for the act of identification or determinat­
ion.
The judgment would not be a purposeful act of ifraiag 
thought, if no p r o g r e s s  were achieved by it. 
Now the progress lies precisely in .the fact that a
relatively isolated experience is being linked up 
with other experiences through common features. If we j 
say Socrates is wise, we find that in the experience 
of the man Socrates there is found an element ’wisdom* 
which it has in common with experiences of other people j 
i.e. we perceive Socrates as a member of the class of 
wise men. Hence the fact that B must needs be the 
wider concept relatively to A, because that is the 
only way we can bring the experience classified under 
A out of its isolation. In view of a later discussion^)
valid judgment at all or a negative judgment.
i) cf. p. k) r-•,?t? •
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we might note here that the impossibility of saying 
^wisdom is Socrates has nothing to do with Socrates’ 
being a substance and ’wisdom* an accident and that 
we cannot predicate substances of accidents, but only 
with the r e l a t i v e  e x t e n s i o n s  of both 
concepts, as one glance at Lhe equally impossible 
*feeling is hunger shows. In other words, the reason 
for the impossibility of such judgments are f o r m -  
al and n o t  metaphysical. --According to this we 
should think that in judgments of the form A = A no 
progress in thought is achieved, because the sphere 
of the predicate-concept is not larger than that 
of the subject-concept. But in reality even here 
there is a little progress achieved if we take the 
formula A = A as a shorthand for ’What was supposed 
to be A is really A*.
Things seem to be different in the case of a
(•&> (*?) 3
judgment of the form il y a^ /A; becaup il y a seems to 
represent nothing but the general concept of'existence *; 
the S of the primum logicum seems to be the objective 
world in its potential totality. In this case the con­
cept involved in S seems to be necessarily larger 
than any B could ever be. But, as a matter of fact, 
il y a does n o t  represent ’existence’ in general, 
but a particular unclassified or undetermined 
existence, an isolated particle of existence.
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We find thus that the relative extension's of the 
concepts A and B become really understandable if we 
take the purposefulness of the cognitional act into 
account; progress of thought dan only be achieved if 
A can be classified u n d e r B. On the other hand, 
as we have pointed out, the fact± that a concept A 
falls under B can well be assessed outside the judg­
ment.^-) But the fact that A is a prius logicum and a 
de te rminandum in relation to B, which is thus a ooster- 
ius logicum and a de terminans,i s indeed an inter-con­
ceptual relationship which cannot be separated from
/
the judgment. There we have a p o s i t i o n a l  re­
lationship between concepts, i.e. we compare them in
the .
relation to their position in ’pyramid* of concepts.2-)
I
Ve see whether or not they have contact and examine 
their relative rank, compare their extensions. Here 
we have a c o n s e q u e n t  relationship between 
prius logicum and posterius logicum which is at the 
same time a pa p u r  p o s e f u l  relationship between 
de terminans and determinandum..
It is sometimes said that only a very limited 
number of statements reflect a classifying judgment 
of the type A is B , others, such as Socrates is wise 
are perhaps better called ’descriptive’ judgments;
others again , such as Socrates converses with his
■)■)*)—  -
1) See above pp. 124/25.
2) S8e above pp. 11/12.
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disciples could best be called 'narrative1 judgments. 
In this sense C. Serrus divides judgments in 'descript­
ive', 'narrative* and 'relational',1) W. Jerusalem dis- 
tinguishes "Wahrnehmungs-" and "Begriffsurtheile", and 
linguists such as Schuchardt0) or Elise Richter4) speak 
of "Mitteilung" as something different from "Urteil".
We think ourselves that all such distinct^ncjsions are 
the result of a confusion between the a i m  for v/hich
a judgment is formed , and the judgment itself,which
s
may be only i n s t r u m e n t a l  in reaching that 
aim. In order to d e s c r i b e  'Peter' as 'running' 
I must have classified him (previously under the con­
cept of 'running beings'; the classifying judgment
underlies the description. This in turn should not be 
descriptive
called^'judgment*; it is no judgment at all, as little 
as a picture is a judgment. In this way we should like 
to defend t h e  u n i v e r s a l i t y  o f  t h e  
f o r m  o f  t h e  j u d g m e n t .
1) Le parallelisine logico-grammatical, p. 96.
2) Die Urtheilsfunktion. p. 59.
5^ Hugo Schuchardt Brevier, p. 225.
4) Wie wir surechen. p. 71.
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• < n> e. CK- -»\ Ji rv» o  ci w- d i t > |
IS h--e— u n f --e- 1 d i n g— e—£— t h -e— o -e - j
•g n i - t i o n a l — a- e- t— — t-i m . - Until now I
we have only considered the in concepts involved in !
i {■
a judgment, their nature and relationship. We have not 
yet analysed the main thing: the judgment itself as j
a special act taking place in time. It is true the 
factor 'time1 was already reflected in a way in the j
i
terms nrius logicum. nosterius logicum etc. , "but this I
|
anteriority of' posteriority was until now nothing "but j
a logical nostulaturn, it was a 'con-sequent1 not a j
'sequent* relation.
If we wish tch study the unfolding of the cognition- I 
al act in r e a l  time, we shall have to place at 
the initial moment (l) the centrifugal direction of
t&iA/a TCti jabs’* r«.*u.>v\
our attention with all its potential cognitional
K
features. Of these we shall analyse first those which 
have been assimilated already hy previous experiences, j 
Of this fact we may he well assured: it is a general 
law that those movements or actions are most easily 
performed to which we are used, which have heen parts j 
of previous exr^ereduces. All training, he it hodoly 
or mental, rests on this fact. So we may well suppose 
that of all the potential features of X, those which 
form the contents of A become^first actual. But to A 
belongs a certain point of view, which is not the one
i/tf
we are occupying now. We are now viewing X through
a perspective, which brings out certain other cognition- 
al features, which form the contents of a concept B.
This in turn is the result of previous experiences 
which have not been made in connection with X = A, 
but in different connections. Their applicability 
to A is now realised and A is consequently reclassified 
as B.
Let us take an example to illustrate this abstract 
account. If I say Notre ami N. est musicien. I have 
singled out somebody - the general object of attention - 
at whom I am used to look in a familiar way as notre 
ami N.; now I realize that he performs ac#s which I 
have observed in certain people known as 'musicians'. 
This is why I can classify notre ami N. as musicien.
Now something else. The nev/ cognitional features 
observed in A, as long as they are not yet assessed 
as B, create a theoretical uneasiness, which manifests 
itself in a feeling of t e n s i o n ;  this accounts 
for the fact that A appears on the one hand as the 
f a m i l i a r ,  on the other hand as the p r o ­
b l e m a t i c a l .  It is characterized by a d o u b ­
l e  m o d a l i t y :  that of quiet acceptance and 
that of doubt. That is why the whole judgment appears 
as an answer to some question and gives it its dis­
cursive character. But in reality no question is asked.
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the double modality of the S is only a snjgtimental re­
action of the cognizant ego. The greater the difficulty 
in assessing the relatively unfamiliar features of X, 
the stronger the tension accompanying the act of 
sub.iectio will be and consequently the stronger will
be the sort of explosion which initiates the sentim- 
c
ental r ^ t a x a t i o n  marking the fact that B has 
been found and used as a classifier of A. We may say 
therefore that the act of judging is accompanied by 
an emotional process which develops in two phases:
(l) tension, and (2) relaxation after a sort of 'ex­
plosion* of the tension.
If this account is correct, the cognitional act 
can be analysed into various phases or part-acts follow­
ing each other in time in a determined order:
(1) Isolation of X by direction of attention.
(2) Identification with A felt as only partly satis­
factory because of the discovery of cognitional feat­
ures not accounted for by A. Double modality of S, 
sentiment of s tension.
(3) Identification of relatively unfamiliar cognitional 
features with B and by that, reclassification of
X = A. Relaxation of tension.
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O u t s t a n d i n g  q u e s t i o n s .  - It 
seems we have reached the point from which it will he 
possible to answer the questions raised at various 
points of our previous discussion and left unsolved so 
far. Let us take them one by one and begin with those 
questions labelled on p. 149.
The first question was: Is 'judging* a separate 
act from the representational synthesis, or are 
judging and representing only two sides of the same 
cognitional act?. There seem indeed to be certain 
psychological states such as representation in dreams 
(including day-dreaming) and in certain aesthetic in­
tuitions where no judgments are involved although re­
presentations certainly occur. As far as judgments are 
concerned the question of the psychological independ­
ence of a representational act from that of judging 
proper does not seem to be of very great importance 
to the analyst. All he is interested in is the fact 
that t h e r e  i s  n o  j u d g i n g  w i t h o u t  
a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  c o n t e n t ,  
and a closer analysis of the problem of how the repre­
sentational order is integrated into the order of 
thought will reveal furthermore that the former is 
dependent on the latter. ^  In any case no representat­
ion of the form the white house precedes the judgment
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the house is white. On the contrary, the white house 
is the P of the postremum logicum of such a. judgment: 
the house is white > there is: the white house, and 
therefore later in logical time. Its dispositional and 
virtual character is therefore an acquired quality.
It may “be, however, that the existence of pro­
nouncements such as Yes! and No! could he held against 
the view that there are no judgments without represent­
ational content. Indeed they seem to he the expressioh 
of modality pure and simple, independent of represent­
ational acts. Such a view would, however, he wrong.
Prom what we have previously said on the denotation of 
modality1' art* -rc-sulta that modality may he come an ob­
ject of attention and as such it must of course he re­
presented. Whether this is done hy representing acts
wlletVttr fit
of consentment or refusal or^in a more abstract way, 
difficult to describe with words,does not really matter, 
as long as we. can agree that in Yes! and No! there • i s 
a representational content. But something else is in­
teresting in these exclamations, and it is this: where­
as usually statements contain judgments on facts which
are represented independently of modality, Yes! and
c
No! judge judgments, they are therefore derived, sepnd-
hand phenomena; The content of these new judgments is 
the modality of another judgment asserted hy a new modal- 
ity of tfieirowrrT) '
l) See above p. 61.
m  -18*.
This leads us naturally to our next point, the 
question What is modality? Modality is the expression 
of a^belief or conviction that there is an objective
^ro'vcr.d.
peae-on? for the identification of X first through A 
and secondly through B. But this belief is first of 
all not a theoretical act, but a state of feeling of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction accompanying the judg­
ment, It is thus the specific emotional reaction of 
the ego while judging. If we consider the judgment as 
a purely theoretical act, we may say that m o d a 1 4 
i t y  i s  i t s  p r a c t i c a l  c o u n t e r ­
p a r t ,  without xi® which, however, the judgment would 
not be complete. Like the theoretical component of the 
judgment modality has two phases: during the first 
identification or sub.iectio, the accompanying feelings
are mixed and then dissolved into satisfaction in the
1)course of the nraedicatio. 'If the latter is unsuccess­
ful, we do not obtain a negative judgment, but only 
an abortive judgment, that is, n o  j u d g m e n t  
a t  a l l .  We get stuck as it were in the middle 
of the process. That goes to show that at bottom all 
f i r s t - h a n d  j u d g m e n t s  a r e  e i t h ­
e r  p o s i t i v e  o r  n o t h i n g .
l) See above p
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But - and uhis is most important - the practical 
side of the judgment may in turn "become conscious, 
that is to say, an object for the cognizant ego. It is 
this objectivation of subjective data we call fr e - 
f 1 e c t i o n*. As a result of this the cognizant 
ego has now before itself an enlarged vista: it sees 
the judgment in its specific practical context. The 
judgment has become a reflected judgment, and this 
can indeed be n e g a t i v e  or p o s i t i v e .
This is most easily shown with regard to the neg­
ative judgment. Its very form shows that it has to be 
conceived as a positive proposition, parts of which have 
been blotted out. Whoever thinks A is not B must have 
conceived previously A is B as a possiblity. But a 
postitive judgment such as A is indeed B . or A is in £ 
fact B , etc. may also reveal fthe reflection on the 
modality of the original judgment.
In the fact of reflection a new situation is created 
the thinker makes his own feelings an object of thought. 
He changes his point of view. He looks first in the 
direction of X, that is in.a centrifugal direction, and 
secondly he looks back upon himself, converting by this 
change of point of view what used to be only of centri­
petal significance a moment ago, when he looked to­
wards X, into objective meaning. That is why in any
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conscious expression of modality we have an 
isct o b j e c t i f i e d  s u b j e c t i v e  
a t t i t u d e .
How we can dissolve the apparent paradox that in 
ideal thought there can be only a positive or negat­
ive modality, whereas we find expressed in language 
so many shades of doubt and volition. The first state­
ment expresses in a reflected form the fact that the 
genuine (unreflected) judgment is either positive 
or nothing, the second presupposes the critical re­
flection on the subjective reactions accompanying the 
unreflected act. That we are so little aware of this 
change of point of view in the reflected judgment is 
easily explained, I think, by the factor of mechanizat­
ion. We are so very used to it that it has become a 
second nature, but we should do well not to forget 
that it is only second nature, not nature itself.
It is a pecularity of reflected judgments, that 
by the mere fact of reflections the thinker splits 
himself up into two persons. It is at this point that 
we find that in thought something of a social phenom- 
enonvpis?s°a t is there fore not surprising toA
find that such typically social phenomena as quest­
ions and commands receive an explanation similar to 
that of reflected modality. They are not judgments 
proper, but they presuppose and reflect judgments.
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This is true of the total question, which requires an 
answer in terms of yes and no (e.g. Did father come?) 
and of the partial question (e.g. Who came?). The 
former represents the reflection on the mod&lity of 
the judgment gather has come, the latter a reflection 
on the partial indetermination of A: Some (not suffic­
iently defined) person has come.
Commands likewise judgmeiits. By saying
Come/ I wish to create the objective basis for the 
judgment you come. As in questions the underlying 
judgments, so in commands the preconceived judgments 
are normally reflected in their form. This is important 
to observe, when we axjproach later on the analysis
of questions and commands.-*-)
It seems thus that we find the S - P structure in 
any basic act of thought, and consequently we should 
find it also in the e l e m e n t a r y  j u d g ­
m e n t  of the type it is raining, which has apparent­
ly a S without meaning, that is it has no S at all.
As far as the question of the S of impersonal ex­
pressions is a linguistic one it need not occupy our
o \
attention just now. 'Considered as an act of thought, 
however, there should be no doubt that an actual ex­
perience of water falling from the sky, which is as
1) Cf. p-r~ 2- ° 1 ff-
2) Cf. MU. ^00 {{■
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^-------- - ----------- ♦ yet unclassified, is connected
with similar experiences in the past, which are classif­
ied as rain: this allows us to determine the actual ex­
perience in the same way. It is as if we said fThe event 
I am witnessing just now is rain.1, only we think of 
S in a way still less determined than the words 'the 
event I am witnessing just now1 suggest. In it is rain- 
ing the S is that relatively undetermined X individual 
existence X, constituted by the fact that we turn our 
attention to it, and the judgment has again the struct­
ure of X is A.
Speaking of the elementary judgment leads naturally 
to a re-consideration of the question of a c o m ­
p l e x  j u d g m e n t  raised on p. 131. Does a 
statement such as Jack calls Jill represent a synthesis 
of various propositions? The answer can no longer be 
in doubt. By showing that the S - P relationship 
cannot be defined as one holding between objective 
elements and by giving to S and P a purely formal de­
finition we have, as a matter of fact, d e t a c h e d  
S a n d  P f r o m  t h e  s u b s t a n c e  
a c c i d e n t  relation. The xjresence of various 
substances such as Jajtck and Jill in one construct does 
thereforemin no way characterize this construct qua 
proposition. To infer from the presence of various 
substances that the construct is a synthesis of pro­
positions is therefore v/rong.
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Oo'n e l u s i o n *  - We have given a purely
f o r m a l  definition of S and P in the domain of
(=concept A)
±h t h o u g h t .  S appeared to us as a prius logicum^
(sconcept B)
.. p, «h. Thx, relation-
ship is characteristic of the p o t e n t i a l
judgment. In the a c t u a l  judgment they follow
each other in t i m e  and are characterized by a
certain m o d a l i t y  which manifests itself in
dcs
a feeling of theoretical insatisfaction and )sycholog- 
ical tension in the case of the S and in a feeling of
s
theoretical satisfaction and psychological de-tension 
in the case of P. Nothing at all has been said about 
the relationship of concepts and judgments to r e - 
p r e  s e n t a t i o n s , '  Both concepts and judg­
ments have been called by philosophers 'representations 
of representations'^) which paved the way to a complete 
confusion between the ideal forms of representing and 
thought among psychologists. We shall discuss the 
question of how representations are integrated into 
thought later.2) But only in so far as they are sym­
bolized in language; for we must never forget that 
we are concerned with* the analysis of language and 
that we distinguish ideal epistemological forms only 
becaujjp we believe it necessary for a better under­
standing of language.
1) Cf. Steinthal's criticism of Kant in Logii Grammatik
u. Psychologie, p. 329, and A. SchooenhauefT-TJie’ 
yfeTt a-is u. Vorstellung (Reclim) Leim “
PaLrt m. v. ■u p-jla.p.78.
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One conseg.uence of our formal definition of S and P 
seems to be that we need not subscribe to the thesis: 
Since in most cases linguistic constructions are not 
conformed to the ’logical1 scheme A is B grammar has 
nothing to do with S and P. - Our contention is pre­
cisely that A is B is n o t  a ^Logical’ but an ob­
jective relationship; it is descriptive of a f a c t ,  
not of a judgment. All sorts of facts may be represent­
ed and form the material of judgments(e.g. Jack calls 
Jill . Cologne lies between Berlin and Paris etc. etc.) 
It is therefore quite true that the formula A is B 
is not of universal value. But this proves nothing
against the S .and*P structure of judgments which is 
*
independent from the structure of represented facts.
S and P are realities of the elementary form of thought 
of that analytic and synthetic constructive act we 
call ’judgment#. The question how far S and P are 
reflected also in language is still open.
P a r t  III 
Chapter (l)
a r  a s y n t a c t i c s i g n s .
«
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I n t r o d u c t i o n .  - The result of our in­
vestigation in the Second Part of this essay is simple 
enough: All thought is performed through cognitional 
acts of an S - P structure. The question we have to 
study now is whether and to what ♦©» extent the same 
structure appears also in linguistic form and what 
methodological use the grammarian^make of this 
distinction.
For the purpose of this new investigation it will 
he appropriate to start with a limitation of the field. 
There is one large class of linguistic signs, which do 
not exhibit any grammatical or - as we should say perhaps 
more accurately - syntactic structure; we shall call 
them p a r a s y n t a c t i c  signs to distinguish 
them from the other sort of signs, which deserve the 
name of s y n t a c t i c  signs. It seems clear that 
we can look for S and P only inside the syntactic field; 
hut sinee parasyntactic signs and syntactic signs(jB&er 
are not to he found ximneatly separated in different 
compartments it is not possible to limit chur observat­
ion to the syntactical field only without having first 
eliminated the parasyntactic signs from the whole com­
plex of linguistic signs. That is why we have to start 
with an account of parasyntactic signs.
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Under the heading of fcarasyntac signs* we group tp-
x
gether all signs which do not exhibit any syntactic or 
grammatical structure. T h e i r  m e a n i n g s  c a n  
b e  a s s e s s e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h i n g -  
m e a n t  v a l u e s ,  b u t  t h e y  c o n t a i n  
n o  i n d i c a t i o n  a s  t o  h o w  t h e s e  
m e a n i n g '  a r e  t o  b e  b u i l t  u p .  In 
accordance with our explanation in Part I, Chap. 5, we 
may say that they exhibit material (i.e. extrinsic) 
meaning but no formal meaning. Para^syntactic signs may 
be divided into the two groups of p r e s y n t a c t -  
i c and p o s t s y n t a c t i c  signs. The latter 
presuppose already the existence of an elaborate gramm­
atical language, the former do not.
P r e s y n t ' a c t i c  s i g n s .  - At the be­
ginning of linguistic development we should like to place 
a sensual intuitive sort of symbolism, ratherrealistic- 
ally imitating or picturing al}. sorts of symptoms.1)
In the earliest stages art, such as painting and acting, 
may have been indistinguishable from language, both 
creating a somewhat deceptive image of reality, which 
seemed to our primitive forefathers almost indistinguish­
able from reality itself, as indeed it does in primitive 
societies to-day. Lnguage, one might almost say, started
l) See above, pp. 80/86.
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by way of cheating and acting. This at least seems to 
he thejksence of the first linguistic act performed 
hy the hahy. The youngster first utters a howling sound, 
say, as a symptom of hunger. Soon he learns that when­
ever he howls, somebody appears to look after him. This 
knowledge he uses now hy howling, even when he ids not 
hungry, just to ©all somebody. In other words he i m - 
i t a t e s a s y m p t o m in order to signal. We 
need not think that the hahy is very conscious in his 
indentions, hut no doubt the imitative howl is already 
intelligently used and a somehow artificial product.
It is therefore already a linguistic sign.1) We find 
already a deflection from its symptomatic to its sym­
bolic meaning comparable to the metaphor.-In the deictic
gesture we find eben,besides this semantic deflection,
2)an abridgment of the originally grasping gesture, ' 
and therefore something comparable to ellipsis in our 
grammatical languages.
Such imitations, be it of personal symptoms such as 
howling, sighing, laughing etc. or those of outside 
phenomena (bow-wow) are inso fa©to symbolic pictures; 
these may well show a structure, even a dyadic struct­
ure, as the numerous reduplications in so-called prim­
itive and children*s language prove; but these may be
1) See above p. 75.
2) See above p. 80.
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prompted by a desire to be very impressive an/by an 
esthetic rhythmical tendency. In any case, this struct­
ure is not of an epistemological nature; it has nothing 
to do with S and P.
If we describe the noise of a mAch#t)egun as 
rat - tat -
feao-tac-tac-taei . t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  
s y m b o l  r e f l e c t s  t h a t  o f  t h i n g s ,  
n o t  t h a t  o f  t h o u g h t  .-If the vanquished 
throws himself into the dust before the ©ictor, he 
pictures the man without force and without defence, but 
it is ingjossible to distinguish in his movement any 
phases which betray S or P, or any grammatical category. 
We call these symbolic imitations of symptoms without 
grammatical structure p r e  s y n t a c t i c  signs, 
because it is probable that this sort of linguistic 
sign$ was already in use before the existence of grammat­
ical (syntactic) language.
This does not mean, however, that presyntactic 
lanjjiage became obsolete, once grammatical language had 
been well established. On the contrary: this acting 
or picture-making lies so much in our blood, that we go 
on using presyntactic symbols always b e s i d e s  
grammatical signs. Better still: they are so intimately 
interwoven with grammatical expression that one might 
well say of some of them that they belong to it as
colour belongs to physical objects; others again have 
a certain independence, but they are not felt there­
fore as strangers in our languages. We nod assent when 
listening to some-bodyfs talk; that means we * incline’ 
ourselves to his authority; we shake the head in sign 
of disapproval. The original meaning of this gesture,
I take it, was the shaking off of an opponent; in 
this the whole body and particularly tfre shoulders 
must have participated. If this interpretation is 
correct, it v/ould mean that the well-known Mediterr­
anean gesturejconsisting of shaking the pointed finger 
from left to right, to and fro, is a sort of translat­
ion from one gesture - that of the body - into a 
Similar one - that of the finger.1)
Knowing that a sudden noise in the midst of silence
automatically attracts attention, we artificially yell
hello! to arouse somebody’s attention, behaving not
very differntly from the cheating baby. Generally 
\
speaking all so-called interjections imitating emotion­
al symptoms, such as ah! , oh! . whew! etc. belong &rtto 
the same category. But the use of parasyntactic signs 
is by no means restricted to a handful of gestures
l) Incidentally, outstreched finger and lower part of 
the arm have to be moved together. I was corrected 
once in Florence for the ’mispronunciation* of this 
gesture when I moved finger and hand only.
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and interjections. They are only "the relatively inde­
pendent elements. Of equal, if not greater,interest 
are those presyntactic signs which belong to the very 
body of our languages: sentence-melody, dynamic stress 
for the purpose of 'underlining1 important parts of 
words sSist snjetences, and word-order.
The melodic pattern of statements varies from 
one language to the other, but one feature most of 
them seem to have in common: that the end is marked 
by a falling note, and the beginning by a rising note, 
whereby the rise starts from a higher level than 
would be the final level reached by the falling note 
at the end. I think this reflects originally the tens­
ion - detension movement, which accompanies the cognit­
ional act in its progress from S to and has then 
been used artificially to denote the beginning and the 
end of a statement. But whereas the melodic features 
of statement-curves show great uniformity as far as 
the beginning and the end is concerned, there is a con­
siderable variety in the way sense-units inside the 
statement are marked off by melodic features.
By way of illustration I reproduce the correspond­
ent curves of French and Spanish as given by Grammont2 ) 
  --------------------------------
1) See above pp. 182/83.
2) M. Grammont, Traite de phonetigue. Paris 1933,0.134.
-198-
1 ) (The German
and add an characteristic English curve.
curve, hy the way, would he essentially similar to the
Spanish one; the main musical differences between the
two languages are of a dynamic not of a melodic nature.
French:
On avail)t vu / Paul III / et Chales Quint / causer ensem­
ble / sur une terrace. // et pendant leur entretien / 
la ville entiere se taisait.
Spanish: j----------- A^-- A\j-----
Andando nor aouella caverna adelante / hahla encontrado 
al fin unas galerias suhterraneas e inmensas / alumbradas 
con un resplandor dmdoso y fantastico / producido nor la 
fosforescencia de las rocas.
English: /
A brilliant debater in Trinity Colle&e. / he was called 
to the bar, / but preferred .journalism. / and bought a 
newspaper, / and still more nev/s papers and magazines.
)))------------------------------------------------------------
1) English is extremely rich in intonational patterns,
but the sentence melody we reproduce here in a schem­
atic for® is one of the most typical ones.
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We see that all the curves have special signs to 
mark sense units, hut whereas these are almost complete­
ly merged in the continuous flow of the whole in French, 
thus asserting the preeminence of the sentence over 
the word, Spanish and English assert the relatively 
greatT^autonomy of the element in relation to the whole, 
hut hoth in a very different manner: in Spanish the end 
of one unit is separated from the beginning of the next 
unit hy a maximum of melodic difference, in English hy 
a minimum. In stylistic parlance I should say that the 
French solution is the most elegant, the Spanish the 
most expressive and the English the most repressive of 
the three.
The melodic patterns of questions, commands and 
exclamations can he interpreted according to the same 
principle as those of statements. They toa are imitat­
ions of symptoms. - To he^gin with questions, their
Viwe. ori0<Tta£€y
particular melodic features has hoon onc-er a symptom of 
getting stuck in the middle of a statement, that is 
before the statement melody was completed. This was 
equivalent to a stimulus in the to col-
lahorate and help out with the answer. This interpret­
ation has heen given hy Kretschmer with regard to
1}alternative questions, ' hut I thinx it is safe to 
l) P. Kretschmer in: A. Gercke, E. Korden, Einleitunr 
Ik in die Altertumswissenscahft I, 3rd ed. , Leipzig 
1927, 6, Gl. - Gf. also B. Sonneck, Der___Satz als
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generalise it, either supposing that this melodic feat­
ure was adopted for all questions per analogiam or else 
that from the very beginning it applied also to situat­
ions like this one: A (speaks) The father... — '
B (answers) has come.
That the melodic (and dynamic) features of commands 
express the exertion of will tending towards a defin­
ite end is so easily seen that it needs no comment, and 
the same holds good of the melodic features of exclam­
ation which is the symbol of the speaker’s being over­
whelmed by emotion. All this goes to showjagain that, 
while we speak, we act at the same time - unconsciously 
of course - not unlike actors on the stagey
Into the same chapter of presyntastic symbols as 
sentence-melody belongs stress in its rdle as underliner 
of important significant parts and that of the order of 
parts of speech with its two main forms, the intellect-
V
ual order A B and the emotional order B A, where the 
very terms ’intellectual’ and ’emotional* indicate their 
originally symptomatic character. But these two, word- 
order and stress, have such a complicated and long hist­
ory, some phenomena have travelled so far from their un­
derstandable origin, that from the modern point of view
Einheit und die Satzarten. Arch, f. d. ges. Psychologie 
XCIV (1935), p 468. - J. van Ginneken, Principes de
psychologic linguistique, p. 340, - M. Gra mont,
Traite de. phonetjque , p. 423.
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I
they seem to he sometimes completely arbitrary. Since 
the question of word-order and stress are intimately 
linked with each other and of a very particular impoi#- 
ance for the problem of S and P, we are going to deal 
with them in a later chapter.1) Here it will suffice to 
point out that they belong together with interjections 
and sentence-melody in the realm of presyntactic signs.
It remains to indicate in a clear and conclusive 
way the essential characteristics of this sphere. I 
think they are the following: In the presyntactic sphere 
speech appears as acting or picture-making in the larg­
est sense. Presyntactic symbols are imitations of sympt­
oms, be it subjective symptoms such as oh!, be it sympt-
rv . 't- t 'a .t  - * clT - T  Ctir!
oms of outside phenomena such as tao '-tao tac t&<M If 
we compare the symbolic with the symptomatic meaning, we 
find from the very beginning a displacement of meaning: 
the howling baby ’says’ hunger (symptomatic meaning), 
but ’means’ Come and occupy yourself with me (symbolic 
meaning); tha vanquished throwing himself into the dust 
before the victor expresses weakness (symptomatic mean­
ing) , but symbolised submission under the victor’s will . 
We can easily imagn^ Le that if the sense-displacement 
goes farther and is coupled with abridgment of the 
symbol, this can change its character completely and 
become a mere diacriticon. This can be clearly observed
l) Cf. Part III, Chap. 0, pp. 3 ? v
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in the later development of our ’submission’ symbol: 
the meaning becomes equivalent to ’yes’, the symbol is 
abridged to a slight inclination of the head. For 
most people this ’nodding-assent* gesture has become a 
mere diacriticon.
Presyntactic symbolic pictures, if they show any 
division into parts, reflect either parts of the thing
■ - t - t»-t- t a t
pictured (free tao-tao-1tsrc>| ) or different expressive 
’pushs* (puff-nuff) but in neither case has this struct­
ure anything todo with the S and P structure of cognit­
ional acts. We learn from this that, w h e r e a s  
i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  d e n o t e  i n  
s p e e c h  w i t h  r e a s o n a b l e  d i s t i n ^ i  
n e s s  w h a t  i s  m e a m t ,  i t  i s  n o t  
i m p o r t a n t  t o  i n d i c a t e  a t h e
m e t h o d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  w h i c h  t h i s  
t o b e I
m e a n i n g  i s ^ b u i l t u p  i n  t h e  l i s t ­
e n e r ’ s m i n d .
IJ*. come-
P o s t s y n t a c t i c  s i g n s .  -/to the same 
result (We com<=»» when we glance at wrhat I should like to 
call the p o s t s y n t a c t i c  sphere. .Here be­
long those diacritica which have grown out of grammatic­
al language, but lost their grammatical structure, and 
furthermore diacritica arbitrarily fixed by -previous 
agreement and therefore really translated from grammat­
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ical language into a new signal-medium. Examples of the 
former kind are the particles of affirmation and neg— 
ation (jces, ja, oui, si; no, nein, non, £as, no) which 
all go "back to grammatical constructions or parts of 
grammatical constructions (e.g. French oui< Hoc (dicit) 
illi, ne - paslnon - nassu etc.); examples of pre­
arranged (or translated) diacritica would he the red 
traffic light or the signal-hall warning ships ag of 
atmospheric disturbances. ,ilot all such signals belong 
of course to the postsyntactic sphere, but only those 
which reflect the content of the original, without 
howver reflecting its grammatical form; others, such 
as Morse, translate both content and grammatical struct-
ure.
One might perhaps raise the objection that signals 
such as the traffic light also exhibit a S - P structure, 
S beings represented by all those features which arouse 
the interpreter’s attention, such as its pecular em­
placement at road-crossings, the arrangement of the 
l^mps, the white post supporting them, and that those 
features which occupy the interpreter’s attention 
during the act of interpreting, such as the red light, 
represent P. But such an argument xe can hardly in­
validate our contention, for th5g,e is no grammatical 
institution or convention to indicate S and P. Should 
we accept that the general signal-character stands for 
S we have at least to admit tha.t there is no S as
9
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part of the light-signal|corresponding to the part of 
a statement in grammatical form which can he identified 
as S by grammatical convention,
With regard to those postsyntactic signs which have 
grown out of grammatical language, one may well ask 
whfcfcji conditions favour this process of degrammaticaliz- 
ation. There we shall doubtless have to name in the 
first place emotional pressure, or better, perhaps, 
pressure 0$ time which translates itself into emotional 
pressure. In circumstances where the urgency of the 
situation calls for brevity, that is in exclamations 
and commands, we observe that sort of transition. It is 
in this kind of situation that Greek ufo'p , French tiensj_> 
Spanish Stomal > va.yal, English fiddlesticks! German 
Da hast esi, Ja Kuchenl (fam.) become degrammaticalized 
interjections. Sometimes we have originally wilfull 
disguising of outtfjfTorm for reasons of taboo as a^help- 
ing factor: Cp. English My foot!, French Sannristi!.
German Potz tausend! for My Godl. Sancti Christil.
Gottes tausendl
Most interesting phenomena result, when these de­
grammaticalized expressions are taken back into grammar.
We may find {that way* a nominative depending from a 
transitive verb: ° , a nominative
after a preposition: Rum serman de eu,^ a predicative
1) H. Tiktin, Rum&nisches Elementarbuch. Heidelberg 
1905, p. 128.- S. Lyer in Zeitschr. f Fnil*
" , /-• 3*0.
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<e---------------       adjective, which shows no agree­
ment with its noun: -porter haut la tdte. an adverb 
without adverbial ending: courir vite.^ ) an imperative 
becoming an adverb: das ist h a l t  so (South.Germ.) 
etc.
& X B X K X E X ± X H X X X ± X B X 2 ! X B X X X X X
P a r a s y n t a c t i c  s i g n s  a n d  t h e  
p r o b l e m  o f  S a n d  P . -  Where parasyntactic 
signs are symbolic imitations of symptoms, it is easy 
to ascribe them to the presyntactic sphere. Pure dia­
critic^ however, may grow out of either presyntactic 
symbols or else grammatical signs, as the comparison 
between the gesture by which we nod ass. nt and its 
iisg spoken equivalent (yes!) shows, ^n the case of 
arbitrary signals it may therefore not always be easy 
to say at a glance whether they are presyntactic or 
postsyntactic signs. But this need not disturb the 
grammarian, for whom it will be sufficient to classify 
certain utterances (or signal-emissions) in the wider 
category of parasyntactic signs. And this he can always 
do where he finds sentences or sentence-equivalents- 
without grammatical structure. - It is perhaps not 
without interest to note that parasyntactic signs 
have often a very great semantic stability, their mean* 
ings show little tendency to develop.
l j  f l . S ol y>. ct'w* a. t Thocte. r  D t t i r m  i n i
f p n . i * £  R t n * i c t  "to ^ r t ' S p a n t r f ^ . .  Mod.  R t y . p p . ^ ^ / w .
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^Prom this account of parasyntactic signs we may learn 
several lessons. The most obvious and the most import­
ant one is perhaps the3fact that t h e r e  i s' a 
l a r g e  g r o u p  o f  s i g n s  w h i c h  a r e  
n o t  c o n s t r u c t i o n s ,  a n d  t h a t  i t  
w o u l d  b e  i n  v a i n  t o  l o o k  h e r e  
f o r  a n y  S - P  s t r u c t u r e .  Tel^ r stand 
for things-meant but do not reflect cognitional acts.
The second lesson we can draw from our observation 
of parasyntactic signs seems to be this: In the same 
measure as signs are realistic imitations of symptoms 
and represent a sort of sensorial, intuitive language 
it will be difficult to consider them as mere reflect­
ions og thought. But this holds good also with regard 
regard to signs representing the other extreme; ie. 
with regard to those signs which are merely arbitrary 
hints. And these two groups of signs, besides teaching 
us that a grammatical interpretation of S - P struct­
ures can by no means be universally applied, also 
teach^ us that it is the two extreme forms of sym­
bolization - that of very intuitive, and that of very 
arbitrary, forms - which offer us the least chance 
of discovering such a structure.
Now between these two extremes we find the field 
of c o n s t r u c t i o n s ,  of s y n t a c t i c  
langajuge, which we are going to investigate presently.
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But "before we do so we have to remember, that there is 
to a large extent a factual interpenetration of para­
syntactic forms (speech-melody, word-order) and syn­
tactic forms and also that it may "be possible to give 
to some of these originally parasyntactic features of 
constructions some syntactic significance.
I
P a r t  III 
Chapter (2)
C o n s  t r u e  t i ' o n .
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P e. r\ t  4; n. c C  <x. tv, cL C  o n  sf T t - m, c. "t ( Qvn
- After having dealt with the pphere of parasyntactic 
signs we are now free to approach the s y n t a c t i c  
field proper. This is characterized*by the fact that 
it expends as far as we can recognize the phenomenon 
called c o n s t r u c t i o n  .We remember that 
the Latin word constructio is nothing but the translat­
ion of the Greek syntaxis. The conception underlying 
these terms was the belief that sneaking consisted in 
’pitting together* words in order to build up sentences, 
and *up to to-day syntax is often taken to mean * theory 
of the sn^tence*. Sentence was thus by definition a 
construction consisting of at least two parts in relat­
ion, and construction was therefore considered as the 
criterion of sentences. From the fact that grammarians 
called the two related parts, which constituted the 
minimum construction, S and P, it is clear that ehbl 
sentence was a synonym of proposition and that *word* 
was consequently synonymous with * concept*.
It should follow from this that sentences consist­
ing of one word only are impossible. But here the ± 
instinct of the linguist got the better of the logist­
ic prejudice; it was admitted that there did exist 
one-word sentences, and one tried to overcome the 
paradox by declaring that they either were construction- 
equivalents, that is to say, that currit had to be
analysed in the same way as p.ier currit. or they were 
sentence-substitutes such as, i?or instance, isolated 
interjections; a third possiblity was offered in the 
subterfuge of ellipsis; me miserum!. puer!etc. were thus 
considered as incomplete constructions.
This state of affairs has been slowly changed by 
a great many enquiries into the nature of the sentence. 
In spite of the lack of conformity in the answers given 
to the now famous question What is a sentence? the dis­
cussion of this topic has not been in vain.1)It has been 
recognized that parasyntactic utterances cannot be ex­
plained away by either supposing that they are only 
truncated or elliptic constructions or by degrading
them to a sort of construction-ersatz or ’sentence- ^ ■  .....
equivalent*. The sheer force of things has led to the 
recognition on the one hand that they are not construct­
ions, and on the other hand that they have essential 
properties in common with recognized types of sentences, 
and that it is just these properties which distinguish 
sentences from anything else. They are, seen from the 
the side of meaning, the completeness of their sense, 
their being semantically self-sufficient, and from the 
point of view of form, the clearly markegt signal-unit.
l) J. Ries, Was ist ein Sa-tz?: E. Seidel, G-eschichte 
und Kritik der wichtigsten Satzdefinitionen. Jenaer
Germanist. Forschungen XXVII, 1935.
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With regard to spoken language, this signal-unit is 
identical with those melodic features of the utterance 
which characterize it as statements, question, r quest 
etc.l) - We were careful to point out in the previous 
chapter that these forms, as old imitations of syn^toms, 
have always existed as units, and this character of 
unity was never lost.Hi:fcMEEgMxthEXffiiE±E2£xEXEEH:tEHEEx 
fSEiHXSXiaxxEX&EXEiE^Eii So we may confidently assert 
that this unity of melodic form is the outer criterion 
of sentences. It thus* appears certain that s e n t e n c- 
e s in the full sense of the term c a n  h e  f o u n d  
i n  t h e  p a r a s y n t a c t i c  s p h e r e ;  
from this it follows that ’sentence* and ’construction* 
are not equivalent and t h a t  t h e  s e n t e n c e  
a s  s u c h  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a n  
o b j e c t  o f  s y n t a x .
S e n t e n c e  a n d  p r o p o s i t i o n . - 
On the other hand there can he little douht that sent­
ences can often he analysed into S and P and are there­
fore constructions in the sense of propostions. But even
in these cases it is of great methodological advantage 
to distinguish the s e n t e n c e - q u a l i t y  
from the p r o p o s i t i o n - q u a l i t y .  
Comparing for instances tu viens, viens-tu? and viens! 
weshould he ahle to say that these three forms are 
identical qua propostions, hut that they are different
id n\7fr.— ^
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qua sentences.
This, I understand, is contrary to philosophical 
practice1  ^ and also contrary to Ballyfs analytical 
method.2) According to this author our three examples 
should he interpreted as d'taffirme que tu viens. 
je demands si to viens and je veux que tu viennes. 
Against this analytical procedure two objections can 
he raised.
(l) We have explained that modality may he con­
sidered as the p r a c t i c a l  c o u n t e r p a r t  
of the t h e o r e t c a l  a c t  establishing the 
synthesis of two concepts A and B by conferring ton
3)them the cognitional functions of S and P respectively.1 
As such modality can he distinguished from that purely 
theoretical act. In the first instance of unreflected 
judgments, modality is not an object of attention.
This changes in r e f l e c t e d  judgments. And 
ther^can he little doubt that in our three instances 
modality i s reflected. Speechmelody here does not 
e x p r e s s  modality hut d e n o t e s  it.
However, by the fact that speechmelody is still a 
a true picture of modality and as such a parasyntactic 
sign it is still clearly distinguishable fo^ rm the 
synthesis of A and B functioning as S and P. This 
can only mean that is should n o t  be interpreted 
as forming part of that synthesis which alone has 
syntactic form. By saying tu viens means j * affirme 
; 1)1 have been told this by Prof. Carnobell - P--1
-— - S O O V P  vJ-
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que tu viens etc. one has made modality the main part 
of the judgment which may result in a maSterial 
equivalency hut results certainly also in a destruction 
of the original propositional construction.
(2) But even this material equivalency between
tu viens and .j*affirme que tu viens etc. is doubtful;
for the new formulation ;i!affirme que tu viens carries 
a
with± it^new modality expressed again by melodic feat­
ures which have the same ca^ Lim of being transposed 
into constructional elements as|the original ones. In 
this way the beginning is made of that finfinite re­
gress* of which we have spoicen on page 137.
By declaring that tu viens. viens-tu? and viens! • 
are identical qua x3r,0P0S^i°ns we overcome the diffic­
ulty which would arise from accepting Steinthalfs opin­
ion that questions and commands are not propositions 
although they can be analysed into S and P.1) For now 
we no longer oppose questions and commands to statements, 
but see in them only different practical contexts of 
possibly identical propositions.
____________________________________________________________
l) H. Steinthal, G-rammatilc, Logik und Psychologie. 
p. 169.
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R e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l ,  c o g n i t i o  n- 
a l a n d  f o r m u l a t i o n  a l  c o n s t r u e  t- 
o n s.-Now as we have seen in Part YJ~' it has been claimed
that this possibility of analysing certain sentences 
into S and P does not interest the linguist, that the 
analysability of sentences depends on the distinction 
of partes orations! and that these cannot be related 
to parts of the cognitional act but rather to sections 
or aspects of reality, and that they are used in sent­
ences as elements of a picture of reality. In a sentence
such/the king arrives in London, it is of little i-nter/st
K *
to say the king represents a S and the other words to­
gether a P, but it is of paramount importance to re­
cognise an actor (the king), and action (arrives). 
and the relation between the acting actor and the place 
(in = relation, London = place). Here then we have a 
second meaning of ’construction’s a p i c t u r e  
o f  r e a l i t y  analysable into different relative­
ly autonomous parts, the partes orationis.
The proble/n|(r/e are faced with is to explore fcow far 
the linguist, recognizing the element of truth in 
these contentions, can really do without the propos- 
itional analysis or whether he will not be well ad­
vised to operate with both. If we adopt the latter 
method we shall have to show how they are related to 
each other.
1) See above pp. 134 and 164/66.
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One thing can already be pointed out here, and
that is that the analysis into actor, action, place
and the like leaves out something which has always
been regarded - and I think rightly so - as being
of eminently syntactic interest, and that is the
g r o u p i n g  of the partes orationis. There can
be little doubt that in our example arrives in London
UiSt(yici Vrbrn
gaSMSxAx&kSM£x^Pk^SESxTQxTMSKlNfir forms a group opp-eoed? 
to the king and that inside this group in London forms 
a sub-group opposed to arrives. Now it has always been 
considered that such groups are functional units such 
as ’subject1, ’verb1, ’adverb’ and that they peflecfr 
reflect in their grouping the S - P structure. This 
consideration is certainly apt to make us inclined to 
operate with both conceptions of construction.
But there is still more to be considered. The 
grouping of elements involves more problems than can 
be solved by either analytical method. It can hardly be 
denied that manus manum lavat and manus lavat manum 
are bath identical qua sentences, propositions, 
picture-s of reality, and functional units, and yet, 
since the order of elements is different, one might 
legitimately say that they are different as to their 
syntactic make-up. Surely the rule that the verb in 
German sub-ordinated clauses goes to the end, is a 
syntactic rule, the reason for which cannot be
accounted for by any of the syntactic methods so far 
considered. But there are more constructional features 
which we can mention in.this connection. There is for 
instance the breaking up of a sign into different 
words such as French ne - pas; the obligatory repetit­
ion of S such as moi .je ne sais pas or le pere est-il 
arrive?. All these seemingly arbitrary features of 
construction are due to accidents of formulation and 
can only be accounted for by a genetic method (histor­
ical grammar).
Thus we are left with s e v e r a l  different 
conceptions of construction or syntax which all make
"ike <mnju)c< to
sense, and because they do,^our problem cannot be dxsx 
Si&xbjekjI x  to discard one or the other and declare them 
out of bounds and keep certain other types, or only 
one, as the legitimate kind(s), but rather to find a 
link between them which makes us understand how ihey 
keep together. The justification for the different 
possiblities of syntactic analysis lies in the fact 
that in meaningful speaking and intelligent under­
standing not one but v a r i o u s  operations 
are involved such as representation, cognition (thought) 
and formulation.
To these correspond three kinds of grammar:
(1) R e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  g r a m m a r .
It accounts for the *actor - action - place* picture in 
our example the king arrives in London.
( 2 ) C o g n i t i o n a l  g r a m m a r .  It accounts 
for the grouping of the elements in the same examole: 
the king : arrives (in London).
(3) S' o r m u l a t i o n a l  g r a m m a r .  It 
accounts for all those accidents in outer form which 
cannot he justified hy the other two grammars, such as 
the end-position of the finite verb in German subord­
inate clauses etc. etc.
The task of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  
grammar will be to showg whflfefr use language makes of 
the ideal categories of representation: space, time 
and quality,1) in constructing the representational 
patterns underlying its outer forms. The traditional 
treatment of grammar has given us glimpses of repres­
entational grammar, but, to our knowledge, its prin­
ciples have never been systematically worked out. (The
*
The reason is that *representation* and ’thought* were 
not clearly distinguished, as we have pointed out before^)
1) See above p. 105.
2) On pp. 33 ff.
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and that ^ physiological psychology was so much occup­
ied with genetic problems that it had little time for 
the patient analysis of ideal representational forms.
But representational grammar cannot stand by itself; 
it has to be integrated into cognitional grammar. If 
we divide constructional patterns according to their 
grammatical P into verbal and nominal constructions, 
according to their grammatical S, into personal and 
impersonal constractions, it is clear that these notions 
are somehow connected with the representational categ­
ories since the noun is connected with space as the 
verb refers to time; at the same time they function as 
S or P. This is the old problem of the relation of 
wo/ucL andj^^X-to S and P, put in a modern form. We 
shall therefore have to show how representational orders 
are integrated into cognitional ones.
Finally we shall have to demonstrate how both re­
presentational gps and cognitional grammar fit into 
that of formulation and show how historical accidents 
create, remodel and destroy grammatical forms, be it 
nominal or verbal forms or coordinating and subordinating; 
patterns and, in connection with this we shall have to 
work out a theory of the g r a m m a t i c a l  S and
The order in which this programme has to be ful­
filled is dictated to us by the nature of things. Re­
presentation, cognition and formulation are related to 
each other as content and form. That is to say, reality 
has to be converted into represented reality, v/hich in 
turn is the basis on which the cognitional acts are 
founded, whereas formulation arises on the basis of 
cognition. We find thus that the order (l) rejjresent- 
ation, (2) cognition, (3) formulation, is an ideal one, 
derived from the nature of their relationship to each 
other.
Having said this, we must hasten to make it quite 
cle§r that we do not pretend to affirm that psycho­
logically we proceed by first repr senting, second think­
ing, and third speaking. What these three stages repres­
ent is^iothing but t h e  r e v e r s  <X. 41 •r o f  a n  
a n a l y t i c a l  o r d e r .  The analyst of linguist­
ic constructions finds, indeed, first a certain order 
of signs, of words and wordelements, secondly, behind 
this as it were, a cognitional order, and thirdly an 
order of represented things, which he relates to each 
other as material foundation and form. That is all he 
can achieve; the genetic question of how the collabor­
ation of representation, cognition and formulation is 
achieved in the psyche of both speaker and listener 
cannot even be approached by a purely analytical method.
Memjbers of an analytical order do not exist inde­
pendently in reality. Representational, cognitional 
and formulational forms are therefore always fotind 
together, integrated into each other. This is why 
representation and cognition cannot be dealt with 
independently of linguistic formulation which has to be 
present at all stages of our discussion, and we must 
show things one in the other rather than one beside 
the othew. This is an& advantage rather than a draw­
back since the linguist is obviously not interested 
in ideal forms as such but only in the way language 
refers to them.
C o n c l u s i o n . -  The characterization of 
parasyntactic signs in the previous chapter has con­
firmed the expectation which we formulated in Part I, 
Chap. 6, namely that language can well be thought of 
existing without referring to cognitional forms. On 
the other hand we have now found in 1 constructions * the 
type of advanced linguistic symbolization of which we
spoke in that same chapter, and which <dee-&7 refers to the
'\\xe.th. o^-
thing-meant by the round-about^of referring to cognition­
al forms. It is in the field of constructions that the 
final solution of our problem - the reflection BdxSx 
of an S - P structure in linguistic forms - has to be 
attempted. The discovery of the three syntactic orders,
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that of representation, that of thought and that of 
formulation, allows us to see the problem in its 
proper perspective. The syntax of thought has its base 
in representation and its expression in formulation,
'YVL c  C ^ C ^ C c
it occupies thus a saedium position in that ideal order 
representation - thought - formulation. It is only by 
drawing the lines both backwards and forwards that our 
problem can be solved in its main implications.
P a r t  ill 
Chapter (3)
T e r m  a n d  r e l a t i o n  i n  s p a c e  
t i m e .
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S p a c e - t i m e  c o n s t r u c t i o n s .  - 
After what we have said about the ideal order of re­
presentation, cognition and formulation it is clear 
that we shall have to begin with an exposition of the 
principles of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  s y n ­
t a x  .That is we are going to treat constructions 
such as the king arrives in London etc. as p i c t - 
u r e s  of r e a l i t y .  Nov/ all these pictures, 
be it the’actor-action-place’ picture or the ’thing- 
(person-)place’ picture (e.g. he lives in Rome) or the 
’possessor- possession’ picture (e.g. he has many boohs), 
or any other, are all built up out of the same elements, 
which we may call t e r m s  and r e l a t i o n s ,  
so that we may say that we find representational con­
structions exposed by linguistic form, wherever sem­
antic analysis leads us to the discovery of represent­
ational constructs consisting of terms and relations.
A l l  c o n s t r u c t i o n s  o f  t h i s  
s o r t  a r e  a t  b o t t o m  s p a c e - t i m e  
c o n s t r u c t i o n s .  That is to say the two 
ideal forms of representation, space and time, are the 
proper medium fi^ g, defining representational terras and 
relations.
This does not mean that in a process of ^represent­
ative ideation we always a i m  at the representation 
of space-time forms, but it does mean, that even when
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we think of non-extended and non-measurable entities 
such as qualities, space-time symbols play an 
a u x i l i a r y  rdle, which, in however ajsubtle 
v/ay, make representational constructions possible.
If these assumptions are true, it seems to follow 
that the P a r t s  o f  S p e e c h ,  being parts of 
representational constructions reflected in language, 
must be somehow connected with the two idekl forms of 
representation, and that it is from this position that 
the intricate problems they represent are likely to 
be approached in a satisfactory way. They seem to be 
the bricks with the help of which representational
«
constructions are built up in language and as such 11 
deserve our interest and attention.
T e r m  a n d  r e l a t i o n  i n  s p a c e ­
t i m e  ( o r i  g o ,  r e l a t i o n  a n d  g o a l ) .
In ancient Rome proprietors of land erected at the 
borders of their property statues of the god Terminus 
in order to indicate the limits of their domain, and if 
we talk to-day of 1 terms* we still denote by that ex­
pression limits of an extension. ’Extension* has thus 
originally a purely spatial meaning, but it is not 
difficult to see how this concrete original meaning 
cou^d be transferred to denote more abstract things.
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The statues of the god Terminus marking the limits of 
legal property could easily symbolize the limits of 
property rights, the limits of a validity. In this 
case we operate with a spatial metaphor, that is to say 
we do not aim at the representation of a spatial re­
lationship, but the spatial relationship still plays 
an instrumental rdle in representing the abstract 
non-spatial relationship of 'validity1; and it is safe 
to generalize that wherever we operate with relation­
ships we operate with a spatial metaphor. Thus we may 
say that in the same way as the Termini marked the 
limits of an extension, any terns mark the limits of 
a relationship.
'Space' is the representative form of the outer j
world, the world opposite the cognizant ego. That
does not mean, however, that this space-world can
be understood without taking into account the co­
at
gnizant ego. On the Contrary, any stamen t about a 
spatial relationship becomes understandable only 
if related to the cognizant ego. A simple example will 
show this. A statement such as the tree stands in 
front of the house holds only from the point of 
view of an observer who is placed on an imaginary 
axis running through the two points 'tree1 and 'house* 
in such a way that his cognizant attention, travelling
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along that axis meets the tree before it meets the 
house.^ This interesting enough, because it goes to 
show that what appears to be to the observer a stable, 
purely spatial relationship in front of is as a matter 
of fact nothing but t h e  p r o j e c t i o n  
i n t o  s p a c e  o f  a r e p r e s e n t i n g  
a c t i v i t y  connecting the tree with the house in 
such a way that the former appears before the latter.
The stable, spatial relationship in front of is 
being constructed by a c o g n i z a n t  m o v e ­
m e n t  establishing the points of a line one after 
the other, and we may call this the o p e r a t i o n ­
a l  or c o n s t r u c t i o n a l  v a l u e  o f  
t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  Prom the construct­
ional point of view, relationships are thus to be x 
assessed as t i m e -  extensions, they presuppose a 
movement of cognizant attention.
Terms on the othee hand appear as r e s t i n g -  
p o i n t s  of cognizant attention, as 'not yet*- 
and as *no more-'movements; that is to say that where­
as relationships have a p o s i t i v e  construction­
al value, terms have a n e g a t i v e  construct­
ional value. But terms are not of an indifferent
e
constructional status; they must be differentiated. 
Instead of saying that the relation in front of holds
t*4 <^9'cr«st t p r o *  t W *  fac - p r C p o* ^
13 V -
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between two (indifferent) terms, it would be better, 
from the operational point of view, to say it holds 
between the origo (the 'not yet'-movement) and a 
goal (the 'no longer'-movement), and the formula for 
an elementary construct in representation would be 
0 R G , where 0 stands for origo, R for relating move­
ment. G for goal. In view of later discussions it is 
important to note here already, that whenever we 
mention either 0 or R or G, we imply the other two.
So any movement has by definition a direction, that is, 
the very notion of movement implies the notions of 
a possible 0 and G; likewise any 0 or 'not yet'-move­
ment, implies already the notion of a (possible) move­
ment going towards a G in the same way as G, the 
'no longer'-movement, implies the notion of this 
very movement coming from an 0.
T w o  Q u e s t i o n s  o f  p r i n c i p l e .
- Prom this there arises an important question of 
principle. It is this: How is it possible to conceive 
the fact that v/e can construct a stationary relation­
ship between the tree and the house with the help of 
cognizant attention which itself is moving? This 
sets us the problem of definig s p a c i a l  c o x -  
e v a l i t y  i n t e r m s  o f  c o g n i z a n t  !
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m o v e m e n t ;  and this is not very difficult,
Goevality of two objects A and B means that, if our
cognizant attention go, s from A to B in a time n and
then turns in the opposite direction, it meets A again
after an equal time interval n, provided its speed is
uniform throughout. As a matter of fact our attention
does not turn, but each step we do actually in one
direction implies the possibility of doing the same
s£ep in the opposite direction; or we mighljsey that
by each actualization of a direction we imply its
reversion in potentia, the two being exactly equal.
On this fact is based at bottom the equality of 
n measured from A to B and of n measured from B to A;
is
on this ts, incidental^ ^al s o  based the other fact
that whoever says A is to the right of B implies
at the same time B is to the of A . We shall
see in due course that mach formulational freedom is
gained by language through utilizing this type of 
1 )equivalency. '
There are diffemt ways in which the balance 
between the actual and the potential cognitional 
timedistances can be effectuated. In the case of 
a s t a t i o n a r y  relationship the balance 
is a b s o 1 u t e, i.e. the chances of actualizing 
in turn the potential timedistance are at no moment 
diminished. In the case of m o v e m e n t  we
0  b -
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have a r e l a t i v e  or c o m p e n s a t o r y  
balance: one timedistance grows in the same proportion 
as the other diminishes. The movement is p r o g r e s s -  
ive, if the potential timedistance is shortened: the 
apple falls to the ground (after the actualization of 
a timedistance, origo and goal have made contact); it is 
r e  g r e  s s i v e  (i.e. A and B are separated) if the 
potential timedistance is lengthened: the apple drops 
from the tree.
The s e c o n d  question of principle we have to 
clear up is the following: In our ideal orientational 
system we^had so far nothing but a pattern of one-dimens­
ional, centrifugal vectors along which cognizant attention 
was supposed to travel. In this way, hovever, we can only 
construct single points; but there can be no doubt that 
in the world represented there exist also lines running 
at angles to the centrifugal vector, there exist also 
two- and threedimensional relationships. The question 
therefore arises how are they to becoaceived in a process 
of ideation which can only operate along onedimensional 
vectors?
The solution of this problem lies in the psssibility 
of moving the observer in relation to the thing observed. 
Ideally these movements are of three sorts: (1) movement 
along an extension (extended movement), (2) movement 
round an imaginary axis (movement of rotation) (3)
b  t  ' Y l
a complication of the former two movements.
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Let us suppose the thing to he represented he a sixsiji
straight line running at angles to the centrifugal
vector of cognizant attention. In this case the observer 1
has to mo'toe p a r a l l e l  to this line, because
if he were fixed he could only rotate,his own axis j\ I
with the result that he would only perceibe a curve j
bending away from him. - Let us now suppose the tiling j
to be represented be a circle and the observer be placed 
in the middle of it. Obviously he builds up the con­
tinuum 'circle1 by moving round his own axis or, math­
ematically speaking, round an axis going through the 
centre of the circle at right angles to a plane defined 
by any three points on the circle’s perimeter.
Bhereas in the case of the straight line the distance 
between the observer and the thing to be represented 
is irrelevant,^ it is fixed in the case of the circle, 
so that the construction of the circle requires as it xex 
were t w o orientational axes: one connecting the 
centre with the perimeter and one running ’parallel’ 
to the rotation movement. (Parallelism of a curve can 
be conceived in terms of tangents striding the perimeter 
and running parallel to the observer’s movement; the 
rotating centre must in this case be thought of as a ;
circle with the radius = 0.)
l)lt may be even shortened or lengthened in the course 
of the movement. In this case the movement ceases to be 
parallel only judged from o u t s i de the plane 
which comprehends both the straigt line and the line 
described by the observer’s movement. t J * .  k.a^> i
C’O'VA—s W ^ v w  O"wv'i-.-.’Ob- '■> '9+*lK .
The building up of a t h r e e d i m e n s i o n a l  
relationship is nothing but a c o m p l i c a t i o n  
of what we have seen in constructing the straight line 
and the circle and needs hardly to be described in 
mathematical language. This would only be an idealizat­
ion of experiences in every-day life where we reconstruct 
a room by looking around, a column by following its 
lines up and down and connecting them from right to 
left (or left to rights etc.
Once a multidimensional thing has been constructed 
point after point and the coevality of these points 
established, the whole forms a spatial continuum or 
resting point for cognizant attention, i.e. a t e r m . 
From the operational point of view it can be described 
as a ’no-longer’ movement, which in turn may serve as 
a starting point or as a ’not-yet’ movement. Now if 
we characterize a term as a continuum in space, that 
cannot means, of course, that we can ever represent
space without time, hut it does mean, that the time-
component of orientational movement does not count, fhe*
leik(Lir CCHMtS faeCQ.u.4C
at--tha% it no longer <ooun%, ho it that4 it does not
On the other hand the time-component is of vital 
importance to r e l a t i o n s ,  although here again 
time cannot be represented independently of space. So 
if we wish to bring out in a sharp clear manner the 
essential properties of term and relation in space and 
time we may perhaps say without fear of being misunder­
stood that a t e r m  i s  ( e s s e n t i a l l y )  
a c o n t i n u u m  i n  s p a c e ,  a r e l a t ­
i o n  i s  ( e s s e n t i a l l y ) a  c o n t i n u - 
u m i n t i m e .
The term is always something isolated, which only 
through the synthetic force of time can be linked to 
another isolated term. It is therefore time which helps
'purely spatial* relationships are constituted by 
’stationary time* is a paradox only in appearance, for 
we have seen that this 'stationary time* is in repres­
entation two dynamic time-extensions balancing each 
other.
t freunrt
to give unity to an objective construct. To say that
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T h e f i x i n g  o f  t h e  o r i g o . - Let 
us now approach the question of the fixing of tfce 
origo. The continuum in space becomes an origo by the 
fact that we consider it as the focal pint of an ideal 
orientational system where four axes, called the three 
dimensions of space and the tirne-dimension intersect. 
This system is in the last instance abstracted from 
the concrete orientational system of the human body,-*-) 
where front is the direction in which we look, right 
and left correspond to our arms, back to our back etc.
In the centre of this system is located the cognizant 
ego existing in time; coevality with it is the mark 
of the present, from where we can construct a past and 
a future.
We can easily transfer notions such as front, back. 
right, left etc. to objects which have some resemblance 
with the human body, such as certain animal bodies 
or even plant-bodies, then also huts and houses, where 
the door is conceived as a kind of mouth, possible wind© 
ows as eyes etc.; it is the sort of metaphor which ex­
plains the etymological kinship between Lat. os. and 
ostium. The metaphor is faded completely where the same 
system is transferred to cubes and spheres, where the 
diffex-ent directions are fixed arbitrarily. But even
l)Cf. K. Buhler, Surachtheorie. pp. 13u ff.
in the completely abstract field the notion of origo 
remains a derived notion, which invariably points back 
to a first origo which is identical with the hie et 
nunc of the cognizant ego of the observer. Any object 
that might become the origo of an objective construct 
begins its existence in representation as g o a l  of 
the gx ego * s attention, where ’attention1 describes a 
specific activity of the ego linking itself to the 
object. Ego and non-ego hang together as in language 
the origo of a deixis and the thing demonstrated. This 
allows us to establish a correspondence between the con- 
tinuum in si)ace with the self-identity of the ego and 
the continuum in time with the cognizant activity of 
that ego. But it is worth pointing out that by conferring 
an orientational patiem upon the non-ego no ’personif­
ication* is necessarily intended or felt to be expressed, 
as any example of the kind of the tree stands in front 
of the house can easily testify. Only learned reflection 
is able to feel in stands an activity of an animal 
body.
L i n g u i s t i c  s y m b o l i z a t i o n  o f  
t e r m  a n d  r e l a t i o n . -  If we turn our attention 
to language we must point out three rather important
2&
things: The f i r s t  is that linguistic expressions 
may he a m b i g u o u s ,  they do not, for instance, 
clearly mark, where the orientational * 0 is to he
found. gHXxxHSfc When I show a picture of a church having 
houses on hoth sides and say the building to the right
of the church is the Town Hall, 0 I must know whether 
I mean to the right of as seen from the observer or as 
seen from the point of view of the church, before I am 
able to identify the Town Hall. That is to say, we 
either transfer the cognizant ego to the church without 
altering our direction or else we change the orientation­
al direction by bestowing unto the building such differ­
ences as front back, right, left etc.
This leads immediately to our s e c o n d  point.- 
We have just seen that according to whether we fix the 
origo in the cognizant ego or transfer it to the church, 
the expression the building to the right of the church 
is the Town Hall or the building to the left of the 
church is the Town Hall may be equivalent. In this a 
remarkable f r e e d o m  o f  f o r m u l a t i o n  
reveals itself. We can easily understand that, wherever 
the fixation of the origo is supposed to be clear, the 
speaker may use a neutral term such as beside or by 
which can mean either to the right of or to the left nt
Much of this formulational f eedom is based om the fact 
that any a c t u a 1 relation is equivalent to its
p o t e n t i a l  reversOdwL Therefore it is in the !
!
philosophical sense of the word 1 immaterial * whether a 
Spaniard answers a knock at the door hy saying Vo.vl 
(cp. French On y va!) where the Englishman says I am 
coming, bee.- use both forms are equivalent, the one 
being the reversion of the other. We find a similar 
equivalency in French l !ami d e Jeah and 1’ami a
Jean. From here it is only one step to the combining of |
both directions in one expression. We think of Old French 
devers which means originally ^rom-to1: Devers les
j|
■port de mer hit un vent venir (Pelerinage de Charlemagne, j 
ed. E. Koschwitz, Heilbronn, 1880, v. 370) or of modern 
French sfa p procher d e (cp. also Ital. da = de ad) j
etc. The same freedom of formulation reveals itself in ■
the equivalence of active and passive formulae: the 
hunter kills the deer - the deer is killed by the hunter.
Here belong also reversfit&s of the type Socrates is wise
and wisdom is im Socrates.-^1 own a book - the book 
belongs to me: German ich dtlrste and mich dtirstefl. and 
many things more*} o+htv .
1) Cf. above pp. 126 f.
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The t h i r d  thing to he pointed out is of even 
greater importance. If we take up again @ur first example, 
the tree stands in front of the house, we observe a re­
markable fact: although I obviously establish a relat­
ionship between the 'tree* and the 'house1, where the 
'tree' comes first and should therefore be 0 and the 
'house' second and should therefore be G, the expression 
in front of is to be understood from the point of view 
of the 'house'. The whole expression wants to say 'If 
you transfer your cognizant ego to the houses so that 
'it' looks out of the front door along an axis which 
meets the house at right angles, 'its eyes' will meet 
'the tree'. It seems therefore correct to assume that 
although the word tree (together with its definite article) 
is the 'first'term in sentence constructions it is the 
'second* term in representational construction.
In other words the elements of the representational 
construct 0 R G are given to us in the order G R 0 t 
which is quite c o n t r a r y  t o  r e p r e s e n t ­
a t i o n a l  l o g i c .  But it is not difficult to see 
that the order is c o n f o r m a b l e  t o  c o - 
g n i t i o n a l  l o g i c ,  wher G corresponds to the 
prius logicum. R-0 to the posterius logicum. The question 
how these two orders are related to each other (if at all) 
will occupy us latur on when we come to the discussion
-2£5-
of the integration of representational into cognitional
grammar. But we must point out here that the order
in which representational elements appear in language 
i& not always to he explained in such a simple way
as in our present instance. The most superficial ac­
quaintance with questions of word-order suffices to 
show that it is often influenced by a great many fact­
ors other than cognitional relationships; some of 
these will be discussed in the chapter devoted to the 
grammar of formulation.^
1) Cf. Part III, Chap. Qf p- 3 ** **•
P a r t  III 
Chapter (4)
O r i e n t a t i o n  a n d  d e s c r i p t i o n .
t
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O r i e n t a t i o n a l  a n d  ’r e a l *  
t i m e -  c o n t i n u a  If we look at the 
linguistic formulation of the objective construct 
the tree stands in front of the house v/e find that 
the three objective factors (i.e. the two terms and 
the relation holding them together) are symbolised 
by four semantic units (i.e. two nouns, a verb and 
a preposition). The two nouns correspond to the two 
terms and offer no particular problem. But why should 
should the continuum in time be symbolised not by 
one but by two semantic units? Both verbs and prepos­
itions have a relating function, so we should expect 
that one or the other would be sufficient to symbol­
ise relations, or else that one class of words should 
be enough from the functional point of view.
In order to explain the difference between the 
two parts of speech verb and preposition, and to 
justify thereby their existence in language, we are 
going to analyse an example which is more suitable 
than the one we have been operating with so far. Let 
us examine the statement Caesar travelled from Padua 
to Rome. Here we see clearly that the prepositions re­
present a p u r e l y  o r i e n t a t i o n a l  
action to be performed by the cognizant ego, that 
is an action which lies o u t s i d e  the re res­
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ented reality, and another action performed by Caesar 
i n s i d e  the objective field. The former links 
the travelling Caesar with his smarting point and his 
goal, by the latter Caesar links himself to Rome, 
separating himself by so doing from Padua.
The word to maxes the listener’s attention race 
ahead of Caesar and establish a time-continuum 
s t i l l  t o  b e  s p e n t  by Caesar, whereas 
the word from makes the listener's attention race 
backwards from Caesar to^&epoint Padua thus establish­
ing a time-continuum a l r e a d y  s p e n t  by 
Caesar. That is to say, we have to distinguish two 
sorts of movement: (l) orientational movement which 
connects as it were different points of the scenery 
(Padua, Caesar. Rome), and (2) reel movement performed 
by the dramatis persona (Caesar). The existence of the
former depends on an action on the part of the co-
oJUo
gnizant ego, whereas the latter exists^independently 
of the cognizant ego and is performed in our case 
by a sort of alter ego, namely the person called 
Caesar. It is the function of orientational movement 
to establish a limiting framework within which the 
rel)fy movement may be represented; it defines the real 
movement in -potentia, whereas the the movement per­
formed by Caesar is represented as real movement in 
actu.
The potential time-continuuin can become actual 
reality only by representing t h e  m a n n e r  i n  
w h i c h  i t  i s  s p e n t ,  and to represent this 
is t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  v e r b . -  
We see thus that the verb distinguishes itself from 
particles such as to and from by the fact that through 
it we represent actual time as distinguished from 
potential or orientational time, and this is only 
possible by representing the manner in which potential 
time is actually spent. In this we discover a new, 
q u a l i t a t i v e  , factor of v/hich mere orient­
ation words are devoid. This it is, incidentally, which 
'establishes the semantic kinship of verbs with nouns, 
in which the same qualitative factor is clearly a jpar- 
ent( cf. to desire, the desire, desirous).^
With regard to time actually spent we can only 
repeat what we said of the representation of time 
generally: any positive step in a time-direction 
implies a potential step in the opposite direction 
of equal extension which is the rever s£*>& of the 
positive step; the connecting activity of travelling 
implies xxsatsHtixixEiE at the same time its reve sion : 
which is ’separation1. Nov; in the objective construct
Caesar travelled from Padua to Rome, the word to 
    ~ ~
l) See the following Chapter.
represents the connecting or positive aspect of the 
verb, from the reversion, namely the factor 1separatior 
as the following graph will show:
Separation connection
Caesar
Padua 4---------- > travelled------------^ Rome
from to
Time: potential actual potential
(past) (present) (future)
This graph calls fife two supplementary remarks
in the way of commentary: (l) The potential time 
corresponding to from has a positive direction al­
though it corresponds to the time spent; for although 
our attention goes backwards from Caesar to Padua 
(i.e. from right to left), it links Padua to Caesar 
from left to right. (2) The actual present is marked 
^y an e x t e n s i o n  and not ty a simple point 
dividing the time spent from the time to he spent, 
because a n y  a c t  o f  s p e n d i n g  t i m e ,  
in our case the act of travelling, t a k e s  t i m e  
i n  i t s e l f ;  thus the actual present has the 
linear character of a p h a s e .  This is the reason 
why there exists a difference between the so-called 
psychological conception of time and the mathematical 
conception of time. We shall see in Part III, chap. 6 
that the notion of the extended present is of the grea* 
est importance for the question of how time is con­
structed by verbal symbols.
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After having studied this example we are now in 
a position to show that at bottom the example the 
tree stands in front of the house is of the same 
structure in spite of its differences. The most strik­
ing of these differences is perhaps the fact that 
the whole construct is stationary; there is no move­
ment by which the tree would link itself to the house.
But still, there is a positive time-continuum linking 
the tree to a place, symbolized by stands. The differed 
ce Caesar travelled from Padua to Rome is mainly
that the negative aspect of the verbal action, which 
was called Reparation1 there, is in this instance 
a ‘resistance1 of the 'ground*, and that the stationary 
action results really from a balance of two opposing 
forces of which only the positive component is sym­
bolized:
The . tree ------------- J the Ground
stands ------------  > -------------- -
This diagram shows the fundamental identity of 
this example with Caesar travelled from Padua to Rome. 
And from here it is easy to find the transition to 
the tree stands in front of the house. All v/e have 
to do is in fact to replace the word ground by housfe 
and on by in front of.In that case,it is true, the 
character of the vert is derived from the relation of 
the tree to a term which is not mentioned in xhe
construct, namely the ground, hut this only proves 
that we are able to operate with derived verbal 
characters and that we can replace the original term, 
the one which accounts d i r e c t l y  for ytay the 
stationary character of the verfe by another, equivalent, 
term. But it is most interesting to see that by doing 
so the specific qualitative character of the verb is 
being obscured and stands is almost equivalent to is_.
c a. ^
L i n g u i s t i c  a n d  l o g i  >a t—i o 
a n a l y s i s  o f  o b j e c t i v e  c o n ­
s t r u c t s .  - I  think the distinction between 
orientational and 'real' time-continue not only ac­
counts sufficiently for the distinction between pfce- 
X:od±ions and verbs, and offers an ansv/er to the quest- 
tion of hoY/ both collaborate, but it^throv/s incident­
ally ftLna some light on the difference between the 
linguistic way of analysing representational constructs 
and that adopted by symbolic logic. For the logician 
it is sufficient to state that *a relation holds be­
tween terms'. He does not trouble about the distinct- 
XHEtion, in the realm of reality, between potential 
and actual time-continua. lie would say therefore that 
the statement the tree stands in front of the house 
has to be analysed as the tree (term), stands in front 
of (relation), and the house (term), and he would
presumably say that the construct Caesar travelled 
SRSMxE from Padua to Rome reflects a relation 
travelled from to binding together three terms: Caesar. 
Padua and Rome.1  ^ The reason for this difference in 
analysis is,of course, that the linguist has to account 
for formlja differences such as prepositions and verbs, 
which are grammatical distinctions, whereas the logici­
an has not. Prom this follows that our distinction 
between orientational and real time is only useful 
for a type of language v/hich distinguished between 
prepositions and verbs, whereas the logistic analysis 
should be valid in general. But our distinctions are 
for their relative value not less but more interesting. 
For they disclose resources of the human mind a 
purely logistic approach would not even suspect.
O r i e n t a t i o n  w o r d s  a n d  d e ­
s c r i p t i v e  w o r d s . -  In defining the 
difference between verbs and prepositions in con­
structs where both collaborate, we have come across 
a distinction of a very great importance. The verb,
l) According to S. Langer in a proposition such as 
"Xanfleippe is the wife of Socrates" the relation is 
"being the wife of". (An Introduction to Symbolic 
Logic. p. 51.^
we said, by expressing the manner in which time is 
spent, exhibits a Qualitative factor, of which the 
preposition is found devoid. Here is the place to 
elaborate this distinction further.
If the task should be laid before us to divide all 
possible words into two groups, then I should say 
that the most adequate way of doing so is to place 
into one category all orientation words and into the 
other all descriptive words, i.e. words expressing 
in one way or another this qualitative factor. Into 
the first group I should place prepositions, conjunct­
ions, adverbial particles, pronouns and numerals, 
including the articles, and into the second group uer6^  
all substantives (common and proper names), qualify­
ing adjectives and qualifying adverbs. That is to say, 
we should adopt with regard to word-language a di­
vision which corresponds mutatis mutandis to the 
classification of symbols in gesture-language into 
deictic and imitative gestures, where the former have 
the function of establishing an orientational order, 
the latter that of describing or qualifying.
We may remark in passing that a twofold division
of the kind indicated is as old as grammar itself.
It corresponds to Appolondios' distinction between 
words exhibiting 7To lot n/and deictic words. An echo
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of this is found in Joseph Priestley’s A Course of
Lectures on the Theory of Language and Universal
Grammar (Warrington 1762) who says: ’’All the words of
which languages of men consist are either the names
of things and qualities (the.,ideas of which exist in
the mind) or words adapted to denote relations they
"bear to one another”; although he adds a rather vague
third division: "or lastly, a compendium for other
words, with or without their relations.”^  Among
moderns this division has been adopted in the most
outspoken manner by A. Koreen who distinguishes ex-
2)pressive and pronominelle Sememe. ' by K. v. Ettmayer
who calls them bedeutungstragende Wdrter and Formantier
(Analyti Syntax I, p. 8.), finally by K. Blihler whose
distinction between S.vmbolfeld and Zeigfeld is one
3)of the pillars of his Sprachtheorie. '
1) 0. Funke, Englishe Sprachphilosophie im spateren 
18. Jahrhundert. Bern 1934, p. 38.
2) A. Horeen, H.W. Poliak, Einftihrung in die wissen- 
schaftliche Betrachtung der Sprache. p.
3) Chaps. 2 and 3.
P a r t  III 
Chapter (5-)
O r i e n t a t i o n  W o r d s
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O r i e n t a t i o n - w o r d s .
N u m e r a l s  ( c a r d i n a l s ) . -  The common 
denominator of all orientatiam-words is the fact that 
they must "be interpreted with reference to the ideal 
scheme of orientation we have described before. In the 
first place we shall mention here the most abstract 
orientation-words, t h e  n u m e r a l s .  Their 
connection with the orientational scheme is very ob­
vious. In the very notion of origo and goal is already 
implied the order antecedens - sequenee or first - 
second.
Numerals reflect a pure t i m  e - o r d e r  and 
are therefore all found on the time-axis of our orient­
ational system; but wc must not forget that *timef is 
always represented with the help of spatial symbols.
Even mathematicians will say that the time-dimension 
intersects the three dimensions of space f at right 
angles1, and we know furthermore from our own experience 
in childhood, from the observation of less advanced 
peoples, and from the etymological origin of our numer­
als, as far as it can be ascertained, that the simplest 
operation with numerals, namely counting, is closely 
connected with deictic fixation of objects and their 
progressive relattfm.
In the same way as the ideal orientational system 
of our body, so the decimal system has been abstracted
from the fact that we have ten fingers (or ten terms 
related to each other by progression); the vigesimal 
system, partly preserved in French quatre-vingts. 
refers hack to fingers + toes. The idea of antecedens 
&& or ’precedsadencef is still revealed by the kinship 
of first with Germ. Furst, whereas se_cond, secundus 
is clearly connected with Lat. sequi. Unus and one 
show to the expert that they belong to Greek |V, Latin 
semel« meaning something like 1 togetherness in one 
place1.
It is clear that in view of these close connections 
no sharply defined borderline can be drawn from the 
semantic point of view between numerals and the other 
orientation-words. nothing more natural than the trans­
ition from numeral to a r t i c l e :  one a(n )and 
its function as p r o n o u n :  one says, a new one. 
From the linguistic point of view it is reasonable to 
see v/ith Professor Jespersen in numerals a sort of 
Xoronoun^. ^  ^
P r o n o u n s . -  With these we may deal briefly. 
Whereas the old grammatical school stressed their 
noun-substitute character as most imxoortant, modern
1) Philosophy of Grammar,gxx£dx p. 85.
—■3^  3—
linguists do not doubt that they have to he classed 
as d e i c t i c  words, or, as we should like to 
say, as orientation-words, since this expression is
Ottg.
more general and comprises even cases like the^  just- 
mentioned where no deixis proper is performed, 
although it is there as a potentiality. In this large
sense we might say that a p r o n o u n  r e f l e c t
a i t e r r a  i n  t h e  o r i e n t a t i o n a l
d e f i n e d  
s y s t e m* stxatxatxa i n  i t s  r e l a t i o n
t o  a n  o r i g o  which may he definite (here. I) 
or indefinite (anywhere. anyone). or as yet undeterm­
ined (where?,who?). We need hardly point out that any 
such term may he in its turn origo in relation to 
any other term.
It is the representational fact of heing space- 
continua which pronouns have
in common with qualifying or descriptive suhstantives, 
which explains why they can function * in place* of 
such suhstantives.
f o r m s  o f ^ n u  m e  r a Is 
-/Both numerals and/pronouns 
forms bjhside substantival/ones. Th^
pronoun tne /re±auon ip an lmagin-
/
n of /
may h /  defined as * the/person opposite
iima
s a J^ erra 
.^dependence 1
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A d j e c t i v a l  f o r m s  o f  n u m e r ­
a l s  a n d  p r o n o u n s . -  Both, numerals and 
pronouns have adjectival forms "beside substantival
ones. The difference is this: whereas substantival
(and numerals) . . _ . .
pronouns^are terms m  i s o l a t i o n ,  adjectival
pronouns (and numerals) are terms seen i njr e 1 a t- 
xsKxiaxanEihsiEXifcExai i o n  t o  a n o t h e r  t e r m .
In the substantival form the element ’relation1 to
an imaginary origo belongs to the d e f i n i t i o n
of the term: you may be defined as ’the person opposite
me*, it is thus a device for the correct establishment
of the term; but once it has been established it is
seen in isolation and may function, in a context, either
♦
as orij^ go or as goal. The related tern, reflected by 
adjectival forms,has to be regarded as potential goal, 
only. My hat is the ’hat belonging to me*, the third 
hous6 is the ’house belonging to the place No. three’ 
etc.
But whether a pronoun or numeral appears in isol­
ation (substantival form) or as related term (adjectiv­
al form), the fact remains that a l l  p r o n o u n s  
a n d  n u m e r a l s  h a v e  t o  b e  r e g a r d ­
e d  a s  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  t e r m s .
- 260-
P a r t i c l e s . -  A similar clear-cut state­
ment does not seem possible with regard to deictic 
adverbs, prepositions and conjunctions. It is clear 
that prepositions and conjunctions represent orientat­
ional relations, but the same can apparently not be 
said of adverbs such as here and there, which seem 
to mark fixed places and have therefore the appearance 
of terms. This would present ho difficulty if we could 
Classify conjunctions and prepositions on the one 
hand and deictic adverbs on the other hand in two 
different compartments. This is however not possible.
The same words which present themselves normally 
as prepositions, such as in or through, take the x 
character of adverbs in he goes in. I am through 
without changing their meaning. In other v/ords, pre­
positions and deictic adverbs cannot be separated
from each other,1) and instead of opposing them as 
relations and terras we have to look for a conciliatory 
formula embracing them both. Such a formula should 
not be a verbal compromise but reveal the true nat­
ure of the words under consideration.
On closer inspection we shall see that the 
definition of deictic adverbs as terms is faulty and 
that a more correct analysis will disclose their 
relational character, thus bringing them into line
l) It is evident that the same is true of conjunctions 
and adverbs. Cf. Where is he? and I know where he is.
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with prepositions and conjunctions.
In Bally*s terminology wfc might say that deictic 
adverbs represent a case of cumul,  ^here meaning 
'in this place*, thggg or *in the place close to the 
speaker*, there *in that p-ace* etc. This is even true 
of the same words if combined with a preposition such 
as from here, to there equivalent to *from in this place*, 
*to in that place', forms which are parallel to from 
under the table etc. Such periphrases represent more 
than purely logical equivalents in the sense of de­
finitions, they bring out the representational fact
that here, there and the like never represent isolated
&
places such as Rome. Padua or^Pancras Station, but 
r e l a t i o n s  t o  c e r t a i n  p l a c e s ,  
and must therefore be interpreted in terms of cogniz­
ant movement. The thing here is a thing to be placed 
in representation close to the speaker etc.
The representational character of deictic adverbs 
can perhaps best be demonstrated by a comparison with 
adjectival pronouns (numerals). There too we found 
relations and terms: my hat was interpreted by *tHe 
hat belonging to (= relation) me (= term)', but whereas 
in the case of adjectival pronouns the stress lies 
on the '-cerm', it lies injthe case of deictic pdverbs 
on the element 'relation'. One might well say that 
whereas adjectival pronouns represent 'terms seen in
1) Linguistique generate et linguistique francaise. p.115.
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relation to another term1, deictic adverbs reflect 
•’r e l a t i o n s  s e e n  i n  t h e i r ,  g o a l * .  
But both have this in common that they cannot 
function as grammatical S.
We believe therefore, that the difference between 
a preposition (e.g. towards) and a deictic adverb 
(e.g. there) is not one between cognizant movement 
(=relation) and cognizant term, but one between 
direction going on and direction seen in its result* 
or as we should like to say between i m p e r f e c t -  
i v e and p e r f e c t i v e  direction or deixis.1  ^
This seems a more appropriate characterization than 
that suggested by Processor JesperseiWin his Philo­
sophy of Grammar (pp. 87/90),(who/speaks of intrans­
itive and transitive particles. At any rate, the 
expressions 1imperfective deixis’, that is a deixis 
which still requires to be perfected, and ’perfective 
deixis*, ie. one which is already complete in itself, 
give us the inner reason of this phenomenon which,
looked at from outside, reminds us of verbal trans­
itiveness or intransitiveness.
If our view is correct and there is no fundament­
al difference between prepositions and conjunctions on 
the one hand and deictic adverbs on the other hand
1) Kalepky (Heuaufbau d. Grammatik ,pp. 103/05) distinguishes 
between zweistiitzige, einstlitzige and stiitzenlose Verhaltnis- 
angaben. The first corresponds to our ’imperfective* the 
second to our ’perfective’ orientation-v/ords. The stiitzenlose 
Verh&ltnisw5rter are simply degrammaticelized perfective 
orientation-words.
we are entitled to group all these three classes of 
words under a common name and call them p a r t i c 1- 
e s , in the same way as we grouped pronouns and 
numerals together as pronouns. In so doing we obtain 
in the field of orientation-words t w o  m a i n  
c l a s s e s  : p r o n o u n s >  r e f l e c t i n g  
t e r m s, and p a r t i c l e s ,  r e f l e E t i n g  
r e l a t i o n s .  This division is parallel to 
that in the field of decriptive words between the 
noun and the verb, as we shall see in the next chapter 
and suggests that in grammar there is something re­
sembling a systematic organization, unstable and 
delicate as it may appear to be.
P o s t s c r i p t u m .  - The reason why part­
icles 11 share some of the pecularities of pronouns" 1) 
is simply that both are orientation-words; but this 
should not induce us to include among the pronouns 
adverbs such as then, there, thence. when, where. whence 
Btc. as Professor Jesijersen suggests; this is incom­
patible with their grammatical behavious. On the other 
hand it seems regrettable that K. Btthler in his Sprach- 
theorie did not see that the orientational or deictic 
character belongs to a l l  particles, whether they
1) Philosophy of Grammar, p. 85.
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{thegf go back to deictic roots such as Germ. £«. or 
not, such as Germ neben, which Btlhler calls "ein x 
waschechtes Begriffswort” (p. 107) to distinguish it 
"from deictic words ("Zeigwbrter*) such as da. This 
is a step backwards in linguistic theory since Her­
mann Paul had clearly affirmed the demonstrative
su. tk
character of even abstract particles as Germ, 
weil, falls or Engl, because. in case.1)
The fact that the same particle can be used either 
imperfectively or perfectively (cf. we left him behind 
us and we left him behind)offers no difficulty, it 
rather confirms our view that both usages belong close­
ly together and cannot be opposed as term and relation. 
More interesting is perhaps the observation that some 
languages are less sensitive than others to the dis­
tinction between dynamic and stationary time with re­
gard to zhe choice of particles. French for instance 
uses a Paris, whether the idea is ’he goes to Paris’ 
or he is in Paris’; ou is ’where* or 'where to*. 
Similar things can be observed elsewhere; weh have 
only to think of Engl, come here! (=’hitherf) as 
compared zo stay here I The explanation for this lies 
in the fact that the cognizant movement of, say, con­
signing somebody in imagination to Paris remains the 
same, whether in represented reality the relation
l) Prinzipien ciur Sprachgeschichte, n. 370
between the.person and the town is conceived as dynami 
or as stationary.
R e l a t i o n s h i p s  r e f l e c t e d  b y  
p a r t i c l e s . -  A lasi'fe word is due on the differ­
ent methods of reflecting relationships by particles. 
There we find first of all that one particle refers 
not HHiy to one relational eleiaent or simple relation, 
as do those hitherto considered (i.e. from, to. in front 
of, behind, to the right cfl? to the left of) but to 
s e v e r a l  relational elements at a time. Let us 
analyse for instance the statement the tree stands 
opposite the house and ask ourselves what opposite 
means in this connection. To this we shall have to 
answer: opposite means that one orientational vector, 
in our case that of the tree. ’runs against' another 
orientational vector, in our case th&t of the house.
In order to construct the relation meant by opposite 
we lend to the house the orientational system of the 
observer and make the house look towards the tree. But 
the tree is also made an origo, it is made ’facing’ 
the house, looking in the direction of the house in
such a way that its orientational axis meets the imagin- 
Jt
ary rigt - left axis of the house at right angles. In 
A
other words, opposite presupposes t w o orientational 
ax£s and t w o origos, and this is why it may be called
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a c o m p l e x  relation.
In the instance just analysed the relation was not 
only complex, it was also d e f i n i t e  in the sense 
that hoth origos and hoth goals where known. But that 
is by no means always the case. They may he a^rtly or 
totally unknown. If I say the tree standsheside the house 
MS we get a relationship which might he called a l ­
t e r n a t i v e  , since heside means in this context 
1 either to the left or to the right of*. An. interesting 
case is represented hy away in he is away . because here 
we have d i a  d i s g u i s e d  n e g a t i v e  re­
lationship, meaning the same as hot here1• Special ment­
ion is deserved hy m u t u a l  relationships such as 
side hy side or against each other. Closely akin to these 
is the case of between. B lies hetv/een A and C means 
that A and C are opposite each other and that somewhere 
on their axis of orientation lies B opposite hoth A and 
C:
In this case one might speak of a s y m m e t r i c ­
a l l y  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  relationship.
Hece we have to make special mention of m u l t i ­
d i m e n s i o n a l  relationships. Indeed a continu­
ously moving origo may he considered as an integration 
n
of an infinite number of fixed origos, each having its
particular axis of orientation. But on the other hand 
there is a marked difference compared with a genuine 
complex relationship of the type of opposite or between: 
here the respective origos and goals do not form a 
continuum, whereas they do in the £ase of multidim­
ensional relationships. And this is the reason why it 
may be advisable to reserve the name of ’complex1 
for those relationships in the world of outer repres­
entation which require for their construction seperste 
origos and goals.
These snort remarkd may suffice to give an idea of
the complexities offered by the representational analysis
of particles. It cannot be our task here to aim at
any sort of completeness. We have to be content with the
analysis of a few obvious cases, §ust sufficient to 
show
up the specific method to be employed in repres­
entational grammar. It would <weiulefr lead too far to enter 
into the almost infinite subtleties of more abstract 
usages of particles. Their analysis and classification 
would certainly be an interesting task but would con­
tribute little to the clarification of principles with 
v/hich we are alone concerned here.
A d j e c t i v a l  f o r m s  o f  p a r t i c l e s  
- There exist also adjectives derived from particles such 
as German hiesig, flfitzig etc. Tney are hardly ever strict­
ly equivalent in meaning with the correspondent adverbs.
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Der hiesige Arzt does not mean 'the doctor living 
in our town', but 'the local' doctor', .jetzig is 
'present' etc. They are best grouped together v/ith 
other adjectives such as northern, blue-eyed etc. 
of which we shall speak in the following chapter; 
divisions are here very unstable, particularly since 
outer form is not always a sure guide. SniHH Span. 
entonces in el entonces medico may be considered as
either a deictic particle or as an adjective. Syn­
tactic and morphological associations make it difficult
to give a categorical decision in these matters.
P a r t  III 
Chapter (6)
D e  s c r i p t  i v e  w o  r d s
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P r o b l e m  a n d  p a s t  e x p l a n ­
a t i o n s . -  After having dealt with orientation- 
words, i.e. words which in one why or another refer 
to the g cognitional categories of space and time 
only, we have to turn our Attention now to descript­
ive words.^ These have in common that they all ex­
press in different ways the third representational 
category, that of quality, and it is this which 
gives them their common d^briptive character. If 
we compare hard, hardness, to harden, or the desire,
to desire, desirous or Spanish el arbol florece. 
el arbol esta en flor. el arbol esta florido. v/e see 
that descriptive words are substantives, adjectives 
and verbs and that these parts of speech reflect 
different aspects of a qualitative factor which may 
be identical for all three. If we call this identic­
al factor their material meaning, the different as­
pects of it define their formal meaning.^)
In the past these parts of speech have often been 
defined in terms of things-meant. In this sense 
substantives were words denoting things or persons, 
adjectives (we include in this category also adverbs
1) I reproduce here in substance, with appropriate al­
terations, what I have said in: Substantiv. Ad.iextiv- 
Adverb und Verb als sprachliche Formen.Bernerhungen
gur Theorie der Wortarten. Indogerm. fforschungen. 
LYII, PP. 81 ff.
2) See above pp.q/
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derived from adjectives}(slow - slowly Were considered 
as expressing qualities, and verbs were held to stand 
for actions or states. These material definitions al­
though of a certain practical value, are obviously not 
satisfactory from the theoretical point of view. Indeed, 
it is difficult to see why we should call a relation 
a * thing', or why hardness should not express a quality 
in contrast to hard etc. On the other hand it should 
not be forgotten that, although not all substantives 
denote things, not all adjectives qualities etc., the 
reversion- of this contention, namely that things or 
persons are denoted by substantives, qualities by ad­
jectives, states and actions by verbs is indeed true; 
and this is a point which has to be taken into account 
in a satisfactory theory of the parts of speech.
An attemijt has been made to overcome the imperfect 
school-theory by explaining the different formal mean­
ings of our parts of speech with the help of their 
syntactic function, by saying a word is a substantive 
if it functions as S or object, it is anjadjective if 
it functions as an attribute , and it is a (finite) verb 
if it functions as P. But there again it seems that one 
confuses the form of a word with its vocation svntscticjue 
Such a method would be entirely satisfactory only if
me form such as substantive or adjective or
 ____  corresponded in each case only one function.
Such is however not the case. The substantive for in-
stance, besides being S, is also object, apposition, 
predicative word; the adjective is either attributive 
or predicative, and although the finite verb is always 
P, or at least the most characteristic formal element 
of P, we find the P in so-called nominal constructions 
without a finite verb. So we see that f o r  m a n d  
f u n c t i o n  c a n  a l w a y s  b e  d i s t i n g ­
u i s h e d ,  and are no more identical than our word- 
forms v/ith the forms of certain things-meant such as 
things, qualities or actions.
S u b s t a n t i v e ,  v e r b ,  a d j e c t ­
i v e  a n d  t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  r e ­
p r e s e n t a t i o n . -  It seems that we obtain 
a mttch more satisfactory theory if we interpret them in 
the light of what we said about representational categ­
ories.^ If we do that, it becomes apparent that a 
substantive represents the qualitative element in the 
form of a term in the sense of continuum in space, the 
verb in the form of a relation in the sense of continuum 
in time; to these representatives of the two categories 
of extension may be opposed the adjective as the re- 
presentative of the category of intension. It symbolizes
l) See above p. 105.
the form in which we represent the connection between 
the measurable space-time world and the non-measurable 
world of qualities , i.e. the form of inherence.- That 
does not mean that the substantive denotes space, the 
verb denotes time, the adjective denotes qualitative in­
herence, but that the three categories of representat­
ion are instrumental in representing the meanings of 
the corresponding verbal categories.
T h e  v e r b . -  The connection of the verb with 
its tenses and time has never been in doubt since 
Aristotle, and German grammarians are ♦ueert3r to call the
verb Zeitwort. The analysis of our examples Caesar 
travel!] ^ d fr»nm Padua to Rome and the tree stands in front 
of the house has revealed tnat we should say that the 
verb qualifies the manner in which time is spent. This 
and the distinction between actual (or ’real*) time and
a d t i / A . ' n c c
potential time may perhaps be assessed as anprogre&g in 
linguistic theory, because it shows the systematic re­
lation of this part of speech to particles, ajconnection 
traditional grammar was unable to see.^ *) it also has 
the advantage of not discarding the element of truth 
contained in the traditional contention that verbs denote 
actions or states, because it brings out sharply the
1) See above p. 253.
feher common formal characteristics of both actions and 
states. Further on we shall have also an oportunity 
of showing the fruitfulness of our conception for the 
theory of verbal aspects and genders.
T h e  s u b s t a n t i v e . -  The character 
of the substantive as spatial continuum or re­
presentational term will form no problem as far as
the substantive denotes things or persons, the repres­
entational form of which is by nature spatial. But that 
this can be generalized to cover all substantives can 
be shown also.
If I say Caesar travelled from Padua to Home I see 
Caesar*s action infieri, step after step; but if I go
•do co 'njpofw
on^speakingi of Caesar’s travel. I now comprise start­
ing point and goal and all the imaginary points in be­
tween together, I have established their coevality, 
and that is precisely what I do when I construct a 
continuum in space. - But not all post-verbal substant­
ives are based on the principle of establishing coevalit 
of all moments involved in an action. English is part­
icularly rich in d y n a m i c  substantives such as 
the kill, a hit, a knock etc. They all represent dram­
atic moments, but again not in their naturali comect- 
ionjwith preceding and following moments, but in isolat­
ion, cut out or framed, as it were. And in this subtle 
way the space-character of the substantive is again 
established.
The same thing can be shown with regard to post- 
adjectival abstracts, although it is perhaps less ob­
vious here. When I say iron is hard I show the quality 
of iron in its proper connection witli the metal, as in­
herent in it. When I speak of the hardness of iron I 
have isolated this property. Now the annihilation of 
a connection, for this is what ’isolation1 means, is 
equal to the establishment of a ’no-longer’ relation, 
and in this lied precisely the characteristic feature 
of a representational term or sx^atial continuum . - 
Our thesis is indirectly confirmed by the fact that in
many languages substantives are often accompanied by 
the definite article which is a f%)m of deictic em­
placement, or an indefinite article which corresponds 
to ’singling out’ or ’isolation’, Indeed tliese two 
forms of emplacement and isolation play a role in 
the linguistic actualization of the substantive, par­
allel to that of the forms of dynamic development in 
the actualization of the verbs, i.e. the finite forms.1)
l) Cf. G. Guillaume, Temps et verbe. Theorie des as­
pects. des modes et des temp s. Paris 1929,p. 10, note.
A d j e c t i v e s . -  Whereas substantives re­
fer primarily to the representational category of space, 
finite verbs to that of time, adjectives exhibit the 
representational form of quality. That is not to say 
that they denote necessarily qualities as words such as 
northern, blue-eyed etc. prove. To contend that a word- 
form is defined by the representational form of quality
means that whatever it denotes is conceived as inherent 
in the space-time world or its representatives. fIn- 
herfl^ce* as opposed to self-sufricient isolation (sub­
stantive), but also different from relation in the sense 
of tirne-continuum (verb) is the general formal charact­
er of the adjective.
In the real world qualities inhere in things; i.e. 
they are represented at the same time and in the same 
place as things. By representing things and qualities 
in discourse by differnt words we separate their re­
presentations in time and space. This isolation of the 
quality may result in a substantive, and any connection 
with things has in that case to be represented by a 
relation-word: a man of courage. The adjectival form,
however, cancels as it were the artificial isolation 
of the qualitative element in a separate word byci form 
which characterizes the quality as potentially inherent: 
a courageous man.
The adjectival form, hov/ever, does not only fith
the denotations of qualities such as good, bad, red, 
high etc. but also the expression of other inherent 
characteristics such as northern, blue-eved etc.
The latter are of quite a different character from the 
former: good, bad, red, high distinguish different de­
grees, whereas northern, blue-e.ved;as indications of 
situation and possession respectively^ do not. But the
fact that they are nevertheless felt to be true ad­
jectives shows that the formal characteristic of in­
herent dependency is wider than that of denotation ofl 
qualities, although it has been abstracted from that 
representational form of quality. As we have mentioned 
already, words like Germ, hiesig and jetzig
also enter this formal scheme.^
P a r t s  o f  s p e e c h  a n d  s y n t a c t i c  
f u n c t i o n .  -To complete the theory of these 
parts of speech we should have to explain the relation 
of their form to syntactic function. This has always 
been understood to account for the fact that a word 
changes its category when it changes its syntactic 
function. A predicative adjective hard, for instance, 
in iron is hard may become a substantive in the hardn­
ess of iron is not disputed etc. This is an instance of
, t Which
what is called ’transposition , and—tha-t ohall/ be dealt
with in chapter 7.
P a r t  III 
Chapter (?)
V e r b a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n s
-  z €% -
T w o  t y p e s  o f  v e r b a l  c o n s t r u c t ­
i o n .  - After having dealt with the parts of speech 
singularly we may possess some knowledge of the e 1- e m - 
e^n t s of construction but we still, lac$ an insight into 
the c o n s t r u c t i o n a l  p a t t e r n s  into 
which these elements are integrated;it would therefore be
logical to make the ’pictures of reality1 such as the
1actor-actiond or the 1thing-cmplacement’ patterns an 
object of further analysis. These and all similar represent­
ational pictures have a certain material content
and a certain constructional form; it is with the latter 
that we are concerned here. - In grammatical parlance
the constructional or operational characteristics of our
.
patterns are covered by terms such as ’active*, ’passive*, j
’transitive*, ’intransitive’; ’personal* and ’impersonal*. ;
I
3£SEJS±XH35iiSHS We have only to go through the formal ;
characteristics just mentioned in order to see that they j 
are all at the same time notions intimately connected with I
the xEEbx v e r b .  And this is easily understandable: ■!
j
in Jack calls Jill, Jack appears as ’actor’ and Jill 
as * thing-acted-upon’, in other words, they appear as *
so-called subject and object of a transitive construction, 
because of the meaning of ’calls’ as a transitive action. j
It is because of the semantic character of arrives that 
the king (in the king arrives in London)appears as an
~ z i s  -
'actor' and London as 'scene or place of the action’, etc
etc. It is always the verb which expresses the dominating 
Idea of the whole construction. That is why Bally could 
claim “la grammaire toute entiere est dans le verbe“ )^ 
and why M. Lombard placed the finite verb in the centre 
of his grammatical system.*0 Let us call the characterizat­
ion of the rdle the verb plays with regard to other parts
i
of speech o u t e r  v e r b a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n .
* Beside this there is an i n n e r  v e r b a l  c o n - ;  
s t r u c t i o n .  By this termw we understand t h e  
w a y  v e r b a l  t i m e  i t s e l f  i s  c o n ­
s t r u c t e d .  Because, far from being amorphous, verbal 
time shows a rich and interesting structure so that we may | 
speak of a real a n a ' t o m y  o f  v e r b a l  t i m e . !
Both things are not entirely disconnected. We owe to Prof­
essor Hammerich the discovery that the essence of the 
passive construction is of a representational nature, it 
is, tu use his term, an “ anachronic" construction, one' 
which is followed from the goal of an action i* b a c k - 
w a r d s  to its origo: the deer is killed by the hunter
i
instead of following the “catachronic" way from the origo 
to the goal as in the active construction the hunter kills 
the deer. The same term of “anachronic" %jy be applied '
1) Linguistique generale et linguistioue francsise, p. 49.
2) See above^p.160, note (3).
3) J.L. Hammerich, Lexus. Sub.jekt und Objekt. Axtiv und 
Passivg. In A Grammatical Miscellany Ofi’ereo. to Otto 
Jespersen. Copenhagen, London, 1930,pp. 313 f.
to the construction of a future tense with the help of 
perfective verbs in Slavonic languages, and this in spite
of their active character. This is possible because I can
very well see an action tending from its origo to its
goal, i.e. an active process, in r e t r o s p e c t  A v- et.
How these things hang together may best be shown by 
the analysis of a concrete example. ,Ao ■ ptte-h- may -eorve? "the
jTvaV serve Ouj
lready quoted the hunter kills the deer^ . Before we begin 
the analysis of this instance we have to remember that the 
verb refers to r e a l  t i m e  as opposed to potential 
time, and that the representation of real time is bound up 
with the representation of the manner in which time is 
spent.Since this in turn takes time, the finite verb 
never refers tox a mathematical moment or point in time 
but to a ptaBE p h a s e .  The kills of our example re­
presents such a phase.
Nov/ the action of billing* starts in an actor (the 
hunter), but is fulfilled only in the thing-acted-upon 
(the deer) we may say therefore that the v/hole phase re­
presented in the construct the hunter ki&ls the deer may 
be divided into tv/o s u b p h a s e s ,  of which the
first may be called c a u s a t i o n a l  or a c t i v e
or s u b j e c t i v e  and the second e f f e c t ^  /
or p a s s i v e  or o b j e c t i v e .
1) See pp. Z {fl
2) Sed above p. 2^9.
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Now we can go a step further and say that the killing, 
before it becomes the hunter's action, must have gone 
through a preparatjbV'yphase in which the hunter's will 
took its aim and was concentrated.to bear in a definite 
direction, where the killing existed already i n p o t - 
e n t i a . Similarly the effective phase can be thought 
of as being followed by another phase in which the killing
continues existing v i r t u a l l y  in its results. If we 
call the potential phase preceding the active one ' e x i s t  
e n c e  i n  p r o s p e c t  & v~e', and the resultant 
phase following the effective one ' e x i s t e n c e  i n  
r e t r o s p e c t &', the whole hum construct the
hunter kills the fleer may be symbolized as follows:
k i l l s
4
h----
the hunter
In the c a s e  of ouriparticular verb which denotes a
willfully directed act aiming at a definite result we may
£
Qualify our four phases as i n t e n s i ^ i f ,(l), t e n s -  
i 9 2 ), d e t e n s i t f  a<U(a) and e x t e n s i o n #
(4). Furthermore we may oppose nos. 2 and 3 as a c t u a l  
phases to nos. 1 and 4 as v i r t u a l  phases. Nos. 1 
and 2 together may be opposed to nos. 5 and 4 together as 
s u b j e c t i v e  ( t r a n s i t i v e )  to o b -
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j e c t i v e ( t r a n s i t i v e )  phases. All 
these distinctions appear thus related to each other in 
the following way:
We have chosen this example because it is particul­
arly rich in analytical possibilities.and thus offers 
a good chance of covering the most important factors 
in this connection • Other cases are easily assessed 
in reference to iliis our model case. If v/e take for
instance the tree stands in front of the house  ^ We 
see at once that the virtual phase no. 1 is a mere 
Tnot yet- and phase no. 4 a mere 'no more-* standing, 
the verb is simply tensive and intransitive. There is 
hardly any need to analyse other verbs here where v/e 
are merely concerned with the clarification of principles 
The one thing we should like to stress is the fact, 
that the i n n e r  construction of verbal time in 
successive phases and important factors of o u t -
e r verbal construction such as transitiveness, intransi 
iveness have the s a m e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ­
a l  b a s i s  and can only be properly dealt with in 
rexDresentational syntax. One concrete example may further
objective , 
\transitive)
subjective
(intransitive)
(1) intensimw€ wtual
(2) tensicflHh
, , > actufil
(3) detensitfwO
(4) extensiawi virtual
- Zf 2.-
illustrate the importance and usefulness of our analyt­
ical principle. The, so-called fpast participle* has in 
our modern languages two logically distinct functions: 
as partici iium perfecti it refers to the past, as 
participium passivi it refers to a passive action or 
state. These things are logically as different as two 
things can "be, and yet, for our linguistic feeling they 
helong together. This "becomes easily understandable, if 
we say that these participle*refer in a general way'to 
the objective phase of a represented action. This is 36* 
a phase where the action both finishes and becomes "perfecU
and at the same time is considered in the >thing-acted-uponf 
i.e. passive. Now with regard to verbs of the type to
kill the objective phase comprehends two subphases: the
detensiomtand the e x t e n s D i f f e r e n t  contexts may
narrow the general meaning of the past participle down 
to the one or the other. Hence the differnces in English
between he has gone (detensi<ft»fl ,he is gone (extension®*), 
between French il a disparu (detensive) and il est 
disparu (extensidi«0; and similarly in the passive voice: 
his bills are paid regularly (detensi^*^, his bills are 
paid (extension*?; les chevaux sont atteles par le valet 
(detensitf!®^, les chevaux sont atteles (extension*!). •*■)
l) 0. Jespersen, Essentials od English Grammar. London 1p/Q 
p. 253.
Th. Engwer, Vom Passiv und seinera Gebrauch im heuti.aen 
?ranzSsischen, Jena, Leipzig 1931, pp. 23ff. and do.
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We see that reference to the d e t e n s p h a s e  means 
reference to the conclusion of an act. This element is
therefore absent in verbs which have no detensive phase:
0
he is admired and he is admired by evr.vone refer both 
to facts as distinct from aEiij&ns acts; the same holds
good of French il est admire and il est admire par tout
le monde.
R e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  . c o n s t r u c t s  
seem thus to d e f i n e  t h e  g r o u n d  c o m m o n  
t o  b o t h  o u t e r  a n d  i n n e r ,  v e r b a l  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  j. This is why we should like to 
deal with both in the same chapter.
I n n e r  v e r b a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n .  - 
Inner verbal construction is defined by a s p e c t s  
and t e n s e s .  The term 1 aspect* refers to begin 
with to the d y n a m i c  or p r a g m a t i c  
character of the verb, it characterizes a process as
A,
* inchoative', * iterative *, perfective1, * imperfective * 
etc. ; * tenses* on the other hand refer essentially to 
subdivisions of t i m e in the abstract, orientational, 
sense, such as present, past and future. Hence the very 
name tense = Old French tens, Latin ptejiipus.
I think it is unfortunate for analytical clarity to
confuse the pragmatic and the orientational characteriz-
ation of time-extensions as has been done. Qa& has*claimed
that the aoristus iffgsssx&sfXKlj(p-reteritfr ]l^ s^ e_jde_f ini), 
the perfecturn (past perfect, .passe compose) and the
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imperfecturn (past imperfect, imparfait) mark at the
0
same time temporal and aspectual distinctions. This 
can he only true if ’aspect* here does n o t  refer 
to the pragmatic character of the verb since in modern 
Romance and Germanic languages a n y  verb, whatever 
its dynamic character, may be constructed in any tense.
We shall therefore distinguish t w o k i n d s  o f  
a s p e c t s  : ’pragmatic aspects* or characterizations 
of the pragmatic character of verbs and 'orientational 
aspects’ referring to the construction of epochs in 
tenses. The confusion of these two notions is under­
standable, even to a certain degree justifiable,in 
historical grammar, since the distinction of tenses
• I
is to a large extent the historical successor to the 
distinction of aspects: At a time when it was realized j
i
that two different verbs of different dynamic character 
such as sura and fui could be used in reference to 
different phases of the same process which followed 
each other in time, the completed process being past 
with regard to the process still going on, the distinct­
ion of tenses was born. But nowadays the dynamic char­
acter of the verb is irrelevant for the construction of !
which i
tenses; this is an analytical truth/the unqualified
of
use^the word 'aspect* tends to obscure. i
P r a g m a t i c  v e r b a l  a s p e c t s .  - 
If we compare the dynamic character of our two verbs
to kill (in the hunter hills the deer) and to stand
the former has a defensive phase, the latter has not.
In other words, the action of killing cannot he pro­
longed beyond a certain point, it belongs to its 
character that it is conclusive, whereas 'standing' may 
be prolonged ad libitum. This is in essence the differ­
ence between p e r  f e e  t i v e  and i m p e r f e c t -  
i v e verbs. So if we wish to decide, whether a verb 
is perfective or imperfective we have just to ask the 
question whether it refers to an<^  action (process) 
which EHmssxisx canae^ be prolonged in represented 
reality.beyond a certain point or not. If it can it is 
imperfective, if it ca, not it is perfective. To start 
for instance i& a perfective verb, because you cannot 
'go on starting'; to walk or to sing, on the other hand, 
are imperfective verbs, because one can, at any moment, 
go on -walking or singing.
This distinction between perfective and imperfective
verbs, useful as it is, does not help ta understand 
fully the rather complicated question of pragmatic
verbal aspects. It is nothing but a starting point and 
needs further elaboration.
(in the tree stands in front of the house) we find that
us
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One important poi^t to consider is this: in actual
such as 'killing1 only after having witnessed its re­
sults. For if the victim is not 'dead', we should have 
to speak of 'wounding', 'hurting', 'persecuting* or the
like. Therefore, the meaning of such an action can "be 
assessed properly only once it is over. We understand 
thus very well, why certain perfective verbs such as 
Lat. fui or tuli had no real present and were used to 
denote past actions.^ If we can form such a present 
of perfective verbs, this can be explained in the follow­
ing way: After ihExsxpsxxsHEEXHf a number of typical 
experiences of 'killing' we are able to assess the mean­
ing of such an action before it has come to its final 
development, at a moment when the issue is no longer in
doubt, that is at a moment when the victim is not 'dead' 
but 'dying'. In this way it becomes possible to assess
the meaning even of a ’perfective* action such as 
'killing' b e f o r e  it is completed, and in actual
fact we always speak of to xill in this sense. Y/e see 
the action of 'killing* before the tension of the act
is spent, in its t e n s i v e  phase without doubting
therefore that it i s  a perfective verb.
l) See above p.
gees sen, wie das w^r. because verges afen is detensiv)6.
F o r m a l  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  
p r a g m a t i c  a s p e c t s .  - Until now we 
have applied the notions af perfective and imperfective 
to different verbs, i.e. verbs semantically unrelated 
to each other such as to stand, to start, to kill, but 
it is clear that the same notions can be applied to 
one and the same verb, provided its character can be 
assessed with the same degree of justification at the 
level of different phases. Such a verb is for instance
to fall.
We are able to assess the descriptive character of 
the process alluded to by the verb, in its initial phase,
-2?*-
i.e. the moment we see a "body "breaking contact with 
■flu
another "body in^  direction of the ground, how if we re­
fer to that phase, the meaning of the verb will be per­
fective, for the body under consideration cannot !go 
on breaking contact*. But the descriptive character of 
the verb in the sense of 'free movement towards the 
ground* persists during the next phase, that of descent. 
If we allude to that phase the verb will be imperfect­
ive. Nov/ this phase is followed by another moment where 
the tailing' comes to an end and ceases to exist. If
we refer to this final phase oui? verb will again be per-
C£<xs(n# "to
fective since one cannot 'go on to oo&eo ffoiling'. We
obtain thus with regard to to fall three differ*- nt
phases: one during which the movement has a l r e a d y
the character of 'falling', one where it has s t i l l
that character and one where it c e a s e s  to have
that same character. Considered in the first and last
phases the verb appears to be perfective, because they
cannot be prolonged in their specific function, during
the second phase the verb is imperfective, because we
expect it to continue.
This whole analysis of to fall looks obviously art-
a
ificial, for we can oppose the different minings of 
to fall to each other only by narrowing down in each 
case the meaning of the verb, by specifying it in each
- 2  W -
case with the help of notions such as ’already1, ’still1, 
’cease*, whereas if we take the general, unspecified 
meaning of to fall, which is that of ’free descent 
towards the ground’ we shall not hesitate, probably, 
to classify it simply as an imperfective verb. This is 
very true. And yet, our foregoing analysis was valuable 
because it teaches us to expect that a given verb in 
different specifying contexts may appear to be occas­
ionally perfective, even though it be generally, i.e 
outside a context, imperfective. If I say for instance 
he falls from the roof, it is obvious that I refer to 
the initial phase and the verb is perfective. In he falls 
to the ground. I refer to the final stage, and wu have 
again a perfective verb. But in the parachutist falls 
so many feet per second, to fall is imperfective.
If we look at our examples we find that the charact­
eristic keywords for the perfective interpretation are 
from and to. Now wherever such particles are felt to 
belong to the verb itself such a verb will be charact­
erized as perfective. Such is the case for instance in 
German, where we have ab-fallen, auf-falien and - in cl 
metaphorical sense only - be-falien, ver-fallen etc.
Most of these compounded kx verbs in German (cf. also 
zu-falien, durch-fallen etc.) seem to be perfective 
verbs or at least to have once been perfective verbs,
-279-
whereas the corresponding simnlicia are often imperf­
ective. There is, however, a notable exception to 
this rule. Wherever we find in German side by side 
two verbs, both composed with the same prefix, which 
is, however,stressed in one case and unstressed in the 
other case, such as durchbrechen and durchbrechen. 
flbersetzen and ilbersetzen. tibernehmen and ubernehmen. j 
it is the one with the stressed prefix which is perfect­
ive and the one with the unstressed prefix v/hich is 
■
imperfective. j
As is well known, the same method of distinguishing j 
the perfective verb from the impe_fective by prefixat­
ion has been largely adopted by Slavonic languages 
where we have (in Russian) stroit' (imperfective) be­
side -po-stroit1 (perfective) fto build1, pi sat1 
(imperfective) besides na-?jisat1 (perfective) *to 
write* etc. But besides this method there is the other 
one of marking the difference with the help of endings. 
Thus we have beside the imperfective stuchat1 * to 
knock* not only a perfective no-stuchat* but also a 
perfective ^ stuknut*: besides kivat* (imperfective), 
we have kivnut* (perfective) *to nod* etc.
To a certain extent we find characterization of 
perfective verbs with the help of an ending in Latin 
where the so-called *inchoative* -esco has been
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abstracted from verbs wlich by their general meaning 
denoted the beginning of an action or a process. Thus 
we have obdormisco beside dorrnio. calesco beside
caleo, amasco. beside amo etc.
prefixation and suffixation ate only the most dir-
o c c a s i o n a l  characterization as in to fall
and p e r m a n e n t  characterization as in com­
pounded or derived verbs, we shall have to class those 
semi-fixed expressions in which the specifying element 
is an auxiliary verb. In Spanish for instance the re­
lation between corner and esharse a correr iS is that 
between German laufen and loslaufen. to German schlafen 
- ein-schlafen corresponds Spanish dormir - quedar 
dormido (cp. also the synonymity between enfermarse 
and caer enfermo). and here belong also those groujjs
which function as verbs, although the main element be 
take, a .
a noun; td/WHliL for instance is perfective as compared 
to to walk, to fall in love is perfective as compared 
to to love; furthermore to fall ill is perfective as 
compared to to be ill, and iDarallels to this can be 
found in any language. They are particularly abundant
in Spanish where we find salir victoriose beside ser
l) About reduplication cf. pp.
ect methods of distinguishing perfective from imperf­
ective verbs.-*-) Between the two extreme cases of
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victorioso. quedar rico “beside ser rico. resultar herido 
“besides estar herido. dar orincipio “beside empezar
known we can say in English he goes on killing without 
having the feeling that such a statement is a contra­
diction in terms, e-inoe killing is an act v/hich cannot 
go on, once completed. It is clear that in such a case 
the statement does not refer to a definite act of 
killing “but to a g e n e r a l  a c t i v i t y  des­
cribed as 'killing1, for which the individual act may 
serve as an illustration, without “being reconstructed 
in detail in representation. It is, in the verbal sphere, 
the same phenomenon as the general or abstract use of 
the noun in the nominal sphere, where the horse may
mean an individual or “be a general term. And-oe herof 
the horse is not a collective noun, “but a genuine sing­
ular as the different number of to “be indicates xhjsrs 
when we compare the horse i s  a domestic animal with 
t.ha government (collective noun) a r e  not satisfied. 
Thus in he goes on killing v/e do not represent an
l) Cf. H. Keniston, Verbal aspects in Spanish. Hisp.
F u r t h e r  c o m p l i c a t i o n s .  - Now 
we must consider a further complication. As is well
Cal. 1936 (XIX), pp. 163/76
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undetermined quantity of individual acts, but rather an 
undivided activity, which may or may not be prolonged, 
and in that case v/e obtain a purely imperfective re­
presentation.
This parallelism between the verb and the noun goes 
even further than that, and may serve to introduce cert­
ain other qualifications of verbal processes, which ,
Ickt
■ s t e r  the before-mentioned inchoativum. are closely re­
lated to the distinction between perfective and imperf­
ective verbs. - Not only do we have verbal forms parall­
el to the gener&l and the individual use of the noun, 
but also forms parallel to the collective noun, to which 
corresponds the representation of a number of individ­
uals in a unity. It is the case of the i t e r a t i v e  
verb, where representation of a sequence of individ­
ual acts is necessary to the constitution of the verbal 
element. Such verbs are for instance to flutter, ia
twitter, to stammer, to whittle etc. Generally speaking 
iterative verbs are imperfective, unless they are made 
perfective by some contextual factor as in to whittle 
down.
Here again the viq]pn of repeated action may present
v
itself without being symbolized morphologically, as 
in Spanish goluear. or else there may be a morpholog­
ical characterization: goluetear. Cf also Lat. treoidare
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against Greek Tp<!/Tu) > vocitare (where the iterative has 
hecome an intensive) against vocare, cursitare against 
currere: German niatschern against platschen. zischeln 
against zischen, English to hohhle against to hop etc.
A further parallelism with the noun may he found, 
in the fact that the same forms may serve to denote 
quantity and intensity. In the sphere of the noun we
o pp 04 cT<
find heside the collective singular its ffcvora-ion, v/hich, 
instead of denoting a plurality of individuals in a 
unity, represents a unity "broken up into individual 
fragments; cf. Spanish los paneles andan uor 1 o s 
suelos. buenos dias. etc. , French lea eaux, les cieux 
etc. Such a plural comes easily to denote an emphatic 
singular. It is understandable therefore, that the 
iterative verb may be easily used as an intensivum . 
when the repeated acts produce an accumulative effect 
as in vocitare. or, on the contrary, as a debilitativumt 
when the £ effect is that of breaking up a force into 
fragments: nlatchern against platschen. to whittle down 
against to cut down.
The interesting thing to note with regard to the 
emphatic iterativa is that they may become perfective, 
as we shall see when v/e go on to consider the part of 
emphatic iterativa such as dedi. steti. cucurri. ueouli 
etc. in the formation of the Latin perfect tense: this 
will be done in a later paragraph.
J
We have seen how intimately the notion of verbal
aspects is connected with the meaning of the verb it-
\
self and the unfolding of that meaning in the repres­
entation of time. Aspects in,this sense express the
different ways in which the 'going-on* of verbal mean-
j/'nce.
ings is represented;/they refer -in sliorti to the prag- ,1we
matic character of the verb isad-may thoroffo-ro be» calledV 
p r a g m a t i c  aspects.
O r i e n t a t i o n a l  t i m e . -  Quite a 
different matter is the representation of verbal meaning 
in o r i e n t a t i o n a l  t i m e .  For orient­
ational time can be concei-ved quite independently of 
pragmatic aspects. It can be expressed in t nns of 
present, past and future. Only this much results from the 
integration of pragmatic happenings into orientational 
time, that the present isnnot a mathematical point vith- 
out extension, not simply the negation of past and fut­
ure, the 'no-longer-past1 and 'not-yet-future 1, but it 
is a positive time-extension, which extends as far as 
the pragmatic time-extension integrated into the pres­
ent; it thus includes some time-particies of the past 
and some of the future in the mathematical time. The 
verbal present has the character of an e p o c h ,  and 
and so have past and future.
Present, past and future are relative notions; the
past lies before the present, the future lies ahead of
the present and the present itself is fixed with relatioi
to the speaker, it is the temporal fheref. Once wc
have fixed an epoch as ‘past*, we^free to imagine
another -epoch still further past, as we may also imagine
an epoch lying ahead of ih a supposed future epoch, 
and that may go on in theory ad infinitum.In actual
practice the past of an epoch which is itself past in 
relation to the present’s past is already rare- and so 
is the corresponding future epoch; and further complic­
ations are hardly^of any importance to the linguist.^
The epochs seen in direct relation to the present are 
sometimes referred to as absolute past and absolute fut-
i
ure, epochs only indirectly related to the present are j 
referred to as relative past eh or relative future j
epochs. It would be clearer and less misleading to 
talk of directly related past and future and-indirect­
ly related past and future.
O r i e n t a t i o n a l  a s p e c t s .  - Low 
afpeati at
the march of time a continuous flow; by introducing 
the notion of epochs, we introduce some element of 
stability into the representation of time, and this
1) But of course not entirely. Cf. Ch. de Boer, Les temps 
11 surcomposes,fdu francaiss. Revue de Linguistique Romrne, 
iii, p. 283 ff.
can have different degrees. We may represent epochs as 
merging into each other, as sharply separated or simply 
as different, and in this way v/e arrive at the notion
of o r i e n t a t i o n a l  a s p e c t s  comparable 
to that of pragmatic aspects.
In English, for instance, there is one form for the 
» past, which characterized that epoch as not-connected
with the present epoch. It is a definite past: he trav­
elled. There is secondly a form where the connection
with the present is left undecided, it may or may not 
exist: he used to travel;1  ^ there is thirdly a form 
which expresses that the past epoch merges with the 
present: he has travelled.and there is finally an ex­
pression for an unfinished epoch: he was travelling, 
which has of course its counterpart in all epochs, 
present, future and past.
In French again there is a definite future .je ferai. 
i.e. a future seen as detached from the present, and 
another where the present and future are linked up:
.ie vais faire, whereas the English future I shall do 
% is indifferent to these distinctions. The difference 
between je .fis and .i *ai fait corresponds roughly to 
that between English I did and I have done, although 
the iDeriphrastic past has the tendency of taking the
place of the definite past, in spoken French. In i_l
1 ) The almost synonymous he would travel denotes the <ame
orientational aspect; whereas he used to travel indicates
simply a habitual activity in .the .pas^ t, he wq uIc! travel "im­
plies that such a habitual doing is  ^typrcsIF-^TTi^-pTe^
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faisait the past epoch is seen as unfolding itself 
witho.ut however "being felt as unfinished as it is the
case in he was doing.
O r i e n t a t i o n a l  a n d  p r  a g m a  t -  
i c axix a s p e c t s ,  - The fact that our modern
Germanic and Romanic languages and also Latin, lay the 
stress, in verbal morphology, on the symbolization of 
epochs and orientational aspects, seems to be a relat­
ively advanced feature. In many cases v/e are still able
to see how the predominantly orientational morphology 
has grown out of a mainly pragmatic morphology. For 
instance Latin nosco and novi have once been related to 
each other in the same way as Ge.man ich lerne kennen
^  C(
and ich kenne (cp. Greek oldoC ); Greek <*(fToL/koLt and 
u t
fcaTij tcoc correspond to ich stelle mich and ich stehe: the
same holds good with regard to Latin do and dedi» where
reduplication means originally emphasis and thoroughness,
*1 give thorougly*, I give until I can no more*; or with
regard to Greek k. »-t0 throw’ and^*A< »\t »to hit’.
It is clear that nosco and novi can be taken
as two different phases of the same process, which follow
each'other in time and thus take on the character of 
epochs: the initial phase nosco preceding the final
phase novi, or else, the final phase following the init­
ial phase. And the same time-relation can be recognized
mutatis mutandis with regard to do - dedi and the 
rest. It follows from this that at the level of iiovi,
nosco has past already and I can therefore use novi 
in order to express a past nosco surviving in its results 
In this way v/e get a morphological expression for a past 
epoch linked up with the prc sent, which is the essence 
of what v/e call a perfect tense. We see a past action
in its present result, we view phse M no. 1 from the
1 ^point of view of phase no,. 2 . '
i
There exists also the possibility of constructing ! 
a future tense in a similar v/ay, because from the j
point of view, say, 'throw*, the action denoted by j
'hit* lies in the future. Hence the fact that in Slavonic! 
languages perfective verbs, representing the oe«irfact­
ive phase of a process, serve as an expression of the 
future epoch. This seems plausible enough, if v/e looxL
at the phenomenon superficially. But while in actual 
/
f a c t  the adoption of a form expressing the terminating 
phase for the symbolization of a perfect tense has 
never been very difficult to understand once the 
connection between pragmatic aspects and tenses had been 
g r a s p e d ,  the adoption of perfective verbs for the ex­
pression of the future epoch is still a subject of 
l e a r n e d  discussion.^) We must therefore dv/ell a lit Li e
1) See p. 280.
2 ) Cf. Debrunner's review of E. Koschraieder, Zeitbezug
und Spra_che, Indogerm. Forschungen XLVIII (1900),pp. 89/98.
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l.mger on this vexed question and consider the difficult­
ies of the problem.
I think the main difficulty is the fact that perf­
ective verbs in Slavonic languages cannot form a pres­
ent tense, whereas in other languages a y>erfective verb 
behaves in this respect exactly as an imperfect one.
There is nothing to prevent us from forming a true pres­
ent tense from German erbauen (perfective) in the same
way as from German bauen (imperfective), but in Russian
apparently
va postro.vu dom, although being parallel in its form to 
German ich erbaue das Hadsg. has the meaning of a future 
tense. If that is so, it is probable that the way in
which the future epoch is constructed in both languages 
differs.
9 The German sentence, without any doubt, represents 
a present action in view of its future accomplishment, 
that is, the time-construction is p r o s p e c t i v e .  
In Russian, on the contrary, I consider a future accom­
plishment, the beginnings of which lie in a relative
past, that is, my time-construction is r e t r o -
1)s p e c t i v e .  Hence also the fact that the Slavonic
1 ) I follow in this E. Koschmieder, Zeitbezug und Sprache. 
Ein Beitrag zur Aspekt- und Tempusfrage. Leipzig, Berlin 
1929, and also G. Guillaume, Temps et verbe. Theorie des 
aspects, des modes et des temps, Paris 1929, pp. 105 ff.
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tUi tkt ,
 ^future thus constructed is a definite future, com­
parable to French je ferai, that is, one which does
tie cost lAi'fK
not evolve out of the present, as would be^the other 
Slavonic construction ya budu stroit*. comparable to 
German ich werde bauen. It is furthermore clear that 
such XEspfiEJfcix retrospective time-constructions can 
only operate in perfective verbs, because the conditio 
sine qua non of it is the fixation of a point beyond 
which the view cannot extend and from which we can . 
only turn back as it were. Such retrospective perfect­
ive verbs cannot construct a present tense for the 
simple reason that the present is an epoch consisting 
of the juxtaposition of past and future time-particles. 
Once I select one undetermined time-particle as point 
to look back from, all preceding time-parttcles appear 
in the perspective of a relative past, whereas any 
possible following time-particles are excluded from 
the view. Retrospective perfective verbs express]_really 
disconnection with the present.
This hypothesis is thus of a very great explanatory 
value. If it has any weakness, this lies probably in its 
psychological improbability. Psychologically it seems 
so artificial, and surely it is difficult to see in
retrospective perfective constructions old primitive 
types. But this impression of improbability will dis-
appear if we can discover a plausible motive for
adopting the retrospective view £Kx$X8«»x8£xiskx«x&*»
„  This
for the construction of a future epoch, fflero is not the
place to conduct a detailed investigation into this
problem. But at first sight it looks as if the clue to
empha tic
it could be discovered in an inxBnsiXB fait accompli 
construction. une could imagine that
he shall die to-morrow could be expressed in a more 
vivid form as by to-morrow, he has died already 1, an­
ticipating the result. In this way we would select a 
point in the future seen from which the process has 
already come to an end, and the adoption of a perfective 
verb to suggest just that becomes understandable,
l
I n t r a n s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s .  -So 
much for the time-anatomy of the verb. We have now to 
approach another question, which we should like to form­
ulate as follows. If the verb is a time-continuurn. it 
is by its very pature the symbol of a relation, and yet, 
if we compare the hunter kills the deer with the hunter 
gfflt runs, it ?/ould seem that only in the first instance 
does the verb fulfill a relating function, but not in 
the second, and that it is therefore not true to say 
that the finite verb alv/ays symbolizes the R of an 
objective construct.
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But it can be -easily? shown that the difference be4 
tween the two expressions cannot be assessed in this 
way. As a matter of fact, with each step the hunter % 
takes, he reaches a possible goal, which is shifting 
with each further step. It would be correct therefore 
to say that in the hunter runs the finite verb expresses 
a r e l a t i o n  t o  a p o t e n t i a l  g o a l  
o u t s i d e  t h e  v e r b a l  t i m e - c o n -
t i n u u m, whereas in the hunter kills the deerthere
is a real goal inside the verbal time-continuum. If a 
goal is to be fixed for a verb such as to run, we have 
to prolong artificially the continuum of actual time 
by an orientational time-continuum: the hunter runs 
t o w a r d s  his hut.
As we have said before^-) the very idea of a time- 
continuum or relation implies that of at least tv/o 
terms, and if one term only is expressed, the other is 
still necessarily implied. If we call a verb whose 
second term lies outside its scope an ’intransitive1 
verb, v/e shall understand without difficulty, why one 
speaks of aja transitive verb ’intransitively used’ when 
no specific second term is mentioned, but the general 
idea of it is implied: King Arthur hunts the deer.
King Arthur hunts; v/e eat a meal, v/e eat (well). pfifopt; 
What the genuinely intransitive verb and the transitive 
verb intransitively used have in common, is the con-
0 See above p.23,4.
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centration of our attention in the causational phase 
of the process, and this is what the grahimatical de­
finition of the intransitive verb as denoting an action 
not leaving the sphere of the subject, expresses.
The p a s s i v e  v o i c e . -  The exactly re­
versed picture of the intransitive verbal construction 
is the so-called passive voice. ^  Reversed, because the 
process, instead of being viewed from the point of the 
fagent' or origo, is conceived from the point of view 
of the 'thing-acted-upon' dr goal, that is, it is con­
sidered from fcho p-oint-of view— ©fi a phase which is
latest in the development of verbal time so that we
rview the time-axis not in its natural progession as
K
would be the case if we viewed it from the point og
view of the origo. This has been called by Harnmerich
1)an "antichronic'* construction. '
That the passive is a of the intransitive
and not of the transitive construction can be seen 
from the fact that here the verbal process is only con-
sidered inside the goal^as in the iran intransitive 
construction it is regarded as confined to the sphere
of the origo» Therefore a possible connection with the 
origo must be established, in the case of the passive 
voice, with the help of a pireposition, exactly as we 
use a preposition to extend the intransitive active
i
time-dimension to the goal. In this respect the hunter
l )  X j . L .  i l a u i m e r i c h ,  h e x u s .  S u o j e & t  u n o .  o b , j e x . t .  j ^ i t i v  u n d
Passiv. In: A Grammatical miscellany o f f .  t o  u. Jesnersenl 
 - - - - - - - - -  p .  3 1 4 .
runs towards his hut and the deer is chased 'by the hunter j
are in close correspondence. Wherever an active transit-
j ive verb is used in a passive construction a process of 
i \j i) i
| intransitivation takes place. ' j
3 :i .i  |
I !
j R e f l e x i v e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  a n d
j I
| M e d i u m  V o i c  e.- A special case of intransitivat- !
I !
j ion is given in the r e f l e x i v e  verb. Here the j
| effect of intransitiveness is produced by the identific-
ij
j ation of origo and goal: he washes himself.Here we have
I
; to distinguish two main peasibilities. The first is the
!
I o c c a s i o n a l  use of the reflexive. In this case
I
| the reflexive pronoun is a genuine goal, which happens
I\
j to be identical in meaning with the origo : the reflexive 
I f
j pronoun is used in opposition to the non-reflexive: il__ |
| a * arr^te would be understood as being parallel to _il
1 ; i
* m 1arr£te. il l*arr€te. il les arrete etc. This is a genuine 1
i\
! splitting of a term into origo and goal, the same term
i
| appears tv/ice in different xlsx roles which present
I
| themselves in time one a f t e r  the other.
i
ii --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  ■
1 l) uDas Passiv stellt einfach eine besondere in der
I
i Sphere des Subjects sich abspielende I n t r a n s i -
i t i v i e i ’ u n g  der." ? .  Sommer, Yergleichende Syn-
| tax der Schulsoraclien, Leipzig, Berlin 1931, p. 48.
This is identical with what we say, only v/e zhBuirixlxkE 
; prefer teluing of ’goal* instead of " Sub j ext". I'
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The second possibility is the p e r  m a n e n t 
use of the reflexive pronoun v/i hi the verb, how one re- 
| flexive pronoun functions in opposition to another re­
flexive pronoun: il s'arrdte as opposed to ,je m'arrete.
| v
| tu t*arretes etc. In this case we do not have two terms
1
following each other in time, which happen to be identical 
| in meaning, but one terra which from the outset is felt
j
j as something which is origo and goal at the same time, 
the pragmatic process instead of being first centrifugal 
and then centripetal as in the genuine or occasional re­
flexive, is at each moment boths centrifugal and centri­
petal:
m  il  j
t arr£te J becomes: fc-arrete— >
*12 se>------- &  se)
m  ->n2
| Our effort of splitting the term in two is frustrated
from the outset by an opposing force outweighing it in 
strength, a positive progressive movement is outweighed 
at any moment by a negative regressive one. The so-called 
j reflexive or m e d i u rn voice is born. It is a true 
I Medium* voice in the sense that it is neither active 
| noi? passive, neither progressive nor regressive, but both 
! at the same time It is reflexive in so far as it is an 
action doubly, i.e. positively ana negatively, related 
to its term, which is orip;o and goal at the same time. -
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From all this the semantic kinship betv/een the re- 
ax el
flexive medium earthr the intransitive becomes obvious,
"because the whole construction is a frustrated or
negative transitiveness, i.e. in-transitiveness; cf.
il sfarr£te with he stops.
Often, however, the reflexive medium has a charact-
• eristic shade of meaning of its own. G-rown out of the
occasional reflexive it retains something of that notion;
Co
An action is performed with respect the origo or 
agent. Hence the fact that the reflexive medium voice
i
underlines the part the agent takes in the action, his j 
interest in the action (medium of interest). We can j
observe that often verbs denoting such subjective |
psychological phenomena aueh? as emotion, volition, 
thought eta. appear in the form of the reflexive medium. 
Cf. English to enjoy oneself, to trouble oneself, to 
forget oneself, to pride oneself: German sich 
freuen, sich schamen, sich irren, sich bemuhen, sich 
erinnern'. sich anstrengen:French se re.iouir. se douter. 
r 1anercevoir. s1evanouir. se tromper. se renentir. se 
•fc-gwnrgagg-g-y moouer. s'amuser, s.1 aviser, se souvenir. 
s1exnrimer. se taire. se desesoerer etc. Spanish de­
serves a particular mention in this connection, for 
not only has this language gone very far in the use of 
the reflexive medium, but also the reflexive medium 
there, far from being a petrified occasional reflexive
as ig. French, is very much alive and particularly ex­
pressive in all those instances where it is used as a 
significant variation of the non-reflexive verb. As to 
the extension of the reflexive medium, v/e find that it 
has spread to old intransitive verbs: irse. venirse. 
salirse. entrarse, estarse (but cf. also French s*en 
aller. s * enfuir), besides the other uses to be observed 
elsewhere such as equivocarse.alegrarse. entristecerse, 
esforzarse. acordarse etc. etc.
But its semantic effects are most remarkable where 
we find side by side in almost identical contexts: 
creer and creerse t pensar and pensarse, cellar and
callarse, dormir and dormirse. comer and comerse. caer 
and caerse, creer and creerse etc. etc. In all these
occasions the reflexive is a true "signo de espontaneid- 
ad“ ( C u e r v o a n d  gives often a peculiar Spanish flav­
our to certain expressions; cf. Ella se tenia la culpa
* 2 ^nor no hacer caso de mama. '
Apart from this * subjective* medium as v/e might call 
it, which directs the listener*s attention back to 
the origo and thus underlines its part in the action, 
we also find a sort of * objective* reflexive medium, 
the meaning of which is passive.
In the app^endix (liote lo2) to A. Bello, it. J. Cuervo, 
Grammatical Castellana. Paris 1S36.
V. Blasco Ibanez, Arroz y Tartana. Valencia 1910,p.110.
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It is of the greatest interest to observe how this type
of reflexive medium is admitted in French, only when 
the first term is a thing, hut not if it is a person. 
Meyer-LUbke notes that la langue frangaise se narle 
dans toute l ’EUrone is currently accepted, hut it would 
he inadmissible to say »ou Jesus-Christ se vend chaciue 
.i our. ^ The reason for this is apparent enough: With the
idea of a person that of ’activity* is so closely as-
"1 £
sociated that it resist^'suc^eesfully the passive tenden­
cy of reglexive construction, whereas the idea of a 
thing lends itself naturally to passive treatment.
To this we may add the other observation that, although 
French admits the passive medium voice with a thing as 
first term, it does not admit the mentioning of an agent 
without adopting a different construction altogether;
it is not possible to say * la langue franyaise se carle 
for la lan&ue francaise est parlee par les diolomates 
par les diplomatest~as it would be possible to say in
Spanish el idioma frances se habla nor los diplomaticos
or el idioma frances es hablado por los di olornaticos.
This goes to profce that in French the movement of the
attention remains truly reflexive; origo and goal remain
identical. It is not possible to add a second origo as it
were. In other languages, such as Spanish for example,
1) W. Me ye r-Ltlbke, Grammatik der Romani schen Sorachen. 
Ill, Leipzig 1899, paragr. 382.
/    this step has been taken, however,
and the reflexive movement has become occasionally 
purely regressive. In Rumanian (Slavonic influence?), 
the Slavonic and the Nordic languages the reflexive is 
the sign of the passive.
Note: The reason why Spanish has gone farther in the
elaboration of the passive medium than French, lies, 
according to Reichenkron (Passivum. Medium und Refle- 
xivum in den Romanischen Sprachen, p. 65), in the fact 
that Spanish possessed a reflexive impersonal construct­
ion with passive sense. The development started from con 
structions such as el idioma se habla, where el idioma 
is originally an accusative which came to be felt a 
nominative thanks to its pjhace before the verb. It is 
in any case remarkable that French has replaced Lat. 
impers. dicitur by homo dicit (= on dit) and not as 
Spanish by se dicit (= se dice).
' / • / / ' T hx e S' ' u b s/t a n c e - p . i* o p e/r t y / r e -
/  / /-/ / / ^
1 a/t i 9 tn • -/' This/inve strati on of verbal construe t-
/  / /  f  /  /  / 1
4ons /rom tXe point of view of representational gram.mr ;
/  / / / / , ; 
wild noj/onl# ,/ftave clarified the idea of time/ con- /
ystru^dions generally, but y/ill alsp7havebubstantiated. 
in conjunction/with the theory or the p/rts of speech,
our/claim that the different pattern# such as the’actor
/  / /  /  /
/-actionwobject1 pattern, the * thihgem...lafcemen^ *' prtwrn
_ J
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the/^posses8o^posessionVpatt^m etc. abe r^ adTly 
Mil ^presentational ter'Im-relation constru^tions^end 
variations jxr the^ jtoasic 0-R-G relation,
I m p e r s o n a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n s . - 
As a last item in this chapter we may deal "briefly
with impersonal constructions, "because they seem to 
have something to do with verbal genders. This at
s.
least is the opinion of Professor Garnillf^ ieg who
calls the type il est arrive un malheur Uunpersc5nli-
ches Medium’1. It is a medium voice because it is
’die Feststellung einer Veranderung, deren Agens ge-
ftihlt- aber sirmlich nicht erfasst werden icann." It
is impersonal, ”weil das Seiende, das von der Ver^ nde-^ -ui:
rung erfasst wird, gleichfa'lls mit den Sinnen nicht
1)
bestimmt werden kann.” I find it difficult to make
Professor Gamillscheg*s statement my own. For my !
linguistic feeling il est arrive un malheur is
distincly active in contrast,for instance, to German
es wird gesungen which is distinctly passive, whereas *
b&> \
cela ne se fait pas seems to^*best assessed as a re- |
flexive medium voice.
l) Cf. his criticism of Bally's Linguistique generale 
and linguisticue frangafse^  in Deutsche Literstur- 
zeitung IN  (1954) col. 264. Also: K.W. Asbeck, Day? 
unpersonliche Medium im Fr^nzbsischen. Ber 1 iner meilp£- (• 
zur k&manischen Philologie VIII, p.1. |
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In the past the problem of the impersonal was stat­
ed by asking whether or not impersonal constructions
ha& a ’subject1. To us the question presents itself 
differently, since we distinguish between cognitional 
and representational structure. The question of the 
S - P structure of the type pluit has been decided by 
us in the sense that doubtless S and P are expressed, 
because by pluit a given exorerience (S) has been 
assessed with the help of a passed experejlnce as rain 
(P).^) The question remains now, what representation, 
if any, may correspond to the impersonal pronoun or 
the equivalent impersonal ending?
In order to answer that question we must remember 
that the representation of any progressive movement is 
a relation (R) and refers consequently to a potential 
0 and to a potential G.2) In the case of an intransit­
ive construction such as pluit the potential G remains 
outside the sphere of verbal development, it remains»
potential in character.3) The origo. on the other hand, 
'is felt as being actually there in some vague way which 
seems to defy definition. To conclude from this that 
there is no origo would be wrong. The truth is that 
the origo is a c t u a l  but u n d e t e r m i n e d .
1) See above p. 190.
2) See above p. 2t4.
3) See above p. 491.
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It may be that such an undetermined origo is not 
* active1 in the sense of 1 cause of the verbal movement’
and that in that sense the impersonal verb has indeed 
no ’subject’ in the sense of ’actor’."^  But there can 
be no doubt that (l) the origo ±x of the movement is 
represented although it has been left undetermined, and 
(2) that the movement itself is progressive. It is 
therefore ’active* in the sense of representational 
grammar, although not in the sense of ’movement pro­
moted by somebody or something'.
If that is so we must expect that impersonal pa^ive 
and medium constructions also occur, and this is in­
deed the case. Gf. German es tanzt (vor meinen Augen) 
with undetermined 0 and progressive construction, es
wird getanzt with undetermined G and regressive construe 
ion, es tanzt sich(gut), where an undetermined 0 and
an undetermined G coincide and the movement is both
l) That the simpersonal construction is easily tinged with
activity has been shown by II. Ammann, Zum deutschen 
Impersonate, ffestschr. Ed. Husserl = Jahrb. f. Philos. 
u. phanomenol. fforsch.. Erganzungsband, Halle a.S. 1929, 
pp. 1/25. Gf. also E. Kieckers, Zu den verba impersona- 
lia im Heuhochdeutscnen.Sprachl. Miscellen VI,30.
Acta et Comaentationes Universitatis Tartuensis (Dor- 
gatensis). B (Humaniora) XVII, 2, Tartu 1930.
pro- and re-gressive. V/e see thus that, from the point 
of view of representational grammar, impersonal con­
structions behave in every respect as other verbal con­
structions and that it is even relatively easy to account 
for their grammatical behaviouB in terms of repres­
entational forms. A problem only arises if one tries 
to analyse them in materialistic terms; they are too 
massive. I jAould be at a loss to explain in terms of 
'persons* and 'actions' what is meant for instance by 
the construction of a 'regressive movement rels ting a 
potential origo (which remains outside the verbal 
sphere) with an undetermined goal'. Such a statement 
is however easily understandable in the framework of 
representational grammar. In other words, construction­
al problems which appear intractable in a materialistic 
terminology are easily solved in terms of representat­
ional forms. This seems to prove that the latter approac i 
is the more realistic one.
P a r t  III 
Chapter (8)
I n t e g r a t i o n  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t ­
i o n a l  g r a m m a r  i n t o  t h e  g r a m m a r  
o f  t h o u g h t .
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T h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  " b a s i s .
” We have shown how the possibilities inherent in the
idealx forms of representation, space, time and qual­
ity are utilized in linguistic constructions; they were
all term-and-re1stion patterns which could be analysed 
without troubling about S and P. But as representations
are integrated into the cognitional form of thought, 
so we must show how representational grammar is integr­
ated into cognitional grammar. In dealing with this 
question we are iuimediately faced with a major diffic­
ulty. The reasonable thing would seem to be to begin
with the representational basis or the material of the
cognitional act and then show how it is formed and 
welded into propositions. But, unfortunately, although
in a statement suchx as the tree stands in front of the 
house the representational construct Q-R-G is a prius
from the ideal point of view compared to the S - P
structure, it is an a n a l y t i c a l  p o s t e r  - 
fmse j u s , i.e., it is found only at the end of the
analytical process of interpretation, and this very 
representational basis appears only in so far as it 
is formulated in the statement.
As it is, it I o j k s  as if we had first a complex re­
presentation, which is being analysed into its elements 
0,R and G. In this way v/e obtain three isolated Elem­
ents -which, in relation to thought, deserve all in the 
same way the name of 'term* in the sense of possible
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objects of thought, notwithstanding the fact that one 
term in thought corresponds R, i.e. a representational 
relation.1) The latter seems, however, to have a priv­
ileged position, since it is defined as being some- '
thing between 0 and Qr, whether I say the tree stands in 
front of the house or the house stands behind the tree. 
We may say therefore that Tr (= term of thought re­
flecting the representational R) is the M i d d l e  
T e r m ,  and the others, by way of contrast, are the 
E x t r e m e  T e r m s .
t
But isolated terms do not constitu^ the special 
thought-construct we call a proposition. In order to
j
do that they must be brought together. The link connect­
ing the elements of thought must of course belong to
thought and n o t  to representational reality. The j
 ___________________________________________________________  j
l) It seems a little odd that our linguistic habits force j
us to speak of ’term* and fre^ltionf in the domain of 
t h o u g h t  as we did in the domain of r e p r e s ­
e n t a t i o n .  In this way we are not only forced 
to call a representational ’relation* a ’terra* of 
thought, but we have to look later on for a relation 
in thought, different from that in representation. This 
state of affairs is, however, not v/ithout a psychologic- 
al justification. Thought processes are not .eonse-ioue.
We can make them observable only by representing them, 
i.e. t r a n s p o s i n g  t h e m  i n t o  t h e  
c a t e g o r i e s  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ;
link is called ’determination’; for either v/e look for 
the tree and wish to ’determine* it "by its relation to 
the house, or else we look for the house and wish to 
determine it byii&its relation to the tree. Now if the
determinandum of the thought construct is ’the house*, 
the determinans would "be ’its relation to the tree’.
In either case it is the M i d d l e  T e r m  or Tr 
which appears as the p r o p e r  i n s t r u m e n t  
o f  d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  It is also clear that 
in thought the three terms, gained "by this analysis, 
are w$elded together by a synthetic movement called 
’determination’ into a dichotomic construct (Tg) (Tr-To) 
and this accounts for the order of the representational 
terms and also for their grouping. It is not difficult
to see that such an analysis, starting with the analyt­
ical "breaking up of a complex representation and ending 
in the constitution of a proposition, contains all the 
essential features of Wundt’s famous hypothesis, which 
has had so many supporters among psychologists, logicians 
and grammarians.
S u c h  a n  a n a l y s i s ,  howeve:
"be f a l s e ,  j? or not only can the specific charact­
er of Tr ftiefr he aoooosod bofo-ro— ’the- house hos-boera
CL
hence the fact that v/e obtain again ’related tepmfi* 
if only in the metaphorical sense.
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as in front of not be assessed before ’the tree’ has 
been fixed as determinandum. but also the choice of 
’the house* as origo depends clearly on the choice 
of ’the relation to the house’ as deteiminans. Sftx®$&$35 
W^&xxwBxXiJU&xiiusi If we chose ’the house’ as determinan- 
durti and its’relation to the tree’ as de te rrninans. the 
specific character ot Tr would have to be assessed as ■ 
behind. In other words we find that, g i v e n a j
p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  r e ­
p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  o r d e r  0 - R - G i s  
i n  f u n c t i o n a l  d e p e n d e n c e  o n  
t h e  c o g n i t i o n a l  a c t ,  i t  c a n  
t h e r e f o r e  n o t  b e  s u p p o s e d  t o  
e x i s t  p r i o r  t o  t h e  c o g n i t i o n a l  
a c t ,  although it can be abstracted from it, it can 
be considered in isolation; but such an abstraction is 
only possible a f t e r  the cognitional act has 
taken place, and it would be a grave fallacy to deduce 
from the fact that it appears to us as an ideal prius. 
that it is also a real or psychological prius. As a 
matter of fact, the psychological question can//only be 
decided by empirical observation and experiment and 
has no place in a discussion of functional and ideal 
relationships.
The functional dependence of the representational 
order on the cognitional act and the possibility of
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abstracting it apres coup are points of cardinal import­
ance which can hardly he overstressed. All this not 
only proves that a purely representational logic, that 
is a logic working with a symbolism ideally adapted to 
the aprioristic forms of representation, is possible, 
because its possibility is nothing but the possibility 
of abstracting the orientational order from the cognit­
ional act which is instrumental in its establishment, 
it also proves that a representational grammar is 
possible, in so far as the same representational order 
is reflected by words and word-elements, suad 
justifies to a large extent the attempts of certain re- 
fwnners such as Kalepky and Svedelius to build up » 
grammar outside Aristotelian logic(in the large sense).
But this is only part of the truth, for it goes 
also to show that the possibility of abstracting a 
representational order from the cognitional act proves 
nothing agsinst^that cognitional act. It would therefore 
be wrong to use representational logic as an argument 
against cognitional (S - P) logic, as it would be wrong 
to use representational grammar as an argument against 
traditional grammar, and it is here that the same re­
formers overshot their mark.
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T h e M i d d l e  T e r m . - So far our thesis 
has been based on one example only, and although I be­
lieve it to be true, it does not perhaps contain the 
whole’ truth, and it remains to be developed into its 
consequences. The first point we have to take up and
to submit to closer inspection is hie contention that 
the proper instrument of determination is Tr, i.e. a 
term of thought reflecting a representational relation.
This is quite convincing as long as our first term was 
either * the tree* or ’the house’, but what happens, if 
we begin our statement by the being in front of... ?
A statement such as the being in front of relates the ±n 
tree with the house, may sound a little odd in every­
day language, still, it cannot be denied that it is 
perfectly legitimate, and it should not be difficult 
to find in scientific prose many statements in which 
apparently R is taken out of its position as middle 
Term and made ’First Term’.
V/e g^ hve to say again ’ a p p a r e n t l y  *: It
looks as if we had the same representational basis
0 - R - Gr, out of which R was taken and employed as a
first term, and that all the nev; proportion does, is to 
re-place JR into its original context. The shifting of 
R involves an abstraction, its re-placement necessitates 
a new factor R, a nev/ Middle Tern’, in this case re­
presented by the word relates, which has not been gained
through a widening of the representational field (as !
|
v/e would find it for instance in the tree stands !
BBTween the house and the road) but by way of 
. a n a l y t i c a l  e x p a n s i o n , by splitting j
stands in front of into the name of the relation, ex- i
pressed by the being in front of and its function, re­
presented by the word relates; and such an account would 
give us apparently tke key to the understanding of 
’abstract’ and ’analytical* linguistic constructions.
But again, such an analysis would be based on an 
e r r o r  o f  p e r s p e c t i v e .  It may be true !
tha"fe^ the st^ement the being in front of... a relation 
designate or R is being placed into a context repres­
ented by 0 and G. But this only goes to show that the 
establishment of 0 - R - G is the r e s u l t  of a 
cognitional act aiming at the placement of the potent­
ial relation; it would be wrong to assume ths 0 - R -
G forms already the basis of that proposition, and that
R has been taken out of this particular context only ' •
in order to be re-installed into that same context.
To contend that, would be equal to contending that the
speaker moves in a circle. What has happened in reality 
is that the being in front of has formed part of 
various previous experiences from which it has be-n
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isolated in tie - other way t h a * i ft h e  tree* in the state­
ment the tree stands in front of the house: it is there­
fore a r e a l  t e r m  in exactly the same sense 
as !treef. The difference is only that the toeing in 
front of is, as we said, a r e l a t i o n  d e s i g n ­
a t e  , whereas the tree in the other statement is not.
The rule about the position of the Middle Term is 
therefore in no way infringed by a statement beginning 
with a reaction designate.
The fact that the one expression (the being in front 
QE .of) is abstract and the other (the tree) is not, is
irrelevant in the matter.^
Let us now Eonsider the example he took a walk to 
Crajjjaffiond. As in our previous example Tp (the being in 
froht of) could be considered as a relation designate, 
we find now that a Tg (a waPk)is in the same case: we 
can consider it as../1 abstracted" from a Mir die Term to 
walk (cf. he walked to Craiilmjond) into which it is 
“replaced” with the help of to take, as the being in 
front of was “replaced” into the "original” construct 
with the help of relates. To take a walk seems to be
|in the same apparent senS^7the result of an analytical
expansion ias the being in front of.
And again we have to insist on the fact that in
realitv there is no "original” construct he walked, to ph 
^ :-------------------------------------------------
1) Cf. above pp. 127 f. **
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If we can consideWat ally to take a walk as an ana­
lytical former it is not in relation to an ’original’ 
construct, "but in relation to an i d e a l  con­
struct wich is the result of an interpretation:
is being interpreted in the direction of to walk: 
the being in front of relates the tree and the house 
is being interpreted in the direction of the tree 
is in front of the house . In both cases we reduce
a relatively complex representational construct I 
to a relatively simpler construct II of material
equivalence. To consider the simpler construct II as 
the ’original’ one is equivalent with committing the 
same methodological mistahe which we have criticised 
before, when we considered the judgment wisdom is 
in Socrates as against Socrates is wise3-)llere as 
there a psychological prius is considered as a meta­
physical or ontological prius. This is quite unwarrant­
ed as v/e have seen and we may refer the reader back 
to our discussion on wisdom is in Socrates without 
having to repeat our argument.1)
But, seen from a different point of view the
expression wisdom is in Socrates b nga into the
See above ;j)p. 127 f
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the present discussion, for it is parallel to 
the “being in front of relates etc.. The^expression 
to take a wali^ has also a parallel in Socrates has 
wisdom. Both wisdom is in Socrates and Socrates has
wisdom are to "be interpreted in the direction of 
Socrates is wise. In both cases we have an Extreme 
Term to be Mreplaced*’ into an attributive connection. 
This is not quite the same thing as a relation design­
ate but an analogon to it. Already Aristotle had 
seen that the substance is the place ( it Q  t<Szc j 
of the accident, i,e. Socrates is v/ise is a term-relati
pattern in which the relating factor^is not independ- 
ixc |W
Ant as in/Socrates has wisdom . but forms a whole
cArifXitoi in  tb * ac£fuZi*-*~ '
with the accidentj ^ The adjective v/ise may be charact­
erized as an attribute in statu attribuendi v/hereas 
wisdom represents the attribute in isolation. The 
paradoxical nature of the adjective^an thus be 
symbolized b$i trT.
l) See above pp. 2^5 f.
/
j
o/
x
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T r a n s p o .  s i t i o n  a n d  a n a 1 y t -
i c a l  p e r i p h r a s e s .  - A s  the reader
may have realized already, it is on these facts,
namely the described reduction of a relatively com-
plicated analytical construction to a relatively
tko't
simpler synthetic one^is based the mechanism of
transposition and that of analytical periphrases.
We shall deal with transposition first.
By transposition different authors seem to under­
stand different things, but most would probably agree 
that a walk may be regarded as tranpoping a verb to 
walk and that wisdom likewise is the transposition 
of wise. The former is a verbal,the latter an adject­
ival abstract. They correspond to Aristotlefs 
Secondary1 substances as opposed to the ’primary1,
CUrti'tVa. 6 fa
concrete substances. It seems Indioatcdr to limit the 
discussion, for the time being, to such instances as 
these.
The very term ’transposition’ is a difficult and
dangerous one, for it seems, to imply that for inst­
ance something called a ’verbal idea’ can be given 
under certain circumstances in a nominal form, and 
that seems to be always the case, if the ’verbal 
idea* is made the grammatical subject or object 
of a statement: the being in front of relates. I taxe 
a walk. Likewise an*adjectival idea’ is in its
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correct place when I say Socrates is wise, hut in 
wisdom is in Socrates i&xA£2£Ax& it appears ’trans­
posed*.
Behind this belief v/e find the conviction that
basically the idea of an action or a' state should be
symbolized by a verb, that the idea of a quality 
reflected
should be syiafeBlxxEil by an adjective, and that by
virtue of a metaphysical necessity. If v/u find 
states, actions or qualities expressed by a substant­
ive this must be regarded as a sort of artificial 
trick the name of which is ’transposition*. There is 
little doubt that Aristotle’s philosophy is in the
last resort responsible for such a conception, for 
the belief that a substantive is necessarily a 
substance and S for metaphysical reasons can be 
traced back to the Greek philosopner. The conviction 
that the verb is the ’proper* symbol of states and. 
actions, the adjective the ’natural* expression of 
qualities is exactly parallel to the substantive- 
substance assumption, the germs of which can be de­
tected in the traditional *substance-accident* scheme 
and the connection of. the ’copula’ with the categories 
’verb’ and ’existence*.
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As the substantive is closely associated with 
the grammatical function of S, the verb with that of
P and the adjective with that of attribute, one argues 
that the change of syntactic function is responsible 
for transposition. If the meaning of an attribute- 
word or a 1 predicate-word is to be incorparated into 
a subjectword we have to transpose an adjective or a 
verb into a substantive. This looks.as if between 
the supposed ’original* adjective or verb and the 
corresponding substantival v/ords resulting from ti ansp 
position there is a g e n e t^c link: transposed 
substantives seem to be d e r i v e d  from the 
corresponding adjectives or verbs,' and ’transposition* 
appears therefore as a special form of ’derivation*.
That transposition ad^ derivation have in fact 
been confused results for instance from Bally*s con­
tention that French laboureur transposes a verb la­
bourer and xh±3e±± solaire transposes soleil. Here we 
see that also primary substances are being considered 
as either the result (Laboureur) or the material basis 
(soleil) of a transposition.
Against this we shall have to point out that deriv­
ation and transposition should be clearly distinguished.
l) Lins, gener. et ling. fran<?. . 2nd edition 184).
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’Derivation* is a purely genetical concept which 
can he used properly only in historical grammar,
whereas ’transposition* concerns only representation­
al logic. One example makes that clear: Whether I say
wisdom is in Socrates or courage is in Socrates is 
functionally the same thing; both wisdom and courage
May be considered as transposing wise and courageous 
respectively. Nevertheless in the first instance 
it is the substantive wisdom which is derived from 
the adjective wise, whereas in the second instance
it is the adjective courageous which is derived from 
the substantive courage.
In order to decide whether or not a given word is
derived from another given word we have to await the
verdict of historical grammar. The question whether
or not a given word is transpos&dg another given 
w&rd can be decided without any historical knowledge.
The basis for this decision is only the reduction 
of a psychologically less simple analytical expression 
to a psychologically simpler synthetic construction 
of material equivalence, as we have pointed outu
What now is ’psychologically simpler*? - From ohe 
point of view of thought it is psychologically simpler 
to have a conereturn as the basis of S, because it is 
more tangible. In this sense Socrates is wise .
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the tree is in front of the house are simpler than 
wisdom is in Socrates or the being in front of relates 
the tree with the house.- From the point of view of 
representational grammar it is simpler to represent 
a relation designate by a verb or a particle instead 
of by a substantive, or to symbolize the attribute 
in statu attribuendi by an adjective, a form specially 
designed for such a purpose.
We may now turn to the problem of p e r i p h r a s ­
e s  • We have seen that in the thought construct (TrTs) 
form a group as opposed to (T^)* Accordingly we find 
that take (Tr) a walk (Tg) forms a unit of thought as 
distinct from a possible T^ which would be S. The 
being in front of (T-j ) relates (Tr) on the other hand 
do not form a close unit. The closely knit unit now 
appears to be ajEpgBi-jatoaggi p e r i p h r a s e  of the
simpler expression: to take a walk may be considered as
as
a periphrase of to walk. A periphrase appears thus^the 
result of two forces: analytical transposition and 
synthesis with an element Tr inside a predicative funct-
■f-
ion. This is the principle of the constitution of peri­
phrases. We shall give a more detailed account of their 
mechanism in the following paragraph. All we wanted to
do here is to show that the concepts ’transposition1, 
’analytical form’ and ’periphrase’ belong closely to­
gether and that the criticism of the one entails nec­
essarily the criticism of the other.
S
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A n a l y t i c a l  p e r i p h r a s e s .  - Up till 
now we have considered only one type of periphrase,
namely to take a walK = to walk where ^ substantive
adjective which fulfills this function; he. is de jendcnt 
on = he depends on, he is agreeable to = he agrees to:
1’ afrbrefe^ gfcgaKjjt; est fleuri = l ’arbre fleurit: es tamos 
deseosos = deseamos. etc. The adjective as represent­
ational form has this in common with the substantive 
that it is a non-temporal form, it can therefore very 
well symbolize something that looks as if it had been 
taken jut of temporary connections and can be combined 
with a verbalizator to constitute with it the symbol 
T>f a time-continuum in the shape of a ’conjugated
adjective’. The difference wartja the substantive is 
only that it cannot be thought of as existing in isol­
ation, hence the fact thaf it is unsuitable to function 
as first term; whereas to take a walk can be reversed 
in the form of a passive voice; a v/aiic was taken, 
periphrases consisting of a verbalizator andjm ad­
jective cannot be reversed in the same way.
On the other hand the adjective itself has an ana­
lytical equivalent in the form of preposition + 
substantive or a casus obliquus. In this way we obtain 
the adjective-equivalent; a man of courage = a cour­
ageous man.
’transposes* the verb. Often, however, it is the
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It is possible to abstract a whole scheme of peri- ♦
phrastic analytical equivalences according to which 
auxiliary verb + noun may represent the analytical 
periphrase of the verb: el arbol echa flores = el 
arbol florece. If the auxiliary verb is transitive 
it has in turn an analytical equivalent in an in­
transitive verb + preposition: el arbol esta con flores 
el arbol esta en flor; con flores or en flor being also 
analytical equivalents of an adjective, this corresponds 
to el arbol esta florido = el arbol florece.
We could go even further than that and construct 
according to the same principle the most analytical 
expression corresponding to German er tbtet: er ist 
bei Totung von, where von symbolizes analytically
the transitiveness of the verb: bei + copula is the 
equivalent of a transitive verb: er bewirkt IStung von;
preposition + substantive = adjective: er ist Toter
von: verb first preposition, substantive + second
preposition: er schlagt tot etc.
The mechanism of analytical transposition can be 
expressed in a simple formula:
Verb -4 Adjective -4 Substantival Abstract.
This formula has to be read: an# adjective may trans­
pose analytically a verb, a substantive may transpose 
analytically both verb and adjective:
florece, esta florido. esta en flor*
Having abstracted this scheme of analytical 
equivalences we have to insist on the warning we 
uttered before, that it reflects nothing but 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  i n t e r p r e t ­
a t i o n  , which in ea.cn concrete case 1 I
OlJl—
vague and in many instances unrealistic or im­
practicable. The obvious and ordinary thing remains, 
of course, that a given linguistic construction 
should be interpreted in its own right and not as a 
periphrasis of another representational construction. 
On the other hand the correspondencies are so fre­
quent in our languages that the theorist must find
i
the courage to formulate the rules of this construct­
ional synonymity, which after all, illustrates well 
the tendency of language to liberate itself from 
material bondage and become a free interplay of inter­
changeable forms.
S y n t h e t i c  c o n d e n s a t i o n .  - 
The logical counterpart of analytical expansion which
accounts for periphrastic expressions would be 
s y n t h e t i c  c o n d e n s a t i o n .  And here 
again we would have to point out that by this terra 
we must not understand an operation in the mind of 
the speaker but a j p r i n c i p l e  o f  i n ­
t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  which would operate in the 
opposite direction from that adopted in the case of 
analytical forms, i.e. if in the process of inter­
pretation we are forced to dissolve a given picture 
into more parts than it shows on the surface.
“ O &  *“
Such seems to be the case with certain adjectives: 
polar. .regions = xegiQ.ns ofh.the poIe.£; British made = 
made in Britain; French wine = wine of (from) Prance; 
vehicular traffic = traffic of vehicles: a winged, 
creature = a creature with wings: a one-eyed -person 
= a person with one eye etc.
In the realm of verbs we find for instance to cool. 
to sadden, to clean etc. in the sense of to make cool,
to make sad, to make clean; to to dust, to motor, to 
house there correspond, to clean the dust, to go in a
motorcar, to put up in a house etc. - Although English 
seemp particularly rich' in such forms they seem to 
form a normal feature in other languages; it is there­
for redundant to add more examples.
The Question arises tarisesr whether or not we shall 
call the sjmthetic forms transpositions* of the 
corresponding nouns in the analytival interpretation.
In other words, is solaire to he called a ’transpos­
ition* of soleil/^vehicular a * transposition* of 
vehicle, to dust a ’transposition* of the dust etc.
I should he inclined to ans?/er this question in the 
negative.
The analytical forms in all these instances are 
in fact undistinguishahle from d e f i n i t i o n s .  
Their relation to the corresponding synthetic con-
Jjuc- nM- „ 3/6 •
densations is the same as that between mare and 
female horse, between manse and the minister’s resid­
ence etc. They have a distinct e x p l a n a t o r y  
character which is in no way characteristic of either 
transpositions in the sense of ’secondary substances’ 
nor of analytical periphrases. Indeed, which term is 
transposed in mare or in ms rise?
Other considerations will confirm this view. The 
principle of condensation is most conspicuous in 
e l l i p s e s .  The heading of a newspaper article 
recently published was Under the Influence, which has 
to be interpreted, of course, as under the influend.e 
of drink; to see in the shorter formula a transposit­
ion of any element of the enlarged formula would be
quite impossible. We may even go further and say that 
the principle of synthetic condensation is operative 
in all a b r i d g e m e n t s ,  be it of the type 
B.B.C.for British Broadcasting Corporation be it in 
any etc.
Because of these difficulties it is perhaps ad­
visable to see in transpositions and periphrases 
t y p i c a l l y  a n a l y t i c a l  p h e n ­
o m e n a .
It remains to mention that the rfchte* principle of 
synthetic condensation can worx: occasionally in a
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very subtle way and explain certain cases of v/hat we
should like to call dXBgniEBdXEyjiixxx: d i s ­
g u i s e d  s y n t a x .  When I say il m ’a fsvorable-
rnent imoressionne, it is easy to see that the ad­
verb really qualifies the nominal element of the 
synthetic condendation: il m(a fait une impression 
favorable. It is less obvious to distinguish between 
the two meanings of he has spoken well, because the 
same verb to speak is a synthetic condensation if 
taken in the sense of to niaiee a speech, and in that 
case the adverb again qualifies the nominal element 
of that condensation: he spoke v/ell at the luncheon
= he made a good speech at the luncheon: otherwise it 
is just an ordinary adverb of manner Qualifying the xxx 
verb itself. The same difference can be observed com­
paring French manger bien in on mange bien dans ce 
restaurant with notre petit mange deja tres bien.
In the former instance bien qualifies the idea of*food1 
synthetically contained in the verb, in the latter
instance it is just an ordinary adberb of manner.
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C o n c l u s i o n . -  We have surveyed a fair
variety of analytic and synthetic constructions, 
different formal possibilities of materially equival­
ent meanings. What we considered were not psychol­
ogical processes but principles of interpretation. 
Integration of representational forms into those of 
thoughtJis for us a question of functional analysis of 
interdependencies of representational and cognitional 
forms as they are suggested through linguistic con­
structions and not a question of psychological happen­
ings in the souls of either speaker or listener. The 
result of these investigations is very simple indeed. 
We found that representational constructions are in 
functional dependence on thought, and that, whatever 
complications may arise, it is always the Middle Term, 
the representational relation, which is the instrument 
of determination in thought. This is not surprising.
One has to know what one wants before on can find out 
what is. In thought one wants always to determine one
a«.<*
factor in relation to another factor,^only once this 
is decided can the specific character of the relation
be properly assessed. It can therefore not be given 
already before thought starts to act.
The integration of representational into cognit­
ional forms can therefore be exprt ssed by the formula
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(Ti) = S (TrTg) = P. In order to bring this out in
the clearest possible way we have neglected certain
complications or, rather, variations of this basic
formula. We have treated, for instance, the being in
front of as a simple Tr. In reality the syntactic
analysis of the tree is in frflnt of the house gives
a more complicated formula than (Tp) = S (TrTo) = P. 
W&xh&XB
We have the tree (Tx) is (T^ti) in front of (tr) 
the tree (tg=Tg). But even this complication only con-
firms the correctness of the basic formula.
Linguistic constructions can express these cognit- 
ional structures thanks to the fact that both verbs 
and particles refer to representational relations, 
pronouns and substantives to representational terms. 
Adjectives have, as we said, a paradoxical nature which 
Ban only be adequately symbolized by trT. - All this 
is very akin to Aristotle's theory, it is only slight­
ly more complicated through the distinction of repres­
entational and cognitional forms and, above all, it 
eliminates any ontological implications by a simple 
reversion of the perspective from a genetical view to
a merely analytical view.
Here is the place to forecast a further complicat­
ion: in formulas such as there is: A and similar ones 
there seems to be no Tp, or else, S seems to byrn- 
bolized by a verbal expression. As we shall see, this
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does not invalidate the results we have just formulated. 
The difficulty presented by such constructions will 
be overcome by distinguishing the grammatical from the 
cognitional S and P. This is a question of the relat­
ionship between ideal grammar and the grammar of formul­
ation which &&&11 occupy us in the last chapter.
S u b o r d i n a t i o n  a n d  c o o r d i n ­
a t i o n . -  Having said this it must be surprising 
«
that in this scheme there seems to be no room for 
certain Middle Terms, which nevertheless play such an 
important part in thought and in language and v/hich are 
generally called c o o r d i n a t i n g  relation­
ships, since determination is essentially the same as 
subordination.
Grammarians simply accept the fact that both types ■
of relationship exist, they also accept the fact that
coordinating constructions easily change into sub­
ordinating ones, and that, generally speaking, the 
difference between both is slight, v/hich may be proved 
by the (hypothetic) etymological kinship between Greek
and Latin et or the semantic kinship between and \
and with.
Philosophers have in modern times analysed certain 
types of coordination and distinguished "Copulative"
and "konjunktive Addition" (Erdmann), to wnich Carnap
has added a "divisive" function. Btlhler's distinction 
between " sachb tin deludes" and " satzicettendes und" 
throws light on the creation of a grammtical tool 
out of a concrete relation. But all this leaves 
the fundamental question of"the difference between 
these two classes of relationship (subordination and 
coordination) unanswered.-*-)
It is perhaps not without interest to point out 
that the terms coordination and subordination belong 
originally to traditional logic, where they denote 
different relative ramcs in the pyramid of concepts. 
Coordinated concepts are those located on the same 
level of the pyramid; if concepts are located on 
different levels, those on the lower level are subord­
inated to those on the higher level. In other words 
coordinated concepts are the® of the same degree of
generality, whereas subordinated concepts are of 
lesser generality than ehe corresponding subordinating 
concept. 'Snow1 and 'sugar' are coordinated, but each 
is subordinated to 'white objects'. Since predication 
aims at subordination I can expre ss the fact of two 
coordinated concepts being subordinated to a third 
by saying snow and sugar are white objects.
1) Cf. K. Biihler, Sprachtheorie, pp. 317/18.
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It is easy to see, however, that such a distinction 
does not account for the different construction in he 
painted the ma£donna and the child and he oainted the
' ' ' -  "  " " "  1 - -  r »  , ii r  ■  — ■ ■ ■  ii ■ I i i — i i i ■  , .  i .  , , i  i ,
madonna with the child, nor for the difference between 
the landscape is beautiful and beautiful, the landscape! 
We must therefore try and find a different basis for 
assessing correctly the difference between subordination' 
4 and coordination. Aftd I thimc it is this: Subordinating 
relationshiiJS are d i r e c t  relationships, coordin­
ating relationships are i n d i r e c t  relationships. 
A n  i n d i r e c t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  h o l d s  
w h e r e  t w o  o r  m o r e  t e r m s  a r e  c o n ­
n e c t e d  b y  a n  i d e n t i c a l  ( d i r e c t )  
r e l a t i o n  t o  a n o t h e r  t e r m ,  w i t h  — 
o u t  b e  i n g  ( d i r e c t l y )  r e l a t e d  t o
e a c h  o t h e r .  This is, first of all, a r e -
*
p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  characterization. In 
T h o u g h t  indirectly related terms occupy the 
s a m e  r a n k ,  directly related terms occupy x 
d i f f e r e n t  r a n k s .
It seems to me that such a definition covers all the 
instances quoted. Both .sugar and snow are characterized 
in their relationship to white objects but not to each 
other. Likewise the madonna and the child are both 
goals of an action of painting but are not related to 
each other as they are in the madonna v/iiui the child.
which IB one single goal. In beautiful, t h ^ langgSES.1 
we have a simple juxtaposition of two statements, which 
are both held to he parts of another statement, and it 
is in this that lies their relationship to another term. 
The fact that the one, i.e. the_la^Ee, is destined 
to he S, beautiful P in that other statement, is of 
course not expressed, if we do not take into account 
musical characterisation.Likewise in a statement
such as nologae u a O S t S g g B ^ S E U a ^ g a O f i ^  we h8Ve 
a direct relation holding between Cologne, and the other 
two, hut only an indirect relation between Berlin- and
Paris.
Since coordination of two terms is based on a cor.iaon 
relationship to a third one, they are often of a certain
semantic harmony: if tlllB
expectation of harmony is frustrated, this may he ex­
pressed by some element of modality in coordination:
„ P t ( h u t )  experienced. 0 notte^ . he is young— 2_e_t_A°_u-i; —
* p b e n c h e nero. (Michelangelo). Often
Hnl r.ft tempo D .g—ri u —  ----
a i t e  - n a t i v e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s :  e i t n e r  -  o r
t h e  t e r m s  a r e  a i t m n o i
n e i t h e r  -  nor. V e r y  often semantic (and w i t h  n e g a t i o n ;  r i e i u i g x .  - - -
of* t h e  t e r m s  is expressed by a particle in­harmony of t h e  t e i  mb
dicating similarity, which involves comparison: hu
- - - - -   h a v e  h e r e  a  straigtforward pare-t a x i s ,p) s^tacticail, we0nevs ^  £t uy ,PPPByuirCcic
symbolism. Of. p - i S h
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If the coordinated terms both form part of a con­
structional picture, they are construetionally e q u i ­
v a l e n t  through the relationship to another term 
(equality of r a n k ) .  This means that each of them 
separately or both together can be counted as one element 
of thought-construction: (Peter) (preached in Home).
(Paul) (preached in Rome), (Peter and Paul) (preached in 
Rome)are examples of such constructional equivalencies.^) 
Constructional ^equivalency is sometimes referred to as 
’telescoping two statements into one’: Peter preached in 
Rome + Paul preached in Rome = Peter and Paul prbached in 
Rome. Or I found the cage + it was empty = I found the cage 
empty. B u t  as in the case of transposition, analytical 
expansion and synthetic condensation, it is most' important 
to point out that the expression ’telescoping various state­
ments into one* is dangerous and easily misleading, since 
it seems to suggest a genetical hypothesis, where nothing 
but a possibility of interpretation is involved. It would 
be quite wrong to think that two independent statements
1) Things are naturally diffetent, if the coordinated terms 
are nothing but unspecified parts of.a constructional pict­
ure still to be evolved, as in beautiful, the landscape!? 
just because they are still constructionally unspecified.
2) On this construction and others cp. the discussion immed­
iately following.
existed in the ppeaker's mind, which have "been telescoped 
into one. The truth is that we have a mental act called
r
coordination, and that it is an outstanding property of 
coordination that it allows the interpreter to establish 
this equivalency between a coordinating construction 
and a corresponding plurality of statements.
.Generally speaking, the linguistic characterization 
of coordination is morphological uniformity, i.e. coordinal 
ated finite verbs appear in the same tenses, moods and 
number, coordinated nouns appear in the same case. To this 
rule the ijredicative nominative seems to be an exception: 
vir est fortissimus is obviously a subordinating relation­
ship, in spite of the formal concord between vir and 
fortissimus. But we must not forget that the predication 
of a noun implies a comparison; this is not only the 
case when the predicated noun is an adjective, which may 
be either a positive, a comparative or a superlative, but 
also when it is a substantive: Du bist eine Blume = du 
bist w i e eine Blume. In this instance we have two 
coordinated terms Du and Blume, and bist represents the 
tertium comnarationis t the meaning of the whole being 
Du bist wie eine Blume ist. This coordinating relationship 
is particularly clear in the Old French construction
l) This supplements our remark on Jack calls Ji&L . P*/9o
— <jb5 —
tu fais gue fols.
The transition froia vir est£sicut (est) fortissimus 
to vir est fortissimus is made in this way that, 
through frequent usage, the attention of speaker and 
listener learns/to pass overy&j^g^y the tertium coin- 
parationis and to connect vir and fortissimus directly 
instead of indirectly. The result of this displacement 
of the centre of attention is that the original substant­
ive fortissimus is turned iiic^t, an adjective and that 
the whole construction acquires*the value of a sub­
ordinating expression. The original coordination is felt
already much more strongly in examples such as he died 
a hero. In any case we are entitled to consider the 
construction consisting of boun (nomin.) - Copula - 
boun (nomin.) as one where the two nouns are coordinated 
first terms or subjects of an intransitive verb. Hence 
the kinship of this construction with what is generally
J __ >
known under the name of as examplified by
I found /the cage/ empty.-0 where emuty is clearly
coordinated with cage in no other way than hero is with 
he in he died a hero. But, of course, it is by no means 
always necessary that the n o un s should be co­
ordinated. In Shakespeare1 s there is a dfcvil haunts you'")
1) 0. Jespersen, Philosophy of Grammar, p. 122.
2) H. Paul, Prinzipien5 , p. 122.
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the two verbs are coordinated through their equal re­
lation to devil. - fc*To this chapter belong inter 
alia the double accusative (eum regem fecerunt) and
parent constructions (;ie vous le dis e n a m i ;  
i n  i h m ist ein grosser ltOnstler dahingeganagen),
which need not be enumerated in this general essay.
In any case our assumption stems to explain the
very curious morphological fact that we find an intrar
itive verb such as to be combined with a nominative
in’stead of a preposition or casus obliouus as
occasionally in Slavonic languages,1) and accounts
also for the peculiar constructional flavour of the
so-called predicative noun which is nothing but a
feeling of coordination as distinct from subordination
Coordination is a term denoting equality of ram:
of two or more terms indirectly related, it belongs
thus to ideal grammar; it is useful to distinguish •
coordination in this sense from the parataxis found
in formulation. Formulational parataxis applies
\
to the juxtaposition of two independent entities
as in beautiful, the landscape/, but does not cover
instances such as the Madonna and the child, although
both expressions show coordination. - What now is
1) Instances such as .ie vous le dis en ami, er nahm sie
zur Frau show how originally subordinated terms (en ami .
zur Frau) may come to be felt as coordinated terms.
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coordination in relation to subordination? Is it Ii
a special procedure in its own right? The answer is 
that t h o u g h t  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  s u b -j 
o r d i n a t i n g  a n d  t h a t  c o o r d i n ­
a t i o n  i s  o n l y  a c o m p l i c a t i o n  
o f  t h e  s u b o r d i n a t i n g  p r o c e s s .  
Two terms of thought can be coordinated only through 
either being subordinating or subordinated in respect 
of a third term. Therefore the chapter on coordinating 
relationships is only a necessary elaboration to that 
on subordinating ones and does not reveal a new
principle of thought.
P a r t  III 
Chapter (9)
I n t e g r a t i o n  o f  i d e a l  g r a m m a r  
i n t o  t h e  g r a m m a r  o f  f o r m u l a t i o n
/
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F o r m u l a t i o n a l  g r a m m a r  i s  
h i s t o r i c a l  g r a m m a r . -  In the prev­
ious chapter we have dealt with what we called the 
integration of representational grammar into the 
grammar of thought. It remains to take the last step, 
namely to describe how both are integrated into the 
grammar of formulation. And here again we must guard
ourselves against the danger of falling a victim to a
J U.U "t
false perspective, fo a—similar way*as we discovered
OLpprtki
that we do not irep^ ae-sent first/representational reiat- 
ions and then think,Ait would be^ quite wrong to sup­
pose that we have now thought (with the corresponding 
representations) denoted by language in formulation. 
For in this way we could only arrive at a parallelism 
between the grammar of formulation and ideal grammar, 
i.e. grammar constituted by the ideal forms of re­
presentation and cognition.
This is, however,not the case, and it was pre­
cisely the recognition of the absence of this par­
allelism which justified the revolution of 
Empirical1, ’positivistic’, ’historical’ and psycho­
logical’ grammar in its different aspects against the 
’scholastic’ and ’aprioristic’ grammar of antiquity, 
the Middle Ages, Port koyal and Becker, add which
O l.cL  1 / k . n . c l
constituted such a great in linguistic
science. At the base of this revolution in grammatic­
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al science was the realization of the fact that form­
ulation, far from being a mere re flex of ideal grammar 
in linguistic symbols, had to be considered as the
fulfillment of an eminently p r a c t i c a l  task:
that of communicating a certain m a t e r i a l
meaning to a listener.
The specific f o r m ,  in which the speaker
chooses to express that material meaning is only of an
<x
instrumental, secondary, importance and^largely con­
ditioned by practical factors such as the type of
language he chooses - signal^ gesture-language, word- 
language, mothertongue or foreign tomgue - and, further­
more by his own acquaintance with the subject-matter, 
the acquaintance with the subject-matter supposed to be 
possessed by the listener, the physical presence or 
absence of the thing-meant, the physical and ppychical
degree of alt^rness or tiredness in the speaker, his 
momentary disposition, his taste, age, education ett/. etc
This means that the speaker in no way necessarily 
aims at designing, say, a person-action-place picture 
or at arranging the parts of his communication accord­
ing to the distinction and order of prius logjLcum and 
-posterius logicum in a proposition; what he does aim at 
in the first place is, we repeat, the communication to 
the listener of a certain material meaning. Any means 
to that end is legitimate, if only he can hope to 
make himself understood. If that were not so, the use
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of parasyntactic forns, of m i c o n s t r u c t i o n s , ,  of 
all sorts of negligent speech including 1 mistakes’,
repetitions and curtailments, reformulations and correct
/tsr
ions, in other words all that has interest©^ the psycho­
logy of language could not be accounted for.
How formulation would not be the practical business i' 
is, if it did not avail itself of a socially accepted
symbolism with relatively fixed semantic values which 
f
it coup. adapt more or less scrupulously - or unscrup­
ulously - to a given purpose. This goes to show that 
formulation is dependent on the one hand on social 
t r a d i t i o n :  it uses a stock of symbols accepted 
in a given society, and in so far as it does it is con­
servative, sometimes very tenaciously conservative; on 
the other hand, however, it may be very revolutionary 
and innovating in the way this traditional symbolism 
is handled; and these two apparently contradictory 
X)roperti.es of formulation are completely compatible with 
each other, Just because formulation is a continuous 
readjustment of traditional symbolism to new purposes.
Formulation is an activity. In formulational grammar 
language appears a.B energeia, not as ergon, everything 
appears in a continuuous flow. The ressonabJe approach 
to the grammar of formulation is therefore the h i s t ­
o r i c a l  m e t h o d .  The lesson historical grammar
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gives us is twofold. (1) Formulation is not only destruct­
ive but also creative, or better still, by destroying it 
creates: French s'approcher de starts life as a contra­
diction in terms, as a logical mistake, as it were; this
contradiction has been eliminated, however, for the mod­
ern speaker, by adjusting the etymological sense of de 
to the function of a. In the Hordic languages there has 
been created a passive voice out of a reflexive constr i.ct- 
ion which is no longer felt as such, etc. etc. (2) The 
new symbols and values thus created bear the mark of 
h i s t o r i c a l  a c c i d e n t  as distingished 
from natural or aprioristic necessity. On the other hand 
they use\ of course possibilities inherent in the human 
mind and reveal therefore in var^tntj degrees a certain 
kinship to each other in languages widely separated in 
time and space, and any answer to a genetical question 
has to be based on the knowledge of the potentialities 
of the human mind, the 'pure* forms of representation 
and cognition, and has therefore inevitably a general, or, 
aB certain modernists would say, a panchrohistic aspect.
T h e  p r o b l e m  o f  t h e  i n t e g r a t ­
i o n  o f  i d e a l  g r a a m a r  i n t o  t h e  
g r a m m a r  o f  f o r m u l a t i o n . -  How let
us see how the problem of the integration of ideal grammar
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in its two aspects (representational and cognitional) 
into the grammar of formulation presents itself in the 
light of the foregoing considerations. We might start 
from the recognition of the fact that in our Indo-Europ­
ean languages there exist certain representational patterns 
such as the *actor - action* pattern, the ’possessor - 
possesion - object* pattern, the ’thing - identical - 
thing* pattern and the like, which may be considerd with
it
Aristotle as variations of the one basic 
pattern and reveal the dichotomic S - P structure of 
thought.
Integration of ideal grammar into the grammar of form-
fit. prot&JS
ulation may then be taken to mean feew^out of these normal 
patterns, new constructions are developed in the course of 
historical development through their adaptations to nev; 
purposes. This we have shown already to some extent in 
the foregoing chapters with regard to certain details, 
and we were forced to do so, because these ideal struct­
ures interest the linguist only in so far they appear 
in formulation, and formulational constructions had thus 
to be present at all previous stages of our discussion.
But our problem presents itself in the most radical 
and exacting form if we ask how these ideal patterns 
themselves have been created. For if we start from the 
recognition of certain Term-Relation patterns, srwe 
accept already a certain integration as given, whereas
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we do not if we make the genesis of theses patterns
themselves an object of investigation. The question
therefore is , how was it that representational and
cognitional relationships became Brbsri± symbolized in |
language^ at u. \
-—  —  -—  - — - i t  coxn tj cA-bout
Pro m  this formulation .results that two sides of the i
i
problem have to be considered: the representational and | 
the cognitional aspect. Un^de/“ the first heading we 
may ask how language came to distinguish the main parts 
of speech, noun and verb. If it is true that all re­
presentational patterns are nothing but variations of 
the H / o -/y/*'*' Patera, thea^ /jgenesis a is by implic­
ation answered, at least in principle, by answering 
the Question of the creation of the noun and the verb.
We need not be concerned with the adjective. It is 
probable that ii represents a later nominal development. *0 j  
Under the second heading we shall have to investigate
the genesis of the dichotomic multiword sentence.
a
Here as always the very formulation of jams problem 
forces upon us a certain method to be employed in its
solution. In our case the question itself suggests that 
at some moment in the distant past there jaetve
beest in exclusive use linguistic symbols satisfying the 
most rudimentary and practical needs of communication
n$«. *
viii ah remT'Tts'tT— rrf the intimation to some listener of a 
certain material meaning, w£ithout having therefore re-
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course to space-words and/or time-words or to a S - P 
structure. This methodological postulaturn finds itself 
fulfilled in pre-syntactic holophrases, which have 
therefore to he the startin^point of the investigation.
We should then he called upon to show the genesis of our
constructional patterns either by way of innerjdifferent- 
iation of potential parts of the holophrase ±nto words, 
or by way of outer agglutination of various independent 
holophrases, or a combined process. According to the firs
hypothesis, say, a subordinating 'pi^eson-action-place * 
pattern, as symbolized in les Anglais sont arrives ici. 
would have been formed through inner differntiation of 
an old holophrase j^lesangls s?tarivezisij ; according to
the other it would owe its existence to the agglutination 
of jlesangls. 1 sStarivezisiH.1)
Although analogies to such developments may be found
here and there in langugaes to which I have access, I am 
unable, as a student of modern languages, to trace the 
history of# the creation of our e b h j s x x X h . constructional
patterns according to the terms of our problem. Further­
more I suspect that it is withjthis question as with thfc/fc
ont
other^of the origin of languages: a very legitimate pro­
blem, but one whose solution is quite impracticable.
All I can supply under these circumstances is a
l) heedless to say that of the two the agglutination- 
theory is by far the more popular.
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critical account of some of the hypothetical answers
to our question which have been attempted by otherd. Even 
such an account
if^thsrb has no other results than that of clarifying 
our ideas regarding the vexed nature of the problem, 
it will perhaps not be entirely useless.
N o u n  a n d  v e r b . - A s  to the question 
whether the first holophrases were nominal or verbal, 
no satisfactory answer has yet been provided; it is even 
difficult to see what is the precise nature of this 
question. We can conceive the two tefms nowadays only 
in contrast to each other, and on this contrast our Indo- 
European grammars are largely built up. It is difficult
to imagine that only one formal category should determine
the structure of a language, because that would be equal
to a toal lack of grammatical categories. Such a language 
K
would simply not distinguish any parts of speech at all. 
Should the question mean that there was a language de­
noting things but not states or actions, or the other way 
round, it would be absurd. If it could be shown that old 
nouns are formed from roots, which we have to consider as 
rather verbal than nominal, such as serpens belonging to 
serpere, we would narrow the problem down to an etymo­
logical question concerning certain v/ords in a certain 
linguistic family and not be able (&t—e-ld? to rnaxe ah^  jort
general pronouncement as required by our question. Even
with these restrictions in mind it would he difficult 
to get sufficient etymological proof for Schuchardtfs 
thesis that the first words were rather of a verbal 
nature corresponding to a dynamic interpretation of the 
outside world,1) since nominal roots of the type the hear 
(= ’the brown one*) are as old as verbal roots.
On the other hand there may be some reason to support 
a nominal hypothesis, if we take the term 'noun* in a 
vety large sense and not in the precise morphological 
of Indo-European grauimar. The isolated holophrases may be j 
interpreted as representing the object of a deixis, 
barp;! for instance meaning there is: (a) bang! The deixis 
is indeed nothing but the social equivalent of the phen­
omenon called ’direction of attention’. It is destined 
to focus$ the listener’s attention in the same direction 
as that of the speaker’s. Reasoning on these lines one 
may argue that in the deixis we may see a sort of verb 
avant la lettre (cf.Wo\^-, voilal) and in the possible 
object of a deixis a sort of orae-nomen. And we would jbluu 
thus have in all those cases vihetie the action of de­
monstrating is symbolized by a real bodily action (out-
f
streched arm, turning of the face etc.) the possiblity 
K \
of perceiving che holophrase as symbolizing the object 
of that deixis. And in so far as deixis and object are 
differentiated, w-C would have the beginnings of a 
differentiation of categories required for the establish-j
ment of the category ’noun*.
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j But there is an intersting corollary to this hypo-
thesis. The moment where the deictic action in turn is
I
| expressed "by holophrastic words such as Latin eccel,
j Russian votl♦ we would have to take them for potential
| verbs. We would thus get a language Built up on the
j
j d i s t i n c t i o n  o f  d e i c t i c  w o r d s ,
| w h i c h  a r e  v e r b a l  a n d  d e s c r i p t -
i
I i v e  w o r d s ,  w h i c h  a r e  n o m i n a l .
I It is on these assumptions that we can reconstruct a
f
. j
| nominal origin for the much discussed impersonal verbs
I _  -
I of the type oluit, of which/we "ifactually know only that
j it consists of a descriptive and a deictic element, or that
| we may embark on the reconstruction of a prehistoric|
| nominal morphology out of the isolated use of descriptive
| words.1) On some such assumption is ultimately based also
I the widely held conviction that nominal syntax is older
; 2)
j than verbal syntax. 7 For descriptive verbs are typical
! of subordinating syntax and, according to another hypo-
! thesis equally widely held, the coordination of two
i
I objects of deixis precedes this subordinating syntax. To
|
j use Bally*s example, before we obtain a form coucou frrt!
!  — — —  _
I 1) A. Rehring, Anruf, Ausruf, und Anrede. in: Festschrift 
| Th. Siebs (1933), pp. 95/144.
! 2) F. Lorey, Per eingliedrige Bominalsatz im Franzbsischen.
Ein Beitrag zur franzdsichen Syntax und Siylistik. Diss. 
j Marburg 1909, p. 17.
I H. Keyl, Zweigliedrige pradikative hominalsatze im Fren- 
zSsischen. Piss. Marburg, 19o9, p. 8 .
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in the sense of !the bird flies1, we had an older type 
coucou! frrt! = !There is a bird! There is flying!
All this taken together forms quite a plausible body 
of scientific opinion. But the student of modern langu­
ages will find it difficult to subscribe to it, for hex 
will often search in vain for analogies to these assumpt­
ions in the material he observes. First of all he finds 
that deictic words are either pronouns (this, that) or 
particles (here, there) or paragrammatical words (ecce. 
vot). Where genuine verbs are used for the purpose of 
deixis they tend to lose precisely the syntactic proxjer- 
ties of verbs: t6ox> o oc^V'ftonof' , le voila. cfest nous.
Secondly he will find it very difficult to see in 
most cases of nominal syntax an older type than verbal 
syntax. - £ In order to show this it will be useful to 
distribute all zhe linguistic x>henomena which have been
grouped or might be grouped under the heading of 'nominal 
three
sentence1 into main categories: exclamations and 
statements. Beginning with the latter we find again a 
threefold subdivision: (1 ) the monotornic nominal state­
ment (defense de fumer), (2 ) the dichotomic nominal state­
ment (Paulus fortis). (3) the contrasting nominal state­
ment (Froides mains - chaudes amours. Tel maitre - tel 
valet.).
l) Linguistic? ue ganerale et linguistioue francaise, p. 80.
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The explanation of this last group is the easiest 
and most obvious; we are going to deal with it first.
The fact that its correct explanation has been so con­
sistently. overlooked by the most eminent grammarians is 
no proof to the contrary, but only shows how blinding the 
prejudice of the so-called 'primitiveness' of this type
has been.
The form of the contrasting nominal statement is to
be explained by that well-known phenomenon called reprise. 
It consists in isolating from a previous statement -
whether spoken or imagined#: - a significant part (or parts) 
in order to make sure whether it (they) may legitimately 
belong to the same statement, or else to make sure whether 
one has correctly understood. For instance one hears
someone saying Jimmy is a scoundrel and is puzzled by such 
a statement. Now one picks up (re-prise) its main terras 
and weighs them carefully in order to find out whether 
or not they are all Compatible: Jimmy? A scoundrel? If 
Jimmy is a scoundrel is a proposition, the reprise is not, 
but consists only in a close examination of the material 
of a possible proposition; any question therefore as to 
which part is S and which is P is out of place.1) The
l) The following quotation shows how the reprise works:
Sie erkennt, dass Erec sie iiber alles liebte, nur an sie
dachte, und dass sie inn tief beleidigt hat. Aus torichtem 
Stolz:... Enide stolz? Sie die sanf tmutirce. geduxdige. 
stille Frau, vom Dichter mix alien Tugenden weibiicner 
Anrnut und Derail t geschiiuckt? Dennoch stolz. u-ine dr as sie 
es wollte, waren soolze, hochmtHige Worte aus ihrem munde 
gekomnen. litichler in ZRPHH XL, p. 87.
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specific character of a reprise is clearly brought out 
in German, where the two elements are often linked by 
the coordinating particle und; especially if the question 
is turned into an exclamation: Er und unschuldigl Wer 
soil das glauben?, where das reefers to the compatibility 
of the two coordinated terms.
In the same manner the famous saying Pas d'argent, 
pas de Suisses can be explained from a reprise: Est-ce 
que .i'ai bien compris? Vous dites: f?as dfargent1 ? as 
a reply to the statement Nous n'avons pas dfargent, and
the corollary pas de Suisses is clearly nothing but an 
echoed form; i.e. a form imitating another one which is 
already not ’primitive1 but an isolated part of a verbal
construction. Similarly are to be interpreted Fro ides m i  
mains, chaudes amours, only that we see here a disguised 
predicative relationship (Qui a les mains froides etc.) 
which, if anything, strengthens the impression that we 
are confronted with a derived structure and not with 
a 'primitive1 one (cf. also tel maitre, tel valet;
Frische Fische, gute Fische and the like).
The origin of the monotomic type defense de fumer 
is different. It is akin with the use of names and titles 
The title of a play or a poem is nothing but its 
significant name, and very often, almost normally, it 
appears in nominal form: Othello, the Moor of Venice 
etc. etc. In the same way we use labels: Eat-aoison
& -3 4 9 -
and announcement's such as Dubonnet. Scottish Ham- dis­
played in s&opwindows are nothing else, but the label- 
techni^toe put to a special use. They do not mean orig­
inally and essentially that the article named is present, 
or a gpal of the speaker's attention. They are just de­
signed to evoke an image in the reader designed either 
to warn him (Ratpoison)or else to stimulate his wish 
to possess the thing mentioned by the label(Dubonnet .. 
Scottish Ham). It is from this non-propositional origin
that statements such as deflense de furner and similar ones 
are derived. This 'label-technique' is surely not what 
is meant by 'the primitive use of holophrases'. Where we 
find it to-day employed in statements it is often used 
in contrast to verbal constructions, the c o e x i s t ­
e n c e  o f  w h i c h  i s  t h e r e f o r e  i m ­
p l i e d .  If we read:
"Nuit dans la paille, iSnorme ronflement ^ de cinquante 
homines terrasses par la fatige. Puis le reveil, et, de 
nouveau, la boue liquide jusqu'aux chevilles. La grande
voie etant interdit a nos fourgons, discussion nerveuse 
a 1 'issue de laquelle nous nous separames: les voitures 
a la recherche d'un detour par les chemins de terre, nous, 
les pietons, arpentant les bas-cdtes de la route sur la- 
quelles se ruaient, dans les deux sens, des files de 
camions automobiles presses comrne les wagons d'un immense 
train...11 ^
it is clear that such a style-telegramme is directly in­
fluenced by the way nev/spaper headlines are framed, i.e. 
a style derived fvorn titles. This is certainly a relative­
ly modern procedure comparable to those paintings the art
of which consists rather in a technique of leaving out
*)■)•)---------------------------------------------------
1 ) (gioted from an examination paper.
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than that of putting in. In any case this sort of style
strikes us as extraordinary just because it is used in
contrast to our ordinary verbal syntax, (bn the reality
of which it thus relies in an even more outspoken way 
than defense de fumer.
No doubt defense de fumer h a s  a propositions!
character, but this is no original feature but a derived
as
one; is may be described fax a nominal substitute tffor 
verbal constructions, a short-hand expression of verbal- 
constructions, but nothing that could have a claim h£ to 
greater historical primitiveness. The original function 
of such nominal expressions was that of n a m i n g ,  
n o t  t h a t  o f  j u d g i n g .
Out
But of course, once names functioning as stprnents 
had been created in this way, new nominal statements 
could be made which cannot be directly related to labels* 
This was all the more natural as these monotomic nominal 
statements offerend certain expressive advantage! compared 
to verbal constructions. These advantages are to be found 
precisely in the fact that such nominal expressions allow 
a complete avoidance of personal modes of speaking, which 
becomes occasionally desirable. A good example of this
and at the same time of a nominal statement which cannot
a
be derived from ’label* is se taire sur les rangs! We use 
such an expression if we wish to avoid a personal con­
struction, if we widh to give to our request the most
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general, absolute, form, a greater generality thatx that 
expressed by a personal construction. It is the same 
psychological motfeive which prompts us to chose the general 
on (on ne fait pas cela)or an objective construction 
(cela ne se fait pas) or an im-personal construction (il 
est defendu de fumer) These three constructions show a 
great affinity to the nominal type defense de fumer. in 
so far as they are not personal, but the nominal type has 
the additional advantage of absoluteness.
To claim that defense de fumer represents a more primit­
ive type than il est defendu de fumer is methodologically 
the Same thing as the contention that pluit was nominal
i
j
before it became verbal. This means that one ascribes to • 
pluit the value of ecce pluvia: similarily the greater I
primitiveness of defense de furrier can only be claimed
j
by interpreting it in the light of il y a : defense de fumeri 
Such an interpretation, however, far from proving the !
f t  e ju .ppojfc i
greater originality of the noun, only stipulates the 
greater originality of the duictic verb (il y a. ecce) 
in respect of the descriptive verb.
Still, it coaid be argued that we find d i c h o ­
t o m i c  n o m i n a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n s  in 
Latin and in Russian (as in Semitic languages), v/hich 
are not derived, second-hand, phenomena, but obviously 
truly archaic. Now,as far as Russian (and Lithuanian)
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fitre
 is concerned, such a contention can no longer he
maintained. They are relatively modern features.1) - 
Remains the Latin type Paulus fortis wjithout copula.
The argument that this is as least as old as the type 
Paulus est fortis (with copula) has been developed by 
Delbrtlck, who says that the construction with copula is 
the result of a fusion of two constructions: Paulus est 
+ Paulus fortis = Paulus est fortis: .ergo, the type 
Paulus fortis must have existed independently of the verb­
al type. Ries has made an attempt to expose the fallacy 
of this argument. He writes: "HStte es solche S&tze 
(i.e. of the type Paulus fortis) schon gegeben, so 
hatte es an dem Anlass zur Entstehung der Kopula gefehlt. 
Das gesteigerte Bedtirfnis in gewissen FSllen genauer durci
ein Women zu pradizieren, ftihrte zur Hinzuftigung eines
Womens zum verbalen Pr&dikat; dieses verlor neben jenem
2 }an Bedeutungswei?t und sank zur Kopula he rah." 1
We come to a similar)_result a! Ries'if we remember
what we said before on subordination and coordination.2)
According to our theory the predicative noun (i.e. fortis!
was not originally a subordinating word but a coordinated
one, and the ’copula' was a tertium comparationis .
hence the grammatical concord of Paulus and fortis. If
that is so, it goes to prove that the coordination of
1) J. Befcigny, Zum indogermanischen Nebensatz. Indogerm. 
Forschungen XLYII (1929), pp. 138 ff.
2) J. Ries, Was ist ein Satz? p. 163, note.
3) See above pp. 327 ff.
-352^
of the so-called predicative noun p r e s u u p p o s e
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  v e r b ,  that 
tertium comparationis. and is therefore not older than 
verbal syntax. Bally was therefore right in supposing 
"sous-ententeu of the copula in Paulus fortis.1) and the 
whole type reveals itself as a genetic successor of the 
type with copula, not as its contemporary, let alone 
predecessor.
There remains to be examined the question whether 
t h e  n o u n  i n  e x c l a m a t i o n s  (The* 
scoundrel!. Beautiful, the landscape!) is not. more prim­
itive than a corresponding verbal type of construction.
It could be argued that we fall automatically into a 
state of primitivism, when under the influence of strong 
emotions. Exclamations are often a symptom of strong 
emotion.' The typical form used in exclamations is the 
noun. Ergo, nominal syntax is primitive. Additional proof,
the resemblance of these forms to those used by small 
2)
children.
Such sweeping argumentation has all the merits of 
superficial bril^ancy, but it is not difficult to show 
its limitations. Let us begin with the type beautiful, the 
landscape! Already the fact that the landscape is added,
1) Ch. Bally, Copule zero et faits connexes. Bullet, de la 
Societe de Ling. 23 (1922), pp. 1/6.
2) P. Lorey, Per eingliedrige Nominalsatz im Pranzosischen 
p. 19.
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is proof that the speaker feels that bepfetiful itself
is elliptic. As we have seen before, we find here two 
coordinated parts assembled for a proposition to be
built up; as they stand they are of equal rank, as all
coordinated terras. Nov/ besides the fact of coordination,
we have certain rhythmical-melodic features which
suggest that this equality of rank has to disappear and
to be replaced by a construction in which the landscape
is S and beautiful P, and the correct form of that
statement is only the, landscape is beautiful. The nominal 
character of thet two terms used in the exclamation thus 
results from the rdle they are destined to play in the 
statement the landscape is beautiful and cannot be ex­
plained by the 'pfrimitivenessT of the construction.
Co a similar result^We are led when we analyse
The scoundrel!, The cheex!, The silliness of the thingl. 
They are felt as nouns in as much as they are felt as 
objects of a deixis or simply as objects of our bewilde- 
ment, in any case as something dependent on an activity. 
This, by the way, seems to be the correct explanation 
of the accusative in Latin me miserumland the like.
If that were not so we would simply find presyntactic 
forms of the type phew!, frrt! etc. which cannot be
classified as either verb or noun. Our apparently primit­
ive nominal forms (the scoundrel!etc.) may be con­
sidered as de-grammaticalized or pa p o s t - syntactic
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forms , but -chey are not primitive in the sense of p r e - 
syntactic forms.
As to the holophrases of children's language they 
can he interpreted either way, as is well known and
  ____________________________________ A.'ju-
resjernble | therefore in form *cr the^quoted phew! and
frrt! Bow-wow may as legitimately refer to the dog 
as to its actions, and this fact alone is sufficient to 
el|iminate theBe utterances fromjany discussion on the 
genetic priority of this or that representational form.
T h e  d i c h o t o m i c  m u l t i w o r d
[
s e n t e n c e  . -Let us now turn to the cognitional
!
side of the question and ask how the dichotomic multi­
word sentence may have come into being, where the express­
ion 'dichotomic* refers to the snalysability of the j.
sentence into S and P.1) - The opinion that our primitive 
holophrases are normally predicates of a S represented 
by the referent or situation 'subjected' to our attention
p \
has often been proclaimed. J In this way the compatibility 
of a monophrastic expression with the dichtomic structure 
of the judgment was saved. It is this assumption to­
gether with the other that the symbolization of coordin­
ating relationships preceded that of subordinating
1) Cf. above p. 541.
2) H. Paul, Prinzipien5 , p. 129; cf. above p. 139.
relationships, which forms the "basis of most theories 
subordinating
accounting for the^multi-word sentence and its syntactic 
form.-1*) An expression such as coucou (S) frrt. (P) 2)
originated according to-these assumptions from
coucou! (P) frrtl (P). It follows from this that the
word representing S in the subordinating sentence (i.e.
coucou) has a double function; It is P with regard to
the subjected referent and S in relationjbo frrt. This
we can illustrate by the formula;
(S) - *
_______ S - P
coucou frrt.
where the brackets round the first S indicate its extra- 
linguistic nature. In this way the bi-partite sentence 
(consisting of two parts of speech) is supposed to have 
come into being.
1 ) Coordination1 and 'subordination* are to begin with 
terms belonging to the gramma* of thought. Transferring 
them to formulational grammar they refer to syntactic 
structures r e f l e c t x n g  the corresponding j
logical schemes. Now whereas in thought a relationship j
is either coordinating or subordinating, in formulat- J
i
ion we find all sorts of intermediate degrees. This 
"unlogical” behaviour of formulation results from the 
the fact of transvaluation and adjustment. A coordin­
ating construction such as He fell. Dead! may be used j
to symbolize a subordinating relationship and be slowly 
adjusted to its new rdle; he fell,, _dead, he fell dead.
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Prom this can he seen that in the explanation of the 
£
subordinating mu^ti-word sentence the phenomenon known
i t  ^
as construetio Jto has to play a prominent rdle,
since there is one part of speech common to tfcje two
propositions; it is the coucou of our example. And we
find indeed that H. Paul^and others make extensive use
of this explanatory principle in their genetic account
of the tri-partite^(consisting of three parts of speech) 
(sentence^. It is easily seen that Schuchardt's well-known
contention to the effect that "in einern ursprttnglichen, 
eine wirkliche Kette bildeneden Satz jedes mittlere G-lied 
eine Doppelfunktion austibt, nSmlich P = S, jedes Anfangs- 
glied nur S, jedes Endglied nur P ist," says ai bottom the 
same thing with the difference that he does not take into 
account the extra-linguistic S at the very beginning. 2) 
Hammerich's analysis of Per Knabe schlagt den Hund int©: 
Per Knabe schlSgt
+ geschlagen wird der Hund
Per Knabe schlagt den Hund
follows the same pattern.It also shows, by the way, 
why the grammatical object, determining the idea contained
Whyle it would be absurd to ask , if one refers to*ideal 
relationships, whether coordination is older than subordin­
ation, the question is quite legitimate in the domain of
formulation.
IjPrinzipien5, pp. 138/41.
2) Schuchardt-Brevier, p£ 281.
3) In: 0/ Jespersen, A Grammatical Mescellany. pp. 313/14.
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in the verb, and thus being a (secondary) P, could be 
called by Schuchardt uein in den Schatten gerttclctes 
Subject"?-) and we know already that Hammerich makes jsbubx 
use in this analysis of the fact that the active direct­
ion equals potentially the opposite passive direction, 
this however concerns the representational structure of
the sentence rather than its cognitional structure. The 
latter, as a matter of fact, allows a certain latitude
of representational xsg interpretation without losing
therefore its cognitional identity. Therefore the formula
Per Knabe schl&gt
+ das Schlagen ist (gerichtet) gegen den Hund
Per Knabe schlagt den Hund
fits equally well and, besides, illustrates the function&l 
kinship between the object and the adverb. This interpret­
ation has been adopted, among others possible interpret­
ations, by Schuchardt.2)
1) Schuchardt-Brf vier, p. 289.
2) I refer to Schuchardtfs example A schlag- auf B (Bre-
Z
vier, p. 245). - It is in line with Beimels explanation
of the accusative in Petrus pulsat Paulum as an old case 
with local connotation (Bereichskasus); Indogerm. Forsch. 
XXXIII (1915), p.l, XXXIV (1914),p. 285, XLIV (1927),
p. 249, LIII (1935), p. 104; Sommer ibid.XLVI (1928), 
p. 27.- We disregard here Schuchardt*s interpretation 
of the nominative (Petrus)as an old locativus-intrument- 
aliS> which is in keeping with what we are going to say 
on Germ, mit dieser Peder schreibt sich—s ..gut, p. 3Q(o*
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Professor Peutschbein*s interpretation is slightly 
different. According to him the correct analysis would 
be:
Per Knabe schlSgt 
+ Per Knabe ist gegen den Hund
Per Knabe schlSgt den Hund. -1*)
Here we see that the part common to the propositions is 
the S, but we find again the double S/P function of the 
middle term, which is to be explained by the fact that in 
the expanded sentence we have an old P of a two-term sent­
ence changing into a (secondary) S of the three-terra 
sentence.
To anyone who would consider the cidted formulae of 
equal merit the temptation becomes very strong to ex­
plore in a systematic way whether it would not be feasible 
to construct ot^er possibilities on the same principle 
and find out how many possibilities there are in theory.
I think it would be interesting to yield to this tempt­
ation and see what we can find out in that way.
If we represent the parts of the sentence by numbers: j
1 ,2 ,3 ; if we note the cognitional functions of the tv/o 
relatively elementary propositions by small letters 
(s. p), and those of the proposition resulting from their 
fusion by capitals (S, P), we obtain the following possib- . 
ilities of combination, provided we agree that no. 1
l) M. Peutschbein f uwd Utiet6 t Co* lew , p-
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should always appear as an S:
(i) s p (ii-) s p (iii) s p
S X 2 S 1 2 S X 3
P 2 3 P 3 2 P X 2
In these formulae the reader will easily recognize
(i) as one of Schuchardt1s, (ii) as Paul-Hammerich1&,
(iii) as Deutschbein1s hypothesis.
Now, to this we may add three more formulae, whihh do 
not operate with the <&7To iSoi-v-ov principle, but could 
illustrate all the same the transition from coucou! frrt! 
to coucou frrt. provided we are allowed to introduce 
a deictic expression as an auxiliary third term. We would 
then obtain something like this:
(iv) s p (V) s p (vi) s p
S I -  S 1 2 S 1 3
p 2 3 P - 3 P - 2
This may be read as meaning: (iv) A bird! There is flying!>
(v) A bird is there! Flying! , (vi) A bird fl^ig! Xtauex 
Is there!
It is not difficult to discover that these genetic 
constructions correspond closely to purely analytical 
possibilities. Grjfnmarians have long been accustomed - 
rightly or wrongly - to analyse a statememt such as |
The king arrives in London in different ways: (The king)
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5 - (arrives in London) P, and they say that here the 
so-called grammatical and the psychological or logical
6 and P coincide. But we have only to stress in London 
and the analysis would he (The king arrives'} S - (in 
London) P, HHdxthEyxsayxlhaixhEXExcfihEXKBKExiiEii where 
this coincidence is no longer maintained. These two 
interpretations correspond to our hypothetical construct­
ions no. (iv) and (v) respectively. Now let us stress 
arrives and we get an anlysis, which would he reflected 
by the formula no. (IV).
This correpondence between purely analytical findings 
and genetic reconstructions is no miraculous coincidence. 
It rather goes to show what the genetic reconstructions - 
a l l  genetic reconstructions-really are, namely 
l e a r n e d  p r o j e c t i o n s  o f  a n a l y t ­
i c a l  f i n d i n g s  i n t o  a|g e n e t i c 
p e r s p e c t i v e ,  where the logical prius appears 
as a historical prius.To do this is as gratuitous and 
wrong as the genetic interpretation of terms such as
1 transposition*, * analysis* and * synthesis *, of which \
\
we have disposed previously and seen that it is based
£ j
on an error of perspective, and therefore methodological1 
unsound.
This does not mean, however, that all these genetic j
i
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s ,  a r e  n e c e s s a r i l y  wrong, it only m e a n s  j
j
that they may not be correct; and they can be proved, !
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only if thoroughly subs uantiated by historical material.
And here the empiricist plays the stronger hand. We have
only to look at the material produced by scholars such
as H. Paul or A. Sommer to quote only two authors
of widely read hooks - who are hoth deeply steeped in
historical research, to find out that , indeed* subordin­
ate
ating constructions^evolve out of coordinating ones and 
that the construetio. w W  Uocvo'v plays an important
part in this development. But it must he clear that we can
accept this only for those cases which have actually heen 
proveit by a historical method and that any generalization 
of the sort that all subordinating constructions have de­
veloped ojat of coordinating ones is inadmissible in spite 
of its nrirna facie probability.
If we put speculation s.sme and rel,/ only on ven™* I 
fiable facts we shall find as often as not that historical 
development works in the opposite direction, namely that j 
coordination genetically follows subordination. I should 
for instance be inclined to accept as the correct ex- 
olanation that the Latin ablativus absolutus. being a
c o o r d i n a t e d  p a r t  o f  a c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  h a s  developed out 
o f  a  . s u b o r d i n a t i n g  c o n s t r u c t i o n .  I n  o t h e r  words t h a t
  1j
1 ) H. Paul, Prinzi-oien5, pp. 133 ff. - ?. Sommer, Ver-
p-leichende Syntax der Schulsprachen, pp. 105 f f .  j
the type hos_tem gladio destricto occisit is historically 
older than hostem, gladio destricto, occisit. But we need 
not venture into the past in order to observe this. The 
tendency to break up subordinating constructions into 
coordinated parts can be studied now^with all desirable 
distinctness. It becomes manifest under our very eyes 
in modern French as a few examples, chosen at random , 
will show. We read in Bloch (ffeodalitc. p. 13): ...avec, 
parp surcroit, aux regards de diaries et de ses conseillers,
1 favantage de se rattacher, par les liens de l^ iot.image
a ,
vass^Lique et. en consequence. 1 Obligation de lfaide mi-
litaire, une principaute. de.ia, en realite. toute formee.., 
and later on (p. 235): On le voit, en Angelterre et chez 
les Scandinaves, exprimer, indifferemment. des formes 
tres diverses de subordination. - Other examples are:
Ce sont celles-ci que, goguenard, Villon ira contempler 
(Champion, Villon I, p. 92). - Une petite qui etait sur |
i
j
ses q u i n c e  ans. a peine, a ce moment la.(Giono. Un de 
Baumugnes, p. 13).
I think that a careful and critical examin­
ation of the available historical material would lead to
the conclusion that it is impossible ^ to-reduee» genet- 
ojrilu-C'*'
ically, hypotaxis to parataxis or the other way round,
A
and I am inclined to ±h±HX maintain that both construct­
ional procedures in nuiimn languages are as eld as the 
reflection of cognitional forms in linguistic material.
~ 3 C 3 ~
It may perhaps he useful to corroborate our thesis 
with che help of another test-case. According to a theo^ 
which considers all subordinating constructions as 
genetic successors to coordinating ones it would be 
only too natural to suppose that wherever we find a 
subordinating type instead of a coordinating con­
struction, the former will have been evolved out of the 
litter by a 'natural1 and 'self-explanatory' transition.
And yet, pxeeeh observation of pr< sent-day linguistic 
usage makes a different interpretation more likely.
To the question What caused your cold? v/e hear somebody
answer: I think it was an open window. : in the sarnie sen® 
one says I can't stand oonje windows. In both cases the
meaning of open window is 'the window's being open* or 
'the fact that the the window was (is) open'. In other 
words7we tend to use a logically wrong expression when 
the logical de torminandum is abstract and the logical 
determinans a conereturn: we prefer I instead making the 
ooncreturn the determinandum and the abstract the detemin- 
ans. We follow thus the same tendency which makes us 
prefer Socrates is wise to wisdom is in Socrates, with
the difference that in this last example there is no 
jLogi raTf clash between linguistic ormulauion and logical 
structure.
Another helping factor seems to be that the construct-
io£: concrete noun + abstract adjectival attribute,
riifC . /
is so frequent that it is.^ feastt* reproduced than the
3 6 S' -
the otner one; ehhexe abstract noun + concrete attrib­
ute; we therefore prefer the type which saves some
psychical energy all the more readily, since we know 
how easy it is for the listener to adjust the meaning 
correctly. To employ the logically more correct ex­
pression would Tapp ear t clumsy and pedantic. - As a 
last;and by no means less^important factor we have to 
mention that language does not always provide an abstract 
noun for the logically more correct construction so 
that one would have to make use of circumlocutions with
the help of empty words such as fact or nature.
B.B.G,
I heard axt^announcer saying: The advance of our 
troops has been made difficult by the mountainous 
country. This is much more fluent than the logically 
more satisfying by the mountainous nature of the country 
not to mention by the fact that the country is mountainous 
or worse stillfthe country's being mountainous.- In the 
same way a German-speaking person would agree that Prof­
essor v. Ettmayer wrote in uis Analytische Syntax1)
Wenn ein fmnfmal vollstandig durch- und umredigiertes 
Manuscript eines wissenschaf tlichen Werkjes ein Mas stab 
fhr die Gtlte desselben ware... instead of Wenn die 
funfmalige vollstfindige Durch- und Umredigieruihg des 
Manuskriptes eines wissenschaftlichen Werkete etc.
1 ) Analytische Syntax der franzosischen Sprache. II,
Halle a.d. Saale 1956, p. I.
~ ytv* -
"because the former expression is more fluent than -une 
latter.
In all these cases we have therefore primarily a 
s t y l i s t i c  problem, not a genetic one. The
attributive construction is not the successor of the 
corresponding predicative one, but simply one of 4weJ^ 
coexisting possibilities of expression which, for a 
number of good reasons, is often preferred to 
predicative construction, although it is logically not 
quite satisfactory. And this explanation^ holds .pre-
feehlff alsojgood with regard to post Christum naturn 
and nach getaner Arbeit ^ which cannot therefore be 
considered as evolved out of a predicative construction.^ 
29; Now it would again be v/rong to generalize from tnis
l) These constructions bear so much the character of
c
being continuously formed spoiltai^ ously that it is 
strange to note that they have been looked upon as
<l»r /P a r e t .t 'P r th iA  «7 1 ‘t / '
having Hxignii-originated in Latin^ Cf. Lerch, 
Pradikative Particinia fur Verbalsubstantive im 
ffranzbsischen. Beihefte der Zeitschrift fiir Komanische
Philologie XLII. Halle a.S. 1912; p. 100.
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experience and to think that the "type concrete noun + 
t
aljributive adjective, is by itself, by some intrinsic
P-nd-
virtue^effort-saving. Each formula has to he investigat­
ed individually and to he judged (Jin its own merit. In 
German for $instance it is usualiy to describe the title 
of a picture hy using the expression Die Vertreihunor 
Athalies aus dem Temp el. v/here the French would say 
Athalie chassee du temple. Now it could he argued that 
the reason for this reflects a different attitude of the 
scholars who engaged in the business of classifying
pictures with the help of descriptive titles. In Germ-
Sfittd* iti
any the scholars imposed their clumsy mode of^  pedantic
otic
(speech* of abstract nouns on the public, in France they 
thought it more polite to use a type of expression the 
public themselves would have used. But it is probably 
more correct to say that in German the abstract noun is i 
more descriptive than in French, it leaves no doubt 
that Athalie is not the agent but the victim of the action 
thanks to the sense of the pre-verb, this in tttm is 
connected with the ease with which pre-verbs are used 
in composition, and with the fact that th.ir descriptive 
character is felt in a more lively way, v/here as the 
corresponding French^ word is more of an arbitrary 
abstract label: The rdle of the French noun in the 
attributive genitive is less clearly characterised as 
either agent or victim: 1 "expulsion dfAthalie. To
A
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use Saussurefs terminology, the G-eraan term is more 
motive, the French more arbitraire. hence lesscy
cuc(
■gr-e-a4> resistance er» a relatively greater ease of 
formulation of the type abstract noun + attributive- 
genitive-of- a -concrete-noun here than in French.
ijs 4*
$
So we may sum up the result of our critical survey 
by saying: The question why the subordinating ovt/iot 
(s) - />iV(p) pattern and its variations has been ad­
opted in Indo-European languages as the basic pattern 
can not be answeredl We have to be content with the more 
modest task of showing how certain types created by 
tradition vary.
We thus renounce the temptation of venturing into a 
hypothetical prehistoric field and limit ourselves to 
the realities of historical linguistics. As appears 
already from the analysis of the type post Christum 
natum we find that formulation constitutes)often a 
compromise between two forces: an ideal tendency to­
wards correctness of an expression according to trad-
itohally accepted standards and a practical tendency 
*
deflecting formulation from that ideal *aim. In this 
practical tendency become manifest all the forces, 
cause*or motives, which explain the deviation of 
formulatiop. from the standards of ideal correctness, 
be it laziness, hurry, emotion, aesthetic tendencies
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or physical inabilities. The ideal tendency needs no 
theoretical justification. The practical tendency does 
no harm long as there is a listener capable of under­
standing what is meant in spite of the incorrectness of 
formulation, and capable of automatically adjusting the 
faulty expression to its ideal aim,
nothing shows more clearly the social nature of langu­
age than this continuous relying by the speaxer on 
intelligent cooperation on the part of the listener.
Here is something we can observe again and again: an ex­
pression starts its career as a ‘mistake*, following 
the practical tendency of formulation, but - and this
is no less important - through its constantly being 
adapted in interpretation to a sense to which it d$d not 
quite fit to begin with, it is being treated as if it 
were the correct expression, and finally the feeling of 
its non-conformity to a given sense disappears and a 
new ‘correct* type has been created. This is the law
governing the change of meaning in its most general forms 
We know already examples which illustrate this swing of 
the historical pendulum: The reflexive, originally adapt­
ed to the reflexive construction proper, becomes the 
legitimate expression of the medium (or passive) voice. A 
form, now the correct symbol of the perfect tense (,j *aj 
construit)has once been the sign of the present tense 
(habeo construeturn) etc. etc.
Here are a few more examples: A Spanish friend living
with me said one day to my wife El cuarto de bano esta 
encendido. It is clear to the intelligent listener that he 
wanted to make a statement on the state of the bal^oom, 
hut chcj^e^an expression (esta encendido) which would x 
rather fit the electric hulh in the bathroom,^ evidently
because the burning light had attracted his attention and 
was still impressing him when he was formulating his 
statement. We have here what could be called a contaminat­
ion of two constructions: el cuarto de bano esta ilumanado 
+ la bombilla electrics, en el cuarto de bano esta en- 
cendida. Similar ’mistakes’ account for el cubo se sale 
(instead* of el agua se sale del cubo). the road is bus.v 
(instead of people move busily about the road). German 
die Bank sitzt voller Menschen (die Bank ist voll (besetzt.) 
+ Menschen sitzen auf der Bank), .French les magasins
ferment a cinq heures (instead of on ferme les magasins
a cino heures) etc. If the latter becomes the normal
tyoe of expression we would be entitled to speak of ferment
as a medium voice.
The ideal tendency is a constant, i t  i s  t h e  
p r a c t i c a l  t e n d e n c y  w h i c h  d q t e r m- 
i n e s  t h e . v a r i a n t  a b e r r a t i o n  
f r o m  t h e  i d e a l  n o r m  a n d  c o n s e ­
q u e n t l y  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  a l i n g u i s t  
i c f o r m u l a .  It is therefore quite correct to
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say that grammar of formulation is historical grammar, 
wherever we try to explain why a certain formula has 
heen introduced to fulfil* a certain function. But inside
tOC CCthnot
the historical field^explore the creation of a formula 
ex nihilo hut only its adoption instead of another formul- 
a already existing. An unprejudiced historical grammar 
can only he relativistic. To operate with absolute 
'origins1 is a methodological mistake, All tet can do 
is to show how new norms develop out of readjustments 
of old norms to new purposes in the act of formulation.
/Yhrofi c&B
starts therefore with the acceptance of a normal 
meaning of a form, which has to he assessed against the 
background of other forms of the same language (synchron­
istic analysis), because it is only in contrast to other
forms that ascertain form fulfils its specific function; 
it then shows by what features ajgiven aberration from 
that norm is conditioned. In other words we have always 
to distinguish with H. Paul between the usual and the 
occasional functions of a given form. Hence the fact thf t
T- t'P  r- *1 *'■■»—
oftenin an act of formulation linguistic forms display] 
a divergence between (l) a traditional surface meaning and 
(2 ) an occasional new meaning resulting from an adjustment 
of traditional form to an individual requirement. That
1) Cf. M. Sandmann, On Linguistic Explanation. Modern 
Language Review XXXVI (1942) pp. 202/03.
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means that the ultimate meaning is often hidden under a 
more or less clearly exposed surface meaning, and has to 
he discovered by an interpretation which goes beyond the 
surface meaning and extends in depth.
G r a m m a  t ' i c a l  a n d  0 o g n i t i o n a l  
S u b j e c t  a n d  P r e d i c a t e . -  Hitherto we have
considered t;ie interpretation of forms, where the listener 
had mainly to rely on his wits and those helps of a general
U
character v/hich may^erived from the speech-situation. But 
sometimes he receives from the speaker certain hints to 
guide him in his task of ’interpretation in depth’ in a 
more systematic way, so that we may talk of a. different 
number of levels through which interpretation is guided.
An example will best show how this is done. Let us inter­
pret the well-known Latin saying Fortes fortune adiuvat.
First we may perhaps deal with certain features 
of merely physiognomic significance, features lending to 
the expression a certain aesthetic form, which make the 
formula look well-coined and well balanced. Such features
are the rhythmical sequence of long and short syllables, 
and the sequence, at the beginning, of tw"5 words with a
i»ich alliteration f o r t es and f._o r t una, sug^est­
ing that the things named by these words belong naturally 
together, have a family air.
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Turning now in the centrifugal direction we find at
a first level of interpretation certain diacritics, semant­
emes and morphemes, exposing a grammatical meaning we
are used to assess as noun, plural accusative; noun sing­
ular, nominative; verb, present tense, indicative, third 
person singular. These build up a representational pict­
ure of the type 'actor-action-thing(s)-acted-upon1, to be
f
mentally assimilated by an act of thought where the actor 
appears as the prius logic urn or S, the rest as the posteri- 
us lopcicum or P. All this constitutes the traditional or
surface-meaning 'Fortune favours the brave'.
But having arrived at this meaning we have to take 
into account certain significant features in our formula 
which indicate the intention on the part of the speaker 
that this surface-mending should be readjusted in the 
direction of another, ultimate meaning. These features 
are the position of fortes at the beginning together
I
with a meaningful stress on that word. This indicates i|
that 'brave' is used in such a way that it not only creates'!
1
a positive value but at the same time excludes the logical ;
contrary. We therefore arrive at a second level of meaning:]
!
'Fortune favours the brave, not the coward. J
i
How we discover that even this second formula does not j
)
yet ^represent the ultimate meaning. Because if v/e now }
take into account the circumstances in which the Latin !
i
saying is used, we find out that the rca1 * or ultimate I
-5 7 2 -
meaning is actually to be brought out correctly not by 
a simple statement of fact "but by a hypothesis: *If you 
v/ish to be favoured by Fortune, you must be brave, not 
cowardly*. We thus find that between the clearly exposed 
traditional surface-meaning and the ultimate meaning 
there is a very considerable gap: The hypothetical meaning 
is not exposed at all, and the conjtrast-meaning *brave, 
not cowardly* is only hinted at with the help of para- 
sintactic signs: emphasis by word-order and meaningful 
stress.
This has an important bearing on the S - P question, 
for we may expect to find that to the S - P structure 
exposed in formulation may correspond another, hidden, 
order, again of an S - P structure, in which however the 
the material exhibited on the surface has fo be re-arranged 
in such a way that what corresponded to a certain S or 
to a certain P in the first order fulfils now different 
cognitional functions in the second order. And that is 
indeed the case often enough, and ifetet is also the reason 
why grammarians quite rightly have opposed to the * gramm­
atical* S and P, directly exposed in the linguistic form­
ula, a *logical * or ’psychological*, or *real* S and P 
hidden under the surface of formulation.
We have ssen before how confusing and misleading 
such a terminology may be.1) We shall therefore be well
1) See above, pp. 157 ff.
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advised "bo replace it by another one, which, must have the 
double advantage of being less confusing and at the same 
time somehow in keeping with traditional terminology, in 
order to facilitate discussion on these topics* Keeping 
this in mind it will be clear that we shall have to re­
tain the term 'grammatical* S and. P for the though t- 
relation exposed in formulation, for the simple reason 
that this term has always referred to that phenomenon.
In place of 'logical* or psychological' S and P we
suggest saying 'cognitional' S and P. This term is not 
the best possible measured by ideal standards, since
any S - P relation is of a cognitional nature, including 
the one exposed in formulation. To adopt the term 
'cognitional* in contrast to the term 'grammatical'
S and P can be justified only by the practical considerat­
ion that 'cognitional* may seem easily acceptable to 
those scholars who were used to either 'logical* or 
'psychological* before.
If an occasional discrepancy between grammatical S 
and P and cognitional S and P is admitted in principle, 
the question arises hoY/ to distinguish tnem methodolog­
ically. Can one elaborate certain general criteria 
which permit us to identify a cognitional S - P struct- 
ure different from and hidden by, a grammatical struct­
ure? There are doubtless scholars who would not hesitate
to answer this question in the affirmative: Whereas 
the grammatical analysis has to follow a morphological
pattern such as noun in^nominative case for S, final
verb governed by that noun for P - and its variations -,
Ay
the cognitional structure can be found ^ taking into account 
the order of the sentence-elements in such a way that 
the foregoing element is the prius logjcum or S to 
the following element, which is the post^rius logicum 
or P; alternatively, S would be the relatively unstressed
part of the sentence, P, as the more important part,
! would carry a relatively stronger stress. That is to say
i
j that v/e are guided to the discovery of the cognitional
j S and P by those criteria which helped us to establish
! different levels of interpretation in the example fortes
!
| fortuna adiuvat. But these criteria - whether taken singly
j or together - though not altogether useless, are only
| of a limited value, as experience soon shows.
|
| As to the order in which significant parts are arrang-
1 ed in sentences, it is too well known that it 4rti can
!
| only be accounted for by considering the most disparate
iI
factors such as m o r p h o l o g i c a l  d i f f e r ­
e n t i a t i o n  (free order in Latin versus fixed order
in French), r h y t h m i c a l  f a c t o r s  (pro—
I clisiS and enclisis), d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f
| m a t e r i a l  m e a n i n g  ( enfant_ter nible versus
i
j terrible enfant) a e s t h e t i c  t e n d e n c i e s
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etc., so as to allow us to coordinate the sequence of 
sentence-elements with a cognitional sequence prius 
logicum - posterius logicum. That is why von der Gabe- 
lentz,1) who was inclined to interpret word order in a 
cognitional sense, has practically no modem followers.
Stress, on the other hand, has been regarded from 
Ph. Wegener and H. Paul to Strohrneyer and Gardiner2) 
as a relatively reliable criterion for the distinction 
of the cognitional P from the cognitional S. This rule 
has been formulated by Gardiner in the following way:
"It is probably true of most languages that vocal stress 
is laid on the word or words which function as predicate, 
while the subject is correspondingly unstressed.”®)
How this is to be understood becomes clear from the 
examples he gives in support of his statement. In Mind 
you come e a r 1 y 1« I called J o h n ,  not E m i l y . 
V e n i c e  is my favourite among the Italian towns, 
the words early. John. Emily and Venice are supposed to 
be used predicatively. 4) And this even applies in Pro­
fessor Gardiner!s view to a preposition (over) in the 
sentence she looked o v ,e_._r her spectacles.5) " Thls
1) See above p. 142, note 2.
2) Ph. Wegener, Untersuchungen fiber die Grundfragen des 
Sprachlebens. Halle a*S. 1885, p. 29. — H. Paul, 
PrinzipienbT p 126, - ?. Stphmeyer, per Stil der fran- 
p.fisischen Sorache, Berlin 1924, p. 61.
3) Speech and Language, p. 271
4) Ibid., p.289.
5) Ibid., p. 259.
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rule, although containing an element of truth, can easily 
be overstressed, and a few critical remarks are called, for 
to reduce it to its correct proportions.
On the one hano. it is a fact of common experience that 
P is as a rule relatively stressed in statements such as 
Two and two are faxr f o u r . He is w o r k i n g . 
To-morrow is S u n d a y . It is also true, that in 
doing so we follow a natural tendency, giving a dynamic 
prominence, to that part of the sentence v/hich has the 
greatest' importance.
On the other hand the it are instances where we again 
stress according to a natural tendency, hut where the 
stress ±x quite evidently does not single out the most 
important part of the statement. Different cases may he
!
distinguished: ■
1 (l) If somebody alleges that I have said something
which in flact I did not say,it is quite natural for me to
answejei* in German Ja. das hah1 ich aber nicht g e s a g tl j
In this case the dynamic pattern of my sentence has the 
emotional significance of tEntrttstungt, but so predomin­
ant is the emotional urge that the cognitionally import- ;
ant word nicht is almost swallowed up in che course of
this ejaculation. Good English examples seem to me to be 
That is the very t ii i n g I or Such is not the c a s e  i
(2) In a second instance a word is stressed in order 
to hold our attention for a little while, until we come 
to a second word which has to be linked up with that
first but is separated, from it by a number of other, 
interposed, v/ords. I could give as an example of this 
: a sentence I have just used in the foregoing paragraph:
; ••• giving a dynamic prominence to t h a t  part of the
I sentence which.. ...If my feeling for the language does not
! betray me, the possibility in English of stressing and
j
! in certain contexts belongs to the same category. It re-
i
| ceives emphasis not for its cognitional importance but
! only in order to carry us over a gap on to the word to|
i be linked up by and. That is to say, it was used origin­
ally either before a parenthesis or a corresponding pause:
I His life was beset by many troubles: Qebts. disease.
I a n d -  last but not least - the infidelity of his wife.
| (5 ) Let us now turn to the examination of the case
quoted by Professor Gardiner She looked o v e r  her 
I spectacles. The stress here is different in nature from 
j the natural stress as we have it in n e t w o r k i n g .
I in that it is an artificially overlaid stress whose 
j primary,function it is to forestall a possible confusion 
I with another word (or word-element) of the same category,
I
i which the hearer might expect. In our case over is stressed
jj in order to forestall a normally expected through. It 
; is therefore a pedagogical stress. We'have observed its 
working already in the analysis of fortes fortuna adiuvat 
* where fortes had to be analyzed as 'the brave,- not the 
cowar This pedagogical stress can fall on various x± j 
significant elements in the same sentence. We have en—
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counter Cd an - instance of this in the sentence The 
P...-Q 6 (not the prose) was h.v L o n g f e 1 1-
o_w (not by another possible author). - In other cases 
only parts of words may be stressed as in German Er 
hat zwar etwas z e r brochen. aber nichts v e r bro­
chen. Finally, the stress may not be intended at all to
Clf
underline a sense-element but a formal element, eo ff 
the teacher says to a German learning child: Ich .ere he 
n a c h Brot in order to forestall the tempting trans­
lation f ft r Brot.
1  ^we examine these examples we shall find that the 
i m m e d i a t e  purpose of pedagogical stress is not 
to single out the P of the particular statement in v/hcjLh 
the stressed element occurs, but only to rule out a 
possible confusion. In our last example nach is the name 
defining the preposition to be used in this connection, 
but not the P of the formulated statement. The case of 
z e r brochen as against v e r brochen is of a similar 
nature. By stressing the word over in She looked 
o v e r  her spectacles, the speaker wants to determine 
a material detail of a representational construct, but 
not to single out the P of his statement. Pedagogical 
stress may sometimes be the guide to very subtle sense- 
adjustments. Of this we have had an example already in 
F o r t e s  fortune adiuvat.Another interesting instance
of this is The Himalayas are as h i g h  as the Ocean 1
is d e e p  .This has to he interpreted: 1 the Himalajas
e --
extend as much in ]^ Lght as the Ocean extends in depth*,
where the expressions fin hight1 and *in depth* define
LS
two ways of ’vertical extension*, a concept wftich is mere 
ly implied hut not formulated.
This does not rule out, however, that the u l ­
t e r i o r  motive of pedagogical stress may also occas­
ionally he tto> induce the hearer to formulate a statement 
in which the stressed ele£jn^ is indeed P in relation j 
to the rest. Such cases are for instance: J i l l  has J
done it = *the doer of it was Jill*, or The k i n g  j 
arrives in London = *the person arriving in London is the 
king*. We shall have to say, therefore, that the 
immediate purpose of pedagogical stress is the forestall­
ing of a possible confusion, and that one of the 
possible ulterior motives may he the singling out of the 
cognitional P of the formulated statement. But it is 
surely wrong to generalise and to see such an ulterior 
motive in any instance with pedagogical stress.
!
I'his artificially overlaid stress is an instance whicli 
proves how important ifc is to keep in mind the social 
aspect of formulation. In Speaking v/e do not airways j 
simply formulate *what we think* or experience, hut we i;
rr
take also into account v/hat v/e suppose the listener j
might think or expect us to say or simply understand. j
-580-
Ana wherever the aesire becomes manifest to forestall 
misunderstanding or confusion, we not only express what 
we wanted to say but also give some idea of what we 
want to avoid saying. We have only to step outside the 
narrow circle of short specimens selected and sometimes 
prepared to illustrate this or that point of grammatical 
theory and observe how a teacher or an orator places his 
pedagogical stresses in order to convince ourselves 
that it is often not possible to operate with >©• criterion 
that this sort of stress indicates the cognitional P 
of a given formulated statement.
. It is interesting and important to observe that pe­
dagogical stress may be laid on occasions on practical!^ 
any element of a given statement and may be the key 
of sometimes very subtle sense-adjustments without
however interfering with grammatical structure. The syn­
tax of statements pronounced with pedagogical stress is 
the normal one measured by the grammatical conventions
'Vte.x'fc-
of a language. We shall presently consider a different 
kind of stronjstress where this condition is not ful­
filled.
tau
(4 ) has a certain affinity to what we have called 
pedagogical stress, in so far as it xx too is a stress 
stronger than the normal one. But whereas pedagogical xixt 
stress was artificially overlaid the stress we are now 
going to consider is the natural reflex of emotion.
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We find it for instance in B e a u t i f u l  . the 
landscane 1 of which we have already spoken. We analysed 
it by saying that here we have two coordinated state­
ments, out of which the listener is supposed to build 
up a-third one, and the stress indicates precisely how 
this statement has to be built up. If we ha$8 the relat­
ively stronger stress on the lands cane v/e would have to 
interpret *There is something beautiful1. *The beautiful ' i
thing(S) is the landscape* (p). As it is, the speaker
d
indicates by the lack of stress on lams cape, that he 
to t>e. *
meant this word^added in an anrto coup correction, to
function as S, so that the statement should be understood !
I
as *The landscape (S) is beautiful* (P). So, B e a u t i - ;
I
f u 1 the landscape! presents itself as the debris of j 
a sentence of the form 1'he landscape is beautiful, broken
A  S t'iup under emotional stress, but theee debris still 
characterised in th^ir cognitional function in spite of
" - CLrC,
the fact that the parts feaye gape' out of joint and have 
changed their ideal ordefr.
How if we apply the same sort of analysis to d o w n  I
he went!* we arrive at an interpretation He went. His
t
going (S) was down (P)', where *his going* represents the 1
p of tti" logicum of h^wejit. As in our previous
example we have here two coordinated statements of which
to be ’
the unstressed one is^considered as the S of the stressed 
one.
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E m o t i o n a l  s t r e s s  a. p p e a r s 
t h u s  a s  a d i s r u p t i n g  f o r c e  in so fa: 
as the normal grammatical pattern is concerned: a 
strongly stressed P precedes an unstressed .S and pro­
vides thus an example of emotional versus intellectual 
(or better, perhaps: ideal) word-order. Furthermore, the 
unstressed part appears in formulation as coordinated 
to the stressed part. - This is a constructional pattern 
well distinguished from the normal grammatical pattern 
exhibiting pedagogical stress.
Although it is expedient to distinguish pedagogical 
or selective stress from emotional stress, it must be 
remembered that both are not mutually exclusive, The 
discovery, for instance, that Jill, of all people, has 
done it, may cause a strong emotion. On might therefore 
claim that in J i l l -  has done it there is an eratbtion- 
al stress operative besides a selective stress. But, 
nevertheless, the effect of emotional stress can only
be assessed, if and when it has that disrupting forse j
which is responsible for the creation of a coordinating j
construction where a strongly stressed part precedes an 
unstressed one. Such would be the case in J i l l . . !
she has done it! Yet, mixed forms may appear. Such a 
compromise form is French c est moi QLui 1 ai fait, 
where the relative clause suggests subordination where­
as ai showing grammatical concord with moi indicates
coordination.
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Taking all this into account we arrive at the follow­
ing conclusions.
In the case of abnormally strong stress we shall have 
to find out the nature of the stress. Cases such as Das 
hab* ich aber nicht gga g e s a g t 1 or the stressed 
a n d  in English and kindred phenomena have no bearing 
on the S - P structure of statements. If these possibilit- !
i
ies are ruled out, we have to find out, wherever possible,
whether overlaid stress is artificially overlaid (peda­
gogical stress) or of an emotional nature. If we decide 
for the first alternative the stress may draw attention
to a formal element (er geht n a c h Brot). to a 
material element (she looked o v e r  her spectacles)
EXXXSXX or to a cognitional part of the statement
(sLjL  1 1 has done it!) . Only in the last case does the
stressed part represent the P of the formulated statement.
If we decide for emotional stress, we have first of all 
a case of the stressed element being coordinated to the 
rest in view of being employed as. P in the ultimate 
meaning.
T«c.€<f<e-
P o s b s c r i p t .  - It is important to 'know that 
in the preceding paragraphs * stress * was taken, not in 
its physiological but in its semantic aspect. Semantic­
ally there may be stress even if there is not physical 
stress. Such an assertion seems at first sight artificial,
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hut will "become more palatable if we consider certain 
French examples where enclitica are used in contrast 
to each other; they cannot receive a physical stress 
for rhythmical reasons, although they are clearly em­
phasised. So we read in the Galeran de Bretagne 1) 
(2157/8): Se les retrai nuis les envav / Ne les dov
pas hlasmer. rnes moy where les is semantically though 
not physically stressed. In the same way we find a 
contrast "between the speaker and the listener expressed
in the following lines of Piramus et Tish^2) (342 ss.):
Tishe. douce "bele faiture: / oevre demaine de Nature./
&
Par l fensi&ne de la ceiAture / Sui ci venus offrir 
droiture / Que ne trouvai la crevehre. / Vostre en est 
"bele lfaventure / D fanercevoir tel troveilre. He re the 
sense is: *...ce n ’est pas moi qui ai trouve la crevace. 
C'est a vous qu’est echu la chance de faire une telle 
trouvaille.* E. Lerch has attracted our attention to
similar examples in modern French: Pour tin pas. ,ie 
vous tue et me tue! (Hemani, 2,2) and Je fais souvent 
ce r£ve etrange et oene trail t / D fune femme inc'onnue 
et oue if aime et ciui m'aime (Verlaine, Hon rdve families -
1) Jean Renart, Galeran de hretagne, ed. L. Foulet 
(Les Classiciues francais du Moyen .Age) , Paris 1925.
2) Piramus et Tishe, ed. C. de Boer (Les Classioues 
franyais du Mo.ven Age), Paris 1921.
/) E. Lerch, Historische franzSs.i.sche S;/ntax •
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These examples also show that in this matter of 
(physical) stress not all languages have the same possib­
ilities. It would hardly be possible to stress et in 
French, und in German in the same way as one can stress 
nn& in English. And this alone should be a warning to 
apply this'criterion of stress for the cognitional .struct-
'
ure of sentences with’ caution.
V *(»
*
We are now free to examine the cases with normal stress
Studying the tension - detension curve accompanying the j
1 . I
normal cognitional act, we have seen already that an I
act of thought is necessarily accompanied by feelings,
i
and that v/e must accept therefore that there will be j
border-line cases, where it is difficult or impossible to 
distinguish between ’normal*'and emotional stress. Only 
this much seems to be clear; since normal stress is ne­
cessarily the prelude to emotional detension it is only 
to be found towards the end of a statement. Any stress [
found at the beginning is inso facto not normal. This goes j 
to show already that the whole Question cannot be debated [ 
without talcing into account the order of sentence elements. §
li
Let us agree that the tv/o statements;
Many important people live in Rome and j
j;
In Rome live many important people . j
exhibit~|both normal stress. If we admit a caesura before I
l )  S AC*
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live in "both our statements, v'e shall "be ahle to say 
that they are cognitionally different. In the first case 
I wish to assert of ’many important people1 that they 
’live in Rome1; in the second instance I Want to say 
of ’Rome* that ’many important people live there’.
If that is so we would indeed he ahle to say that 
(normal) stress ulus word-order give us the criterion 
for assessing the cognitional values of parts of 
statements wherever they diverge from their grammatical 
value. And there are enough cases to make this rule appeal 
acceptahle.
j
For a German for ii,stance there is no difficulty in j
i
analysing rnich (S) hungert (P) in the same way as j
ich (S) hungere (P), and the sarpe applies to mich M
1\
friert, mich dELrstet. mir kommt das komisch vor (cp. | !
j
ich finde das homisch), mir tut der Zahn weh (cp. ich j
i
hahe Z-ahnweh). mit dieser Feder (S) schreiht sich gut 
(P) (cp. Riese Feder schreiht gut), and Latin me pi get . p 
me nudet, me naenitet follow the same pattern. A Russian
will easily recognize the first half of u menya dyenvri !
(
as S and the second as P. The mucji dehated vetrom / I
I
slomila dva dereva exhibits the same cognitional struct- \ 
t.ftr» / slomil dva dereva. Latin me a./, culpa _
l) G. Neckel, Zum Inetrumentalis.,, Indoge_rm... Forschun-en 
XXI (1907), p. 188.
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1
may serve as an illustration of the sort of syntax of 
certain so-called 'primitive' idioms, where they say 
'my walk' for 'ijwalk'.
In all these examples the divergence from the mor­
phological pattern is relatively slight. Although S, ,
instead of "being a nominative, appears, according to
circumstances, as accusative, dative, praeoositionalis 
or instrumental s. it is still a noun, and P is in most j 
cases still characterized "by a verb.
• But there can be no doubt that the finite verb must ■!
often be considered as cognitional S according to the J
3
same analytical principle. In this sense Therejt lived in j
Rome / man.v important people exhibits the same cognit­
ional structure as a ♦Livinp: in Rome (S) is done b.v many ; 
important people (P) would, if it were ever formulated 
in this way. Here belong instances such as French II arri- J
vfiitideux etransers (P), German Es ritten dxg±x&gxter(S) |
 ^ if
di-PPi Rfiit.fir znrn Tore hinaus (P), Es liegt e ±  (S) eine 1— ■■■ ■»  ■ 1 1 *" " ' ' " i
i t
Krone im t.iefen Rhein (P). This latter example shows also |j 
the transition to cases such as Es ist / ein Schnitter. - 
heissfc der Tod, where the descriptive character of ist ,
I is very thin, so that we can understand how English J
there is. German da (das, es) ist, French c^est, j
voila. voici, Spanish Hay,_Jl®— > 'Italian c—e, cjL I
sono, Greek i(fov etc. have become a sort of deictic j
! particles, comparable in syntactic behaviour to Latin
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ecce, Italian ecco, Russian vot etc. , and we can also see
why these deictic particles can "be considered as prpto- 
verbs.
tiki cU
Surveying these examples, -w h o s e /list^may he prolonged
a.at will, we get the impression^ that the function of 
cognitional verbal S is intimately associated with im- |
personal constructions (whicn term we intend to cover j
both the types it is and there is): or, stated different-
ij
1
ly, that whenever we intend to make the verb a cognit- j
;j
ional S we are ihclined to choose an impersonal construct-!
I
ion. It is thus clear that the impersonal constructions 
have a natural affinity to the noun through their common 
association with the function of S. Arid I should be in- i
clined to think that in this circumstance may be' seen
the psychological motive for deriving the admittedly >
j
oldest impersonal constructions (die Witterunrysimwerso- 1
nalien^)) of the type oluit from nominal constructions. j
Here is perhaps the.place to mention d i s g u i s ed 
i m p e r s o n a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n s . A n  exam­
ple of this we find in French nous avons conserve deux 
manuscrits de la legende. This construction is remarkable 
in two ways: ifc (l) because the morphological S is not 
active, but has the value of an indirect object or 
dativus ethicus of an impersonal construction, and (2 )
l) Of. W. Havers, 2um Xapitel »»Syntax und primitive Kul- 
tur”. W5rter und Sachen. XII (1929) op. 161 p-pj ~
-389-
hXPJl§—SPjlP.Qrye, does not reflect a ,»ast but a present. This
becomes Quite evident if we find that G-. Paris writes in
the same paragnph: La Chanson de Roland est une de celles
cue nous avons conservees dans la forme la ulus ancienne-,#
and later on: Enjregard de ce noeme il nous est parvenu
deux redactions latines...1) I have also found the same
construction, this time in the present tense in Spanish:
Conservarnos las cartas de las arras cue el Camneador dio 
2}a Jimena... ' I should not hesitate to declare that in 4tuk 
examples^ ouchr as il est conserve determined by nous re­
presents the S of the statement and deux manuscrits de la 
legende pepresents P.
The substitution of an incorrect personal construction 
for an impersonal one is no isolated phenomenon. It seems 
to be particularly frequent in presentational expressions 
where the personal construction fulfills the functions 
of the ecce -. il v a -. lie aqui - type: Engl. There 
we have a different example. Span. Aciui tiene Ud. a mi 
frjjo. - in English we find also an i n t r a n s i t i v e  
presentational personal construction in There you are!
This is probably best explained in the light of the pop­
ular That's you!.which is an abridgement of That’s you |
-finished now. thatfs you paid ..now etc. These forms are
old coordinated constructions I hat—i s .you. _are (nave)
1) Extraits de la Chanson de Roland (Hachette)j. p. VIII.
2) Menendez Pidal, Esoana del Cid I, p. 235.
-3 9 0 -
,finished now. E Similarly There you are!would represent 
the abridgment of an originally extended There: you are
now in G-. or Lhere; you are now in a position to .iudne 
or anything similar.
’L o g i c a l '  a n d  ' i l l o g i c a l *  c o n ­
s t r u c t i o n s .  — There are doubtCless a very 
great number of ’illogical1 constructions due to the 
accidents fa of formulation. And the more instances we 
collect of such ’illogical’ constructions the stronger 
the conviction may grow in us that the so-called ’logical’ 
constructions are statistically in a minority, that the 
reality of language is much better reflected in the 
’illogical’ ones. The so-called ’logically correct’ con­
structions on the other hand appear almost as precarious 
accidents, whose importance has been artificially 
exaggerated by academies and schoolbooks in the name of 
a logical system, in itself only a second-hand product, 
abstracted precisely from these same linguistic forms; 
and it is just a trend of argument like this which leads 
to an undermining of ’logical’ grammar in the name of 
’psychology’ and finally to rhe pos tula turn that we should
build up a grammar without S and P.
Such an opinion is entirely justified as long as one
selects one type of expression as the only one conformable 
£
■to logic. ^ if one clsinis til at- the logical Judguent 
should he represented by the substance - property relation
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as examplified by Socrates is wise. - But according to 
our theory the substance - property relation is not a
thought relation but an objective relation, and, besides, 
not the only objective relation v/hich may be integrated 
into a judgment. The *thing-emplacement1 picture, the 
1actor-action1 pattern, the ’possessor-possession1 
pattern and others are logics^ as satisfying as the 
substance - property relation.
Thus, in the the framework of our theory, the field, 
of logically legitimate formulations is vastly increased 
and less barren than that suggested by traditional 
logic. If we iisLKX in turn claim that all these con- 
structional patterns can be to a representational
term-relation pattern, we wanted to show by this merely
hov/ linguistic forms refer to the categories of space7 
time and quality. But we do not claim therefore in any
way that the basic scheme Q-fi-G- is logically more legitim- 5 
ate than any of its variations; on the contrary, they 
are logically legitimate just because they can be derived 
from that basic scheme. So for us a l l  c o n ­
s t r u c t i o n s  a r e  l o g i c a l l y  a c c e  pt- 
a b l e  w h i c h  a r e  w e l l  a d a p t e d  t o  
t h e i r  m e a n i n g d  a n d  n e e d  o n l y  a 
m i n i  muu m o f  a d j u s t m e n t  o n  t h e  
p a r t  o f  a n  i n t e r p r e t e r .  In short ]
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they are linguistic means well adapted to cognitional 
aims, measured "by social standards.
This leaves as possible 1 illogical1 formulations 
(a) parasyntactic signs and (b) those forms which need 
a marked adjustment of the surface-meaning to the more 
or less hidden ultimate meaning.
As to the former, they are really not ’illogical* 
hut logically indifferent, since they refer merely to 
cognitional contents and do not exhibit cognitional form.
With regard to the latter we should like to argue, 
that even if statistics could prove that t&e ’illogical*
constructions were almost the normal thing and so-called 
’logical* constructions in a Minority, this is a case 
where we^legitimarely be distrustful of statistics. It 
is just because logical patterns, i.e. patterns well 
adapted to cognitional forms are so strongly entrenched 
in our linguistic memory, that we can afford to deviate 
from them as often as we do. Statistics can only dis­
close the frequency of this or that type din formulation; 
it cannot show the guiding power of the ideal patterns 
which are a necessary help in interpretation and make 
their influence felt even, or rather, precisely there 
where they do not appear on the surface. Nobody would 
probably ever say D o w n  he went! if me ciid not 
possess the pattern he went down., French il .arriveit
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gens appears as deux etrangers arrivaient with
My
a reversed S - P ordex*. Exclamations such as kingdom 
fQ.h. a. horse l> Meinen Hut, bit tel etc. , formulae such, as 
Pas, d*argent, pas de Suisses. reveal themselves as debris 
of constructions and are interpreted against the back­
ground of constructions which are logically more satis­
factory.
The coexistence of logically satisfactory constructions 
with illogical constructions facilitates greatly the 
process of interpretation and the presence of well adapted 
constructions in linguistic memory is one of the main 
conditions for the quick adjustment of illogical forms to 
logical ends. Have we now to think that the listner really 
’ translates1 a logically less satisfatory expression into 
a more satisfactory one? Note quite; but it is probably 
safe to say that in him there goes on a certain process 
of adjustment of illogical1 forms to logical ends, and 
that in that process logically more satisfactory patterns 
play an important role. Likewise the speaker in using 
ideally imperfect forms relies constantly on the Correspond­
ing adjustment on the part of the listener and therefore
on the effective working of ideally better adjusted 
patterns. This is why vie claim that the very existence of 
‘illogical* forms is an indirect proof of the vigour wit2i 
which the ideally more satisfactory forms assert themselves.
G o n  c l  u s i o n s •
/
-394-
G o n c l u s i o n s .  - As the explorer of un­
known territory draws up a map at the end of the journey 
which provides an easy and simple orientation and gives 
a schematic description of the newly discovered land, it 
may he useful for us, aft^r having journeyed through the
densities of analytical argument, to map out our way in 
a simplified and schematic forii^ . This will Enable us to
see in retrospect how the different parts of spKKjsh our 
essay are knitted together, and this in turn will allow 
us to formulate our conclusions in a more convincing 
manner.
At the beginning we found that t iree sciences, 
different from each other and yet intimately connected, 
namely logic, psychology and grammar operate each with "tkt 
terms S and P. But this fact in itself was not favourable 
to a comprehensive determination of these terns: In the 
measure that these three sciences, badly distinguished 
in some of their most vital aspects up to the 18th century, 
differentiated themselves in a more comprehensive way, 
each one elaborating its own methods, the centre of in­
terest shifted away from the S - P question to new pro­
blems, and the old distinction between S and P was carried 
along only in a traditional way. Soon the sciences of the 
mind could claim that the very distinction toElKBMxaxjmzx 
g was ’really* a grammatical one, and grammar in turn
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could contend that it was ’really1 a logical or
I
psychological distinction.
It was this state of methodological uncertainty 
which prompted us to investigate the matter anew from 
the point of view of the grammarian. It seemed advisable I 
under the circumstances to start with a characterization ! 
of the logical, the psychological and the linguistic
points of view. This led to a conception of linguistics 
as a f u n c t i o n a l  science and of language as 
an (artificial) i n s t r u m e n t  f o r  c o m -
fi
m u n i c a t i o n . ,  a me taxy both speaker and listen-! 
er have in common, consisting of signs (in the sense of
!
d i a c r i t i c a  and s y m b o l  s) and their i;
: v
semantic values (m a t e r i a 1 and f o r m a 1 
m e a n i n g s ) .  We had then to point out that the 
adequate interpretation of signs, their understanding, 
was necessarily based on the understanding of the 
t h i n g  m e a n t ,  or c o g n i t i o n , . a  term j; 
which should comprehend both r e p r e  s e n t a t i o n j
and t h o u g h t . We had thus arrived at a conception 5
I
of language and a conception of cognition as clearly j
distinguished entities. T h i s  n o n - i d e n t i t y l i
t;
o f  l a n g u a g e  a n d  c o g n i t i o n  on the ! I 
one hand, and their f a c t u a l  e n t a n g l e m ­
e n t  on the other hand, is really the cornerstone of
the whole argument.
After this, the next step would, he to see, to which 
sphere the distinction between S and P can be ascribedj 
and there we found that they should be considered as the 
logically related phases of the cognitional act and be­
long therefore to the d o m a i n  o f  t h o u g h t .  
After having thus fixed S and P in their proper sphere 
and explained the meaning of these terras in that sphere, 
we had to explore how far the factual entanglement of 
thought and language justifies the adoption of the terms 
S and P in grammar.
In this investigation we proceedeAby way of eliminat­
ion. We found that there isa p a r a s y n t a c t i c
4
linguistic sphere in which there is no room for the dist­
inction of S and P. It remained to test the domain of 
c o n s t r u c t i o n .  Herfwe found that construction
has three different aspects: that of r e p r e s e n t ­
a t i o n ,  that of t h o u g h t and that of f o r  m- 
u 1 a t i o n .
In theory we might now expect that it would be possible 
to eliminate the representational aspect from our dis­
cussion, since the proper sphere of S and P is thought. 
This, however, was not advisable in practice for the 
following reasons: (1) Since Aristotle it was recognized 
that between the cognitional category of S, the represent­
ational category of oidiot, , and the linguistic category 
of was some kind of connection, and the same holds
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good with regard to P, action-process and . Re­
presentation, thought and formulation are so closely inter, 
woven that h^ tey shEX nave often been badly distinguished 
in the past; it is therefore justified for any new theory 
which is cased on a criticism of past beliefs to show 
up the propriun of S and P in connection with both 
representation and formulation. (2) We found that the 
linguistic form of S and P and the whole mechanism of 
transposition, analytical and synthei]tc forms cannot be 
understood without a clear understanding of representation­
al constructions. Hence the necessity of dealing with'the 
analysis of representational grammar and its integration 
into cognitional grammar and of both into the grammar I
r
of formulation at some length. In this attempt we had j
,
to rely mainly on distinctions not made in a systematic 
way by previous investigations. This explains why we |-
gave so much space to representational grammar in this 
essay. A shorter exposition, we felt, would not have been (
* i
sufficient to give the necessary degree of solidity to j
Ii-
our new analytical doctrine. j
So much for the way along which we had to travel. It s
:
$
will appear from this retrospective account, we hope, |
that the construction of this essay follows a logical • 
plan and that it is adequate to the nature of our problem
i...
and to its ultimate importance for so many things which j
'!
might seem at first sight not directly connected with it. i
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And now a1 word on the results.
Here we have to stress the fact that we consider the
i
| c o g n i t i o n a l  a c t  as a r e a l i t y  and 
! its a n a l y s i s  i n t o  S a n d  P a s  1 e g - 
i t i m a t e . In so far we accept Aristotlefs doctrihe.i
But we do not accept,therefore, the metaphysical found­
ation on which it is "built. I t  i s  n o t  t r u e ,  
as Aristotle's theory implies, t h a t  t h e  s t r u c t -
u r e  o f  t h o u g h t  r e f l e c t s  t h e
A .
s t r u c t u r e  o f  r e a l i t y .  Much of the crrti- 
Icisrn levelled against Aristotelian logic is justified 
in so far as it is directed against this point. It is 
however ill-directed in so far as it tries to v/ithdraw 
recognition the cognitional act or judgment on the
ground that the dichotomic structure of the proposition j
is insufficient %  account for the infinite complexity f
of objective relationships. .It cannot "be denied that the I
representational structure of reality is infinitely more j;
\;
complex than the dichotomic structure of Aristotle's |
proposition. But this should logically lead to a theory 
of representational constructs compatible with, and in- j
tegrated into, the dichotomic cognitional structure, but f
CL* /mt/ofl/iMj'
not to the acceptance of the one mndei? exclusion of the
v
other. We have therefore distinguished between the i d e al j 
f o r m s  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  and those of }
t h o u g h t .  In the domain of the latter we have !
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striven after a p u r e l y  f o r m a l  definition 
of S and P which appeard^ in their theoretical aspect 
p.rius logicum and posterjus logicum respectively; 
both are characterized by a specific form of modality, 
which in turn represents the practical context necessarily 
belonging to that theoretical structure. This definition 
is free from metaphysical implications.
In trying to answer the question how far and in wh±B 
wh46K form a S - P structure is reflected in language 
it is important mt to point out that the 'primary need 
in* speaking is the communication to a listener of material 
meaning. Form is only an instrument to achieve that end, 
and since the speaker can always to a certain extent 
rely on the intelligence of the listener, the latter will 
be-able to grasp this meaning, even if the instrument 
of communication is imperfect and clumsy, by intelligent 
guessing, by taking into account extra-linguistic factors 
such as are offered by the ’situation* in the widest
!
sense. The more both speaker and listener are familiar
with these situational factors the less elaborate the 
sign needs to be. In certain well-known, ever-recurring
situations, language may be reduced to mere hints. It 
would be in vain to look for a S - P structure in such 
signs.
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But even very elaborate signs may lack such a 
structure. The vanquished enemy who throws himself 
into the dust at the conqueror’s feet in order to 
signify his submission, a long-drawn lament to express 
sorrow, are instances of a pictorial language by which 
the ultimate meaning is constructed by a technique 
similar to that used in the pictorial or plastic arts; 
it is an intuitive technique, which easily dispenses 
with S - P structures.
The range, however, of such an intuitive and sens­
orial language is relatively limited. It may be enlarged 
by metaphorical extension. By it the relation of the 
sign to the ultimate meaning becomes complicated: in­
stead of referring directly to it, it is related to the
rox.-C't
ultimate meaning by a roundaboutj* the sign acquires a 
mobility, a degree of arbitrariness, unknown to non­
metaphor ical sensorial language. Through the double 
process of conventional abridgement and fa'ding of the 
metaphor, the first diacritics are born and the operatioi 
with ’inner forms’, abstract mental symbols associated 
with aribitrary diacritica, created. These mental sym­
bols ^re^apt to do the work of representing material 
meanings in a more subtle fashion and on a higher plane 
than sensorial symbols. But still, they are essentially 
picture-building, and in so far as they are, they may 
be vwwfriiBcfl analysed without reference to a S - P 
structure. In this sense I may say that the hunter kills
the deer is simply an ‘actor-iaction-thing-acted-upon* 
picture, the tree stands in front of* tlie house a ‘thing- 
emplacement1 picture etc. An analysis of pictures thus
constituted leads to the recognition that they are 
up out of elements called ‘t e r m s 1 and ‘r e ­
l a t i o n s ’ which ultimately refer to q u a l i ­
f i c a t i o n s  i n  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t ­
i o n a l  f r a m e  - w o r k  o f  s p a c e  a n d  
t i ui e .
It is only "by probing further that we discover 
that the specification of relations such as in front of. 
to the right of. kills or is killed etc. are in funct­
ional dependence on the choice of one of the terms as 
nrius logicum and thus in f u n c t i o n a l  d e ­
p e n d e n c e  o n  t h e  c o g n i t i o n a l  
a c t . - I t i s  therefore wrong to think that we 
first represent and then integrate representation into 
thought and both into formulation. One of the most 
important results our essay has to offer is precisely 
to point out that the task of the linguist cannot he 
to follow up the way from sensorial impressions to their 
integration into representation and thought and finally 
to their expression in language. The very persuit of
such a task is methodological Don Quixotism. The lingu­
ist is only interested in possibilities of interpret)—
-4 0 2 -
ation of linguistic forms. Only by getting rid of a 
pseudo-psychological perspective can we determine with 
any clarity the import of transposition, periphrases, 
analytic and synthetic expressions. In all these are 
revealed p r i n c i p l e s  o f  i n t e r p r e t ­
a t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  p s y c h i c a l  
e v e n t s .
With regard to the representational and cognitional 
constructions revealed by language operating with mental 
forms, we may repeat what we said about linguistic form 
and its relation to ultimate meaning, namely that in the 
practical task of formulation the speaker can rely on 
the intelligent collaboration of the listener, i.e. he 
may allow himself to use expressions v/hich are ambiguous 
or. even faulty, measured by ideal standards. That is why 
we find in formulation all sorts of complications, which 
show that besides formulae well adapted to representat­
ional and cognitional structures, we find others which 
are merely adaptable to those structures by an addition­
al effort on the part of the listener. Among them those
& , /are of special interest wh*c* the exposed structure 
disguises another, hidcien one, v/hich leads to the term­
inological distinction between g r a m m a t i c a l  
and c o g n i t i o n a l  S and P. The development may 
finally lead to p o s t  syn. t a c t i c  forms,
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v/hich again resist interpretation in termr of S and P, 
and behave in that respect exactly as presyntactic for.as. !
All this may seem disconcerting, and raise the sokx I
suspicion that cognitional analysis is only an artificic- 
ial creation of a grammatical school unduly impressed 
by epistemology and logic. Against this we may point
out that inconsistencies of linguistic formulation would I
ii
defeat the very purpose for v/hich language has been created,; 
namely understanding between individuals, if they were 
not constantly corrected and intelligently adapted by 
the listener. To recognize this is no false idealism 
but eminently realistic. We have even seen that certain 
hints such as stress and word-order (in certain circum­
stances) have no other raison d’etre but to help the j
interpreter in that task of adjustment. This always works ■
i n  o h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  b e t t e r  a d -  j.
I
j u s t e d  f o r m u l a e .  In this way we are led back ! 
to those basic patterns in which a cognitional (and re­
presentational) order is clearly revealed.
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